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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the influences and dynamics of community positions towards nearby 
mining projects in Brazil and Chile from an affected communities perspective. This 
subject is important because even after many initiatives and guidance aimed at helping 
companies to obtain good community relations, also known as a social license to operate 
(SLO), conflict in many mining community contexts is still prevalent today. In 
considering this, the thesis draws from Stakeholder, Resource Dependence and Social 
Movement Theories to help explain community positions towards these mining projects. 
The field research includes multiple stakeholder interviews from case studies of eight 
different mining affected communities in Brazil and Chile which are categorized into 
groups of higher or lower conflict. The main findings are that the more independent from 
mining a community is the greater the likelihood of conflict and the more independent 
type of communities perceived the mining projects as threats to their independence. The 
lower conflict communities were more economically dependent on their nearby mining 
projects. My findings also indicate that these more independent communities’ collective 
mobilization to resist such projects is nullified by influence strategies employed by 
mining companies via initiatives such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) that can 
serve as co-optation and lead to divisions within communities.  
The findings of this thesis call into question the validity of CSR-related notions such as 
an SLO from an affected communities perspective. An SLO implies community power; 
however, the research from the community perspective indicates that community power 
is not a constant or unchallenged. When countered by mining companies and the State, 
community resistance is broken down and community positions change. The scenario of 
mining company community relations set in a globalized world is dynamic and ever 
changing due to the various influences directed to and from affected mining 
communities.  
I propose a model which suggests that in situations of high interdependence between 
mining company and local community, stakeholder theory holds true.  In these cases the 
vast array of social responsibility-related practical guidance literature on gaining good 
community relations is valid. Where a community is more independent and collectively 
resists the mining project, the company will use countermobilziation, CSR, co-optation 
and obstruction strategies to obtain a resistance free environment in which to conduct 
mining activity. 
The research contributes to stakeholder and resource dependence theories as well as to 
related practitioner literature on community relations and business and human rights by 
problematizing these theories and guidance. Specifically, the findings question the idea 
that CSR and best practice community relations lead to a win-win situation. In many 
cases implementing CSR exacerbates community conflict and divisions and is ultimately 
more irresponsible than responsible. The literature does not sufficiently consider the 
complexities of power imbalances between company/State and community in a 
globalized context and how this affects community relations and conflict from a 
community perspective. Further research should be conducted around the dynamics of 
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influence strategies employed by State, company and community in the realm of 
development and human rights. 
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  “What is needed is more research on ethnographies of resistance from the perspective 
of those whose lives are rapidly becoming unsustainable because their livelihoods are 
disappearing as a result of industrial expansion. Perhaps these stories may enable us to 
envision sustainability from multiple perspectives and to imagine different paths to reach 
that elusive goal.” (Banerjee, 2011 p.729) 
1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Antecedents to mining company – community conflict 
My research aims to empirically identify the important factors that influence community 
positions and relations towards nearby mining sector-related projects by examining 
closely eight communities situated near mining operations in Brazil and Chile. This is 
important because as mining activity has increased in the past two decades in Latin 
America, it has been accompanied by increased social and environmental conflict at the 
mining sites and communities. This increase in mining, oil and gas exploration has 
largely been a result of the neo-liberal nature of advice and conditions placed on loans 
and aid made to Latin American countries during the 1980s by institutions such as the 
World Bank and countries such as the USA. As a result Latin American countries view 
mining and its revenues as important for growth and development, and hence one way to 
reduce poverty (Haalboom, 2012). The neo-liberal dominant paradigm, especially since 
the 1980s, has pressured governments to privatize their State services and companies for 
more efficiency. This has led to the decreased role and power of the State and consequent 
increased power of corporations in a developing world context (Berry, 2003; Prieto-
Carrón et al., 2006; Banerjee, 2008; Scherer et al., 2009; Haalboom, 2012).  
 
In these developing countries multinational corporations are less regulated and seen as 
necessary for growth and development by developing nation States who are, as a result, 
increasingly more dependent on them. Corporations have therefore, for good or bad 
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become “corporate citizens” engaging in social issues traditionally the responsibility of 
States, and this has “blurred the lines” between the roles of the State and large 
corporations (Scherer et al., 2009). Therefore with regard to extractive sector companies 
in Latin America, the responsibilities and expectations are even greater in order to respect 
the lives and wellbeing of local communities near mining operations. 
 
Publications have been produced by practitioner consultants, NGOs, international 
organizations and mining companies themselves (as discussed later in this chapter and the 
literature review) which aim to provide solutions for extractives sector companies to gain 
good community relations and contribute to local development and hence avoid conflict. 
Nonetheless, these publications have not had the expected positive impact on mining 
company/community relations as conflict between these groups is currently prevalent 
throughout the world. 
 
In this section I set the scene of my research problem and thus justify its importance for 
study. I will finish the introduction by stating my research question. In this chapter I 
focus on how the plethora of practitioner-related literature offers solutions for mining 
companies, community relations and conflict. Despite this wealth of guidance material 
there still appears to be daily conflict due to mining in Latin America and consequently 
costly delays for the mining companies. I argue that one of the reasons that this advice 
has not worked is that it is very company focused, based on a stakeholder theory 
perspective, which infers that companies can manage their stakeholders for strategic gain 
or legitimacy (Freeman, 1984).  
 
Latin America is an important region in which to study this phenomenon due to its recent 
emergence as a major player in mining. According to KPMG Peru and ICMM (2012) 
Latin America is the world’s leading region for mine exploration, attracting 28% of 
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mining-related investment in 2012, and 25% of the world’s production. In particular, in 
Chile, the mining industry is one of the main industries that spurs the economic and 
social development of the nation. The Chilean mining industry represented 19.2% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, a rise of 24% compared to the previous year. 
Mining exports accounted for 65% of the country’s total exports, which reached US$67.9 
billion (PWC, 2012). It is clear, therefore, that Chile as a nation is reliant on mining for 
its economy and development.  
 
In the case of Brazil, the other country considered in my research, this giant nation has 
substantial mineral deposits and is one of largest mineral producers and exporters in the 
world. The mining industry in Brazil contributes about 4% to the country’s annual GDP, 
which is around US$100 billion. However, exports of iron ore, mainly to China, remain 
the largest source of growth for the export sector (PWC, 2012). Though less dependent 
upon mining than Chile, this activity clearly has a growing importance for Brazil.  
 
Multinational extractive sector companies increasingly tend to operate in the developing 
world in socially and environmentally vulnerable locations, where local communities are 
impoverished and lack basic infrastructure (Gifford et al., 2010; Kemp, 2010). Extractive 
industry company relations with local communities in places such as Brazil and Chile are 
further complicated by the impact of their operations on the local environment and 
communities, as highlighted by Jenkins and Yakovleva (2006): “the discovery, extraction 
and processing of mineral resources is widely regarded as one of the most 
environmentally and socially disruptive activities undertaken by business” (p.272). 
According to the NGO First Peoples Worldwide (2013), indigenous people occupy 20% 
of the world’s land, which possesses 80% of the worlds’ remaining biodiversity. 
Therefore extractive sector projects have a high chance of applying to mine for resources 
on indigenous people’s lands. With extractive sector activities come negative impacts 
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such as displacement of people, environmental impacts such as pollution, health impacts 
and loss of cultural heritage. 
 
Such conditions and impacts have led to situations of conflict between mining companies 
and their local communities whether they be indigenous or not in the developing world as 
studied by academics such as Kapeleus, 2002; Crawley and Sinclair, 2003; Jenkins, 2004; 
Imbun, 2006; Kemp et al., 2006; Eweje, 2007; Idemudia, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Calvano, 2008; Gifford and Kestler, 2008; Garvin et al., 2009; Zandvliet and Anderson, 
2009; Bruijn and Whiteman, 2010; Duarte, 2010; Gifford et al., 2010; Kemp 2010; 
Newenham-Kahindi, 2010; McAdam, 2010; Banerjee, 2011; Urkidi 2012; Kraemer et al., 
2013; and Prno, 2013. The conflict in these empirical research publications is 
summarized as being down to divergent world views and a lack of meaningful 
communication or engagement between both sides.  
 
Mining companies operate with a neo-liberal capitalist world view whereby maximizing 
profits is seen as a significant objective (Banerjee, 2001; Calvano, 2008; Jenkins, 2004); 
however, for a local indigenous community more value is attached to nature and 
environmental conservation because their lives and livelihoods depend on the 
environment, or, in the case of a non-indigenous but poor communities, they may value 
most the health, education and well-being of their family members which could be 
directly put at risk from mining operations. 
 
Such a perspective is supported by writers such as Calvano (2008) who focused on 
conflict between companies and communities in the extractives sector, and point out that 
“Neither side can understand the other’s point of view because each sees the greatest 
good through the lens of their respective values” (p.799). Similarly, Jenkins (2004) 
explains how different ways of thinking and making sense of the world can lead to a 
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rupture in company/community relations: “Companies often see a situation framed in 
scientific fact, whereas many of the communities that they perceive themselves to be part 
of base their view on beliefs and perceptions. This may be of particular relevance to 
indigenous peoples, where radically different world-views may clash with corporations’ 
scientific ‘development’ rationale.” (p.26). 
 
Therefore the assumption (which is made more explicit by the practitioner guidance 
literature) is that mining companies should consult and take into consideration 
community perspectives in order to avoid conflict and foster good relations. However,  
one should ask whether just consulting with communities who have irreconcilable world 
views, such as those of indigenous peoples, can lead to better relations. This underlying 
conflict is a question this thesis also hopes to address. 
 
Conflicts between local communities and mining companies have also become frequent 
as companies are forced to extract minerals closer to human settlements after having 
depleted mineral resources in more remote areas of the world. Driven by increases in 
demand for minerals such as gold, iron ore and copper, and commodity prices, mining 
activity has proportionately risen along with the changing political economy as 
highlighted earlier where developing nation economies have been advised by 
international financial lenders such as the World Bank to open and liberalize their 
economies and exploit their nature resources in order to grow and develop.  
 
This has especially been the case in South America, where not a week goes by without 
some sort of mining and local community-related conflict taking place, as I have 
observed over the past three years as a subscriber to weekly newsletters from the 
Observatory of Mining Conflicts (OCMAL in Spanish) and No a La Mina (No to the 
Mines in English). OCMAL reported more than 150 active mining conflicts in Latin 
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America, most of which began in the 2000s (OCMAL, 2010). As reported in September 
2013 in the Peruvian financial newspaper Gestión, the Peru country director of McKinsey 
& Company consulting services, Lino Abram announced at a conference that two-thirds 
of mining projects approved with an Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA), which 
implies State and a degree of community approval, are delayed due to social conflict. 
(Manrique, 2013). This is a highly significant statistic, as it shows that despite obtaining 
legal approval to construct mines, companies are still highly likely to face social conflict, 
which impinges on their ability to work. I will refer back to this later in this chapter and 
throughout the thesis. Also in Peru, mining-related community conflicts account for the 
majority of all national social conflicts (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2013). Finally, as 
reported by Banerjee (2011), indigenous protests at the proposed opening up of the 
Amazon rainforest to activities, including mining, resulted in violence and the killing of 
more than 50 civilians by Peruvian security forces.  
 
It is clear that mining activities can have many harsh negative impacts on local 
communities, including fatalities. However, the financial value of mining has also been 
made evident to the national economies of Brazil and Chile. The companies mining in the 
communities where I conducted my research have market capitalization in the billions. 
Anglo American have a market capitalization of over US$32bn; Kinross Gold over 
US$5.5bn; Barrick Gold over US$19bn; Antofagasta Minerals over US$13bn; and Vale 
have the highest at over US$83bn (Yahoo Finance 21
st
 September, 2013). Therefore these 
companies wield a substantial amount of financial power and also generate huge sums of 
money. These large market capitalizations also demonstrate the amount of financial 
wealth mining companies amass from their core activity of mining. Therefore in order to 
continue making these huge amounts of money to satisfy their shareholders and cover 
other costs, it is imperative that the large mining companies can mine their resources as 
efficiently as possible and with minimal community and government disruption. In other 
words it is imperative from a company perspective that a mining company is accepted by 
its local community so it can be allowed to operate without disruption. Any conflicts 
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have negative financial implications for the mining companies who, as shown by the 
market capitalizations, need to produce vast amounts of minerals to remain competitive.  
 
In terms of this research, the aim is to understand what is driving these conflicts and, 
where possible, driving cases of good mining company/community relations. There is 
substantial conflict in this context of mining and communities, despite the many practical 
publications aimed at mining companies to help them secure good community relations, 
as well as consultants specializing in the topic. Thus this problem merits further academic 
research to understand from a community perspective, as opposed to the already well 
researched mining company perspective, why and how communities resist or accept 
nearby mining projects.  
 
1.2 The importance of mining company/community relations: A social 
licence to operate for mining companies 
Ensuring conflict is kept to a minimum is important for all actors involved. For local 
communities, poor relations with large mining companies or conflict can mean social 
upheaval and in general can have social, political, and economic implications for these 
communities, their cultures, livelihoods, environments and wellbeing (Banerjee, 2011). 
For the mining companies, conflict can result in significant damage to their operations, 
reputations and ultimately their bottom line profits which risks future investment by 
shareholders (Franks and Davis, 2011). 
 
The pressure and expectations from local communities, civil society and even the private 
sector itself means that extractives sector firms need to maintain good relations with their 
local communities in the developing world in order to gain a social licence to operate –
otherwise referred to as ‘legitimacy’ in the academic literature. According to Kapeleus 
(2002) a social licence to operate (SLO) is imperative in order for firms to grow and open 
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new operations around the globe with government and local community consent. 
Achieving good and positive relations with local communities is therefore a highly 
significant business imperative in itself. This argument also implies that communities are 
the holders or owners of the SLO which therefore implies a certain leverage of power for 
the communities.  
 
There is now a need for mining companies to gain this non-legally required SLO within 
the communities they operate, in addition to the environmental and mining licences 
needed, to avoid potentially costly conflict and negative reputational impacts (Prno and 
Scott Slocombe, 2012). A social licence exists when a mining project is seen to have the 
broad, ongoing approval and acceptance of society to conduct its activities (Boutilier et 
al., 2011; Prno and Slocombe, 2012). Therefore an SLO is essentially about community 
perceptions around a company’s acceptability (Boutilier et al., 2011). As reported by 
Prno and Scott Slocombe (2012), other authors have even stated that gaining an SLO is 
one of the most significant challenges mining companies now face (e.g., Deloitte Global 
Services Limited, 2010; Ernst and Young, 2011; Joyce and Thomson, 2000 in Prno and 
Scott Slocombe, 2012). The difficulty of gaining an SLO is a challenge confronted by 
most mining companies in Peru, despite gaining a legal licence to operate, as pointed out 
earlier from the quote by the head of McKinsey & Company Peru who claims two-thirds 
of mining companies face social conflict after obtaining environmental permits 
(Manrique, 2013). In summary, as proposed by Prno and Scott Slocombe, (2012) the 
SLO is also inherently complex, intangible and subjective. 
 
With regard to the financial implications of mining company/community conflict, Davis 
and Franks (2011) have conducted empirical research via interviews with mining 
company executives to understand the costs of gaining an SLO for mining companies. 
Based on their interviews, Davis and Franks (2011) claim that a world‐class mining 
project with capital expenditure of between US$3-5bn would lose around US$20m per 
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week due to delayed production in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, in terms of lost 
productivity should there be conflict with the local community. Even at the exploration 
stage, a mining company would lose US$10,000 per day in terms of wages and idle 
machinery while conflicts prevent further exploration work. The most frequent costs 
identified by Davis and Franks (2011) on SLO-related conflicts were linked to staff time 
spent on risk and conflict management, and disruption to production.  
 
A local community collective class action lawsuit in the Northern Huasco Valley of Chile 
managed to cease operations of the country’s largest gold mine recently. In Chile in April 
2013 the State authorities fined Barrick Gold with the highest financial punishment in the 
country’s history of US$16m for environmental pollution in the Andes mountains. The 
largest gold mine project in Latin America in Peru, called Conga, operated by major 
shareholder Newmont Mining, has been on hold for over a year due to conflict and 
violence over its contested impacts on the community. This cease in mining activity is 
costing Newmont Mining substantial amounts of money over a long period of time. 
According to Banerjee (2011) a survey of 15 projects in India representing an investment 
of £31bn has been halted by massive protests and resistance movements. Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, two-thirds of all mining projects in Peru undergo delays after 
obtaining legal environmental licences to operate. According to the country director for 
Peru, Lino Abram, Peru loses up to 1.5% of its GDP, 200-300,000 direct jobs and 500-
700,000 indirect jobs as a consequence (Manrique, 2013). 
 
Prno and Slocombe point out that even though an SLO may be granted or issued by 
society as a whole (e.g., governments, communities, the general public and media), 
“local communities are often a key arbiter in the process by virtue of their proximity to 
projects, sensitivity to effects, and ability to affect project outcomes. The power to grant 
(or withhold) an SLO has thus enabled some mining communities to become particularly 
influential governance actors in the mineral development process”. (2012, p. 347). In 
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summary Prno Slocombe (2012) claim that communities have the decision making power 
to grant or withhold an SLO. 
 
Boutilier et al. (2011) further add that an SLO can be withdrawn or withheld by a 
community from the nearby mining project, as shown by the above-mentioned examples 
from Latin America and India. According to the consulting firm “General Wealth” an 
SLO is an enormously valuable corporate asset of public trust in a business (General 
Wealth website). Therefore according to the authors outlined previously the assumption 
can be inferred that the SLO is a resource held by local communities that can be awarded 
to or withheld or withdrawn from nearby mining projects. However other commentators 
such as Escobar (2011) and Banerjee (2011), arguing from a political economy 
perspective, would question whether post-colonial indigenous communities in Latin 
America exist in true democracies where these people can make free choices and 
decisions around offering or withdrawing an SLO.  
 
Hence from a practitioner stakeholder management perspective, the local community is 
considered an important and salient stakeholder within the mining sector context (Prno 
and Scott Slocombe, 2012) unlike for most other industries and companies. The SLO 
literature, however, can at best be described as “emerging” (Prno and Slocombe, 2012); 
indeed at two recent extractives sector meetings, a head of social performance of a 
leading oil and gas multinational jested whether anybody really understood what SLO 
meant. However, despite this apparent significance attributed to the community actor by 
the SLO literature, it is also evident that the company is seen to be playing the dominant 
role of managing both the situation and stakeholders, as will be further discussed in the 
next section. As such, the grave assumption made by Prno and Slocombe (2012) that 
local communities are the arbitrators to grant to and withhold the SLO from mining 
projects should be questioned and analyzed in deeper detail with empirical data, as this 
thesis aims to do. 
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1.2.1 The role of the company as manager in gaining an SLO 
However, gaining an SLO is not as straightforward as obtaining an environmental licence 
for mining, where the mining company only needs to show how it would address and 
mitigate any environmental impacts from its operations. An SLO inherently involves 
building human relations with a local community and is therefore more complex both in 
nature and to obtain. As stated by the Business for Social Responsibility’s (leading global 
CSR advisory firm) head of extractives sector advisory services at Nestor and Springer 
(2013), engaging with nearby communities can be the hardest part of all mining activity 
further highlighting the importance of gaining an SLO.  
“It’s often said that the hardest part about opening a new mine isn’t getting the raw 
materials out of the ground, it’s managing the complex relationship with the 
communities living above the ground near the mine”. (BSR website, 2013). 
The use of the word managing (in bold) is worthy of comment as it implies that mining 
companies should take a dominant role in the relationship with communities and 
“manage” relations with them similarly to the way they would manage their business and 
employees, as also argued by Banerjee (2008) who posits companies want to manage 
their stakeholders. It is this mentality, underscored in the practical guidance literature of 
viewing local communities as subjects to be managed, that could perhaps explain why 
conflicts still occur. 
 
Civil society groups such as Friends of the Earth have campaigned against what they 
deem to be irresponsible behaviour by extractives sector firms. Even pro private sector 
organizations such as the World Bank, along with the mining industry, have declared that 
“proper management of relations with communities is going to be the biggest challenge 
in the next ten to twenty years” (McMahon, 1998, p. 10 in Kapelus, 2002 p. 280). This 
quote being over 15 years old appears to have come to fruition now in 2014. 
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An important part of gaining good community relations and an SLO is also related to 
providing good CSR for and investment in local communities, which has traditionally 
been considered the role of the State and government. However, now with the rise of 
corporate power and decrease of in State power in the neo-liberal dominated world, 
companies are expected to take on certain State responsibilities for the people (Berry, 
2003; Newell, 2005; Prieto-Carrón, 2006; Banerjee, 2008). Nonetheless practical 
solutions being offered for avoiding community conflict and improving relations are very 
much from a company perspective, which places companies in charge of community 
dialogue, engagement and CSR.  
 
This implies that companies have the solutions to this conflict if they treat the local 
communities with more respect and importance. This, however, avoids the importance of 
understanding these conflicts from an affected community perspective, as recommended 
by Banerjee (2011). Communities adjacent to large projects or being faced with this 
likelihood are regarded as “powerless” (Berry, 2003). The power is understood to lie 
between the State and the corporation (Berry, 2003; Newell, 2005; Prieto-Carrón, 2006; 
Banerjee, 2008). Despite efforts to improve community relations via CSR, this approach 
sometimes leads to an increase in conflict and sometimes improved community relations 
with other community groups (Newell, 2005; and Haalboom, 2012). The limitations of 
CSR for gaining an SLO are concluded by Newell (2005) as: 
“CSR can work, for some people in some places, on some issues some of the time” 
(p.556) 
 
Newell (2005) also argues that there is no one-size-fit-all solution for CSR as each 
community context has its own specific nuances. However, as claimed by Anguelovski 
(2011), little is known about the perceptions of local communities towards these 
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community relations and CSR initiatives, or on community motivations for continuing to 
resist corporations. This is a question I hope my research will address. The practitioner 
literature does not emphasize how (mining) companies could instead learn from and 
collaborate with stakeholders, taking a more humble position and therefore striving for 
consensus, as opposed to a premeditated goal of gaining an SLO.  
 
The importance and challenge of gaining an SLO therefore is clear, assuming an SLO 
exists. In the following section the chapter explains the practitioner guidance offered to 
mining companies in order to gain this SLO and avoid conflict with their nearby local 
communities. However, it is worth mentioning that this guidance material has not had the 
desired effect, as the real life examples of conflict with local communities and mining 
companies mentioned previously demonstrate. 
 
1.3 Practitioner guidance and stakeholder literature 
Multinational mining companies are well aware of the financial and reputational pitfalls 
losing an SLO can have on them. The main organization that the multinational mining 
companies funded to help guide them towards obtaining good community relations was 
the International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) in 2001. The ICMM’s mission 
is to help improve the sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining 
company members. The inception of the ICMM really began as far back as 1999 “when 
the global mining firms accepted at the highest level that their sector was facing 
significant problems in reputation, sustaining profits, access to new assets and 
maintaining investor and employee confidence”. (ICMM website accessed 2nd 
September, 2013).  
 
A quick review of the ICMM website reveals that there are well over 100 publications 
ranging from guidance documents, toolkits and newsletters on the topic of good 
 28 
 
community relations for the mining sector. There are many other organizations and 
consultancies also dedicated to this topic of improving mining company community 
relations for an SLO and a shared value or win-win solution both for mining company 
and community in terms of development and overall benefits. Such organizations include 
Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), World Bank Group and its private investment 
arm International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) World Resources Institute (WRI) and even academic centres such as 
The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) at the University of Queensland, 
Australia. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to compile an exhaustive list 
of all the various organizations involved in this subject of extractive sector company 
community relations and conflict, as the list would be extensive.  
 
The above-mentioned actors offer practically-based publications and experience with 
mining companies around what is needed for an SLO from local communities in a 
developing world context, often in Latin America. Furthermore the various multinational 
mining companies also have their own in-house sophisticated community relations or 
sustainability policies, strategies and toolkits. This extensive number of organizations and 
initiatives dedicated to helping mining companies gain an SLO and foster good 
community relations underlines the importance of this subject. However, communities 
still oppose and resist mining projects, as shown by the examples of continuing 
community conflict given earlier in this chapter. Therefore it should be argued that these 
many organizations and initiatives are either committing mistakes or failing to understand 
important issues in the sphere of mining company community relations. 
 
As an example of a company which seems to try to implement the kinds of suggestions 
offered by these publications, Anglo American (one of my case study companies) is 
internationally renowned for its community relations and development which it manages 
via its globally acclaimed 297 page Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT). In 
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2012 the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) awarded Anglo 
American with their annual Corporate Initiative award for its community engagement via 
SEAT; Business in the Community (BITC) the UK’s leading CSR organization was also 
awarded Anglo American for being a “Commendable Company” for its work with local 
communities amongst other sustainability-related areas; Barrick Gold is listed on the 
prestigious Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI); and Kinross Gold, Pelambres 
and Vale similarly have robust community relations and sustainability focused policies 
and communications.  
 
Yet it is worthwhile pointing out that these four companies face public criticism by civil 
society groups and their local communities for their negative environmental and social 
impacts and mining operations at Anglo American’s Minas-Rio project.  They have 
repeatedly been requested to be stopped from continuing by State officials and ceased 
mining at least once in 2012 due to community complaints. Similarly, Barrick Gold’s 
Pascua Lama project has also ceased mining since April 2013 as a result of community 
legal action against the mine. This community resistance serves to further support the 
claims and criticisms made against the effectiveness of CSR programmes on 
communities by authors such as Newell (2005), Prieto-Carrón (2006), Banerjee (2008) 
and Haalboom (2012). 
 
A brief review of this practitioner and extractives sector company guidance can be 
summarized by the following “good and respectful neighbour” principles needed for an 
SLO and good community relations, as shown in Table 1:  
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Table 1 Principles of good and respectful community relations for an SLO
1
 
 Create a good community relations policy based on the principle of “being 
a good neighbour.”  
 Identify the key stakeholders in the communities including those most 
likely to be impacted on by the mining projects. 
 Enter into frequent dialogue and consult in an open and transparent 
manner with the key community groups to understand their concerns and 
needs. 
 Negotiate a way to collaborate together in local development projects, 
including a Benefits Agreement for framing and implementing Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) with the local community. 
 Monitor and track community engagement and relations (including having 
a grievance/complaints mechanism)  
 Partner with community organizations, local government and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to contribute to local economic 
development and other sustainability-related projects. 
 Build capacity of the local stakeholders in different areas such as 
administering tax revenues from mining, technical skills for gaining 
employment, or for starting and running their own small businesses.  
The above points summarize the advice provided by the practitioner and company 
literature for mining companies to gain their SLO and contribute towards local 
                                                 
1
 Compiled from publications such as Anglo American’s “Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox”; ICMM’s 
“Community Development Toolkit”; BSR’s “Six Ways for the Extractives Sector to Improve Stakeholder 
Engagement”; IFC’s “Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing 
Business in Emerging Markets”; Canadian Government’s “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector” and Zandvliet and 
Anderson’s (2009) “Getting it Right, Making Corporate-Community Relations Work”; and Ruggie (2011) 
“The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: an interpretive guide.” 
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sustainable development. These guidance points for obtaining good community relations 
can be found in publications by ICMM, BSR, IFC, World Resources Institute, 
Government of Canada’s CSR Strategy (Zandvliet and Anderson, 2009). In relation to 
academic literature these above-mentioned principles are closely linked to stakeholder 
theory. This link will be explored in more detail in the literature review. 
 
This plethora of good community relations, investment, SLO and human rights guidance 
literature should therefore be called into question regarding its effectiveness. The policies 
and guidance seem robust on paper and in theory; however, in practice they are not 
making a significant difference, as seen from the examples of conflict and violence 
around the world in mining communities.  
 
My research addresses the gap in understanding what drives mining company community 
relations and also conflict from a community perspective. Clearly the practitioner 
guidance literature is not having its intended effect. One of the reasons for this can be 
attributed to the attitude the mining sector and its consultants have towards local 
communities. There is a belief, as shown by the previously mentioned practical guides, 
that communities who resist and are against nearby proposed mining projects can and 
should be convinced and negotiated with to reconsider and accept these projects if mining 
companies follow and implement this guidance. In short all this guidance material and 
CSR-related advisory services do not question the gaining of community consent for an 
extractives project. The assumption is that communities should be convinced to see the 
benefits of a responsible extractives project that will benefit all and have minimal 
negative impacts on their lives. Once persuaded, then companies should work with these 
communities in line with the practical guidance to improve relations.  
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One could even coin the term “Responsible Neo-Colonialism” to describe this 
phenomenon of “friendly domination”, whereby locals must accept a (sometimes foreign) 
invader in the form of a large extractives operation who will dig or explode a large hole 
in their natural environment (which often involves clearing trees, flora and fauna, using 
huge quantities of local water supplies and bringing hundreds or thousands of mainly 
male manual labourers from other regions to the work on this extractives project) to 
extract natural resources and/or minerals with further impacts on the local environment 
and health. However, the big difference is that this is now deemed to be responsible by 
the company and the State, as the company in turn promises to be as respectful and a 
good neighbour as possible with its management of the environmental impacts and for 
consulting the community on a regular basis to hear their concerns whilst giving 
economic benefits back to the community in the form of CSR. In short if extractives 
projects are not wanted by the majority of local residents, yet imposed on them even with 
promises of doing so in the least harmful way with a sweetener of generous local 
economic investment, it can be classed as a situation of “friendly domination and 
imposition offering unwanted gifts”.  
 
In the following section I provide a further analysis of this issue of attitude and its 
importance in explaining why conflicts with local communities continue. This argument 
was also given by Owen and Kemp (2012) and Jenkins (2004) who states the extractives 
private sector world view is that of free market capitalism where no group such as 
government, communities or NGOs should impede the “free development of mining 
operations or the pure market logic that everyone must benefit from such activities.” 
(p.26). 
 
1.4 Mining sector attitudes towards gaining good community relations  
One should therefore take the focus away from the company perspective to a lived 
experience of community actors in order to understand why mining company community 
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relations are still strained after such an effort to improve them (Banerjee, 2011). There 
are a number of factors, including the attitudes and blind spots of the private sector and 
their consultants that offer an important explanation as to why conflict still exists with 
local communities and why companies still cannot obtain their SLO.  
 
All the practical guidance literature cited above aims to help extractive sector companies 
gain good community relations and an SLO, with the assumption that many communities 
are initially sceptical of new mining projects in their area. Advocating the use of 
engagement and dialogue to understand community needs and then to invest in income 
generation activities and working in partnership with communities, these guides argue 
that it is possible to overcome conflict and gain an SLO. In other words this can be 
interpreted as corporate influence strategies. This stems from a belief held by the mining 
sector that their projects and the private sector will have an overall benefit for a 
community (Jenkins, 2004), in particular an economic benefit. This view was also 
reinforced by my several years of working at IFC and with mining company executives.  
 
This problem of attitude is illustrated by the recent words of the Rio Tinto Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the world’s third largest mining company speaking on a video 
on the ICMM’s website stating “the most important challenge facing the firm is 
convincing their local communities that the company’s mining operations are a benefit to 
them” (ICMM, 2011). 
 
The previous quote by the CEO of Rio Tinto implies that the topic of power is important 
for understanding these mining company community relations and conflict. The mining 
companies seem convinced they are absolutely right with their world view which consists 
of mining for economic growth and that communities just need to be educated and hence 
persuaded to also appreciate this world view. This is indeed the dominant hegemonic 
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world view that represents ever-increasing growth and economic development (Berry, 
2003). 
 
Another example of this attitude of self-righteousness and determination shown by the 
mining sector that communities should and will accept mining is reflected in the recent 
debate between ICMM and indigenous people’s NGO, First Peoples Worldwide. The 
debate is framed around the subject of FPIC which is the acronym for Free Prior and 
Informed Consent. The main debate existing between mining companies and indigenous 
peoples and their advocates is how consent is given. The above statement by the Rio 
Tinto CEO about “convincing” communities that mining is good for all of them is 
indicative of the mining sector’s position on this debate. The mining sector is advocating 
the importance of consulting communities about how to mine in a way that is most 
respectful to their lives, but it is not asking them for their consent as to a final decision 
about whether or not to go ahead with a mining project. This position of consulting as 
opposed to asking for consent is indicative of the dominant and hegemonic world view in 
society whereby companies and States place more importance on economic development, 
growth, jobs and tax revenues over the objections to having a new large project located 
nearby to a community, who represent a minority within the country. This point was also 
made by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights (which 
will be analyzed later in the literature review) and where the section referred to just such 
a situation of community consultation and the lack of consent as a form of intended 
“responsible neo-colonialism”. 
 
In June 2013 ICMM published a position statement elaborating this point. Nonetheless 
soon after the June 2013 ICMM statement, First Peoples Worldwide NGO gave their 
official response, which I shall now discuss in greater detail as it explains why 
indigenous communities in general would feel aggrieved, despite mining companies 
consulting, engaging, partnering with them, being transparent and even generous with 
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benefits. It is worth mentioning though that such grievance and resistance to new mining 
projects is not exclusive to indigenous peoples, and that non-indigenous communities are 
also sometimes opposed to newly proposed nearby mining projects, fearing the 
environmental and social impacts they would bring. Such communities are often referred 
to in derogatory terms by the press, media and pro-business groups as NIMBYs (Not In 
My Back Yard). This term refers to groups usually non-indigenous who are against the 
construction of large projects, such as mining, energy or infrastructure ones that would 
negatively impact on their lives, and therefore object to having them in their back yard. 
The difference with an indigenous community’s objections to a large mining project 
being sited in their “back yard” is their concern that such a development could negatively 
impact on their culture and therefore identity as a people. For the non-indigenous people 
the complaints revolve more around the negative impacts on their (rights to a) particular 
quality of life.  
 
In short it is about having the power and autonomy to decide whether a life changing 
mining project can enter their territory and make irreversible changes to the community’s 
identity, culture, way of life and/or quality of life regardless of whether they are 
indigenous or not. The following extensive quote is taken from the First Peoples 
Worldwide’s response to ICMM’s (2013) position statement on Indigenous Peoples and 
Mining. In reference to ICMM’s position statement, First Peoples Worldwide claims:  
 
“ICMM’s new policy paper contains no substantive steps to improving relations with 
Indigenous communities. Its commitment to FPIC is at best tentative and ambiguous. The 
document uses language that is meant to sound empathetic and accepting but in actuality 
still maintains that a mining company has the right to enter indigenous territory and 
begin a potentially highly-destructive project with no regard to nor responsibility for 
ensuring the rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the land. ………we need an approach 
that puts Indigenous People’s rights and human rights, not profit, at the forefront. Stop 
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with the smokescreens, ICMM – indigenous people deserve Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent, which comes with the right to say no”. (First Peoples website, accessed 3rd 
September, 2013). 
 
In short this debate between the mining sector and indigenous peoples demonstrates the 
power struggles between mining companies and (indigenous) communities over land and 
territory use. The debate refers to who holds and grants the final decision over mining 
projects – the mining company and State, or the community living in the territory? The 
discussion also points to the important factors of power and sentiment as explaining why 
community relations may be strained and an SLO so difficult to obtain. 
 
Though the previous section has highlighted cases of conflict and violence, most mining 
company/community relations are without such high levels of conflict. Is this because of 
the practical guidance/stakeholder theory having been implemented effectively? Are 
lower levels of conflict with communities the result of good dialogue, stakeholder 
engagement, partnership, social investment, and trust and transparency with the 
communities, as espoused by the practical guidance? Or are the explanations for mining 
company community relations rooted in more structural hegemonic and power-based 
theories?   Thus I would like to understand what determines the difference between 
higher and lower conflict communities. Authors such as Frooman (1999) posit that power 
is decided by levels of dependence or independence; I therefore state my research 
question as follows based on the above contextual analysis: 
 
What influences community positions towards nearby mining company operations?  
In summary, so far in this introductory literature review we have set the historical and 
political economy contexts of the phenomena of this research. In other words, explained 
how due to the introduction and dominance of a neo-liberal economic system at the 
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international level, multinational mining companies have increasingly started to mine 
near established indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Latin America backed 
by the host States such as Chile and Brazil. 
 
The increased corporate power in Latin America has been accompanied by greater 
expectations of responsibility including duties which have traditionally been associated 
with the State. In the case of the mining companies, the responsibilities are around 
contributing to the development of their local communities, and at the very least leaving 
them better off than how they found them. However, due to the nature of mining and its 
severe physical and psychological impacts on the community there has been substantial 
conflict between company, State and community groups, in particular in Latin America. 
 
Hence there has been a plethora of practitioner guidance material on helping mining 
companies avoid costly conflicts with local communities and on enhancing their 
contribution to local economic development. The underlying assumption in this literature 
is that by consulting communities, mining companies can improve relations and their 
contribution to local development (often via CSR). The other notable aspect of the 
mining company – community literature (both practitioner and academic) – is the vast 
bias of analysing this phenomenon from a company perspective, as opposed to from a 
community one (Banerjee, 2011). 
 
The introduction then continues to detail the financial importance of gaining an SLO for 
mining companies using empirical examples of mining projects that lost millions of 
dollars due to conflicts with the local community. However, the chapter also highlights 
the complexity in gaining an SLO. It also shows how the SLO and practitioner guidance 
is very company-focused with regard to managing its stakeholders via CSR initiatives in 
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order to obtain an SLO, as opposed to collaborating and learning from them for a more 
consensual relationship. 
 
The chapter then questions the effectiveness of corporate policies and international 
standards or guidance on gaining good community relations due to the number of 
conflicts involving communities. One possible reason for this is due to the lack of 
guidance surrounding gaining local community consent for a new mining project. The 
only international norm that exists is the FPIC (Free Prior and Informed Consent) 
regarding indigenous peoples only. Nonetheless the interpretation of this standard is 
questionable with the mining sector’s main CSR body understanding the word Consent 
more as Consultation.  
 
The underlying issue between these mining company/community conflicts and relations 
relates to power imbalances. From a company perspective the objective is to be a 
responsible actor only once and after the project has been given its legal licence from the 
State to commence. The term introduced earlier as Responsible Neo-Colonialism is 
relevant for such a context as mining projects are imposed on communities without their 
consent and ability to make decisions on them or even reject them outright. As such it 
would appear communities (whether indigenous or non-indigenous) are powerless.  
 
I propose to review the ensuing academic literature review guided by the following 
questions which are based on the above discussion of the challenges surrounding mining 
companies and nearby mining communities: 
 How does stakeholder theory address and explain levels of mining company 
community conflict and relations? 
 How can social movement-related theories help us understand levels of mining 
company community conflict and relations? 
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 How can resource dependency theory help us understand levels of mining 
company community conflict and relations? 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
In order to address these questions, the thesis is organized as follows: 
Literature review  
This chapter begins with an analytical discussion around how stakeholder theory 
addresses the issue of an SLO. It questions how much power communities 
actually have against mining companies and the State. Next the chapter considers 
Resource Dependence Theory for explaining mining company and local 
community influence strategies. The chapter ends with a review of how social 
movement theory, resource dependence and stakeholder theory have been used 
with empirical studies to demonstrate how communities have been able to 
mobilize and resist against high impact extractive sector projects. 
 
Methodology – Ethnographic Case Studies 
 A methodology chapter that explains how I researched eight case studies of 
mining communities in Brazil and Chile using ethnographic field research. I 
interviewed those from multiple perspectives including local community 
residents, local politicians, mining company executives in some communities, the 
church, civil society actors and external knowledgeable actors. I chose the eight 
case studies based on my access to data, prior knowledge and their relative levels 
of conflict with the mining companies. 
 
The main questions I asked my interviewees concerned the reasons for their 
perceptions of the mining company or mining community. I also asked about 
perceptions of relations between the mining company and community. I further 
enquired about their views on the enabling factors for community resistance or a 
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lack of resistance, where perceptions were negative regarding the nearby mining 
project. 
 
Once interviews were conducted I transcribed them and followed this up with two 
rounds of coding in search of the major themes. After several times of rereading 
the transcripts, together with additional reading, I decided to analyze the data 
according to macro or institutional levels and at the community/meso level. 
Further reflection, discussions and research led me to use resource dependence 
theory as well as social movement-related concepts as the theoretical lens for 
analyzing and explaining the findings data. 
 
Findings  
 The data revealed that there were two groups of cases in terms of conflict: four 
communities with higher and four with lower levels of conflict with the nearby 
mining company. In the cases where conflict was higher, the communities had 
more of a history as an independent people with livelihoods in agriculture. This 
had not changed much from the past to the present day. Mining in this regard 
represents a threat to their way of life as independent people and further threatens 
to make them dependent upon the extractives sector. The communities are 
strongly opposed to this latter option. As they are economically independent from 
the mining company, they are able to collectively voice their grievances about and 
resistance to the mining projects operating in their valleys. When assisted by 
external civil society groups, lawyers and State justice departments, the 
communities are able to fight back against the mining projects.  
 However such resistance from higher conflict communities has proved 
troublesome, as mining companies are able to employ an array of influence 
strategies based on stakeholder theory, such as CSR. Such strategies co-opt, 
manipulate and divide communities making it difficult for them to withhold an 
SLO from the companies. Instead the situation is dynamic, ever-changing 
including the positions of community, government and even companies.  
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Discussion 
 These changes in position are related to levels of dependence and independence 
from mining. The more independent communities are able to remain, the more 
likely they can resist mining projects. The more communities accept CSR and 
collaborate with mining companies, the more dependent they become on the 
companies and thus lose their SLO. In essence what the literature on Stakeholder 
and Resource Dependence theory and SLO assumes, mistakenly, is that for 
communities to actually have an SLO they need have real power to continuously 
exercise and wield. My research shows this was not the case, as power levels vary 
based on corporate and State influence strategies, together with the resources and 
allies available to more independent communities. 
 
In the following chapter the analysis positions the research question in relation to the 
existing academic literature, with a particular focus on the literature concerning social 
movement, resource dependency and stakeholder theories, and other publications on the 
subject of mining company/community relations and conflict. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I aim to briefly recap on the importance of my phenomenon of research to 
society and business. The chapter commences with a review of CSR/Stakeholder theory 
literature which argues that corporations can create win-win situations for themselves and 
for stakeholders. The practitioner guidance literature on how extractives sector 
companies can gain an SLO has its roots in stakeholder theory and thinking. Therefore 
the CSR and Stakeholder theory literature deserves a critical analysis to understand how 
it explains community – company conflict and how companies can lose their SLO at the 
local level or in other words find themselves in a conflict situation with the local 
community. The guiding question for this sub section of the review will be around how 
this stakeholder or CSR literature explains gaining or losing an SLO, or (acceptance or 
conflict) with local communities. The review takes the perspective that to date the 
literature has been very company-centric, based on a CSR/stakeholder theory perspective 
that envisages companies managing their stakeholders. Despite this wealth of guidance 
material for gaining good stakeholder/community relations there still appears to be daily 
social conflict between mining projects and local communities in Latin America and also 
therefore costly delays to the mining companies. 
 
The review then moves from stakeholder theory to analysing resource dependence theory. 
Min-Dong (2011) argues the most common approach to explaining stakeholder influence 
is based on a combination of stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory. The 
central idea is that a corporation’s social behaviour is influenced by its relations with 
various stakeholders, and the flow and direction of the influence is determined by the 
degree of resource dependence between the corporation and its stakeholders (Clarkson, 
1995; Frooman, 1999; Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Rowley, 1997).  
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Following on, this chapter uses social movement-related theories to highlight a flaw in 
stakeholder-related theories to show under what mechanisms certain community groups 
are able to mobilize against nearby large infrastructure projects including mining. 
However, the analysis concludes that social movement-related theories are not able to 
explain why the majority of groups are unable to mobilize against their target 
organization, which they accuse of being responsible for their grievances. For this the 
review turns to resource dependence and stakeholder theories to underline their 
importance in explaining why certain communities are not able to mobilize against 
nearby mining projects. The analysis thus alludes to how stakeholder, social movement 
and resource dependence theories should complement one another in the context of 
understanding community relations and conflicts with large nearby projects. As a 
conclusion, it would appear that mining companies, aided by the State, try to dilute local 
social movement, and any resistance offered by them, by trying to manipulate and control 
them to induce their dependency on the mining projects, i.e. in terms of employment and 
CSR. 
 
The following section critically reviews practitioner and academic literature on 
stakeholder theory, with a focus on the community actor, and discusses why extractive 
sector companies fail at gaining an SLO at the local level and furthermore what they can 
do to gain community acceptance and avoid conflict with nearby local communities. 
 
2.2 How does stakeholder theory address an SLO from local 
communities? 
The subject of mining company/local community relations can be positioned within the 
business/society academic literature and in particular stakeholder or CSR literature. This 
is because the topic deals with decisions, behaviour and activities on the part of 
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companies that go beyond legal compliance. Gaining local acceptance from communities, 
otherwise known as an SLO, is not legally binding; however, it is desirable from a 
reputational perspective as well as from a financial and production one for mining 
companies (Davies and Franks, 2011). Societal expectations of companies’ social 
responsibilities to their local communities have increased, along with the rise in the 
importance of sustainable development (Prno, 2012). Indeed it can be asserted that the 
wealth of practitioner guidance for CSR and the community (such as that offered by 
ICMM, IFC, BSR and others) based on the extensive stakeholder theory literature is 
testimony to the importance of the community actor within the extractives sector. 
Stakeholder theorists such as Mitchell et al. (1997) also claim the community as a 
primary stakeholder group.  
 
It can be posited that both these aforementioned practitioner and academic literatures are 
based on the main definition of stakeholders outlined by Freeman (1984), that 
organizations should pay special attention to all those actors who can affect them and 
who are affected by them. In the case of mining this would include the local community 
due to the impacts of the mining activities of this group and of the group’s ability to 
cause damage to a mining company’s reputation and production via protests, roadblocks, 
violence and legal action. This section begins with a critical review of the more general 
stakeholder literature from a community relations and SLO perspective. The following 
section provides an analysis of the more specific academic publications on the extractives 
sector/local community relations and conflict, including papers by Prno and Slocombe 
(2012); and Prno (2012). 
 
2.2.1 General Stakeholder Literature Review from a Community Perspective 
Stakeholder theory is regarded to have been proposed as a strategic management theory 
by Freeman in 1984 (Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, 2004) in the hope that organizations 
considering the interests of their stakeholders would do well. Freeman, widely considered 
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the founding father of stakeholder theory, defines a stakeholder as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives” (1984: 46). Stakeholder theory can be understood as an alternative to 
stockholder theory whereby firm’s main objective is to maximize short term shareholder 
returns at all costs (Laplume et al., 2008). 
 
Laplume et al. (2008) reviewed the contents of stakeholder theory literature spanning 16 
years and found the major themes within it to be (1) definition and salience, (2) 
stakeholder actions and responses, (3) firm actions and responses, (4) firm performance, 
and (5) theory debates. The last point considers questions such as the normative 
foundations of stakeholder theory, the problems of stakeholder theory and with which 
theories stakeholder theory competes. The least covered theme in the literature is that of 
stakeholder actions and responses, which signals the lack of attention given to the 
stakeholder perspective. 
 
Margolis and Walsh (2003) reviewed 30 years of publications on business and society by 
organizational scholars in which they confirmed the instrumental orientation of the 
business/society or stakeholder literature. The practitioner and even academic literature is 
dominated by the instrumental or “win-win” argument fuelled by influential thinkers such 
as Michael Porter, that businesses should only do CSR and pay attention to their 
stakeholders on the condition that this benefits and adds value to the business. The 
implication of this, which is not mentioned in the literature is that business should not 
focus on societal problems with communities if they do not deem them as material or 
relevant to their business. Companies and communities may diverge in their views 
around the impacts of a mining project and additionally so if this is a salient issue. What 
is considered irrelevant for a mining company may possibly be seen as salient for a 
mining affected community in terms of impacts. 
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Mitchell et al.’s (1997) publication appears to be an influential text for present day 
practical guidance around stakeholder relations (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011; Min-
Dong, 2011). Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that stakeholders should be identified and 
categorized according to their power (valued resources), legitimacy (socially accepted 
and expected) and urgency or salience (with their claims) with regard to their relationship 
with the organization. However, authors such as Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), Van 
Buren (2010) Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) and Min-Dong (2011), have criticised this 
widely used stakeholder identification framework for not considering power imbalances 
amongst stakeholders or even stakeholder power at all. Therefore one of the areas which 
is less explored in stakeholder theory is the diverse power that different stakeholders 
have. 
 
Taking a more normative view, Phillips (1997) argues that companies must account for 
stakeholders impacted on and be "Fair" to them. The proposed solution by Phillips (1997) 
is for mutual economic gain situations where there is Interdependence between 
organization and stakeholder, where all concerned win instead of a situation of mutual 
exclusiveness. However, such a proposition does not consider conflicts where a 
stakeholder group may not wish to even consent to being affected by stakeholders such as 
between mining companies and local communities. Some mining communities may not 
even wish to cooperate for mutual gain, such as via CSR practices. Obtaining mutual gain 
in places where communities are negatively impacted on simultaneously does not equate 
to respecting fairness in a consistent manner, as outlined by Phillips (1997). 
 
2.2.2 The Community as a Powerless Actor within Stakeholder Theory 
Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) reported an empirical case concerning nuclear power 
plant managers to prove that only the business case in stakeholder engagement achieves 
sustainability-related changes. Therefore where engaging with NGO stakeholders meant a 
loss to the business, the nuclear power plant refused to concede to these external groups. 
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Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) argue that the power plant also manages its stakeholders 
those who are allies, and contains adversarial NGOs by co-opting and manipulating them. 
Hill and Jones (1992) had also observed how managers will attempt to diffuse and 
dissolve stakeholder power at all times to make these groups more dependent upon the 
company and hence providing the company with more power This begs the question as to 
whether it would be possible for mining companies to also co-opt and manage their local 
communities in order to secure their local SLOs. 
 
As a further criticism of stakeholder theory, Van Buren (2001) extended Phillips’ (1997) 
concept of fairness by adding terms of consent and participation to this definition. 
Furthermore Van Buren (2001) also emphasizes the significance of power in determining 
how an organization would treat a stakeholder. Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) point 
to the major gap in stakeholder theory of not addressing issues of power. Van Buren 
(2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren 2010) thus posit that these differences in power 
between corporations and stakeholders explain the divergences in perceptions between a 
powerful organization and its less powerful stakeholders in terms of their relations and 
interactions with stakeholders.  
 
This is a salient point in the context of mining companies and local communities for 
providing an understanding as to why communities may hold negative sentiments 
towards nearby mining projects despite the efforts by these companies with social 
responsibility programmes to help with community relations. Greenwood and Van Buren 
(2010) additionally call for stakeholder theory to pinpoint these power imbalances, 
research their effects and offer suggestions for their remediation. Such a proposal would 
be pertinent to the present research in the context of mining company/community 
relations. 
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Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) analyze Phillips’ (1997) paper on the Principle of 
Fairness and importantly claim that this principle’s main contribution is that it addresses 
the needs of stakeholders who are affected by the firm but who are unable to affect the 
firm themselves, or in other words low-power and highly dependent stakeholders as 
termed by Mitchell et al.’s (1997) classification. Authors such as Mitchell et al. (1997) 
Van Buren (2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), suggest that such weaker and 
powerless stakeholders hold legitimate claims against organizations; however, they 
require the support of a more powerful actor such the State, an NGO or the benevolence 
of a company itself to defend them and their grievances.  
 
In terms of consent, authors such as Van Buren (2001) and Greenwood and Van Buren 
(2010), who argue from a Rawlsian justice perspective, call for companies to gain the 
consent of their low power stakeholders to their participation. Based on the principle of 
fairness, stakeholders, such as low paid employees and local communities, often pick up 
risks from corporations and do not receive the full value of their sacrifices to ensure the 
company can be profitable. In such situations of corporate free-riding, companies should 
be obliged to seek each stakeholder’s consent in proportion to its contribution to the 
company’s success. However, from a local community’s perspective, calculating or 
arriving at an understanding of the proportion of its contribution to the collective success 
of a nearby mining project is not a simple task, as opposed to that of low-wage 
employees manufacturing a certain product. This therefore raises further questions about 
what is considered to be fair within mining company/local community relations. 
 
The stakeholder-related literature reviewed also views the community stakeholder as 
weak and powerless, though with a legitimate claim (Mitchell et al., 1997; Van Buren 
2001; Greenwood and Van Buren 2010). This literature further affirms that companies 
have a moral obligation to listen to the “weak” but legitimate community actor and even 
gain its consent. However due to the community actor’s fragility it would need to be 
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defended by another stronger actor, organization or the government/State. In the context 
of the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs), the global standard on business and human rights 
(Ruggie, 2011), it is suggested that companies must listen to the community and other 
marginalized actors affected by operations; however, and importantly, the UNGPs do not 
make any reference to gaining their consent for any business operations. Therefore it 
could be argued that in practice companies are not being asked to gain consent from weak 
though legitimate stakeholders for the existence of their operations. Not gaining 
community consent from the outset could be the cause for poor relations and conflict 
between company and community. 
 
Overall, the stakeholder theory literature has been criticised by Banerjee (2011) for not 
dealing directly with the prickly issue of what should be done when shareholder wealth is 
created at the expense of certain actors whose welfare has been harmed in the process of 
business activity. In short, as argued by Banerjee (2011), 50 years of CSR and 
stakeholder research has done little to understand the outcomes of CSR for society as the 
focus has been on the business case. 
 
2.2.3 The Community as a Powerful Actor against Mining Companies 
However, not all academic research theorizes the local community as a weak and low-
power stakeholder group. There are academic publications by authors on mining 
company/community conflicts where companies have lost the ability to operate either 
temporarily or permanently. Authors such as Berry (2003), Sharma and Henriques 
(2005), Bebbington et al. (2008), Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), Urkidi and Walter (2011), 
Prno (2013) and Kraemer et al. (2013), point to instances where communities have 
managed to withhold their local level SLO via protests and hence create a (temporary) 
cease in operations. Prno and Slocombe (2012) in their paper “Exploring the origins of 
the ‘social license to operate’ in the mining sector: Perspectives from governance and 
sustainability theories” state that the community actor holds many of the characteristics in 
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Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder identification classification, i.e. to be seen as an 
important actor necessary for a corporation’s success in fulfilling its objectives of profit 
maximization and growth. This claim is in contrast to much of the stakeholder theory 
literature.  
 
As stated earlier there were over 150 mining/community-related conflicts in Latin 
America in 2010 (OCMAL, 2010) and this number has not appeared to decline since. 
This would indicate that the community actor is not as weak, vis à vis neighbouring 
development projects, as is theorized in the stakeholder literature. However, in defence of 
stakeholder theory commentators, such as Mitchell et al. (1997), Van Buren (2001; 2010) 
and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), communities can attract the attention of 
companies if they are defended via more powerful actors, such as by civil society actors, 
the State, or lawyers, which may be the case in these multiple numbers of mining-related 
conflicts in Latin America. 
 
The SLO-specific literature, though nascent and emerging, points to several instances of 
communities withholding their SLO by way of protests, roadblocks and anti-mining 
campaigns. Slocombe and Prno (2012) posit that the blurring of boundaries between the 
governance roles of the State and civil society has strengthened the community voice in a 
mining context: 
“As a result of these shifts, the boundaries between the public, private and voluntary 
sectors have now changed and distinctions between civil society and the state have 
blurred (Rhodes, 1997). These shifts are especially relevant to the emergence of SLO, as 
they have helped enable the voices of mining affected communities to become much more 
influential in mineral development decision making and political processes” p.349 
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Unfortunately Slocombe and Prno (2012) do not go into detail of the mechanics of how 
mining affected communities are able to become so influential in ceding an SLO to 
mining companies. They also emphasize that the emergence of a new sustainable 
development paradigm which has helped increase the number of civil society 
organizations in the mining sector is a key factor for giving more voice to affected 
communities. In addition, new legal rights given to indigenous communities in the 
context of Canada has also helped in this regard. Slocombe and Prno (2012) further refer 
to general instances where mining affected communities can slow down or stop mining 
projects operating; however, the authors do not provide specific or sufficient detail on 
how this unfolds. Such a question is of particular importance, given the relative power 
and wealth a mining company (backed by the government) has over a local community.   
 
2.2.4 – Critique of the SLO – Definition and assumptions of community power 
The SLO concept has been described as “inflated” by Owen and Kemp (2012). The SLO 
notion has received significant criticism by more critical academics such as Owen and 
Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) for its vague definition and its frailty in 
addressing power imbalances between companies and communities in reality. 
 
The empirical paper by Prno (2012) is deserving of particular analysis due to its main 
research question, which seeks to uncover the underlying influencing factors of the 
issuance or non-issuance of an SLO by local communities to nearby mining projects, 
similarly to this present literature review and thesis. Prno (2012) also compares two 
apparently high and low mining company/community conflicts (the two higher conflict 
communities are in Peru and Papua New Guinea and the lower conflict communities in 
the USA and Canada). However, Prno (2012) only conducted empirical field research on 
the lower conflict communities in North America. Prno’s (2012) main findings include: 
(1) context is key; (2) an SLO is built on relationships; (3) sustainability is a key concern 
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for communities; (4) local benefits and public participation play a crucial role; and (5) 
adaptability is needed to confront complexity.   
 
Prno’s (2012) publication is emblematic of the underlying and unaddressed dilemma 
within the practitioner guidance, as well as extractives/community relations case studies 
in academic literature. This dilemma revolves around the level of importance given to the 
community context (and perspective) in determining its issuance of an SLO versus the 
ability of a mining company via its community relations/investment strategy, as well as 
its personnel relations, to persuade the local community for its consent and SLO. This 
underlying contradiction can be observed implicitly in Prno’s (2012) publication as the 
author placed “community context” as the first explanatory factor for understanding why 
a community offers or withholds an SLO. However, in the following four findings the 
author provides instrumentally focused recommendations on how mining companies can 
gain an SLO. 
 
Prno (2012) does not address a key question of what happens when pitting findings on 
the importance of context against implementing his following four recommendations. For 
example, Prno (2012) argues that each mining project and community has its own social, 
cultural and economic particularities that determine whether an SLO is issued or not. 
Prno (2012) further uses the case of the proposed Tambogrande Mine in Peru as an 
example where the community rejected mining, as its expected impacts were 
incompatible with their rural livelihood and also due to the influence of civil society 
organizations who encouraged local residents to oppose the mine. However, Prno (2012) 
does not address the question of whether a mining company implementing the authors’ 
following four recommendations (points two to four: building sound community 
relationships; addressing sustainability; provisioning local benefits and public 
participation; and being flexible), as did the two North American mines, would also 
ensure an SLO at the other two higher conflict communities in Peru and Papua New 
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Guinea, where the SLO was in doubt. This extractives sector literature also does not 
address this question explicitly, i.e. whether an SLO can be obtained when using all the 
recommended and vanguard community relations guidance, such as that outlined by Prno 
(2012) and organizations such as ICMM, IFC and BSR.  
 
It should also be noted that the SLO concept is not without its flaws, mainly pertaining to 
its conceptual definition and the fact that scant research on the subject has been 
conducted to date. According to Prno (2012) questions around what it actually means to 
have an SLO still remain unanswered; in other words, how does one know they have an 
SLO? Mining company executives have sometimes remarked that they only understand 
when they do not have an SLO and are unable to know when or if they actually have one. 
Further still, as argued by Owen and Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) is that there 
are gaps in the knowledge around what level of community support is required to know if 
an SLO has been issued (i.e. does majority support suffice)? Who within the community 
can supply the SLO? How should dissenting stakeholders and viewpoints be dealt with? 
Does a lack of conflict equate to a SLO? The SLO literature ignores this sensitive debate. 
The findings from Parsons et al’s (2013) interviews with mining company management 
demonstrate that the SLO cannot be granted or withheld as such. Instead the SLO 
consists of messy processes of communication and negotiation, and exists on a dynamic 
continuum. 
 
Parsons et al (2013) also critique the SLO on its lack of addressing power imbalances in 
practice between companies and affected communities. Based on interviews with mining 
company management Parsons et al (2013) argue “Social licence discourse may involve a 
shift in power relations, therefore, but structural forces inherently constrain that shift. 
Companies may portray some stakeholder concerns as more legitimate than others. To 
some extent, then, dissent can be marginalised, and a social licence can exist as long as 
relations are manageable” (p.87, 2013).  
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The point of using management discourse to capture the subjects of community relations 
and CSR under the popular concept of an SLO is also a critique leveled by Parsons et al 
(2013) who argue that this only weakens dissenting voices and gives more control to 
management by placing the theme within corporate reputation and public relations.  
 
This point is also echoed by Owen and Kemp (2012) who argue that the SLO term is 
used by the extractives sector to disguise or silence oppositional voices. Owen and Kemp 
(2012) continue to posit that the SLO does not entail companies in understanding the 
“other” but stays very much with the company centric paradigm of the corporate “self”.  
Indeed mining companies rarely agree voluntarily towards community consent before 
commencing with a new project that will affect them, which demonstrates how little 
power these extractive sector actors are willing to share with local communities (Owen 
and Kemp, 2012). 
 
Owen and Kemp (2012) in addition point out that when there is a lack of visible conflict 
and disapproval within a community towards a certain project this could be down to 
cultural reasons and also the suppression and fear of security forces and violence should 
they manifest their grievances and protest. Again the issue of power imbalances underlies 
this criticism of the SLO. Even in instances where there is community conflict and the 
SLO looks in jeopardy mining projects are still able to continue to operate (Banerjee, 
2011; and Owen and Kemp, 2012). 
 
Owen and Kemp (2012) end their paper by underscoring the importance of understanding 
where company motives differ from communities’. According to Owen and Kemp (2012) 
mining company decision-making is motivated by profit maximization and control of 
risk. This mentality as a consequence leads to a focus on the business case for conducting 
any voluntary social related initiatives. In other words if the mining company sees no 
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short term gain in the activity it will unlikely engage in the socially responsible activity 
or project, such behaviour can be regarded as irresponsible and also highlights the ethical 
weakness of the SLO concept. Instead of conceptualizing the SLO as binary we should 
consider it in terms of levels of a SLO which is in constant change argued Parsons et al 
(2013). 
 
Answers to these questions will help advance the study of the SLO and lead to a better 
appreciation of the opportunities and challenges associated with its implementation. This 
present study may shed light on what an SLO is and how a company might be more 
sensitive to where they are in their journey to gaining one. Though legitimate criticisms 
have been made towards the SLO concept by authors such as Owen and Kemp (2012); 
and Parsons et al (2013) this present thesis deals more specifically with stakeholder 
theory which is more established and broader than the SLO concept. As claimed by 
Owen and Kemp (2012) the underlying foundations and philosophical underpinnings of 
the SLO concept have not and most likely cannot be established. As such this thesis will 
focus more on making a contribution to stakeholder theory. 
 
An important issue to address within the literature, for the research of this thesis, is to 
understand exactly how much power local communities have towards their nearby 
mining projects? According to some stakeholder theorists, such as Mitchell et al. (1997), 
Van Buren (2001; 2010) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), communities have 
legitimate though low power. Authors such as Sharma and Henriques (2005) and Prno 
and Slocombe (2012) on the other hand argue that communities do indeed have power to 
disrupt company operations via roadblocks and protests. Nonetheless it should be noted 
that even stakeholder literature authors such as Mitchell et al. (1997), Van Buren (2001; 
2010) and Greenwood and Van Buren (2010), concur that communities, only via a more 
powerful actor such as the State or an NGO, could in fact affect a company and therefore 
become a more powerful or salient stakeholder.  
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However stakeholder theory has been criticized for its shortcomings and lack of ability to 
theorize company/stakeholder relations in today’s much more globalized world, since 
stakeholder theory was conceived in 1984 by Freeman and later significantly developed 
in the 1990s by other management scholars.  
 
2.2.5 Political CSR and the Role of the State as a Critique of Stakeholder Theory 
Commentators, such as Phillips et al. (2003), recognize the limits of stakeholder theory in 
terms of providing an understanding of the topics of human rights abuse and 
environmental destruction, claiming these questions lie outside stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder and CSR theories make the assumption that businesses operate in the context 
of strong States who have the capacity to enforce laws and regulate corporate behaviour 
for societal good (Scherer et al., 2009). However, in this current climate of globalization 
and a dominant neo-liberal economic system where markets are deregulated and State 
responsibilities are privatized, it has been argued that governments’ ability to enforce and 
regulate business conduct for societal good has been lessened. States no longer have the 
capacity to enforce and regulate business conduct for the societal good (Banerjee, 2008; 
Scherer et al., 2009; Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011). 
 
Due to the privatization, deregulation and a smaller State that transfers more 
responsibility to multinational corporations, stakeholder theory loses its relevance in 
todays’ global world and, as such, Jensen and Sandstrom (2011) label globalization as 
stakeholder theory’s “blind spot”. This phenomenon is also creating “blurred lines” 
between State and business (Scherer et al., 2009) as they both work in unison especially 
in the developing world in the pursuit of development and growth. Globalization 
therefore creates much more complexity in the issue of business and community relations 
due to there being more actors with overlapping and interconnected roles (Jensen and 
Sandstrom, 2011) in terms of development and wellbeing. For example to illustrate the 
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complexity of the main actors involved in the context of a mining company and a local 
community in Latin America, one would have to consider the bank or financial institution 
financing the mining project which is often a multilateral international organization such 
as the World Bank, the mining company itself, the host nation State of the mining 
company (usually in the developed North), the receiving State of the mining project, 
national and local government as well as international, regional, national and local civil 
society organizations with divergent ideologies, amongst others.  
 
Due to this complexity that globalization and a free market approach has created, 
multinational corporations should see it as their corporate responsibility to undertake 
certain public responsibilities of the State when operating in areas of limited and weak 
State presence (Jensen and Sandstrom, 2011). Moreover, multinational corporations are 
able to exploit this weak State regulation to their advantage for doing business at lower 
cost, such as paying very low wages, spending less on environmental impact protection 
measures, and paying much lower taxes.  As developing world societies have fewer 
social, health and environmental provisions and less external regulation due to corruption 
and a weak functioning State, companies are able to exploit these loopholes by paying 
lower costs and taxes, thus maximizing profits even more (Banerjee, 2007; Jensen and 
Sandstrom, 2011). 
 
Because of this exploitation of a weaker regulated society, thinkers such as Phillips et al. 
(2003) argue that multinational corporations have a moral obligation to be socially 
responsible and fulfil certain developmental needs in a developing country context. As 
outlined earlier in the introduction section, the private sector has started to accept this 
responsibility, and act on it as a corporate citizen (Scherer et al. 2009). Specifically 
regarding the mining sector, the largest mining companies have created their own self-
governing social responsibility member initiative, ICMM, for community relations and 
social responsibility purposes. However, the difference between policy rhetoric and 
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performance, with regard to the treatment of and benefits to local communities, is highly 
apparent (Newell, 2005; Banerjee, 2008). Moreover understanding the local community 
perceptions on mining companies and their CSR and community relations attempts has 
largely not been studied, especially from a stakeholder theory perspective. 
 
The role of the government regarding the community and their welfare is a contradictory 
one according to Berry (2003) from his research into an environmental justice conflict 
between the siting of a chemicals plant in a low income African-American community in 
Louisiana, USA. On the one hand the government is expected to represent the best 
interests of its voters in the community; however, on the other hand the government also 
considers the overall good and development of the nation State, which can be in conflict 
with the wellbeing of the local community, such as the negative impacts of a particular 
mining operation starting near residents. This is often why conflict occurs, and this 
contradiction is also a crucial and central underlying question in my research.  
 
In particular, globalization reveals the simplicity in the theory’s boundary conditions and 
how these boundaries make it difficult for both mainstream and narrative alternatives to 
stakeholder theory to provide credible and useful answers to two central stakeholder 
questions: Who gets to define what a stake and a stakeholder are and where do the 
corporation’s responsibilities begin and end? – Jensen and Sandstrom (2011).  
 
Berry (2003) also criticises stakeholder theory, in that stakeholder theorists have not yet 
adequately conceptualized the community as a primary agent, despite making most of the 
lists of primary stakeholders. Similar to Newell (2005), Berry (2003) argues that different 
stakeholders have different powers at different times. One attempt by the international 
community to recognize the corporation as a political and global actor with more 
responsibilities to those it impacts upon, in other word with regard to human rights 
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impacts, is that of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights. 
 
2.2.6 (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights – an answer for 
responsible business in a globalized world? 
Perhaps the most robust and universal guidance that has come out for companies to 
respect their local communities was in June 2011 when the United Nations (UN) 
endorsed the UNGPs for Business and Human Rights. After years of debate as to whether 
this UN framework should be legally binding, since 2011 the UN has also entered into 
this debate of corporate responsibility. Concerned with the many adverse human rights-
related impacts from the private sector on society, employees and the supply chain, the 
UN Human Rights Council endorsed the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) in 2011. According to Professor Ruggie the UNGPs are the global standards of 
practice around business and human rights (Ruggie, 2011). The importance of the 
UNGPs was further compounded by the European Union who, in 2013, decided that 
Nation States would develop plans to implement the UNGPs at a national level, and the 
UK government duly launched its national implementation plan in September, 2013 via 
an official presentation by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs William Hague 
(Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2013).   
 
The main relevance of the Guiding Principles for companies is ‘Pillar Two’, known as 
“the corporate responsibility to respect” all human rights and to remedy any adverse 
human rights impacts (UN Human Rights Council, 2013). The special representative 
from the UN, Professor John Ruggie, stated clearly in 2008 that social responsibility acts 
by companies cannot substitute or replace a lack of respect of the human rights of local 
communities, employees and other stakeholders, therefore implying these guidelines as 
the absolute minimum companies should be doing with regard to their duty to respect 
those they affect, such as communities and workers: 
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“Furthermore, because the responsibility to respect is a baseline expectation, a company 
cannot compensate for human rights harm by performing good deeds elsewhere”. (p.5). 
However, the UNGPs are what is known as ‘soft law’ or, in other words, voluntary 
guidelines and therefore are not mandatory or even legally binding. Pressure is still 
mounting though from the UN and other civil society groups towards companies 
implementing the UNGPs, especially for the extractives and apparel and textiles sector 
companies. Some large extractives companies, such as Shell, Rio Tinto and Total, have 
been working with specialist human rights advisory organizations for assistance on 
implementing the UNGPs. The UNGPs like much of the other corporate responsibility 
guidance available recommends creating a policy and then consulting with potentially 
affected stakeholders or Rights Holders so that the company can plan to minimize all 
negative human rights-related impacts.  
 
Whilst the UNGPs in their Operational Principles section make brief mention around the 
possibility of training community members in the joint monitoring and participation of 
efforts to minimize human rights impacts, the main emphasis is for the principles to be 
implemented and operationalized from a company perspective, as opposed to the 
perspective of those affected. As such the UNGPs can be regarded as having a company 
centric paradigm.  
 
Furthermore the UNGPs do not pose any significant challenge to corporate power or 
power imbalances by requesting companies to gain consent of affected parties by their 
operations. Instead the UNGPs are very much compliance-focused with the aim of 
companies mitigating and/or managing impacts on people in order to fulfil their corporate 
responsibility duty to respect. The emphasis on compliance with human rights and 
treating them as indicators or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) obscures the process in 
striving for compliance. For example there may have been strategies of influence 
employed by the companies, State and other actors in gaining compliance. For example it 
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has been reported by indigenous NGOs at conferences on this topic that companies “buy” 
the signatures of indigenous community members to obtain their consent under the 
ILO169 law. In addition companies may also use co-optation strategies such as CSR 
benefits to communities in order for them to accept a certain level of environmental 
impact, which is still high and harmful to their standard of living and livelihood. As a 
consequence this would allow the company to claim they jointly identified and mitigated 
environmental impacts. The UNGPs make no mention of the elimination of human rights 
impacts as such an argument would also have direct implications with reducing corporate 
power to operate whilst transferring power to the affected groups such as communities. 
 
Nonetheless, in 2013 and 2014 there continued to be weekly reports of human rights 
abuses, implicating mining companies around the world, which call into question the 
effectiveness of such new, soft laws or guidance for companies to respect human rights. 
Despite counter-arguments by practitioners that the UNGPs need years to show any 
improvements on the ground towards affected groups, the fact that these principles are 
very much a continuation of previous voluntary CSR-related standards and guidance, 
such as the UN Global Compact, ICMM Community Development, IFC Stakeholder 
Engagement which have been around for and used by corporations for the past ten years 
already, provides further support for authors such as Newell (2005) and Banerjee (2007). 
 
This notion of either being able to directly or indirectly affect a company’s SLO was 
theorized by Frooman (1999) in his seminal paper bridging stakeholder influence 
strategies with resource dependence theory, as will be analyzed in the final part of this 
section. 
 
Banerjee (2008) further criticizes stakeholder theory from a power perspective referring 
to the notion of stakeholder management as a form of colonialism by companies, arguing 
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that those who do not tow the corporate line are either co-opted or marginalized. It is 
worth reminding ourselves of the quote by Jenkins (2004), that the current world view for 
mining is that no group such as government, communities or NGOs should impede the 
“free development of mining operations or the pure market logic that everyone must 
benefit from such activities.” (p.26) a view which Owen and Kemp (2012) also subscribe 
to..  
 
Such a situation I refer to as “Responsible Neo Colonialism”. The subsequent analysis of 
four publications with their empirical case studies from a mining community 
relations/conflict focus put into perspective the power or lack of power communities 
have, from a social movement theory, in resisting and also showing how corporate 
influence strategies attempt to manage, co-opt and marginalize their local communities. 
This demonstrates the simplicity of stakeholder theory in explaining business-affected 
actor relations. Related to power and dependence it is worth discussing the theory of 
resource dependence and in particular stakeholder influence strategies as delineated by 
Jeff Frooman (1994). 
 
2.2.7 Extractives sector – community relations academic and practitioner 
literature  
Academic scholars have also researched and published on this same topic of mining 
company/community relations and conflict. The academic literature on large extractives 
sector company relations and conflicts with nearby communities is not well established 
and very much emerging without a clear theoretical foundation. There are no more than 
50 published peer reviewed papers on this subject, and moreover many of them are a-
theoretical, in other words of a descriptive nature. These papers also mainly take the form 
of singular case studies focusing on conflicts generated by the environmental impacts 
perceived by communities. The main theories authors have used in management 
publications to explain the findings of their research in an extractives sector/community 
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relations context, include cross-cultural-related theories (Crawley and Sinclair 2003; 
Lertzman and Vredenburg, 2005), legitimacy theory (Gifford and Kestler (2008); 
Idemudia, 2007); and identity work theories (Bruijn and Whiteman (2009); Kraemer et 
al., 2013) to explain the difficult relations and conflict between extractives sector 
companies and local communities. With the exception of the identity work papers, the 
other authors take a more firm-centric view, arguing that the explanation of mining 
company community relations lies within the mining companies and their own 
organizational identities, cultures, strategies and leadership. What these different 
theoretical perspectives fail to capture is the importance of the local community context 
and perspectives. 
 
With the exception of Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) and Kraemer et al., (2013) the 
remaining 13 publications are quite descriptive and company-focused in their 
explanations of these antagonistic relations between resource extractive companies and 
local communities. Furthermore, the authors do not go beyond using notions of 
grievances, injustices and weak community relations management systems by companies 
to account for these conflicts, poor relations and hence the lack of an SLO.  
 
Many of the publications, such as those by Jenkins (2004), Eweje (2007), Idemudia 
(2007), Garvin et al. (2009) and Duarte (2010), simply point to the facts of divergent 
world views or value systems between extractives companies and their local communities 
for explaining conflict and therefore do not offer more robust theorizing. With the 
knowledge from previous field research in mining communities that perceptions and 
relations with companies can be mixed and range between positions of conflict and 
positions of mutual admiration, I argue that these publications are not sufficient in 
helping to answer the review question of explaining what factors lead to gaining or not 
gaining an SLO from a local community.  
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By maintaining a sole company focus for explaining and understanding these relations 
and conflicts between the extractive sector and local community, the authors are taking a 
similar stance to the practical guidance literature. The authors of these publications are 
implying that all the answers and solutions rest with the mining companies and their 
behaviour, management systems, personnel, policies and strategies. Such a vision 
neglects the community context which may be very much against the mining company’s 
proposed project in the community, regardless of how much the mining company 
changes its behaviour or even world view. The next sub-section considers some 
explanations and solutions proposed by academic and practitioner guidance, specifically 
on the subject of extractives sector and SLO conflict. 
2.3 Resource Dependence Theory – Explaining Mining Company and Local 
community influence strategies 
 
King (2008) puts forward that a company’s autonomy is limited by its dependence on 
certain stakeholder groups to sustain certain resource bases (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). 
Firms that benefit from their corporate reputation might be held hostage by their 
dependence on this source of success.  
 
Frooman (1999) provides support for the argument by Banerjee (2008) that organizations 
attempt to manage stakeholders. The difference being that Frooman (1999) does not 
question or pass moral judgement on the assertion that companies need to manage their 
stakeholders, in contrast to Banerjee (2008) who labels this as stakeholder colonialism. 
Therefore Frooman (1999) claims it is important to understand not just how organizations 
manage their stakeholders but also how stakeholders, who in the case of this research are 
the community actors, attempt to influence companies. 
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Frooman (1999) argues that using an unmentioned assumption about stakeholder theory 
is the inherent conflict between management and stakeholders. He asks the valid question 
about why a manager should be concerned with stakeholder theory if relations were 
healthy and stable with all stakeholders. Therefore he chose to bridge stakeholder theory 
with resource dependence theory to account for more structural and power-related factors 
affecting company/stakeholder relations. As such his paper could be seen as a response to 
the critique in earlier sections around stakeholder and CSR theories being too company 
focused and not taking into account stakeholder influence and perspectives. Nevertheless 
Frooman (1999) has as the aim of his work to help organizations manage their 
stakeholders better to avoid conflict and therefore provides evidence on more critical 
perspectives, such as Banerjee (2008) who claim companies want to co-opt and pacify 
dangerous and opposing stakeholders.  
 
Resource dependence theory was developed and widely attributed to Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s seminal publication in 1978 (Frooman, 1999; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who proposed that organizations were not self-sufficient and 
in total control of their destiny, and as such needed to recognize their external 
environment as a source for being controlled and affected by other actors (Frooman, 
1999; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). The following quote highlighted by Frooman 
illustrates the argument around the control that actors in the external environmental can 
have over an organization: 
“Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, the environment must be 
relied upon to provide support. For continuing to provide what the organization needs, 
the external groups or organizations may demand certain actions from the organization 
in return. It is the fact of the organization's dependence on the environment that makes 
the external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible and almost 
inevitable” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 p.43 in Frooman, 1999 p.195). 
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Frooman (1999) proceeds to claim that it is the dependence of firms on external 
stakeholders for resources that gives these actors leverage over them, and vice versa. In 
the case of a community, it would be their reliance on a mining company for resources 
such as jobs, income and livelihoods, that would make them dependent on the company. 
The environment makes firms susceptible to external constraint and control by 
stakeholders. From Pfeffer and Salancik’s quote above it is possible to see how resource 
dependence has similarities with the SLO argument adopted by practitioners within the 
extractives and CSR sector. As argued by authors such as Boutilier et al. (2011) and Prno 
and Slocombe (2012), mining affected communities influence the SLO of nearby mining 
projects by creating conflict. The numerous examples cited earlier of the hundreds of 
extractive sector-related conflicts with communities in Latin America also underscore 
how the external environment, such as local communities adjacent to mining companies 
can be a constraint and influence their behaviour by causing disruptions to mining 
operations and being a reason for having CSR/community relations strategies. 
 
Frooman’s (1999) model of stakeholder/organization resource dependency based on the 
work by Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978 can be argued to offer an explanation to the 
question of why certain mining communities mobilize for the purposes of influencing the 
behaviour, or even the existence, of the nearby mining companies. All mining 
communities have some sort of grievance (often similar ones related to environmental 
and health impacts) about mining inflicted impact and moreover these same communities 
also partly hold and issue the critical SLO resource the mining firms need so they can 
operate conflict free. According to Frooman (1999) and resource dependency theory, if a 
stakeholder group holds a resource that is critical to an organization (such as an SLO or 
acceptance to do business without conflict in the case of this research) then this 
stakeholder group can make legitimate claims to the organization as it can control the 
supply of this vital resource.  
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However, in order to know if the local community has sufficient power to deny issuing an 
SLO to a mining company, it is necessary to verify both that the mining company is 
dependent on the local community and that the local community is not dependent on the 
mining company. Power is therefore defined in relative terms, i.e. the local community 
has power over the mining company if the mining company is more dependent on the 
local community relative to the local community’s dependence on the mining company 
(adapted from Lawler and Yoon, 1995 in Frooman, 1999). Following on, Pfeffer and 
Salancik posit that “when the net exchange between organizational entities is 
asymmetrical, some net power accrues to the less dependent organization. This power 
may be employed in attempting to influence or constrain the behavior of the other more 
dependent organization” (1978, p.53 in Frooman, 1999). 
 
Central to resource dependence theory is the notion that a firm’s need for resources 
provides opportunities for others to gain control over it (Frooman, 1999), such as local 
communities in mining areas. Stakeholders providing resources to a firm are considered 
to have two general forms of control over a firm: firstly, determining whether the firm 
receives the resources (an SLO in this case) it needs; and secondly, deciding if the firm 
can use the resources or SLO in the way it desires. 
 
Frooman (1999) further elaborates on resource dependence theory to propose his own 
stakeholder influence strategies which he calls withholding and usage: “Withholding 
strategies are defined quite simply, then, as those where the stakeholder discontinues 
providing a resource to a firm with the intention of making the firm change a certain 
behavior” (p.199). Withholding in the context of this research could mean physical 
disruptions to the mining operations by community roadblocks and protests to cease 
operations. Usage strategies could include a media campaign led by the community 
together with NGO actors, or legal action led by lawyers/NGOs and/or politicians to 
cease mining operations. 
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Such a behaviour change in the context of mining companies would include respecting 
local community human rights, the local environment, impacts from mining, water and 
land access, a more generous sharing of benefits, social cohesion and cultural beliefs and 
disparities between the distribution of benefits and risks (similar to the main mining-
related community grievances reported by Kemp et al. (2010). The ultimate behaviour 
change in the context of mining would be accepting demands by the community for a 
complete shutdown of the mine if communities withhold their SLO. In this circumstance 
local communities would not be requesting the mining companies to change their conduct 
but to cease mining activities and just leave the land permanently, as was the case with 
the Esquel gold mine in the Argentine Patagonia in 2003 and Vedanta mining in India, 
2013.  Frooman (1999) uses examples of employees withholding labour by striking and 
of catalyzing consumer boycotts. Importantly he states that the mere threat of using 
withholding (or any of the influence strategies) may be as effective a tool for influencing 
firm behaviour as the actual use of the strategy.  
 
This point about threat is highly relevant for my research as it is what drives mining 
companies to implement CSR-related programmes and community relations, as I have 
been told frequently by mining company executives and consultants. Indeed many mining 
companies consider their local communities as an important aspect of their risk 
management and mitigation; mining giant Anglo American refers to relations with their 
local communities as “mutually dependent”.  
 
Mutual dependence between a mining company and local community would infer the 
employment of usage strategies. According to Frooman (1999), usage strategies are those 
in which the stakeholder continues to supply the resource, or SLO in the context of my 
research, but with conditions attached. In the case of a mining community, the locals may 
try to negotiate better benefits sharing, employment opportunities, and reduced 
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environmental, cultural and/or human rights impacts from the mining company in order 
to continually offer their SLO. However, the mining company would also be aware that 
the community is equally dependent on them for their own welfare in terms of 
employment, tax revenues and income generation; therefore the community does not 
leverage as much power to mobilize against them as a whole (though certain factions who 
are not so directly dependent on the mine may engage in collective mobilization) and 
completely cut off the SLO. Therefore in such negotiations neither the mining company 
nor local community would have all their demands or desires fulfilled as there would 
need to be compromise from both parties. 
 
The main difference between both strategies, as posited by Frooman (1999), is that a 
stakeholder who employs a withholding strategy, is prepared to sever the flow of 
resources to a firm, via protests and litigation, whereas an actor similar to a local 
community that employs a usage strategy is not willing to cut off the SLO it grants to the 
nearby mining project; instead it is likely to try to negotiate better terms and conditions 
such as lower environmental impacts and more social responsibility. The fact that a 
stakeholder is able to simply walk away from the relationship with the firm with no harm 
to itself gives the threat of this action even more credibility, as seen in the mining sector. 
This industry experiences hundreds of community conflicts, in Latin America alone 
(OCMAL, 2010), where the communities do not wish to give the mining companies their 
SLO and furthermore would like them to leave their territory.  
 
Mining companies are not able to source the SLO from another stakeholder in a different 
location, which means they are dependent on this specific local community stakeholder 
group. However, in my research I have seen instances where mining companies in Chile 
and Brazil will recognize a more distant urban community as its main community 
stakeholder over the nearby indigenous or rural community which was threatening to take 
away its SLO. Such a practice fits in with resource dependence theory as it shows the 
 70 
 
organization using co-optation or alternative means strategies to reduce its dependence on 
one actor and secure the resource from another source which it can then control more 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005) 
 
In other situations, however, such as one in which the stakeholder and firm are mutually 
dependent, the stakeholder will not be in a position to walk away from the relationship 
(Lawler and Bacharach, 1987; Williamson. 1979, 1983 in Frooman, 1999). In such a 
situation the well-being of each will be linked to the other, so each will do well only by 
considering the needs of the other (Frooman, 1999). Such a situation can be compared to 
the relationship between a company and a trade union, though both are adversaries in 
terms of wage demands and conditions, both parties ultimately cannot survive 
(temporarily) if the other were to close down and/or disappear. 
 
Frooman (1999) then finishes his article by discussing a typology of influence strategies 
and resource relationships. One of his main arguments is that stakeholders who are 
dependent on the firm but where the firm is not dependent on them need to use indirect 
strategies to influence the firm, for instance by leveraging other stakeholder groups and 
allies such as consumers with whom firms have a high dependency relationship, as shown 
in the following quote: 
“I define indirect strategies as those in which the stakeholder works through an ally, by 
having the ally manipulate the flow of resources to the firm (by either withholding or 
usage)” (p.198). 
Frooman (1999) ends his paper with four propositions related to indirect and direct 
stakeholder influence strategies over the firm: 
“Proposition 1: When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder 
will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202). 
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“Proposition 2: When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will 
choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202). 
“Proposition 3: When the relationship is marked by stakeholder power, the stakeholder 
will choose a direct withholding strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202).  
“Proposition 4: When the relationship is one of high interdependence, the stakeholder 
will choose a direct usage strategy to influence the firm.” (p.202). This is related to the 
four Lower Conflict cases. 
 
Based on the stakeholder theory, SLO literature and mining communities’ conflicts news 
stories, one can suggest that local community actors when allied with other groups such 
as national and international NGOs, lawyers, State actors (such as justice and regulation 
departments) can hold power over the mining companies, and hence the mining 
companies are to an extent dependent or hostage to these multiple actors.  
 
In rural communities where mining is a new, developing industry, one can state that these 
groups are independent in terms of livelihoods and therefore are not dependent upon the 
nearby mining projects. Therefore Proposition One where there is low-interdependence 
would be appropriate for such situations. In cases of conflict or a desire to withhold the 
SLO, a local community would have to partner with an ally presumably such as a lawyer, 
civil society organization or receive support from the state in order to resist the nearby 
mining project’s SLO.  
 
Finally, in communities where mining has a longer history and the residents are 
dependent upon the industry for jobs, incomes, livelihoods and their quality of life, one 
would affirm that Proposition Two is most pertinent. This is where the mining company 
would hold the power and the local community would need to rely on its benevolence or 
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on an external ally such as an NGO or local government for benefits such as community 
investment or other CSR-related benefits in exchange for its SLO. However, the mining 
company would be aware and calculate that in this situation the community would be 
unlikely to withhold the SLO and enter into conflict, and moreover doing so even via an 
external partner would be counter to their community livelihood needs and desires. 
 
What is clear is that for the local community as a whole to withdraw or withhold their 
SLO, besides being independent from the nearby mining projects they must engage in 
some sort of collective action and behaviour. Furthermore, as signalled by stakeholder 
theory, even SLO authors will need the assistance of external actors such as NGOs, the 
state and lawyers in order move up the power league of stakeholders and be heard by 
companies for their legitimate demands. In other words communities would need to take 
an indirect influence strategy in accordance with Frooman (1999). 
 
Alternatively, communities that are dependent upon mining will want to offer their SLO 
or goodwill in exchange for certain benefits from the nearby large mining projects, e.g., 
CSR, sustainability, community investment or community development, amongst other 
terms. A large mining project near a community in the developing world would in many 
cases represent the main economic activity and actor in the locality, and therefore at the 
very least the municipal government (if not local residents as well) would demand some 
form of benefits sharing or redistribution of profits locally, such as employment, training 
or additional social investment in exchange for an SLO, in addition to the legal licence to 
operate.  
 
This is the case with large mining companies in whichever location they operate. These 
more mining dependent communities would need to partner with the very same mining 
companies and other mining friendly NGOs (often hired by the mining company) and the 
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local government to identify, request and collaborate in the delivery of their community 
benefits often known as CSR, community development or investment. At most these 
communities could show their anger in small collective groups at the nearby mining 
companies only to request more or different CSR, thus making this a usage strategy in 
line with Frooman’s (1999) typology. In such cases these more dependent communities 
would be primarily after negotiation, not for turning off the supply of an SLO.  
 
As a consequence it is pertinent to analyze (see the next section) how social movement 
theory addresses both more independent and more mining dependent communities on 
how they can successfully and unsuccessfully create change collectively. More 
specifically to this research it would mean how or under what dynamics communities can 
come together as collective groups to reject and resist mining; and secondly how they can 
negotiate better community investment or CSR benefits from large nearby developments.   
 
However, resource dependence theory being a structural natured theory has been 
criticized for the lack of corresponding empirical research conducted. This is the reason 
why authors such as Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) have claimed resource dependence 
theory has been sidelined as an effective metaphor explaining organizational behaviour 
and not treated as a theory in its own right.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the resource dependence theory was developed in a company 
context and in particular within the mergers and acquisitions field. Such a context is very 
different from that of the current research topic and therefore may be regarded as a 
limitation of this research. Nonetheless Frooman (1999) adapted the theory specifically in 
the stakeholder conflict context and Henriques and Sharma (2005) carried out empirical 
research using Frooman’s 1999 resource dependent based theory of stakeholder 
influence. The aforementioned authors test Frooman’s (1999) model of withholding and 
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usage strategies via quantitative research on company reports and some company 
questionnaires based on managerial perception.  
 
However, the research employed no stakeholder interviews or questionnaires. Henriques 
and Sharma (2005) importantly claim the local community and civil society groups can 
withhold critical resources such as an SLO via roadblocks and questioning the legitimacy 
of forestry companies. However, this assumption was not supported by a rationale of how 
exactly communities can take away the SLO from forestry companies and in addition for 
how long this SLO is to be withheld. Considering the research was based on secondary 
reports and managerial perceptions only, it would seem understandable that Henriques 
and Sharma (2005) did not shed more light on these questions, which this present thesis 
will hope to do for the mining communities under research. The following section 
considers social movement theory’s treatment of the community actor.  
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2.4 Social movement-related Literature 
This thesis also considers the social movement-related literature as it provides a more 
detailed level of analysis of collective action by aggrieved groups towards dominant 
societal institutions who call for some sort of social and political change. King (2008) 
uses social movement theory to explain how stakeholders are able (or unable) to 
influence corporations. He states that though social movement theory was developed 
primarily to focus on collective action against the State, many of the key insights from 
this theory can shed light on understanding stakeholders of the firm, and this would 
consequently include the community actor.  
 
In his paper, King (2008) provides support to the critical thinkers of stakeholder theory 
by confirming that firms and the State need to manage their stakeholders. He thus argues 
from a perspective which intends to help companies manage their stakeholders should the 
latter attempt to collectively mobilize against the former. 
 
This current section of the chapter uses King’s (2008) publication to delineate social 
movement theory’s treatment of the community actor as the author tries to bridge 
stakeholder and social movement theory by analyzing corporate stakeholders through a 
social movement lens. This is the closest the social movement literature comes to 
addressing the community stakeholder. 
 
King (2008) takes Frooman’s (1999) work further to understand how secondary 
stakeholders can influence corporations via social movement theory. King (2008) 
criticises stakeholder theory for its firm-centric view of stakeholders that fails to consider 
stakeholder action. King (2008) also acknowledges the work of Frooman (1999) in his 
stakeholder influence strategies work, however criticises it for its resource dependence 
perspective which King (2008) says is too structural and does not do justice to the level 
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of the community, in particular to the collective action that is needed to influence firms 
and is assumed as a given by Frooman (King, 2008). 
 
In short, social movement theory moves the emphasis of analysis from the manager’s 
perspective to the external settings of collective action outside the corporation (King, 
2008). As argued by King (2008), a social movement perspective of corporate 
stakeholders complements the current literature examining stakeholder strategies of 
influence (e.g., Frooman, 1999; Hendry, 2005) by focusing on the collective action 
needed to attract managerial attention. He finishes by suggesting stakeholder scholars 
should take inspiration from social movement scholars and pay more attention to 
particular historical instances of stakeholder influence and its consequent effects on 
management. 
 
Collective action is necessary for secondary stakeholders such as local communities to 
exert pressure on nearby mining projects as these communities’ members lack resources 
individually (King, 2008). Moreover, it takes the community as a whole and a vast 
majority to withhold the SLO or create significant levels of conflict for a nearby mining 
project.   
 
In contrast to resource dependence and stakeholder theorists, social movement theory 
analyzes the processes of collective action which is regarded as important for 
understanding collective behaviour (King, 2008). Collective action does not always 
occur, despite high levels of individual grievances and motives for action against a 
private sector company (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). Social movement theorists 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), provide three main explanations why some groups 
are able to overcome obstacles and engage in collective action against a corporation, 
known as the political process model: 
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1. Mobilizing structures  
a. Organization strength  
b. Resource endowment 
2. Corporate (political) opportunities, and  
3. Framing processes.  
However, it should be mentioned that not all social movement theorists agree with this 
political process model. For example, Snow and Benford (2000) and Jasper (2010) 
criticize the highly structural, macro- and resource-focused arguments used by political 
process proponents such as McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow as ignoring the importance of 
culture, emotions and a sense of injustice for the mobilizing of social movement. Snow 
and Benford (2000) and Jasper (2010) further contend that dismissing the “why” of social 
movement, in favour of “how” social movements mobilize, fails to provide a full and 
accurate picture of the phenomenon of collective action. Jasper (2010) correspondingly 
makes the main call of his paper for social movement literature to reflect and devise a 
theory of action, which is currently lacking.  
 
In line with this argument proposing a more meso or ground level perspective on social 
movements Cefaı (2007) in Jasper (2010) presents ethnography as the surest way to 
understand the situations in which humans make sense of their world. 
 
Berry (2003) makes a poignant assertion around the challenges facing a community 
mobilizing against the siting of a large industrial or extractives project. A community in 
such a situation is not only fighting a specific, proposed development but is also fighting 
general societal values and norms. It requires a powerful community to alter traditional 
power dynamics between themselves, government and industry to achieve regulatory and 
behavioural change that is more beneficial to the local community. Understanding the 
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phenomenon of social movements from both a structural and micro level perspective is 
essential to understand why and how certain communities are able to mobilize against 
nearby mining projects and why other communities are not capable of such a feat.  
 
According to sociologists McAdam et al. (2010) the social movements and contentious 
politics literature is the best place to analyze community responses to infrastructure 
projects (which have also created large environmental and social impacts similar to 
mining) as it is fundamentally concerned with the workings of emergent collective 
behaviour. Nonetheless the social movements literature has paid almost no attention to 
the subject of social movements opposing infrastructure projects in emerging markets.  
 
As mentioned earlier, political scientists and structural sociologists have considered the 
most important driving factors for successful social movement to be access to financial, 
human and political resources. Indeed some proponents such as McCarthy and Zald 
(1997) have gone as far as to argue that all societies have sufficient feelings of 
discontent; they need the right organizations with political resource and power to supply 
them in order to become social movements and create the desired change. Thus one could 
extrapolate that without these resources, organizations and leaders’ groups are prohibited 
from mobilizing. According to Min-Dong (2011) stakeholders monitoring companies 
need institutions to legitimate and strengthen their claim. Without institutional legitimacy 
and support for stakeholders’ claims, it is very easy for large firms (such as mining 
companies) to dominate the stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders often depend on the 
power and legitimacy based in institutions.  
 
This powerful claim is evident in the empirical research on mining company/community 
conflict in the works of Bebbington et al. (2008), Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), Cabrejas 
(2012), Kraemer et al. (2013) and Urkidi and Walter (2011), where the importance of an 
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external organization to help the local community with resources was a highly important 
factor for mobilizing the community against the mining company.   
 
However, since the 1980s, authors such as Snow (1986), Gamson (1992) and Jasper 
(2010) have called for more socio-psychological factors to be included within 
frameworks to explain why social movements form and succeed (point III in King’s 2008 
framework). Such factors, commonly referred to as “framing”, include a sense of 
grievance, injustice, threats to identity and ideologies (Snow and Benford, 2000). These 
factors have also been referred to as “threats” (McAdam et al., 2010) or “demand factors 
of mobilization” (Klandermans, 2004). According to Mannarini et al. (2009), the 
following six factors are highly influential in communities mobilizing against unwanted 
infrastructure projects in order of importance according to Mannarini et al (2009): sense 
of injustice, community involvement, the perception of the existence of a vast majority in 
the community favouring mobilization, group identification, place attachment and 
collective efficacy. Indeed, in the social movements framework provided by King (2008) 
earlier in this chapter, the subject of framing was stated as an essential element of social 
movements theory. 
 
2.41 Social movements from a Community versus project siting perspective 
Two significant social movements-related publications are those by McAdam et al. 
(2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012), which both focus on oil and gas pipeline sitings, 
thus similar to the mining context. The former examine the causal factors of mobilization 
efforts against the siting of 11 oil and gas pipeline projects across the developing world 
by using archival data only. The latter used fieldwork interviews to make a comparative 
analysis of the reasons behind different mobilization levels from USA communities 
facing the construction of Liquidified Natural Gas (LNG) terminals in their proximity; 
the methodology for this research was fuzzy set analysis and therefore not ethnographic. 
Fuzzy set analysis for multiple case studies leans more towards structured interview 
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analysis using statistical measurements with minimal community residents’ perspectives, 
as depicted in McAdam and Boudet (2012). 
 
In McAdam and Boudet’s (2012) research on 20 American communities facing the 
construction of LNG plants, as well as McAdam et al.’s (2010) findings of community 
mobilization in 16 different developing world countries against the construction of 11 oil 
and gas pipelines, the authors found that in most cases communities did not manage to 
mobilize or vent their frustrations and grievances. McAdam and Boudet (2012) also 
stress the importance of understanding why so many “communities at risk of 
mobilization” do not mobilize against such heavy environmental impact projects and 
criticize current social movement authors for focusing on the very rare instances of 
successful collective action. McAdam et al. (2010), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and 
Klandermans in a personal communication in 2012, argue further that this lack of 
mobilization by “at risk of mobilization groups” is overlooked by the literature and needs 
further understanding and theorizing.  
 
As proposed by McAdam and Boudet (2012) this present thesis also intends to study the 
variation in community responses to the mining operations to allow the phenomenon of 
interest to move from successful social movement to “mobilization attempts” or, more 
accurately, “communities at risk of mobilization.” p.409. After all, as stated by Zald and 
McCarthy (1977), all groups have grievances about some issues, however very few take 
collective action to address them. This is a question this present research aims to address 
by researching cases of mixed and low conflict/good relations with nearby mining 
projects in Brazil and Chile.  
 
Despite the majority of the social movements literature not addressing the area of 
communities at risk of mobilization, that are facing environmental impacts from large 
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industries such as mining projects, authors such as McAdam et al. (2001), (2010) and 
McAdam and Boudet (2012) posit that social movements literature is best placed to study 
this phenomenon because it essentially deals with emergent collective behaviour. Such 
collective behaviour is at the crux of communities who take a collective position against a 
nearby mining project. Therefore this present thesis uses the lens of social movements 
literature and social identity-related theories to analyze my phenomenon of research 
regarding community positions towards nearby mining projects, and in particular using 
the above-mentioned relevant publications for theoretical grounding. 
 
Another relevant social movements-related publication is provided by Walsh et al. 
(1997). These authors set out with the objective of researching, via telephone interviews 
and questionnaires, what factors contributed to incinerator location sitings across the 
USA,. They concluded that the main factors prevalent in communities where incinerator 
plans had been defeated were that they were always supported by country-wide activists 
– not just at the local level. Secondly, having access to influential local politicians was 
also a great aid in the community’s resistance; this was also corroborated by Shriver and 
Kennedy (2005) in their research on an American mining community, and by McAdam 
and Boudet (2012) in their oil pipeline siting study. These conclusions support the more 
structural arguments around the importance of resources for communities to be able to 
mobilize. 
 
Further relevant examples include Devlin and Turbino (2012) who suggest reasons why 
the community of Itabira, an urban city in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil (the same 
state where two of my case studies are located) mobilized and de-mobilized against plans 
for mining very nearby. Abers (2007) wrote about how external agents such as academics 
were a crucial factor in creating a collective identity for building a social movement in 
two Brazilian communities facing large dam constructions. A final subsection of the 
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literature is that of the social identity domain, which also speaks much more about the 
framing concept, at the more individual/micro levels.  
 
2.42 Social identity-related theories  
At a more meso/community level, the thesis also draws on social identity theory within a 
social movements literature context to help explain at a community level what is driving 
the positions and sentiment towards nearby mining projects. Rowley and Moldoveanu 
(2003) posit that social identity is a “set of mutual understandings regarding the unique 
characteristics that distinguish (members) from nonmembers” (p. 208). Social identity is 
defined as the features that make a group unique from any other (Albert and Whetten, 
1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) propose that groups 
who value their common identity more than their shared interests are more likely to 
mobilize against a focal organization.  
 
On the other hand, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) continue to posit that individuals 
belonging to various groups with competing interests are less likely to engage in any 
action against an organization; for example, a local community resident may not protest 
against the environmental pollution from a nearby mine if s/he also receives CSR-related 
benefits from the mine, as protesting in this case would be self-defeating. The links to the 
higher structural argument of resource dependency theory, as put forward by Frooman 
(1999), are clear to see in this example where the recipient of CSR can be seen to have a 
level of dependence on the mining company and therefore would have their position 
compromised should they openly protest against any negative impacts. 
 
In a similar line of argument, Gramlin and Freudenburg (2006) make an interesting 
contribution from their research into the divergent perspectives of communities in 
Louisiana and California towards nearby coastal oil exploration platforms. They argue 
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that historical, biophysical and social factors explain the different responses of these 
coastal communities and stress the need for “multiple-factor explanations, as opposed to 
single-factor explanations” of these types of phenomena (p.486). To summarise, 
communities in Louisiana were much more accepting of the oil industry on their coast 
because local fishermen had historically enjoyed a good relationship with the sector, 
which had also provided employment. Due to the geography of the Louisiana coast, the 
visual impacts were limited and even more so due to the fact that few people actually live 
on the coast. Most people in Louisiana, who have one of the lowest education levels in 
the USA, had a family member or friend working in the oil industry nearby – referred to 
as the “social multiplier effect” by Gramling and Freudenburg (2006) – and so therefore 
also approved of the sector.  
 
In California much of the opposite was true. Historically the oil sector had never been 
present, and people who lived on the coast did so to enjoy the scenery and unspoilt 
nature. The biophysical nature of the Californian coast, differently from that of 
Louisiana, meant that the oil platforms would be highly visible. Thirdly, the Californian 
population is one of the highest educated nationally and near the coast the main employer 
is the tourism and recreational sector (Gramling and Freudenburg, 2006). The importance 
of the industry or sector historically in the community was also a key factor reported by 
Bebbington et al. (2008) and McAdam and Boudet (2012) in their respective studies. 
These arguments also have an explicit link to the dependency thesis, that when a 
community member has a level of dependency on the mine and when the mine 
simultaneously holds the same degree of power over this community member, then 
mobilization attempts are nullified. Therefore the social movement and social identity 
literature should take into consideration the dependency theory, as posited by Frooman 
(1999).  
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However, as reminded by King (2008) in his review of the social movement’s literature, 
groups may share common beliefs and grievances about a corporation’s responsibility to 
its constituents, but without mobilizing structures they lack the means to transform those 
sentiments into action and influence. He argues that both the macro-institutional and 
meso-community levels are highly important in understanding the levels at which groups 
mobilize. McAdam et al. (2001) also argue that it is more at the meso-community level 
where social movement can be triggered and therefore this level needs more ethnographic 
research, which is my chosen methodology.  
 
This literature review concludes by offering an analytical review of several empirical 
academic publications set in the context of mining-affected communities, and relations 
and conflict with nearby mining projects. The following publications also demonstrate 
the importance of the community perspective in the context of mining 
company/community conflicts: Bebbington et al. (2008); Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), 
Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Kraemer, Whiteman and Banerjee (2013). These 
empirically based publications demonstrate the importance of a critical CSR perspective 
on how the mining companies approach community relations as an explanation for why 
relations turn negative and companies lose their SLO. These publications also combine 
elements of stakeholder theory from the mining company perspective and elements of 
social movement theory to illustrate how the mining-affected communities have 
attempted to mobilize against nearby mining projects. This leads to an assertion that 
instrumental CSR and stakeholder theory, and its translation into practitioner literature, is 
not the panacea it claims to be in resolving stakeholder conflict and gaining a clear SLO 
simply by considering and engaging with aggrieved local community members. 
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2.43 Literature review of the community perspective on mining 
company/community relations and conflict 
I begin by discussing the work of Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) who write about an 
indigenous Peruvian community – the Machiguenga tribe – and their position regarding 
the construction of a gas exploration plant on their land. This tribe’s traditional way of 
life within the flora and fauna was threatened by this large extractives project. An 
external NGO helped strengthen their identity as an indigenous people through 
workshops and educational materials, which led to the community uniting to resist the 
gas project even more for the sake of their collective identity. The strengthening of a 
collective community identity with the support of an external NGO actor in order to resist 
a mining project is not contemplated by the above-mentioned literature from the mining 
sector or stakeholder theory. This is an important aspect for explaining and understanding 
the conflict and resistance to the gas-mining project in Peru.  
 
Bruijn and Whiteman’s (2009) main argument and claim is about how the Machiguenga 
people’s identity work was triggered by false promises made by the Camisea gas project 
and persistent negative environmental impacts on the livelihood and culture of this 
community. Moreover, Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) argue that the Machiguenga 
people’s identity work was instigated by an organization established by themselves 
known as the Comaru. Upon seeing environmental damage to their land and unethical 
behaviour from company representatives, as well as increased migration of men to their 
territory to look for work at the project, the Machiguenga people through their Comaru 
organization began a process of identity work or strengthening.  
 
The Comaru organized several workshops for their people to learn and become aware of 
the international legislation, their rights as an indigenous people, and the organizations 
and NGOs that would defend their rights as indigenous people. In my own experience in 
neighbouring Chile I discovered a very similar picture with an indigenous community of 
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a mining company. Learning how their cultures are valued outside their countries, in 
particular in the western and developed world by NGOs such as Survival and Friends of 
the Earth, and international organizations such as the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) and the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), helped 
to revitalize and consolidate their identities. As later put forward by Bruijn and Whiteman 
(2009) this example of “glocalization” led to increasingly strong rejections of the mining 
project, culminating in their refusal to participate in consultation meetings and the 
community statement that they would no longer engage in talks with the company as they 
were now in total opposition to the project.  
 
Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) conclude, “a deeper understanding of the process of local 
identity work, across the individual, community and collective regional level, improves 
our understanding of how unwanted natural resource development affects Indigenous 
cultures” (p.489). Their conclusion only goes a little way towards answering this thesis’ 
main phenomenon of interest, i.e. what influences local communities in their position 
regarding nearby mining projects. Bruijn and Whiteman’s (2009) final remark in their 
paper is “Future research is needed to explore if and how identity work helps us unravel 
the causes of blockades, kidnapping, and forcible closure of oil and natural gas 
production”. (p.493). I aim to expand on Bruijn and Whiteman’s (2009) recommendation 
for further research with my own research, by considering how identity affects 
community positions towards nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile.  
 
However, what is lacking from Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), with regard to the present 
research interest, is a discussion around structural level power dynamics and 
mobilization, such as how the Camisea gas project company reacted to the Machiguenga 
people’s resistance. Did the mining company use an influence strategy including social 
responsibility programmes, and what was the counter-response by the Machiguenga 
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people to this? The following two papers by Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Kraemer et al. 
(2013) address more fully the complexity of these mining company/community conflicts. 
 
The publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) builds on two previous publications by 
Urkidi on the Pascua Lama mining conflict in the Huasco Valley in Chile, which is a case 
study this present thesis intends to study. In Urkidi and Walter’s (2011) publication, they 
discuss two mining community conflict cases (though not comparing and contrasting 
them) of Pascua Lama in Chile and Esquel in Argentina. The research was conducted in 
an ethnographic and qualitative manner after Urkidi had remained in the Huasco Valley 
for weeks in 2008 trying to understand the different community positions towards Barrick 
Gold’s Pascua Lama project. The article discusses how environmental justice claims of 
participation, recognition and distributional justice were more salient from the 
community perspective over time. Urkidi (2008) takes an even more process focused 
approach by discussing how the social movement against Pascua Lama developed using a 
timeline to tell the story.  
 
The main findings presented in Urkidi and Walter (2011), which are relevant to this 
thesis research in terms of understanding mining company community relations and 
conflict from a community perspective, include how Barrick Gold did not provide 
acceptable participation for the local community in discussing Pascua Lama at the project 
stage. Urkidi and Walter (2011) argue that Barrick Gold only offered the Huasco Valley 
the opportunity to participate in local consultations about the proposed mining project 
before they published their Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA). However, once 
Barrick published their EIA it was clearly too overly technical and extensive for the local 
community to understand. Barrick Gold gave a short time frame for receiving comments 
and those who gave feedback to the mining company were aggrieved that these were not 
taken into consideration and were ignored, according to the interviewees. It therefore 
seems that Barrick Gold had tried to follow the guiding principles of gaining an SLO, as 
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mentioned earlier, by consulting the local community and being transparent. However, 
they were not very cooperative in actually helping the community to comprehend the EIA 
nor did they allow much time for or even take on board the suggestions from local 
concerned residents, which suggests that the mining company was not sincere in its 
intentions from the outset. 
 
Urkidi and Walter (2011) go on to state that the Huasco Valley community was divided 
in its resistance to Pascua Lama. At the EIA stage, OLCA, an external NGO from 
Santiago, also began to participate much more in the community resistance, offering 
advice and support for tackling Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama mining project. 
Furthermore, within the local community the indigenous group, known as the Diaguita 
people, was not resisting the mine, together with the non-indigenous community groups; 
the Diaguita instead were insisting on litigation, lawyers and the legal process to stop 
Pascua Lama from materializing this project. According to Urkidi and Walter (2011) this 
was an example of the desire for recognition. To add further complexity, Barrick Gold 
had won over some of the Diaguita community with their generous CSR initiatives and 
were in fact dictating the Diaguita identity to the Diaguita people and promoting 
indigenous leaders in order to manage and manipulate the community to its advantage: 
“The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to conduct 
workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a nonexistent 
Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have raised false 
leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the media, discrediting 
the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable divisions between 
community members and their neighbours. All these actions have led to confusion and 
they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos.” (Letter to Canadian 
parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino Agricultural Community, May 2009.) (p.689) 
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The main argument Urkidi and Walter (2011) continue to make is how the community 
tried to frame the anticipated negative impacts from Pascua Lama into a broader and 
international scale in order to win more support in response to the co-optation tactics of 
Barrick Gold. The community used arguments and frames such as Barrick paying little 
tax, the lack of democracy in the licensing process for the mine and the close relations 
with politicians that Barrick Gold supposedly enjoyed. At the international level the 
community framed its discourse around the alignment with climate change and water 
depletion. The Pascua Lama mine has now been suspended since April 2013 (over a year) 
due to an order issued by the Chilean courts of justice who based their decision on the 
irresponsible management of toxic chemicals by Barrick Gold. The previous theme about 
how Barrick Gold manipulated the Diaguita people’s identity and how external actors and 
NGOs entered the community resistance movement provides a linkage with the next 
publication to be highlighted, that of Kraemer et al. (2013).  
 
Kraemer et al., (2013) focus their publication on the community and social movement 
resistance against a proposed bauxite mine in India in the area where the Dongria Kondh 
tribe lives; they present their findings in a unique process style with a timeline of 
interrelated relevant events. Their data are based on ethnographic field research with 
dozens of community interviews over a period of weeks in India, similarly to the research 
informing Bruijn and Whiteman (2009) and Urkidi and Walter (2011). In a more explicit 
way than Urkidi and Walter (2011), Kraemer et al. (2013) argue that stakeholder theory 
fails to capture the complexities of mining company community conflicts mainly because 
of the counter-mobilization tactics employed by firms to co-opt and destabilize anti-
mining resistance movements. This would also include what Barrick Gold allegedly did 
with regard to manipulating the Diaguita people’s identity, as reported by Urkidi and 
Walter (2011). In the case of Kraemer et al. (2013) the Vedanta Resources mining 
company was able to co-opt the local community leader, Jika who was leading the local 
resistance and mobilization against the planned mine. Vedanta Resources did so by 
offering to pay Jika education scholarships to study abroad, once Jika had accepted he 
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left the community and even appeared on videos stating the importance of the mine for 
the community’s development. Furthermore Kraemer et al. (2013) also recount from their 
field research how people related to Vedanta Resources, such as suppliers, employees or 
recipients of CSR, used intimidation and threatening techniques on the local community 
members who were opposed to the mine. The lines between CSR and counter-
mobilization, as Kraemer et al. (2013) refer to such corporate influence strategies, 
became more blurred when some members of a youth club funded by Vedanta 
Resources’ CSR programmes beat up local anti-mining protesters with cricket bats 
sponsored by the mining company. In addition to violent incidents, there was also the 
alleged linking of the mining company to the death of a leading opponent in a car crash. 
Vedanta Resources also funded several local developmental NGOs to co-opt the local 
community by offering capacity building benefits, and disseminate the message that 
mining would offer positive economic and social impacts to the local community. These 
tactics also overlap with some of those outlined by Urkidi and Walter (2011) in their case 
of Pascua Lama in the Huasco Valley in Chile. Vedanta Mining in India as with Barrick 
Gold in Chile have also been ordered to suspend operations since late 2013 due to 
community conflict and rejection of the mine. 
 
Another factor Kraemer et al. (2013) highlight as being significant in the community 
mobilization against the nearby mining project is that of external, including international, 
NGOs (some that also worked on the side of the mining company). As in the cases of 
Bruijn and Whiteman, and Urkidi and Walter, it seems the external actor’s role is 
imperative in mobilizing the local communities against unwanted nearby mining projects.  
 
The fourth and final case study for analysis is that of Bebbington et al. (2008) who set out 
to answer how social movement affects the development and livelihoods of rural 
territories in Peru and Ecuador using mining projects as the context in their work. They 
use archival data to put forward their argument as opposed to direct fieldwork in the two 
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communities on which they report. They also discuss the complexities of these social 
movement dynamics affected by internal and external issues such as power and 
leadership struggles with and amongst other organizations and actors, including the 
mining companies. Bebbington et al.’s (2008) publication is highly relevant to the present 
research phenomenon because it takes a longitudinal or historical perspective on major 
events in the mining company community relations; however, it also compares and 
contrasts two different case studies in a mining context. This is what the present research 
aims to do though this time using multiple case studies. 
 
Bebbington et al. (2008) firstly analyze the case of MYSA in Cajamarca, Peru, the largest 
gold mine in Latin America jointly owned by the largest gold miner in the world the US-
based Newmont Gold, the Peruvian mining company Buenaventura and the World 
Bank’s IFC that has a 5% stake in the company. MYSA first faced opposition from the 
rural communities which were expected to be most affected by this new proposed mining 
project. However, these rural community associations did not have clear aims and in 
general were considered to generally want better terms and conditions in their treatment, 
compensation and social responsibility benefits from MYSA. Therefore the mobilizing 
structures (King, 2008) were weak in this rural community. Around the same time as 
some publicly visible environmental violations of the mine, MYSA finally succeeded in 
persuading these rural community associations to accept their social responsibility 
programme’s benefits. Once this became known by the public in the local community and 
the nearest urban communities, it de-legitimized the rural associations’ credibility and 
power. As a result of this acceptance of collaboration with MYSA, the social movement 
resistance towards the mine soon moved from rural to urban organizations. The urban 
movement was more intellectual and academic focusing on the environmental impacts of 
the mine and therefore taking a more hardline approach against the mine. The urban 
social movements in general did not want to see the mine developing at all in the region 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). 
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In July 2004, when the central government gave MYSA authorization to restart 
exploration in Quilish there were immediate protests. “Confronted with a situation in 
which its "social license to operate" seemed increasingly in the balance, MYSA withdrew 
its request for permission to explore in Quilish.” (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.3012). 
 
However, as this conflict grew in Cajamarca many different actors with differing aims 
and objectives joined the mobilization. Therefore as posited by Bebbington et al., (2008) 
the social movement against MYSA had no coherent proposal for an alternative 
livelihood to mining. Though MYSA had stopped trying to mine in Quilish, it had 
continued to grow in other parts and at the same time, as a response to the urban 
community mobilization, increased social responsibility and local purchasing spending 
by six or seven fold, which, it can be argued, began to create dependency from the 
communities on the mine and thus give power or leverage to MYSA over the community 
and essentially an easier SLO. In addition, MYSA was claimed to be involved in 
intimidation against activists and any others willing to resist the mine (Bebbington et al., 
2008), in a similar vein to the counter-mobilization of the mining company that Kraemer 
et al. (2013) uncovered in India.  
 
However, in Bebbington et al.’s (2008) second case study of the Cotacachi community 
facing a nearby mining project in Ecuador, the findings contrasted with those in Peru. In 
this case external actors, such as US-based NGOs, became aware of these plans to mine 
in the area before any action by the mining company. The international NGOs 
communicated this information to local actors in Cotacachi which led to a gradual 
process of social mobilization opposing the proposed future mine.  
 
Environmental NGO, Acción Ecológica, together with local community actors in 
Cotacachi then began raising awareness around environmental issues and making 
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communities aware of the costs mining can bring and moreover on how to effectively 
mobilize and oppose the mine. In time the community took a hard line against the mine 
as they had also been funded by Acción Ecológica to visit other mining sites in Ecuador 
and Peru. The social movement against mining included an NGO, two youth groups, a 
vocal priest, an ecotourism entrepreneur and environmentalist, and a community-based 
organization in the areas most affected by the nearby proposed mining project 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). This community was evidently stronger in terms of resource 
endowment and mobilizing structures than the Cajamarca community in Peru. This 
multiple actor and well-focused social movement organization was able to persuade the 
Cotacachi local government to pass a municipal ordinance declaring itself an “ecological 
canton” which meant that mining would not be permitted there. The mining company in 
Cotacachi was without any political allies, unlike in the case of Cajamarca (Bebbington et 
al., 2008). 
 
Together the social movement organization and the municipality invested substantially to 
develop alternative and new economic possibilities such as organic coffee production, 
handicrafts, and community managed ecotourism. The justification for this work was the 
idea that “we are convinced that, if we are to block mining, we must offer practical 
productive alternatives… that generate employment.” (Bebbington et al., 2008 p.30).  
This was unlike what had happened in Cajamarca in Peru. Cotacachi therefore was not 
dependent upon the nearby mining company as it had its own organic livelihood, unlike 
in the communities in Cajamarca in Peru and arguably in the Huasco Valley in Chile, as 
reported by Urkidi and Walter (2011) or in India as argued by Kraemer et al. (2013). 
 
This important situation had, according to Bebbington et al. (2008), made it more 
straightforward for the community movement organizations to maintain a shared and 
coherent environmental agenda in Cotacachi. The mining company in Ecuador was also 
much smaller than MYSA in Peru and therefore was not able to engage in serious 
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counter-mobilization using social responsibility-related tactics to gain support and 
diminish opposition, unlike MYSA who had won over their opponents with jobs and 
funding. 
 
Bebbington et al., (2008) also point to the macro structural level for an important 
explanation, i.e. Ecuador is much more hydrocarbons focused and has a nascent and 
small mining industry, whereas in Peru the government decided some years ago that they 
would develop and grow via mining. The Peruvian State sponsored MYSA to come into 
Peru to mine for gold and was the first new multinational mining company after many 
years to be given such permission. The mining opponents in Cajamarca were against the 
joint alliance of MYSA and the national government (Bebbington et al., 2008).  
 
Therefore it seems that a more united community with a strong identity and its own 
livelihood, as also shown by Bruijn and Whiteman (2009), helps in preventing unwanted 
mining projects and essentially an SLO for mining companies. The fact that MYSA is 
currently suspended due to violence, also demonstrates that questionable ethical 
behaviour such as counter-mobilization, aggressive social responsibility spending and 
intimidation of opposition actors does not bode well for the long term.  
 
It is also worth pointing out that Cotacachi was in the international limelight for having 
one of the first indigenous elected leaders who was making radical changes to the local 
economy in line with ecological practices. This also attracted many NGOs and volunteers 
to the canton, and so increased financial and technical resources available for resisting the 
mining project. To this day the mine at Cotacachi has not commenced operations despite 
attempts to do so since 1996. Nonetheless the Ecuadorian government has partnered with 
the Chilean copper company Codelco, the largest copper mining company in the world, 
to mine the area around Intag and they have now started to explore the area. This also 
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lends support to the idea that the situation of conflict and an SLO can change over time. 
At the time of writing and publication in 2008, Bebbington et al. claimed mining had 
been stopped in Intag due to community resistance. However, in 2014 the Ecuadorian 
government, together with Chilean mining company Codelco, have aggressively returned 
and started explorations and in April 2014 the leader of the community resistance in Intag 
was arrested by the police and put in chains on a charge of inciting disturbances. This 
example also shows the power of the State/Business nexus in dealing with community 
resistance to such projects and also weakens the importance attached to the SLO. In other 
words despite there not being an SLO in Intag, the Ecuadorian State is still able to push 
ahead with mining exploration for the mining company, that in turn has also been using 
corporate influence strategies and CSR to gain some local support by those least affected 
by the mining project (Zorilla, 2014).   
 
In addition, the mining operations in Cajamarca, Peru have been suspended due to 
excessive violence (though at the time of Bebbington et al.’s publication in 2008 it was 
still operating) adding further evidence to the importance of temporal considerations of 
legal licenses to operate, conflict, relations and mining within communities as these 
change. All these elements present further questions around the importance of the SLO 
concept by itself, in isolation. As shown in these cases there may or may not be an SLO; 
however, a mine can be functioning or not contradicting the SLO. 
 
In short Bebbington et al. (2008) via their Ecuador case study and Bruijn and Whiteman 
(2009) argue that a strong, well organized and coherent social movement within the 
affected community can explain overall anti-mining positions. On the other hand, when 
communities are fragmented by differing aims they are more susceptible to counter-
mobilization tactics of large and powerful mining companies and can therefore be co-
opted and manipulated as in Cajamarca (Bebbington et al., 2008), in India (Kraemer et 
al., 2013) and in the Huasco Valley in Chile (Urkidi and Walter, 2011). 
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The above four empirical case studies from Peru, Chile and India provide substantial 
evidence that stakeholder theory and the practitioner guidance material for mining 
companies are not sufficient for these firms to gain community acceptance and avoid 
local conflict and hence are insufficient to explain the positions communities take in 
relation to mines. The cases highlight the importance of understanding the specific 
contextual factors within the communities and of mining company actions or influencing 
strategies for gaining a deeper insight into company/community relations. The papers by 
Urkidi and Walter (2011), and Kraemer et al. (2013) help in understanding the 
phenomena of mining companies’ influence strategies, such as counter-mobilization, 
manipulation, divide and conquer, as well as the potential for CSR initiatives with the 
local community to influence community positions. Therefore they are alluding to the 
concept of power relations between the mining company (and State) and the local 
community.  
 
This chapter finishes by offering some concluding remarks on the importance of 
dependence and social movement-related theories for my research question. 
 
 
2.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
It is worthwhile finishing this section with an argument supplied by Bebbington et al. 
(2008) on why communities may mobilize in the context of mining, which implicitly 
links dependency theory with social movements in a relevant mining context for my 
research. They state “At the same time, threats to livelihood might also elicit mobilization 
motivated by the cultural and psychological losses that might arise when livelihoods are 
disarticulated” (p.2995). The authors here claim that communities can mobilize when 
they feel their livelihoods and culture are threatened, or in other words as I argue their 
independence is placed in jeopardy from mining. As a conclusion, I argue mining 
companies backed by the State try to dilute local social movements and resistance by 
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trying to make these same community groups more dependent upon them, despite their 
adamant public claims to make local communities as self-sufficient as possible. As such 
this would make the communities less independent and more dependent on the mining 
sector. It would also offer an important understanding of the reasons driving mining 
company community relations or conflict.  
Mining as an activity causes high levels of environmental and social disruption to local 
communities as I observed from my field research, past practitioner experience and as 
also reported by Bebbington et al. (2008), Jenkins (2004) and Kemp et al. (2010).  Most 
community residents with a mining operation located nearby have good reason to 
complain about excess dust, noise, traffic, cost of living, social problems, migration, 
water depletion, water pollution and lack of benefits sharing by the mining companies. 
As argued by Zald and McCarthy (1977) all groups in society share grievances about 
certain issues or topics; however, very few take collective action to address them. This 
begs the question therefore of why communities experiencing social and environmental 
impacts from nearby mining projects do not take any collective action against them 
whilst other communities do take such group action against the mining companies when 
the impacts are quite similar in nature. 
 
The debate between social movements, stakeholder and dependency theory was 
highlighted by King (2008) who posits that both stakeholder and dependency theories are 
unable to account for providing further insight and details into how collective action 
occurs against an organization. Therefore social movement theory is the most appropriate 
for helping to understand how groups such as communities or NGOs may collectively 
take action and influence a company.  
 
However, after analyzing in this chapter some of the literature from authors such as 
Bebbington et al. (2008), Gramling and Freudenburg (2006), Kraemer et al. (2013), 
McAdam and Boudet (2012), Rowley and Moldoveanu, (2003) and Urkidi and Walter 
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(2011), it becomes apparent that social movements and social identity theories fail to 
recognize the power that the target organization or institution holds, which can in turn 
subdue the ‘at risk of mobilization group’ and/or become dependent on this target 
organization, therefore nullifying any real collective mobilization or resistance.  
 
Using their power to create the dependence of local communities in order to operate 
would be a highly favourable outcome for mining companies and the State. However, it is 
also a gamble for them to begin operating where there is no overall community consent 
or SLO and attempt to wield their power with CSR- and manipulation-related strategies 
to create local community dependence and some sort of acceptance. It seems from the 
case of the Huasco Valley, as reported by Urkidi and Walter (2011), that this was indeed 
the case. Their data are from around 2008 and I intend researching in the Huasco Valley 
in 2012-2013 to learn how this strategy of nullifying local community mobilization via 
creating dependence has worked for Barrick Gold.  
 
I hope to address the question of why certain communities mobilize against their nearby 
mining projects whereas others do not, by assessing how important stakeholder influence 
strategies, dependency and social movement-related theories and any others may be in 
providing a credible explanation. Therefore (one of) my main intended contributions is to 
explore how communities mobilize and resist nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile. 
Is there a difference in a more self-sufficient community in terms of how they are able to 
mobilize against mining-related grievances compared with a more mining dependent 
community?  
 
As argued by Banerjee (2011), in order to answer questions around levels of community 
relations and conflict in a mining context, researchers must visit places of resistance, of 
protest, and livelihood struggles. “Instead of seeking more answers to the same questions 
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we should be asking different questions. A critical research agenda will not seek answers 
about whether corporate social responsibility improves profitability but instead ask why 
are communities in different parts of the world protesting against corporations and 
governments, why are they willing to give up their lives for their struggle (Banerjee, 
2011, p.341). The theories of resource dependence, social movements and social identity 
will help in answering these aforementioned questions.  
 
In addition Banerjee (2011) also calls for researchers to understand the power dynamics 
between different actors in the contested space of business – community conflict. This is 
because such conflicts, according to Banerjee (2011), take place in the “larger political 
economy of development involving complex power relations between market, state and 
civil society” (p.723). This is an important gap in the literature which this thesis aims to 
address. A final quote from Banerjee (2011) sets the platform for this research: 
“What is needed is more research on ethnographies of resistance from the perspective of 
those whose lives are rapidly becoming unsustainable because their livelihoods are 
disappearing as a result of industrial expansion. Perhaps these stories may enable us to 
envision sustainability from multiple perspectives and to imagine different paths to reach 
that elusive goal.” (Banerjee, 2011 p.729)  
 
To finish this literature review Table 2 is a summation of ten main academic papers on 
large corporate projects/community relations and conflict reviewed previously. The table 
synthesizes the papers according to how they report on the strategies taken by the 
company or State to gain community acceptance; the level and type of community 
dependence on the (proposed) project; and thirdly the mechanics and dynamics of any 
collective or social movement (including identity) from the community in relation to the 
(proposed) project: 
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Table 2 – Summation table of main academic publications reviewed which focus on large corporate projects – community 
relations/conflict  
Author(s) Year Industry 
Sector 
Type of 
Re-
search 
State and Corporate 
influence strategies 
Community 
dependence – 
independence levels 
Social movement/identity 
perspective 
Outcome of 
conflict (in May 
2014) 
Walsh 1997 Waste 
Inciner-
ators in 
USA. 
Archival 
with 
some 
telephone 
inter-
views 
Nothing Nothing Structural - Needed 
countrywide support from 
other organizations as well 
as political support. 
Most of the 
sitings were 
successful and 
communities did 
not succeed. 
Berry, G. 
R. 
2003 Chemical 
Plant in 
Louisiana, 
USA – 
Japanese – 
Shintech 
Inc. 
Archival 
data 
Strong political backing. 
Promises of jobs and 
$300m of local 
economic development 
and investment. 
Co-opting of local 
community committees.  
No mention of this 
mainly because it is 
about a siting project. 
However, the 
chemicals company 
and government 
allude to the future of 
the town as 
dependent upon the 
arrival of Shintech.  
Structural - A strong well 
organized community able 
to connect with other 
important governmental 
agents, academia and 
NGOs was essential for 
success. Using racial 
environmental justice as the 
main framing. 
“The success of the anti-
Shintech coalition would 
not have been possible 
without sophisticated legal 
and political maneuvering 
(centered on environmental 
justice considerations) that 
wedged the federal 
government in the form of 
the EPA between Shintech 
The plant was not 
built in Convent, 
Louisiana due to 
the success of the 
community social 
movement.  
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and local and state 
government elites and 
agencies” (p.25). 
Lertzman 
and 
Vredenbur
g 
2005 Forestry, 
Canada 
Case 
study 
with 
inter-
views 
and 
Archival 
data 
review 
Company approached 
indigenous community 
to be equal partners and 
decision makers on 
Scientific Panel for 
Sustainable Forestry 
Practices. 
The indigenous 
community appear 
not to be dependent 
on the forestry 
project. However, 
there is no mention of 
the native 
communities’ 
livelihoods. 
Reports a success story of 
the Nuu-Chah-Nulth elders 
who had been protesting 
coming together with 
scientists and management 
to a consensus in a decision 
making panel overseeing 
the management of the 
logging project. 
Logging still 
continues. 
Shriver 
and 
Kennedy 
2005 Uranium 
mining, 
Picher, 
Oklahoma 
USA 
Field 
Research 
State supported one 
community group who 
wanted relocation. 
One group is socially 
dependent on the 
community due to 
cultural, historical 
and family ties. 
Having the support of the 
governor gave financial and 
media backing to a group 
who wanted relocation. 
The town was 
shut down by the 
government and 
the community 
relocated. 
Bebbingto
n et al. 
2008 Mining 
projects in 
Peru and 
Ecuador 
Archival 
data 
State backed foreign 
mining company 
projects in Peru and 
Ecuador.  
In Peru the gold mining 
company negotiated 
with rural community 
opposition to begin 
collaboration on CSR 
and other investment 
projects. 
Companies used CSR 
In Peru part of the 
rural community 
decided to accept 
social responsibility 
projects from the 
mine. This created a 
level of dependence. 
In Ecuador however, 
the community 
purposely focused on 
ethnic tourism to 
avoid dependence on 
the proposed mining 
In Peru a group of local 
urban intellectuals united to 
lead collective resistance 
against the mine and State. 
In Ecuador the resistance 
started when a US NGO 
went to the community to 
mobilize local resistance. 
The election of a local 
indigenous Mayor was an 
important figurehead and 
leader for the social 
movement against the 
The gold mine in 
Peru is 
suspended. 
The copper 
mining project in 
Ecuador is now 
in the exploration 
phase. The 
outcomes of both 
mines have 
reversed since the 
publication of 
this paper in 
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and local economic 
development and jobs 
discourse to gain local 
community acceptance. 
In both Ecuador and 
Peru, State security 
forces clamped down 
hard on demonstrators 
resisting the respective 
mining projects. 
project. mining project. The mayor 
wanted to implement a 
strong indigenous culture in 
the community. This in turn 
attracted more interest of 
foreign NGOs to help with 
the resistance. 
 
2008. 
Bruijn and 
Whiteman 
2009 Gas 
extraction, 
Camisea, 
Peru 
Field 
research 
CSR, offer of jobs as 
well as intimidation of 
indigenous peoples to 
relocate. 
A minority of the 
local community 
accepted jobs in the 
mining project, 
however also were 
vocal in their 
concerns of the 
impacts from the 
mine on their culture 
and identity. 
Foreign NGOs and an 
organically created 
community organization 
mobilized the Machiguenga 
people to strengthen their 
identity and rejection of the 
gas mining project. 
The mine was 
given approval 
for expansion 
further into the 
Amazon jungle 
where there are 
uncontacted 
tribes. A 
Peruvian legal 
NGO is currently 
suing the 
Peruvian 
government for 
this decision. 
McAdam 
et al. 
2010 11 Oil and 
Gas 
pipeline 
sitings 
across 
develop-
ing 
Archival No focus here. Not relevant to the 
paper. 
Overall found that size and 
expected impact of project 
influenced mobilization.  
Moreover, found that when 
communities were given an 
opportunity to voice 
All the pipelines 
have gone ahead 
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regions concerns such as in 
consultations this led to 
conflict and protest as it 
was an ideal opportunity.  
Urkidi and 
Walter 
2011 Gold 
mine, 
Huasco 
Valley, 
Chile 
Field 
research 
Claim that Barrick Gold 
did not consult 
meaningfully with the 
community. The EIA 
report was too technical 
for most to comprehend 
and therefore objected to 
the mining project.  
The mining company 
used CSR and financial 
incentives to win over 
local support, which also 
divided the local 
community. 
Barrick accused of 
imposing its own idea 
around the local 
indigenous community 
identity, history and 
culture with the aim of 
gaining acceptance. 
Some, a minority in 
the local community, 
were dependent upon 
CSR. The local 
government was 
becoming dependent 
on this investment 
and taxes. However, 
few jobs went to the 
Huasco Valley 
community. 
The local community 
is dependent on water 
for their livelihoods, 
and water was at 
threat from the 
mining project.  
The local community was 
able to benefit from a 
national environmental 
justice NGO called OLCA 
who took their cause as 
their flagship campaign.  
OLCA were able to project 
this conflict to an 
international stage, framing 
it under the issue of climate 
change and environmental 
injustice from multinational 
corporations. 
 
OLCA also helped to 
mobilize the local 
community in its resistance 
to the mining project. 
At the time of 
publication in 
2011 the Pascua 
Lama mine was 
still in the 
construction 
stage. Since in 
April 2013 the 
mine has been 
suspended by the 
Chilean justice 
courts on 
environmental 
grounds and 
remains until 
today, i.e. 
September 2014, 
suspended. 
Slocombe  2012 A Mine in 
each of 
Peru, 
Papua 
New 
Field 
research 
at the 
mines in 
USA and 
Red Dog mine, USA has 
partnered with local 
native community 
organization with the 
mine. The native 
At the two North 
American mines the 
communities were 
partners with the 
respective mining 
The two North American 
mines had established 
collective indigenous 
community organizations 
who negotiated with the 
There have been 
no changes since 
the publication of 
this paper in 
2012. The mine 
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Guinea, 
Canada 
and USA 
Canada 
and 
archival 
for Peru 
and 
Papua 
New 
Guinea  
community shares in 
profits, jobs and CSR 
from the mine. Also has 
a decision with the 
managing of impacts 
from the mine. 
Minto Mine, Canada 
also partnered due to 
laws with local native 
community who 
participate in decision 
making over running of 
the mine. Mine provides 
jobs and CSR benefits. 
Management of the mine 
seen as open and 
responsible. Community 
relations perceived as 
strong leading to trust. 
Tambogrande, Peru – 
the Canadian mining 
company proposed local 
development and 
minimum environmental 
impact as a way to gain 
an SLO. However broke 
promises. 
OK Tedi, Papua New 
Guinea – BHP Billiton 
did not understand the 
local culture, context or 
projects and therefore 
dependent on them. 
In Peru the 
community was not 
dependent on the 
mining company as it 
had its own 
livelihood based on 
agriculture. 
mining companies by 
themselves. 
 
However, the US, Peruvian 
and Papua New Guinea 
communities worked with 
civil society actors at times 
of conflict. This was most 
prevalent in the Peru case 
where the community 
worked together with local, 
national and international 
NGOs to help resist the 
proposed mining project. 
 
The affected community in 
Papua New Guinea 
collectively took the mining 
company to the courts of 
justice in Australia, which 
led to a community victory 
in calling for better and 
more expensive 
environmental protection 
from the mine. This led to 
BHP Billiton selling its 
majority share in the 
project. 
 
 
in Peru was 
rejected and 
abandoned. The 
mine in Papua 
New Guinea 
continues, as a 
State owned mine 
without BHP 
Billiton. Both 
mines in North 
America operate 
as usual. 
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communicate well with 
the local community. 
 
Kraemer 
et al. 
2013 Mining in 
India 
Field 
Research 
Vedanta mining is 
claimed to have used 
CSR as a weapon to 
counter mobilize against 
community resistance. 
The paper claims the 
mining company was 
linked to intimidation, 
violence, threats to local 
opponents of the mine.  
The authors also allege 
Vedanta mining co-
opted the well-known 
local community 
resistance leader who 
was the face of their 
campaign, by offering to 
pay for his education.  
The paper makes one 
mention of how the 
community is 
dependent upon the 
forest and agriculture 
resources, threatened 
by the mine. 
Focused on local, national 
and international 
movements against the 
mine. How the interactions 
between the three levels of 
groups created friction, 
tension and mistrust of the 
others. Seems that the local 
grassroots movement did 
not invite all the national 
and international activists 
to become involved and 
saw their participation as a 
hindrance. 
The mining 
project was 
actually 
suspended by the 
Indian justice 
courts in late 
2013 and remains 
shut due to 
community 
objections (after 
the publication of 
this article). 
 
  106 
The synthesis from Table 2 shows that only the publications by Bebbington et al. (2008), 
Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Slocombe (2012) cover all three aspects of corporate/State 
influence strategies, community dependence and social movements/identity. Only the 
publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) was completely based on empirical field 
research in the mining community. Moreover none of the ten papers explicitly focused on 
the issue of community dependence on or independence from mining as it relates to 
corporate/State influence strategies and community resistance. Indeed the three papers 
that did cover the subject of community dependence on or independence from the mining 
projects do so within their general case study background context sections. The only 
paper that takes a detailed process perspective around the interactions and dynamics 
between the mining company and State influence strategies and the community/NGO 
responses is the single case study of Kraemer et al. (2013). The articles by Bebbington et 
al. (2008), Urkidi and Walter (2011) and Slocombe (2012) cover the interactions between 
both company/State and community/NGO in much less detail and at a higher level as 
they were based on archival data (with the exception of two of the four case studies 
researched by Slocombe, 2012). 
 
As a result of this literature review the empirical research will be guided by the following 
topics: 
 
 The mining company and State influence strategies to gain acceptance from the 
affected local communities from multiple actor perspectives 
 The level of community dependence or independence from the mining project 
from an affected community perspective 
 How affected communities mobilize to resist or collaborate with the nearby 
mining projects  
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3.0 Methodology  
 
3.1 Philosophical perspective 
All research inquiries and researchers have paradigms around the nature of the world they 
are to study. These paradigms tell researchers where they sit in the world and of the 
different relationships within it (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Paradigms are based on beliefs 
and should be accepted as the faith and choices of researchers just as religious beliefs are 
widely accepted. Indeed there is no way of verifying the truthfulness of a paradigm, as 
can be shown by the continual philosophical debates for thousands of years (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). The research paradigm, according to Blaikie (2007) contains assumptions 
about how researchers understand social reality and consequently how it should be 
studied. 
 
The research paradigm refers to the ontological and epistemological assumptions that the 
researcher holds. This means discussing the assumptions around the nature of social 
reality (ontology) and a similar set of assumptions about the way in which knowledge of 
this reality is created (epistemology) (Blaikie, 2007).  In order to be as transparent as 
possible with my research it is important that I reveal my assumptions around how I 
make sense of social reality as this will inevitably affect the decisions I make surrounding 
the collection of data and their analysis.  There are a number of different ways of 
understanding different ontological and epistemological positions; however, I am 
drawing on Blaikie’s framework as the author compares and contrasts the various 
different and divergent positions from positivism to constructivism. Doing so allows me 
to show how my philosophical perspective compares and contrasts with that of others 
who may also conduct similar research and in a similar context. 
 
Blaikie (2007) categorizes six different ontological assumptions (as shown in Table 3 
which he has based mainly on the work of Bhaskar (1978 in Blaikie, 2007). The major 
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distinction that can be made between the positivist/realist and relativist ontologies, (the 
idealist ontology is often referred to by other thinkers as interpretivist) is that positivist 
theories in general argue that both natural and social entities exist independently from the 
activities of the human observer. A positivist also believes in research, which can 
discover the objective and independent truths, whereas an interpretivist on the other hand 
believes that each individual has their “own” truth or reality perspective, which is 
influenced by their social contexts, thus making reality a subjective construction (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
An inductive approach to research on the other hand is less structured and not linear, and 
as mentioned earlier, is recursive in nature where the researcher pedals back and forth 
between the data, themes and research question (Ely et al., 1997). Researchers taking an 
inductive or grounded theory approach usually have no set theory or only a vague idea of 
theory on which they are basing their empirical research, as they hope their findings will 
“speak to them” about where their theory contribution lies. It also works contrary to the 
deductive approach as it is more bottom-up, whereby the researcher works from 
observations towards theory building (Burney, 2008). 
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Table 3 Combinations of Ontological and Epistemological Categories (Adapted 
from Blaikie, 2007) 
 
 
Ontology 
Objectivi
sm 
Subjectivi
sm 
Falsificati
on 
Neo- 
Realis
m 
Constructioni
sm 
Conventional
ism 
Positivist 
(Shallow 
Realist) 
X      
Conceptu
al Realist 
 X     
Cautious 
Realist 
  X    
Depth 
Realist 
   X   
Relativist 
or 
Interpretiv
ist 
    X  
Subtle 
Realist 
      
   
Using the above framework and explanation, it should be possible to argue around the 
appropriate ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying my PhD research 
interest. As noted in the introduction section, I am interested in understanding community 
positions towards nearby mining projects in Brazil and Chile. These are evidently not 
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tangible objects that can be studied and are in fact subjective phenomena. In other words 
I could study this subject objectively in a more positivist manner; however, I have chosen 
to be more involved and conduct the research in a more ethnographic style by being 
closer and even trying to experience the phenomenon of my research in order to better 
understand it. In order to ascertain what factors influence the positions community 
members take towards nearby mines, I, as a researcher, will have to engage extensively 
with different community and mining company actors in order to ascertain the different 
interpretations of why communities behave the way they do towards mining companies.  
 
It is therefore clear that my ontological and epistemological assumptions, according to 
the framework offered earlier, would fall categorically under Relativist or Interpretivist 
Constructionism respectively thus also ensuring coherence between both types of 
theoretical assumptions. In the following section I continue to discuss further my choice 
of research methods for obtaining data for my PhD research. 
 
3.2 Methods used in relevant and similar research 
The subject of community conflicts with nearby large projects such as in the extractives 
sector, energy, natural resources and related infrastructure, has received substantial 
attention from academic literature at a theoretical level but more so at an empirical level. 
Furthermore, due to the plethora of consultants and international organizations, such as 
the World Bank and the United Nations, who work on trying to resolve large extractives 
sector, natural resources and infrastructure-related community conflicts, there exist 
extensive amounts of guidance, policies and report publications on the topic. The media 
also has dealt with this topic substantially from a Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) 
perspective to a development-related question in developing regions. 
 
The relevant theoretical papers include: Jenkins (2004) who specifically examined CSR 
and mining/local community conflicts; Calvano (2008) who provides a framework for 
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analyzing company/local community conflicts; Bebbington et al. (2008) who explain the 
factors which led to a more successful community resistance to mining in an Equatorial 
mining community case study in contrast to a Peruvian one; and McAdam et al. (2010) 
who, through secondary research, attempt to explain why certain communities in certain 
countries mobilized against oil pipelines and why others did not in developing world 
regions. All four publications were researched with desktop archival data and without 
field visits. 
 
3.3 My research methodology 
Having outlined earlier the different methodologies used by other similar and relevant 
works, and moreover in coherence with my chosen ontology and epistemology 
(interpretivist and constructionist respectively), I decided to use multiple ethnographic 
case studies as my methodology, given the kind of understanding I was seeking to 
uncover. Edmondson and McManus (2007) argue that “methodological fit” is necessary 
to enhance the ability of research in answering its question. They argue that in less 
mature fields of organizational research, where less is known, that more exploratory 
qualitative methods would prove fruitful as opposed to the use of positivist quantitative 
methods, mainly because qualitative methods allow the researcher to gain more in-depth 
explanatory data to aid in creating an understanding of certain nascent phenomena in the 
field. 
 
Indeed prominent sociologist McAdam argues, in McAdam et al. (2001; 2010) and 
McAdam and Boudet (2012), that ethnographical research is best suited to uncover the 
underlying mechanisms that trigger communities and groups to mobilize against large 
nearby projects. Therefore unlike any of the previously mentioned publications, I aim to 
address this gap and research the question around what influences communities to take 
the positions they do towards nearby mining projects by comparing eight cases via 
exploratory and in-person qualitative fieldwork. I take such an approach in the hope of 
building on the current theoretical explanations offered by authors such as Bebbington et 
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al. (2008), Jenkins (2004), Özkaynak et al. (2012) and Urkidi (2008; 2010) as to what 
factors influence community positions around nearby mining projects. 
 
The term ‘ethnography’ is used interchangeably with the terms ‘participant observation’ 
and ‘fieldwork’ (Delamont, 2004). Ethnography is a form of qualitative research and 
hence corresponds to my stated ontology and epistemology of interpretivist and 
constructionist respectively, and also aligns well with an inductive research strategy. In 
addition, ethnography, through spending lengthy amounts of time in the field talking to 
various relevant informants from different and often competing perspectives (anti-mining 
and pro-mining), helped me gain a deep understanding of the ways they (community 
members) construct their social realities, and explain their positions towards the nearby 
mining projects. By employing ethnography, I was also able to use my five senses to 
make sense of the relations between company, community and the key issues. 
 
Authors such as Sandelowski (1986), Silverman (2000) and Lincoln (2002), who write on 
the topic of quality in qualitative research, argue that there is no and should be no 
prescribed method for qualitative researchers making inclusion or exclusion assessments 
or attaching weightings to the data. Researchers should instead aim to be as transparent as 
possible and leave an audit trail regarding the decisions and actions they took right from 
the start of the research up until the data interpretation. In the following section I outline 
in a transparent manner how I chose the different case study sites, followed by collection 
of data and their subsequent analysis. 
 
3.31 Choosing Case Sites 
To begin with I give a brief overview of the justification of the selection of my case 
studies to add important context to understanding the assessment criteria I used for the 
collated data. I chose multiple case studies, eight in total and this afforded me the luxury 
of using “polar types” as per Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) “A particularly important 
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theoretical sampling approach is “polar types,” in which a researcher samples extreme 
(e.g., very high and very low performing) cases in order to more easily observe 
contrasting patterns in the data” (p.27). According to them using such polar types also 
allows researchers to identify the different central constructs and relationships within the 
phenomena being studied.  
 
Therefore I had decided, whilst in the UK, that I would research cases with high levels of 
conflict, mixed levels between conflict and good relations, and apparent good mining 
company community relations.  
 
I based my selection of the eight case studies on desktop Internet research, to see which 
suitable case studies were available in terms of conflicts and supposed best practice cases 
in Brazil and Chile, and conversations with industry and academic contacts who have 
worked with this mining company/community context in Brazil and/or Chile. Second, in 
terms of consideration, I was gaining access to data, but initially I was only willing to 
visit communities where I could interview company executives as well as local 
community actors. However, in the case of high level community conflicts in the public 
sphere, mining companies were reluctant to collaborate with me and eventually I was not 
able to speak to representatives from Barrick Gold and Pelambres regarding their 
respective mining projects for my research.  I chose Brazil and Chile as my two countries 
for case studies mainly due to my previous experience of working and living in both 
countries, my fluency in Spanish and Portuguese and therefore understanding their 
contexts better than those of other nations. In addition, both countries are important 
players in the mining industry, Chile for copper and Brazil for iron ore.  
 
I made contact with senior management at the Canadian mining company Kinross Gold, 
who I knew from my previous research since 2008 and who agreed to speak to me in both 
their mining operations in Chile and Brazil. In Brazil their operations are in the city of 
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Paracatu in the Minas Gerais State, and this mine is the largest opencast gold mine in the 
country. The head of community relations at Anglo American Brazil invited me to their 
then northern iron ore operations in Amapa State, having told me it was better not to visit 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro as “there is not much to see or research there as everything is 
at the construction stage” (Personal communication). I eventually visited a rural 
community in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in early 2013 after discovering interesting 
secondary data and hearing from other community members within the Minas Gerais 
State of the importance of the conflict at Conceiçao de Mato Dentro; it is indeed the 
largest mining project in the world consisting of a 525km mine duct to a port. 
 
Additionally in Brazil I visited two other mining communities, that of Mariana a city in 
Minas Gerais State where I was told by an academic in sustainability, based at the 
Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto’s School of Mining, that there was conflict and 
contention around the proposed construction of a nearby mine by Brazilian multinational 
Vale and secondly around Barro Alto in Goias State where Anglo American had won an 
award by the prestigious national Exame business review for its best practice in 
community relations. 
 
The remaining two communities I researched were Los Caimanes and Huasco Valley in 
Chile. I chose both these communities due to their high levels of media coverage and 
campaigns against their respective mines. The case of Huasco Valley versus Canadian 
Barrick Gold is the most famous mining conflict in Chile. In the case of Los Caimanes, it 
is less well known; however, this humble community itself has managed to attract 
significant social media attention for its conflict with the Pelambres mine (part of 
London-listed Antofagasta Minerals).  
 
Gaining access to the community perspective was much easier, especially in the 
communities of conflict. I still nevertheless, made several attempts to gain company 
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perspectives from Antofagasta Minerals and Barrick Gold on their respective 
communities in Chile, and also those of Vale and Anglo American in Brazil; however, 
only Anglo American agreed to meet me, though for the Conceiçao de Mato Dentro case 
I was only able to obtain access to their London headquarters management. I also 
importantly met and conversed with many knowledgeable experts who were not directly 
related to my case studies and these include industry consultants, academics, national 
government officials, and mining company officials from companies whose communities 
I did not research and also mining community members from communities where I was 
unable to visit. Speaking to external experts helped in confirming and checking my 
knowledge, theory building and ultimately adding to the validity of my data. 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
For each of the eight case studies, I collated data from a variety of data sources. At first I 
researched the weekly newsletters on mining company community conflicts in Latin 
America to identify the main three higher conflict communities based in Brazil and Chile. 
I already had contact with Kinross Gold and the Colla community case study I had begun 
to research two years prior to the PhD for another research project in northern Chile. The 
Colla community had taken Kinross to the courts of justice for the environmental and 
physical impact they were causing to them and their livestock. The Colla had also created 
roadblocks against vehicles going to the mine in protest at the dust plume they create, the 
chemical spills and the roadkill of Colla livestock.  
 
For Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Caimanes I began my research by 
reading online media and press articles on the conflicts from local, national and 
international sources as well as watching many different videos of the conflicts. These 
videos included documentaries by national and international filmmakers who interviewed 
local protagonists to tell the stories through their eyes as well as accompanying protesters 
against the mine and visiting the mine itself, speaking briefly to mining company 
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representatives. I also referred to all the mining company websites to understand their 
perspectives and communications on local community relations. 
 
It was evident from these weekly newsletters, blogs, videos and other Internet sources 
that they had consistent episodes of conflict over months from several years back. Such 
episodes of conflict included:  
 Street protests and manifestations 
 Legal court cases 
 Public assembly meetings  
 Involvement of activist civil society organizations in denouncing irresponsibility 
of the mining companies and projects. 
 
Once I had selected the four higher conflict communities, I began to make contact with 
authors of the blogs, articles, reports, university dissertations (in the case of Huasco 
Valley) and documentary films to see if I could speak to them about their views on the 
reasons behind the current state of company/community relations. Secondly I also asked 
these knowledgeable experts for contact details of local community leaders and 
protagonists whom I could contact for my field visits.  At the Colla community I already 
had collected relevant data previously; however, it was important to follow-up on these 
data with more specific interview questions gleaned from my literature review.  
 
In terms of the four lower conflict communities, there was less publically available data, 
such as Internet blogs, reports, articles and videos, as there was in essence less conflict in 
these communities. Paracatu and Mariana (the two higher conflict communities within 
the lower conflict category) have critical blogs from community members, especially 
Paracatu which also has at least four Masters level dissertations on the mining 
community/conflict and related video documentaries such as the “Mountain of Blood” a 
play on words of the gold mine’s name – Gold Mountain. 
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The Table in Appendix A lists the different actors I interviewed from the different 
communities, length of time spent in each community, whom they represent, which case 
study they are from, the main context and topic of the conversation and questions asked, 
the date and approximate duration. The interviews with mining company executives are 
highlighted in blue. The final section of the table shows interviews with actors who are 
not based specifically in any of the eight case studies; however, I considered them as 
knowledgeable experts on my research question and therefore their opinions and views 
have been valuable in understanding and analyzing my data. I spent between 4 and 28 
days in each of the eight mining communities when conducting my research. As argued 
by Fetterman (1989) in Creswell and Miller (2000) “working with people day in and day 
out for long periods of time is what gives ethnographic research its validity and vitality” 
(p.128).   
 
Such engagement or extended fieldwork (Johnson, 1997) allows the researcher to gain 
more in-depth and multiple perspective views from participants to help confirm or 
disconfirm issues and explanations, in addition to understanding their meanings, sense 
making and social worlds. I also argue that theoretical validity is enhanced as a result of 
spending extensive periods in the field, as I did.  
 
In general I always asked my interviewees their views on the following.  The questions 
are based on the literature on social movement and social identity (for a more specific 
account of questions please refer to the Table in Appendix A): 
 The nearby mining company  
 Community relations with the mining company  
 Why they felt the way they did towards the mining company  
 Why they believed the community felt and acted the way it does towards the 
mining company  
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 Why they believe mining company community relations are the way they are 
 Views around community identity 
 
Along with face-to-face interviews in the communities, constant participation and 
observation, I was also able to conduct activities around participant drawings on three 
different occasions with mining company executives and local community residents.  
 
As shown in the Table in Appendix A, I conducted over 220 interviews and held 
conversations with over 500 people in total with multiple actors including local 
community residents, local government, mining company executives, relevant 
practitioners, academics and leaders from communities affected by mining, which I did 
not visit. In all eight of my case studies I accessed an array of local community 
perspectives and was also able to gain the mining company perspectives (shaded in in 
blue) for seven of my eight case studies, the exception being for the Huasco Valley where 
conflict is very high with Barrick Gold and Goldcorp.  
 
However, as shown in the final section of the table, I also attempted to ascertain the 
views and knowledge of experts such as practitioner/consultants working in the field of 
mining company community relations in South America, other mining company 
community relations executives, NGO representatives who focus on mining community 
conflicts, other mining community leaders and academics who have researched social 
movement and/or mining company community relations in Chile or Brazil. This final 
group of interviewees served to strengthen the robustness and validity of my data and 
conclusions and using such a group is recommended by authors such as Lincoln (2002), 
Sandelowski (1986) and Silverman (2000). In the following section I continue to discuss 
how I initially analyzed and made sense of my raw data collected from the field. 
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3.5 Data Analysis Process 
 
In the following section I offer a step-by-step process of how I analyzed the data. A 
selection of transcriptions of interviews from all eight communities is located in 
Appendix E. Due to issues of page and space limitation in this thesis it is not possible to 
include all transcriptions and my reflections of interviews. 
The interviews were transcribed after the first field research visit to three communities. I 
was able to audio record and also made immediate summaries and my sensemaking 
within 48 hours of the interviews (which I shared with my supervisor).  
 
Once transcribed, I read the different scripts and accounts from the various actors twice 
in order to become more familiar with the stories. As I read them over I engaged in first 
order coding where I was making a note of the most common and salient themes and 
arguments my interviewees were making with regard to my questions (See Appendix B 
for an example.) I coded these six salient and recurring themes largely as being: 
a. The community’s perception and image of the nearby mining project, 
b. An assessment of the mining company’s community relationship, 
c. Environmental, social and economic impact from mining on the 
community, 
d. History of the mine, 
e. Community identity, and  
f. Mining company influence strategies on the local community. 
 
I next attempted a second level of analysis after having coded these three different sets of 
case study interviews, by categorizing the views according to mining company or 
community perspectives on themselves and each other. 
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However, during my second field research visit to my fourth community, the Huasco 
Valley in Chile I was able to fully appreciate the difference between this case and the two 
Brazilian cases of Paracatu and Pedra Branca, and the similarities with the Colla 
community and Caimanes case in Chile. My main conclusion from this comparison was 
around the importance of the community level of analysis for understanding why they 
were able to mobilize or not against the nearby mining projects. It was clear that 
grievances were widespread at all the mining communities where I had been researching; 
however, at some such as Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla, communities were able to 
transform their grievances into resistance to the mines, whereas at Paracatu and Pedra 
Branca the complaints remained as verbal perceptions. My research question had now 
evolved into explaining this difference in the reaction of mining communities to 
grievances felt from their respective nearby mining projects. 
 
This implied the familiarization of a new literature field – that of social movements, 
social identity, NIMBY and contentious politics to help guide my interview questions in 
this second round of field research. The kind of open-ended questions I was now asking 
to guide my in-depth conversation included: 
 Which factors help you to contest the mine as a collective? Or What 
prevents you from reacting collectively to the mine’s impacts and Why? 
 What factors would help you mobilize better against the mine? 
 As a community do you have a collective or individual identity? 
 Have you always taken this position towards the mine? 
 How would you describe your identity as a community? 
 What is the ideal solution to your main mining-related grievances?  
 
For the second round of field research I revisited Paracatu in Brazil, the Colla community 
in Chile and in addition visited Huasco Valley and Caimanes in Chile as well as Mariana 
and Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in Brazil for the first time. Again, due to the ethnographic 
nature of this research not all interviews could be recorded and these were treated more 
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as opportunistic, improvised conversations as I walked through the communities, unlike 
the more formal interview procedure where interviewees had arranged a time to meet 
beforehand and consented to being audio recorded. In cases of conversational type data I 
would record immediate reflections and summaries of the interviews later the same day. 
 
From this second round of more focused interviews I once again transcribed (See 
Appendix E) the many hours of audio recordings, together with the immediate journal 
interview summaries for those interviews I was unable to record. I then tried to make 
sense of this new data together with the older data and, influenced by the social 
movements literature I had simultaneously been reading, decided to initially analyze by 
using four different levels: Institutional, Community, Mine and Individual level.  Each of 
these had a total of 25 sub-factors for understanding my data, and each related to 
community positions around nearby mining projects (see Appendix C). 
 
My aim with these categorizations was to be able to compare influential factors for 
company/community relations between cases of conflict and non-conflict. I present my 
data in terms of displaying the different 25 factors which are colour coded into four 
different strengths of influence, the darkest blue as “Highly Influential”, medium blue as 
“Moderately Influential”, light blue as “Not Influential” and the light blue with red outer 
borders and white font represents factors that are “Absent and Highly Influential”. This 
final factor refers to a situation where the value is judged to be low or absent, such as 
community leadership or external agent support; the fact that these are low or non-
existent is deemed to be highly influential in explaining community positions towards the 
mine. 
 
At the same time as trying to make sense of the transcribed interview data I was also 
conducting other activities to maximize validity. In an attempt to maximize the validity of 
assessing my data I employed specific strategies or criteria for demonstrating qualitative 
  122 
validity, such as leaving an audit trail (see Table in the Appendix A), member checks 
when coding, categorizing, or confirming results with participants, and peer debriefing.  
 
 
I therefore shared my understanding of the interviews with key interviewees from the 
community and mining companies after transcribing, reading and making sense of the 
data. The purpose of these follow-up emails, meetings, phone calls and even 
presentations to mining company executives, was to confirm that my understanding really 
represented the views and realities of my interviewees, and furthermore these 
conversations allowed for further relevant questions to help sharpen my understanding of 
my research question. Authors such as Blaikie (2007) refer to this idea of confirming 
sensemaking from interviewees as “reverse translation”. After repeatedly reading through 
these data to make sense of them and to identify emergent themes based on the social 
movement, social identity and communities at risk of mobilization literature, I devised a 
framework through which to present my data and interpretations. 
 
Nonetheless it is worth mentioning that my research strategy, data collection and 
interpretation was not a linear process. As proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Morse et 
al. (2002), qualitative research such as mine is iterative rather than linear, where I cycled 
back and forth between design and implementation to ensure coherence and logic among 
question formulation, literature, data collection strategies, and analysis.  
 
However, in conversation with my PhD panel and others since, such as at the Egos 
conference where I presented my data analysis, it became clear that these factors, though 
interesting, do not really reveal the richness of what is going on in each case study. Such 
an identification of different factors at different levels that explain community positions 
towards nearby large projects has, to my knowledge, never been published. To do that, a 
more process oriented lens had to be engaged with, one that would really pick up the 
interaction of the different socio-economic-historical factors and the process by which 
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conflict came to be, or did not. In other words as stand-alone factors, the data did not 
justify the extensive data available for a deep understanding.  
 
 
The conclusion I came to was that the concept and theory of resource dependence for 
stakeholders as presented by Frooman (1999) was the core concept that explained the 
differences why communities were able to mobilize and create conflict for the nearby 
mining projects. Furthermore, the different socio-economic-historical factors mapped 
from my data also helped explain the level of community dependence on the nearby 
mining companies theory. Again, I conducted follow-up member checks with my key 
informant interviewees from mining communities, companies and external 
knowledgeable experts, to hear their opinions on the idea of the importance of 
dependence.   
 
In order to combat issues of bias and enhance validity, as with the first round of research 
visits, I sensed data were representative and valid when there was a saturation of hearing 
similar responses from at least five different interviewees.  
 
In order to further address questions of validity and researcher bias in terms of the main 
emergent codes identified, two of my interview transcripts were “blind coded” by an 
academic from a Cranfield University management school. This independent coder was 
not aware of the emergent codes that had already been identified. He identified most of 
the same first order codes as I and my supervisor had done, which can be argued as 
further strengthening the validity and addressing researcher bias in data interpretation. 
 
Table 4 lists excerpts of nine specific quotes from the interviews, along with their 
relevant first order codes. It also demonstrates the rationale and sensemaking for 
integrating first order codes into second order codes.  Finally the table shows the 
aggregate theoretical dimensions emerging logically from the second order codes. This 
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analysis was done by a constant iterative process that involved linking the data with 
theory and the rationale is self-explanatory, as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 – 3.51 Excerpts from 12 quotes to show coding and aggregate theoretical dimensions 
Quote  First Order 
code 
Second Order 
code 
Aggregate 
theoretical code 
“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries here….mining 
is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land, and are happy with that, but 
mining impacts on all of this. We also used to really enjoy going to the waterfall 
and playing in the water but we can’t do that anymore as they have destroyed the 
waterfall, which is the highest in this State, for mining.” (Interviewee code H1, 
Community Leader) 
Negative impacts 
from mining to local 
environment to local 
culture. 
Land, environment 
and culture 
important for 
community. 
 
Importance of 
history and ecology 
for collective 
identity. 
Corporate 
irresponsibility. 
Incompatibility of 
mining with local 
identity. 
Collective identity. 
Stakeholder theory not 
exercised by mining 
company. 
Stakeholder theory not 
relevant from 
community perspective. 
“I brought up my kids perfectly well without the help of Anglo (American) so why 
would I need them to help raise my grandchildren? We don’t need them here for 
their help. We are well and better off without them here causing great impact to 
our lives.” (Interviewee code H2, Maroon Community Resistance Leader) 
No need for mining. 
More costs than 
benefits from 
mining. 
Independent 
identity. 
Corporate 
irresponsibility 
Resource independence 
from mine. 
Stakeholder theory not 
exercised by mining 
company. 
 
“As a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. Everyone 
my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, so it is not a 
foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a new mine is being 
Community 
accustomed to mine. 
Mine is part of local 
historical identity. 
Level of community 
dependence exists on 
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built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local politician and local 
resident) 
the mine.  
“That mining tailings dam is polluting the valley and many of us grow crops, 
avocados, courgettes, watermelons…so that dirty and polluted water from the dam 
will contaminate our crops and then who is going to buy them when they hear they 
come from Caimanes? Pelambres are offering lots of money to the municipality 
for us to have better public services if we accept then we become dependent on 
them! Then Pelambres will be able to do as they please with us and we will be 
dependent on them without our crops and livestock.” (Interviewee code D1, Los 
Caimanes Community Defence leader Carlos) 
Negative impacts 
from mining project. 
Disingenuous 
mining company  
CSR as influence 
strategy and co-
optation of local 
community. 
Caimanes want to 
remain independent 
from mining 
company. 
Corporate 
irresponsibility. 
Community 
dependence on 
crops. 
Mining project a 
threat to community 
livelihood from 
crops. 
Resource independence 
from mine. 
Stakeholder theory not 
exercised by mining 
company. 
Mining company desire 
to create community 
dependence. 
“I’ve already taken part (in their social responsibility programmes) and I was 
able to see and I was able to be up close…(Kinross) is very deceitful… they 
pretend to do lots of capacity building social responsibility to make people more 
independent but in truth they just make people become more in need of their help; 
instead of teaching them to fish they give them a chewed up fish.” (Interviewee 
code C6, Local Cultural and Entrepreneur leader, Paracatu) 
Disingenuous 
mining company  
CSR as influence 
strategy and co-
optation for local 
community. 
Corporate 
irresponsibility 
 
Stakeholder theory not 
exercised by mining 
company. 
Mining company desire 
to create community 
dependence. 
“….crazy about finding local community residents willing to participate in their 
CSR and social investment projects. They sent social and psychological assistants 
to go knocking on everybody’s doors to see what information they could find out 
so they could manipulate them and also try to get them involved in their social 
projects.” (Interviewee code E2, Community leader and elected local politician). 
Disingenuous 
mining company  
CSR as influence 
strategy and co-
optation for local 
Corporate 
irresponsibility 
 
Stakeholder theory in 
action 
Mining company desire 
to create community 
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community. dependence. 
“..that bishop was clearly paid by Pelambres -  he was a Pelambrino! He said that 
Pelambres was willing to pay we eleven hunger strikers and our families generous 
compensation but we said NO! Again they are always trying to divide us and make 
us fight amongst ourselves. We insisted we will only accept a deal if it is for 
everyone in Caimanes! And we will not let them tell us who can and cannot be our 
leader!” (Interviewee code D1, Carlos, local community activist in Defence 
Committee, Los Caimanes) 
Disingenuous 
mining company  
CSR as influence 
strategy and co-
optation for local 
community. 
Community leaders’ 
bravery and 
determination.  
Corporate 
irresponsibility 
Strong collective 
identity as resistance 
against mining 
company. 
Stakeholder theory not 
exercised by mining 
company. 
Example of necessary 
ingredient for social 
movement. 
“Yes its mainly due to the social mobilization department from the State public 
prosecution that has brought us together to resist the mine” (Interviewee H1, 
Community leader, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro)  
Need external actor 
help to resist mining 
project. 
External resources 
for community 
mobilization. 
Social movement 
theory in practice. 
“We are totally united and speak with one voice only. They (the mining 
companies) try to divide us but we are strongly united and organized. We have 
formal meetings at our community centre” (Interviewee code B1, Colla 
community President) 
United and well-
organized 
community. 
Strong collective 
identity. 
Social movement 
theory in practice. 
 
The above description of the different steps I took within the data analysis process shows how the process was not linear and that there was 
substantial cycling back and forth between data and literature (Eisenhardt 1989) and the constant refining of the research question as a result. 
However, as arduous as this task was it has been worthwhile, considering the final output of a focused and specific research question that 
addresses a gap in the literature. 
  128 
4.0 Findings – case study context descriptions 
 
In this findings section I will present contextual descriptions of each of the eight 
communities I researched so that the reader can gain a better idea about the locations I 
later analyze and discuss. These case studies will be organized around a timeline; 
current mining and consultation policy in each region; key stakeholders from the 
market, state and civil society sectors; non-mining economic activity in each region; 
corporate strategies for community engagement; and community strategies towards 
the respective mining projects, before commencing with the first contextual case 
study of the Huasco Valley. The findings lead to classifying the eight communities 
into two groups of higher conflict and lower conflict communities and argue that the 
former is less dependent upon mining than the latter; the lower conflict communities 
also do have objections towards their nearby mining projects. Table 5 justifies the 
classification of the eight communities into higher conflict and lower conflict 
communities. As argued by Zald and McCarthy (1977) all societal groups hold 
grievances of some sort on certain issues or topics; however, very few take collective 
action to tackle these grievances. When communities do organize together and take 
collective action this can manifest itself in conflict, and the kinds of conflict in the 
context of presenting the research are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 – Different manifestations of conflict at higher and lower conflict 
mining communities   
Higher conflict communities (Huasco 
Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, 
Caimanes and Colla)  – withholding 
SLO strategies 
Lower conflict communities 
(Paracatu
2
, Mariana, Pedra Branca 
and Barro Alto) – SLO strategies 
 Community-led litigation against 
mining companies. 
 Multiple street protests. 
 Mining project access road 
blockade protests. 
 Intense national (and international) 
social media campaigns against the 
nearby mining projects (except 
Colla). 
 Anti-mining documentary films 
(except Colla). 
 Anti-mining company street art and 
graffiti in the local community 
(Huasco Valley and Caimanes). 
 Boycotts of mining company social 
responsibility initiatives (Huasco 
Valley and Caimanes). 
 Hunger strike (Caimanes). 
 Individual or small group level 
negotiations with mining company 
over social responsibility benefits, 
environmental impact mitigation 
and more employment. 
 Scarce and sporadic protests aimed 
at specific events such as electricity 
power shortages, a fairer share of 
economic benefits or proposal of 
new mining project. 
 Lower level social media campaigns 
against nearby mine (Blogs for 
Paracatu and Mariana).  
 Higher presence of mining company 
communication and public relations 
in nearby communities. 
 Higher participation by local 
community in social responsibility 
and capacity building-related 
initiatives. 
 
Table 6 below plots the eight different communities in a two by two matrix depicting 
their respective levels of independence/dependence and conflict. For example it is 
evident that Huasco Valley has the highest conflict levels and is mainly independent 
from the nearby mining project. However, the Colla community is the most 
                                                 
2
 I have included Paracatu as a lower conflict community for this table, though for my analysis I keep it 
as an isolated hybrid case characterised by high levels of grievance and low levels of conflict. 
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independent yet conflict levels are lower. The four lower conflict communities are 
also the most dependent on their nearby mining projects. One can infer from this 
matrix that there exists a correlation of some sort between independence and conflict 
levels in the eight mining communities within this study. 
Table 6 – Matrix of Independence and Conflict Levels of the Eight Mining 
communities  
 
 Independent Dependent 
High Conflict           Huasco Valley 
                         CMD
3
  
       Caimanes 
Colla 
 
 
 
Low Conflict 
              Paracatu 
                           Mariana 
               Pedra Branca 
                          Barro Alto 
 
 
This section provides more of a focus and detail on certain case studies, due to their 
complexities. For example the Huasco Community case study will be the most 
extensive due to the many different dynamics around the conflict there, whereas at 
Pedra Branca in Brazil there is much less to report on in terms of community relations 
with the mining company. All names used from hereon are fictitious to respect the 
confidentiality of the interviewees. I start with the case of the Huasco Valley below. 
Table 7 Current Mining and Community Consultation policy and 
legislation affecting case studies 
Brazil – Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, 
Paracatu, Mariana, Pedra Branca and 
Chile – Huasco Valley, Caimanes, Colla 
Community 
                                                 
3
 Conceiçao de Mato Dentro 
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Barro Alto 
Brazil has a national Mining Code 
(Código de Mineraçao in Portuguese) 
which dates from 1967 when the country 
was still a dictatorship.
4
 
 
A new mining code is currently being 
discussed by the Brazilian congress. The 
new code should be passed later in 2014. 
Civil society actors have criticized the 
present proposals of a new Mining Code 
by the Brazilian government for its lack 
of substance on social and environmental 
aspects. Activists argue the proposals for 
a new mining code are far too focused on 
the economic aspects of mining. 
Chile’s free market based economy is 
highly dependent on (copper) mining 
exports. The free market economy was 
imposed during the military regime of 
Pinochet, which foresaw mining as its 
central industry. In order to push for this 
mining focused goal the military regime 
passed the Organic Constitutional Law on 
Mining Concessions (1982) and the 
Mining Code (1983). Nonetheless neither 
of these laws speak about consultations 
with affected communities (Bastida et al., 
2005). 
 
 
Brazilian law requires a RIMA 
(Environmental Impact Report) on all 
proposed construction or extension 
projects (Gomez et al., 2006). However 
there is no explicit mention of consulting 
communities throughout the RIMA 
process. The legislation requires 
applicants to write their EIA report in a 
comprehensive format for local 
community residents to read. The RIMA 
legislation also allows the local 
government to hold a public hearing for 
The Environmental Law 19.300 passed in 
1994 requires all projects of high impact 
to undertake an EIA. Such EIAs should 
be made available publically for the 
communities to give comments and 
expect answers. However, community 
consultation is not legally required unless 
projects would affect indigenous peoples. 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del0227.htm 
See http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/MEIO-AMBIENTE/451188-
AMBIENTALISTAS-CONSIDERAM-RETROCESSO-O-PROJETO-DO-NOVO-CODIGO-DE-
MINERACAO.html  
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potentially affected community residents 
to voice their concerns; however, this is 
not legally required in all cases. In short, 
proponents of large project proposals 
such as mining are not required to consult 
local communities (Gomez et al., 2006). 
ILO 169 ratified in 2002 – Right for 
indigenous and tribal peoples to be 
consulted, informed and engaged freely 
prior to deciding on a project that could 
impact on them.  
This would only affect the case of 
Paracatu as it has Maroon people living 
next to the mine; however they were not 
consulted. In general the implementation 
of ILO 169 in Brazil has been criticized 
by human rights experts 
5
 
ILO 169 ratified in 2008 – Right for 
indigenous and tribal peoples to be 
consulted, informed and engaged freely 
prior to deciding on a project that could 
impact on them. 
The only community within the 
researched case studies that was able to 
use ILO 169 was the Diaguita community 
in the Huasco Valley who managed to 
halt the licence permit application for 
Canadian mining company Goldcorp. 
The Diaguita community claimed they 
had not been consulted and did not give 
their consent to constructing a gold mine 
in their territory. 
 
  
                                                 
5
 http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/512272-convencao-169-da-oit-o-descaso-brasileiro-entrevista-
especial-com-carolina-bellinger  
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4.1 Huasco Valley contextual case study  
4.11 Huasco Valley Background 
The Pascua Lama project is owned by the Canadian multinational mining company 
Barrick Gold, considered to be one of the largest gold miners in the world. Pascua 
Lama is located on the border of Chile and Argentina, in the Frontera district at an 
elevation of 3,800 to 5,200 metres. Pascua Lama is one of the world’s largest gold 
and silver resources with nearly 18 million ounces of proven and probable gold 
reserves 1,676 million ounces of silver contained within the gold reserves, and an 
expected mine life of 25 years. Annual production in the first full five years of 
operation is expected to average 800,000-850,000 ounces of gold and 35 million 
ounces of silver (Barrick Gold website). 
 
The mining project is also located in the municipality of Alto del Carmen, which is 
situated in the Huasco Valley in Northern Chile the research focused on the 
community closest to the project in Alto del Carmen. In the province of Huasco, 
66,491 people live of whom 48,040 are concentrated in the capital, Vallenar (Urkidi, 
2010). The community of Alto del Carmen, with a population of 4,840, is completely 
rural; almost 70% of the houses are adobe buildings and 75% of the working 
population has not completed standard schooling (Urkidi, 2010). 
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Image 1 – Map of Huasco Valley within Chile 
 
Adapted from Urkidi (2010) 
 
The Huasco valley runs transversally to the Andes, is very deep and has steep slopes. 
In just 80 km it goes from 674 m above sea level at the village of Alto del Carmen to 
5400 m at the highest point of Pascua Lama (Urkidi, 2010). This part of the Atacama 
desert has largely remained unscathed by mining activity compared to further north 
which has become obliterated and completely dried up, as argued by my interviewees 
from the local community and as I was able to see for myself whilst visiting the city 
of Copiapo 200km north of the Huasco Valley. The people of Alto del Carmen still 
work in small farms growing food for their own consumption and maintaining herded 
livestock, mainly goats. 80% of the farming lands are used by small-scale farmers. 
(Urkidi, 2010). 
  135 
Image 2 – Huasco Valley 
 
Source: Own photography 
According to Standen (2011), the Huasco Valley community has a very strong 
attachment to the valley, which in turn is closely linked to their identity as a people. 
In particular, the water from the river Huasco that is sourced from the top of the 
Andes mountains is of great importance to the community’s way of life either as rural 
peasant farmers or large scale commercial agriculture businesses mainly growing and 
exporting grapes.  
 
  
  136 
4.12 Timeline for large scale mining in Huasco Valley 
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4.13 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors 
Market 
 Barrick Gold 
 Goldcorp 
 Local wealthy landowners and farmers 
 
State 
 Chilean justice courts 
 National government Ministry of Environment 
 Ministry of Mining 
 CONADI – National body for Indigenous Peoples’ Development 
 Municipal government of Alto del Carmen 
 
Civil Society 
 Local community residents’ associations 
 Alto del Carmen parish church clergymen and nuns 
 Agricultural cooperatives 
 OLCA – Santiago based Environmental justice activist organization 
 Protest Barrick – Canada based anti-Barrick Gold activist organization 
 Environmental justice lawyers representing community 
4.14 Economic Activity in Municipality of Alto del Carmen 
According to the Municipal statistical report in 2012 there were zero numbers of 
residents in the Alto del Carmen community working in mining in 2010. Nonetheless 
60% of the municipality earned its living from agriculture
6
. Therefore from an 
economic livelihoods perspective the community of the Huasco Valley is dependent 
on agriculture and completely independent from mining. Table 8 below shows these 
figures. 
                                                 
6
 
http://reportescomunales.bcn.cl/2012/index.php/Alto_del_Carmen#Indicadores_econ.
C3.B3micos 
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Table 8 – Number of people employed by agriculture and mining in the Huasco 
Valley, 2010 
Industry Number and Percentage employed 
Agriculture 522 – 60% 
Mining 0 – 0% 
Source: Municipal statistical report, 2010 
4.15 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community  
In 2005 Barrick Gold decided to buy the silence of one of their main critical 
opponents, the Water Vigilance Board who signed an agreement with Barrick Gold in 
June 2005. The Board, made up of mainly large wealthy farmers who had been 
opposed to Pascua Lama due to the impacts on their grape crops, agreed not to oppose 
the project upon receiving US$60 million over several years in compensation for 
potential impacts from Pascua Lama to their water supplies, and US$5 million for 
constructing a small reservoir. 
 
According to Barrick Gold’s CSR website www.barrickbeyondborders.com the 
mining company focused on helping with training for skills and employment in the 
Huasco Valley. According to the website the then president of Barrick Gold South 
American claimed “Right from the beginning, we have respected the Diaguita and 
their ties to the land,” Igor Gonzalez, president of Barrick Gold South America. “We 
opened up the channels of communication and invited members of the community to 
discuss issues, to openly ask questions and to work together with us on the Pascua-
Lama project.” (www.barrickbeyondborders.com) 
 
In 2006 Barrick Gold claim to have spent US$7.9m on local purchasing in the Huasco 
Valley. Other initiatives towards the local community according to the 
www.barrickbeyondborders.com website  include: 
 Funding a local hospital for its upkeep since 2006. 
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 By end of 2007 Barrick expected to inject US$16m into the local community 
and identify 700 potential suppliers. 
 From 2006 Barrick also offered training course for farmers and also course in 
Diaguita pottery and handcraft. 
 Controversally Barrick Gold also provided legal support to local community 
residents who claimed to be Diaguita to gain official recognition as Diaguita 
people by the Chilean State as this would qualify them as indigenous peoples 
in eyes of the State and international law. 
 Together with NGOs such as América Solidaria Barrick planned to build 700 
homes for low-income people in the community and improve schools in an 
effort to alleviate poverty, this plan known as the Atacama Committment was 
endorsed by the UN Global Compact. 
 After gauging that they were losing community support and being attacked in 
the press Barrick decided to publish a letter on their website endorsing the 
support of six community leaders from the Huasco Valley. In August 2007 
Barrick uploaded a letter signed by six different neighbourhood associations 
underscoring their support for Barrick and Pascua Lama operating in the 
region. However it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood 
representatives who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del 
Carmen municipality in the Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the 
Water Vigilance Board, the group that receives US$6m from Barrick Gold. 
The other five representatives who signed the mentioned letter of approval are 
from the town of Vallenar and Huasco which is even further away near the 
coast. 
 In 2009 Barrick published a Special Report on the barrickbeyondborders 
website which underlined the community consultation and dialogue the 
company claims to have undertaken: “An extensive door-to-door information 
campaign was organized, with staff visiting residents and providing 
information. They held nearly 1,000 meetings and dozens of open houses in 
Chile’s Atacama Region and in Argentina’s Iglesia and Jáchal districts. 
Members of the Pascua-Lama team talked, they listened and answered 
questions, engaging with government officials and regulators, academics, 
scientists, environmentalists, industry associations, media and the public. 
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Formal consultations took place over 15 months in Chile and 20 months in 
Argentina.” 
 In 2009 Barrick Gold announced later there would be a community water 
monitoring programme for local residents to independently test the water 
quality themselves. 
 In 2010 Barrick stated it planned to improve the aesthetics of Alto del Carmen 
and the Huasco Valley in general to help the community development and 
promite tourism. 
 Barrick donated computers for low-income residents in the Huasco Valley to 
learn computing skills. 
 In 2012 Barrick reported that via the Water Vigilence Board fund they had 
invested US$15m in imprioving water supply to the local community mainly 
by paving the water canals. 
 Barrick had spent US$70m by 2011 in building new roads to the Pascua Lama 
to not disturb the local communities with their heavy mining traffic. 
 By late 2012 Barrick had provided internet and phone access to 150 isolated 
residents in the Huasco Valley. 
 Barrick opened a grievance mechanism system for the Huasco Valley 
communities so they could make complaints and also increase interaction and 
community relations. 
 Barrick reported on further joint community monitoring of water tests with El 
Corral community in the Huasco Valley. 
 The biggest development of all reported on the Barrick CSR website is the 
latest news from 29
th
 May, 2014 that Barrick Gold have agreed with a 
majority of local Diaguita communities to cooperate and collaborate on joint 
monitoring of impacts and eventually for benefits sharing. As stated on the 
website: “After six months of dialogue, Barrick has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with 15 Diaguita indigenous communities in Chile’s Huasco 
province, where the company’s Pascua-Lama project is located. 
As part of the agreement, Barrick will make technical and environmental 
information about the project available to the communities and will provide 
financial resources and materials required to support analysis of this 
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information. This will allow the communities to study and better understand 
the project, its impacts and its environmental controls. 
The agreement will see the formation of a technical committee with 
representatives appointed by each party, and an independent mediator.  
“We believe this agreement will form the basis of a new relationship with 
Diaguita communities, one based on transparency, openness and trust,” said 
Eduardo Flores, Barrick’s Executive Director in Chile. “Earning that trust will 
take time, and it will require consistent engagement and commitment. We’re 
confident that Pascua-Lama is on that path.” (www.barrickbeyondborders.com 
2014). 
 
It should also be mentioned that according to the community respondents Barrick 
Gold began to heavily deaccelerate their local CSR benefits and investment once they 
realized they did not have community acceptance. One example of this was the 
ending of proving free wi-fi internet access to the communities near Alto del Carmen 
the main village in the Huasco Valley. 
 
Overall it would appear that Barrick defended its strategies by using the argument it 
was in compliance with all national legislation and even went beyond by adhereing to 
internationally regarded best practices regarding community engagement.  
 
4.16 Community strategies towards Pascua Lama 
The Pascua Lama project from the outset has divided the Huasco Valley community, 
especially since Barrick Gold have promised jobs, benefits and general improvements 
to development to the community. As a result most of the the community started out 
in the early 2000’s protesting against the proposed mining project. However, by the 
current day a majority of the community neighbourhood associations in the valley 
have signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate with Barrick Gold in 
jointly understanding the impacts from the mine. 
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After years of prospecting during the late 1970s, Barrick Gold applied for mining and 
environmental licences to the Chilean government in 2000 to mine Pascua Lama. 
Local councillor Lionel Fonseca studied the plans and was horrified at what the 
impact would be on the local water sources. Lionel told a local nun to read these plans 
also. The nun was so shocked that she involved the local Catholic church to mobilize 
and educate the local community about the potential negative harm to their lives and 
water that could come should Barrick Gold be granted their licences. The nun 
mobilized the local clergymen and church who started to give masses on the riverbed 
to symbolize and show to the local community the importance and sacredness of their 
water supply and moreover how they should protect it from the threat it was facing 
from pollution and depletion that would be caused by Pascua Lama in the future. This 
created a ripple effect with more local residents curious to learn more about Pascua 
Lama and those men who had worked in high altitude mining elsewhere in Chile in 
the Andes mountains also began to disseminate their technical knowledge and 
experience of the negative environmental impact of mining to water sources, which 
increased concerns across the Huasco Valley. 
 
Lionel Fonseca also contacted Santiago based environmental justice NGO OLCA in 
2000, who in turn decided to take this challenge as their main cause for justice. 
Therefore OLCA and the church began educating the local community by framing the 
arrival of Pascua Lama as a direct threat to their way of life and identities. Between 
2001 and 2003 the local church, OLCA and several community leaders including 
Lionel Fonseca were able to educate, raise awareness and mobilize the local 
community around the impacts of the Pascua Lama mining project on their lives. This 
involved painting public walls and the church with anti Pasua Lama slogans and 
painting the local church’s façade depicting the valley now and before as a peaceful 
and beautiful place and then below showing a hellish image of what the valley would 
turn into if Pascua Lama was given the go ahead. (See images II and III) In addition 
OLCA organized screenings of other mining conflicts with communities from around 
Latin America so the Huasco community could learn about how other regional 
neighbours were dealing with similar problems. In short OLCA, the church and local 
leaders had framed the conflict around the banner of water and how Pasuca Lama 
represented a direct threat and incompatibility with the local livelihoods and culture, 
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in other words that Pascua Lama would kill the Huasco Valley. Some of the public 
mural slogans include “water is worth more than gold” and “Pascua Lama is bread for 
today but hunger for tomorrow” (See image IV). This education and awareness 
raising that had been provided to a community mainly made up of peasants was clear 
to see when I spoke to several elderly residents who spoke to me about global climate 
change, the involvement of George Bush in Barrick Gold and how according to them 
the CEO of Barrick Gold Peter Munk had stated that “hunger has a price and that if 
Chilean want to eat they have to pay the price of their glaciers”. This last comment 
has infuriated many of the local community.  
 
Image 3 – Parish Church with anti mining mural painting in Alto del 
Carmen, Huasco Valley 
 
Source: Own photography 
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Image 4 – Close up of Mural of “Before and After” Pascua Lama on the 
main Parish Church of Huasco Valley in Alto del Carmen 
 
Source: Own photography 
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Image 5 – Centre of Alto del Carmen in Huasco Valley slogan “Pa$cua 
Lama Bread for Today – Hunger for Tomorrow 
 
 Source: Own photography 
 
In 2005 Barrick Gold decided to buy the silence of one of their main critical 
opponents (Urkidi, 2010), the Water Vigilance Board who signed an agreement with 
Barrick Gold in June 2005 to monitor and improve the water supply to the rest of the 
valley. The Board, made up of mainly large wealthy farmers who had been opposed 
to Pascua Lama due to the impacts on their grape crops, agreed not to oppose the 
project upon receiving US$60 million over several years in compensation for 
potential impacts from Pascua Lama to their water supplies, and US$5 million for 
constructing a small reservoir. According to my interviewees and also to Urkidi, 
(2010), the agreement was another important turning point and political opportunity 
in the conflict and the development of the social movement, mainly because the main 
economic power who had been together with the anti-Pascua Lama movement had 
now changed sides and the group opposing Pascua Lama was consequently much 
weaker in terms of power and resources.  
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Despite this loss of a strong ally in the fight against Pascua Lama, the movement 
increased their street protests in the Huasco Valley against the mining project with 
there being 2,500 participants in the largest street manifestation; also via the Internet 
OLCA was able to disseminate and escalate the conflict to an international level. This 
led to Canadian anti-mining NGOs such as StopBarrick and Mining Watch Canadian 
offering their support and inviting local Huasco leaders to speak at Barrick’s Annual 
General Meeting in Toronto and at universities about the Huasco Valley conflict. 
There were also anti-Pascua Lama street protests in London, Cambridge and 
Barcelona and the international press and filmmakers were also covering the story. A 
local newspaper poll in the Diario Chañarcillo in late March 2005 had shown the 
overall local community rejection rates to be at 97%; nonetheless many locals were 
beginning to become despondent and disillusioned knowing that the decisive and 
legal powers over Pascua Lama’s future were held by government, and it appeared 
that government and Barrick Gold were united in their desire to mine in the Huasco 
Valley.  
 
However, in late 2006 the Chilean government authorized Pascua Lama but on the 
basis that Barrick would not touch the glaciers. There were immediate mobilizations 
and protests; however, shortly after the community became despondent. Though the 
majority of the community disapproved, they were also resigned to the fact that their 
government had the final decision, despite the constant attempts by OLCA to create 
more protests.  
 
Barrick Gold on the other hand stepped up their CSR and community relations 
campaign by sending many sociologists and anthropologists to engage with the local 
community in a bid to improve relations. According to my interviewees as well as 
Salinas (2007), Urkidi (2008) and Standen (2011), Barrick Gold were proactively 
seeking to become an integrated important cultural actor in the Huasco Valley by 
sponsoring shows, concerts and other events for the local community; further, Barrick 
Gold entered into partnership with the Chilean government’s Ministry of Health to 
fund US$10m in local health-related projects as part of its Atacama agreement.  
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However, according to my interviewees, as the trust had been broken before with lies 
from Barrick regarding the glaciers and other impacts from Pascua Lama, many in the 
local community despite its very basic schooling and low income levels were not 
interested in receiving “breadcrumbs”, as they referred to them, in the form of CSR in 
exchange for giving their acceptance or SLO to Barrick Gold. Barbara, a Diaguita 
leader and Chilean government official also explained that despite low literacy levels 
amongst the community, they have a tendency not to trust outsiders. Despite the 
majority of the residents at the Huasco Valley being against Pascua Lama, Barrick 
Gold were still able to convince a minority of the benefits of the mining project.  
 
Furthermore, Barrick engaged in what could be considered as a manipulative strategy 
after identifying that their supporters were of Diaguita origin, as were most of the 
other inhabitants of the Huasco Valley. According to my interviewees from the 
community, OLCA and external experts, Barrick Gold worked on building good 
relations and trust with a group of Diaguita people and also took them to meetings in 
Toronto to demonstrate an SLO by the Diaguita people (even though this group was 
not representative of the community as a whole).  
 
Barrick Gold helped strengthen the leadership of members of the Diaguita group with 
whom they had good relations so that they could publically defend the mining 
company with a legitimate voice. Barrick were accused of creating their own Diaguita 
leaders who did not have any legitimacy within the established Diaguita community 
in the valley (Urkidi, 2010). Barrick Gold also realized that in 2006 the Chilean 
government was going to officially recognize indigenous people and empower them 
with additional rights about determining how their territory is used as well as offering 
certain social benefits to them. It was therefore in Barrick’s interests to enjoy good 
relations with the Diaguita local community and make this public. 
 
Historical reasons are relevant in explaining this as the Diaguita have systematically 
been lied to and cheated over hundreds of years by different foreign colonizers such 
as Incas from Peru, Spain and the Chilean State.  The mining company published a 
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book in 2009 on the Diaguita Identity with the help of a well-regarded anthropologist. 
The book claims, amongst other things, that the Diaguita people’s true historical 
identity is that of miners and that becoming farmers is more of a recent livelihood. 
Meanwhile, according to all my local community interviewees (Interviewee codes E1-
4) Barrick Gold was not adhering to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
requirements and had partially destroyed the glaciers which had in turn led to reduced 
water levels in the rivers (which Barrick Gold attributes to global warming). Barrick 
Gold were also not managing their cyanide in a responsible manner in the mountains 
having spilled some and also accidentally spilled huge amounts of human excrement 
from their mining operations into a river down in the valley. 
 
In 2008 the Chilean government signed the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Treaty 169 to protect indigenous peoples. This treaty gave indigenous peoples the 
final say on any large projects to be constructed near them. In April 2012 the Diaguita 
community in Huasco valley defeated another Canadian mining company – Goldcorp 
and its gold mining project El Morro – using ILO169, which gave them renewed 
strength and conviction they could still oust Barrick Gold. 
 
In late 2012 a well-known national environmental lawyer Luis Sanchez approached 
two Diaguita leaders at the Chilean House of Congress where they had presented their 
case of injustice for five minutes to Senators, and in which they explained that Barrick 
Gold had diminished the glaciers and reduced significantly their water supplies. 
Sanchez, an accomplished lawyer who has successfully defended other indigenous 
peoples against large hydroelectric and thermoelectric coal power stations in Chile 
offered his services to the people of Huasco Valley in order for a commission should 
they win compensation. The Diaguita leaders Barbara and Sandra accepted Soto’s 
offer. 
 
This decision to accept lawyer Sanchez by a few Huasco valley leaders brought to the 
surface latent tensions, divisions and mistrust within the Huasco Valley community. 
The community residents such as Lionel Fonseca allied to OLCA and the local 
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Church were and remain very much against this idea of having Luis Sanchez defend 
their battle. The argument from this group is of “No Negotiations” with Barrick Gold, 
that Pascua Lama must be stopped and never accepted. Therefore as per this faction, 
if the group led by Barbara and Sandra accepted compensation from Barrick Gold, 
this would give the multinational carte blanche to do as it pleased and would lead to 
the Valley’s destruction. The group led by OLCA and Lionel Fonseca see lawyer 
Sanchez as only interested in gaining financial compensation and not concerned about 
the environment of the Huasco Valley. 
 
However, Barbara and Sandra visited all the different official neighbourhoods in the 
Huasco Valley giving speeches along with two other allies of the communities asking 
for their approval and signatures to accept Luis Sanchez to represent them in the 
Chilean courts. The main discourse used to frame their argument was that their first 
and foremost objective was for mining operations to cease. However, they were also 
realistic that this may not be possible as it would be them versus the world’s largest 
mining company and the Chilean State. Therefore they wanted compensation for the 
damage already incurred from Barrick Gold. They had spent ten years marching and 
protesting along with OLCA against Pascua Lama and achieved nothing whilst 
Barrick had been destroying the glaciers and depleting water supplies that was now 
causing conflicts between neighbours over the amounts of water they can use to 
irrigate their land. In their view OLCA make a living off the mining conflict and 
therefore have no desire for the conflict to end. 
 
Eventually Barbara and Sandra obtained enough support from the local community 
for Luis Sanchez to represent them. By late 2012 Barrick were in financial difficulties 
with Pascua Lama and received a fine for financial irregularities. In April 2013, Luis 
Sanchez submitted his request to cease operations at Pascua Lama which was 
accepted by the Chilean justice along with the self-admittance by Barrick Gold of 
their failure to comply with environmental regulations surround cyanide management. 
In May 2013, Barrick Gold received the highest environmental fine in Chilean history 
of US$16m for environmental irregularities in particular for non-compliance with the 
responsible management of cyanide at the mining site and their mine remains 
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suspended until today over one year later at the time of writing this thesis in June 
2014. 
 
In late May 2014 as reported earlier by the Barrick Gold website the mining company 
signed a memorandum of understanding with 15 communities in the Huasco Valley 
lead by Sandra and two lawyers including Luis Sanchez to work together with Barrick 
in jointly identifying environmental impacts of Pascua Lama to the valley. This idea 
is very much steeped in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights, 
which calls for identification of impacts to human rights ideally conducted in a joint 
initative between project and community. Furthermore such an agreement could lead 
to benefits sharing with the 15 neighbourhood associations just as feared by the 
groups staunchly opposed to the mine.  
 
Local councillor Orlando who had been together with Sandra in 2012 now moved 
positions and started a campaign and social movement on Facebook and in the valley 
called “Creating Valley” denouncing this new agreement between Sandra and Barrick 
Gold. As a result those opposing the mine lead by Orlando have been marching and 
protesting again in the community. The Bishop of Copiapó a city 200km away also 
sent a letter showing his support for those against negotiating with the mine due to the 
environmental risk. 
 
The result of this agreement has been to further divide the community of Huasco 
Valley, in fact this division in its strategy for dealing with Barrick Gold has been 
indicative of the community strategy towards Barrick since the company’s 
announcement of its arrival to the valley in 2000. 
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4.2 Conceiçao de Mato Dentro – contextual case study  
According to Anglo American’s website the Minas-Rio project, currently under 
construction is a mining project in Brazil that will have an initial production capacity 
of 26.5 million tonnes of iron ore for export. With an investment of over US$5.5 
billion, the project includes an iron ore mine and a processing unit in the region of 
Conceição do Mato Dentro Minas Gerais State, and will have the longest pipeline in 
the world, at over 525 km long, pass through some 32 municipalities. (Anglo 
American website). 
 
The Minas-Rio mining project was actually bought the Brazilian iron-ore giant MMX 
in 2007 and later sold to Anglo American in 2008. MMX is a national Brazilian 
mining company owned by a well-known and polemical Brazilian oil, gas and mining 
magnate Eike Batista who was the wealthiest man in Brazil until 2012 and one of the 
richest in the world.  
One of the main controversies surrounding the conflict of this case is that of the 
location. Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is considered the eco-tourism capital of Minas 
Gerais State in Brazil. It is a small historical municipality with colonial buildings 
dating back 300 years and a population under 18,000 people. Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro is in the Espinhaço Reserve between the endangered Atlantic Forest and the 
Cerrado and has the State’s highest waterfall. (See Image VI). 
The main economy and subsistence of the local community in Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro is from small-scale farming, dairy production and eco-tourism. Therefore the 
arrival of the largest mining project in Brazil if not the world has caused great concern 
with much of the local community in terms of the environmental and social impacts to 
the town and region of the arrival of thousands of mining workers and of the physical 
mining activities. 
Imagine V shows the project’s location in relation to Brazil and the State of Minas 
Gerais. 
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4.21 Timeline for Minas Rio Mineduct project in Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro region 
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4.22 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors 
Market 
 Anglo American 
 MMX 
 Hotels, diners, private landlords 
 Eco-tourism hotels 
 
State 
 Ministry of Mining 
 State public prosecution office 
 Minas Gerais State politicians Rogério Correia and Padre Joao  
 Municipal government of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and surrounding villages 
 
Civil Society 
 Local community residents’ association - REASA 
 Local community social movement against mining duct – Atingidos pelo 
Mineiroduto  
 Maroon residents 
 GESTA – Federal University of Minas Gerais socio-environmental justice 
research group 
 
4.23 Economic Activity in Municipality of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro was heavily dependent on the service sector as opposed to 
agriculture or heavy industry (including mining). 63% of the GDP of the municipality 
derives from services; this supports the community views that the region is dependent 
on eco-tourism and not mining. Agriculture represents 20% of the GDP and Industry 
such as mining accounts for the least at 17%. Therefore from an economic livelihoods 
perspective the community Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is dependent on eco tourism 
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and consequently rural conservation and seemed independent from mining in 2011. 
Table 9 below shows these figures. 
Table 9 – GDP amout per seconomic sector in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, 2011 
Industry GDP amount and percentage of local 
economy 
Services (including tourism) 91,932,000 reais (63%) 
Agriculture 28,758,000 reais (20%) 
Industry (including Mining) 25,109,000 (17%) 
Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011
7
 
4.24 Corporate strategies for engaging with the local community 
Compared to Barrick Gold’s Pascua Lama mining project the Minas-Rio mineduct, 
one of the largest and most expensive mining investments in the world surprisingly 
has scarce data available from Anglo American about their community engagement 
and CSR. Nontheless using community summaries and the limited information 
available from desktop research the following can be put forward.  
 
The corporate strategies for Anglo American are associated by the local community to 
those of the previous owners MMX. According to my interviewees, their blog sites 
and from public hearings I watched online the environmental licencing process was 
fraught with suspicion, a lack of transparency, and alleged political favours so that 
Eike Batista’s MMX could obtain the necessary permits for mining. Almost as soon 
as MMX had been awarded the licenses just one year later Anglo American 
successfully bought the Minas – Rio project from Eike Batista for US$ 5.5billion. It 
could be interpreted that MMX had done the difficult and more dirty work for Anglo 
American to have the largest iron-ore mine project in the world. 
                                                 
7
 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?codmun=311750&idtema=
125&search=minas-gerais|conceicao-do-mato-dentro|produto-interno-bruto-dos-
municipios-2011&lang=_EN   
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Community representatives explained that MMX’s initial strategy to gain entry to the 
area was fraught with manipulation and murky dealings. Several community members 
as well as GESTA, an academic centre which researches extractive company – 
community conflicts in the region, of how in 2007 one of Batista’s representatives 
arrived in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro making enquiries into the possibility of buying 
up land for horse breeding and farming. Unsuspecting local community residents 
helped him and sold the representative land, though became suspicious once they 
noticed how much the representative had bought. Soon after all was revealed that the 
land had been bought for mining and not agriculture related activities. (GESTA, 
2013).  
 
Intervewees and desktop research of videos as well as documents by GESTA (2013) 
claim that human rights abuses started to happen (from the time of MMX and later 
Anglo American). Such abuses include intimidation to sell land, to evict long-
standing residents from their land, constant blasting and detonations of land near 
residents’ homes, polluting rivers and water supplies, destroying the local waterfall 
Passa Sete and in general not listening to the affected communities. The community 
argues that large scale mining is not compatible with their agricultural way of life that 
requires clean access to water. Image VII shows the environmental impact of Anglo 
American’s mining activities to the Passa Sete waterfall and the river. Image VII is 
also an invitation to a public hearing to discuss Anglo American’s alleged human 
rights abuses.  
 
GESTA and other Human rights organizations denounced the above to the Business 
and human rights resource centre in 2013 to which Anglo American replied in 
December 2013 with a position statement available online at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1023845/jump. The mining company argued that 
the Minas-Rio mining project is properly regulated by all Brazilian authorities for its 
impacts and therefore in compliance with all legal duties and requirements. Anglo 
American also acknowledges the Minas-Rio mineduct is complex and impacts 
communities. In the statement Anglo American also refutes all claims that it has 
interfered in any gatherings or social movements discussing the mine (Anglo 
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American, 2013). Indeed it worth highlighting that Anglo American does not apply its 
award winning SEAT (Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox) to the communities 
affected in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, the reason being due to the magnitude of 
impacts at this project as signaled to me by an unnamed Anglo American employee 
who wished to remain off the record with that comment. 
 
With regards to the claims about forced evictions from land and questionable 
resettlements of communities Anglo American respond that “The company 
emphasizes that it has never used coercion or practiced any violent and/or illegal acts 
in negotiation processes with land owners. When the removal of landholders has been 
necessary, such action has always been preceded by a court order and carried out in 
conjunction with authorities, according to legal guidelines.  
Anglo American has a Land Management Program that respects local and World 
Bank standards. Negotiations are individual and not collective, as contained in the 
Land Negotiation Program approved by standing authorities. All resettled families 
receive social-psychological and livelihood creation support including agricultural 
capacitation for 3 years after their move”. (Anglo American Statement, 2013).  
 
One of the other main grievances of the communities in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is 
that not all those who are impacted by the construction of the mineduct are recognized 
as affected by Anglo American. In fact Anglo American only recognizes two 
communities as impacted. The company’s response is that the identification of 
impacted communities is carried out by Brazilian government authories called Copam 
and that Anglo American only provide some oversight in this identification process. 
Once again the mining company uses the argument of being in legal compliance to 
defend its community engagement position. 
 
Nonetheless it should be mentioned that Anglo American have invested considerably 
in the urban area, as a senior manager from the company explained to me for example 
having spent millions of dollars on restoring a colonial church and building a 
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technical training centre for locals to build capacity in mining and construction skills. 
Furthermore the mining company has developed its programme to purchase and 
source as much as possible from local vendors and suppliers. In specific as stated in 
the Anglo American position statement (2013) the company has invested in the 
following: 
 “Preservaçao”, an Environmental Education Program which benefits 9,100 
students and 910 teachers, from 49 schools in the  community.   
 Construction and remodeling of Health Units and Hospitals in Conceição do 
Mato Dentro, Dom Joaquim and Alvorada de Minas, including training to 
medical professionals.  
 Local labour development programmes, resulting in a US$12 million 
investment in the qualification of professionals in Conceição do Mato Dentro 
to enable them to find jobs at the project and more widely.  
 A partnership with Reprolatina, a sexual health NGO, through which 30,000 
people have benefited from either programmes designed to raise awareness or 
certify sexual health professionals. 
 The Mover Program, which provides professional training and qualifications, 
with lectures, workshops, “mobile” trainings in a bus and via a web portal. 
 Promova, a Local Supplier Development Program, which aims to generate 
8,000 jobs by 2015. 
 
In summary it would appear Anglo American legitimize and defend their actions and 
position by stating their compliance and collaboration with Brazilian State authorities, 
legislation and with international organizations abiding by international norms and 
best practices 
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Image 6 – Location of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in Brazil 
 
Source: Google Maps 
Image 7 – View of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro  
 
Source: http://www.alugueldevansbhmg.com.br/passeios-e-aventuras/aluguel-de-van-para-conceicao-do-mato-
dentro-mg/  
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Image 8 – Invitation to public hearing to discuss alleged impacts to Passa 
Sete River and Waterfall by Anglo American  
 
Source: Supplied by anonymous community activists 
4.25 Community strategies towards Anglo American 
In general the urban community of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro who have hotels, 
guesthouses, restaurants and other businesses were in general in favour of the mine 
especially before the commencing of construction. The reason for this positive 
outlook was related to the anticipated financial returns and profiteering. Indeed 
inflation in the town has risen by several thousand percent according to my 
interviewees in terms of housing and accommodation (interviewee codes H1-3).  
 
However, the majority of the community who live in rural areas and even some of the 
urban dwellers today are very much against the Minas Rio project due to the adverse 
human rights, social and environmental impacts mentioned earlier. Two well educated 
up to university level community leaders, Fernanda and Paula tried hard throughout 
2010 and 2011 to find organizations, lawyers and political leaders that could help 
them however, they believe the power of Anglo American and the mining project was 
so great that most of those they consulted for assistance were co-opted in declining. 
According to Fernanda and Paula for a lawyer or politician to defend their case 
against a mining project of this magnitude would mean career suicide. Fernanda and 
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Paula were though able to enlist the enthusiastic support of GESTA, the academic 
centre for environmental conflicts based at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. 
The director of GESTA a professor with a PhD in Sociology from the UK has been 
very involved in this resistance against Anglo American’s Minas-Rio project. 
 
However it was the Ministry of State Prosecution (MSP) who are independent of the 
government and have, since early 2012 with limited financial resources via their 
Social Movements and Mobilization department helped strengthen the collectiveness 
of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro’s rural communities that are most affected by the 
mining project. 
  
Fernanda and Paula approached the MSP in 2012 seeking help to defend their rights 
against the environmental impact from the mine, against alleged land grabs, fairer 
compensation from being resettled to new houses in other areas and for supposed 
intimation by Anglo American security personnel. Through the MSP’s special Minas 
Gerais State Office of Inclusion and Social Mobilization (CIMOS in Portuguese), 
attached to the Attorney General of Justice, CIMOS aims to promote dialogue and 
coordination between the Prosecutors, public institutions and civil society 
organizations. Its line of action for those purposes is: Public Hearings; Community 
mobilization and coordination; Procedures for Implementation and Promotion of 
Social Projects ministerial recommendations, mediation, lectures, events, meetings, 
studies, research and reflections (Cimos, 2013).  
 
During early 2012 two officials from the local CIMOS visited the affected rural 
communities of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro to learn about the grievances and issues 
facing the communities regarding the Anglo American mine construction. The 
community explained that they were not able to dialogue effectively with the mining 
company as they would always refute all claims or injustice and negative impacts. 
Therefore the representatives of CIMOS suggested the community create a local 
association to monitor the impacts and moreover, to meet regularly to discuss the 
important issues. The reason being, as per my conversation with CIMOS 
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representative Marco, was in order to create a more solid, collective and united local 
community identity which would in theory help to get more answers and responses 
from Anglo American. This local association, which has been formalized, is called 
REASA (in Portuguese). REASA meet periodically with community members and 
other government officials they also invite Anglo American representatives who do 
not always attend. In these meetings they discuss the monitoring of environmental, 
social and human rights impacts  (REASA, 2013).  
 
Another important element of the conflict between community and Anglo American 
is the validity of an independent report compiled by an organization call Diversus into 
mapping affected communities from the proposed mine and understanding 
community perceptions. At a meeting between the community and Anglo American 
(known as Anglo Ferrous locally) on the 10
th
 June, 2010 it was decided by the MSP 
that Anglo American should finance the research and reporting of an independent 
study into the affected communities of the Minas Rio mining project. The 365-page 
report was released in 2011 and came to the conclusion that the environmental, social 
and cultural impacts on the communities would be severe and moreover that nine 
different communities would be affected. The response from Anglo American was to 
refute these claims and argue via their own second diagnostic research that only two 
communities would be impacted. Therefore only these two communities in Conceiçao 
de Mato Dentro should be engaged and compensated. This difference in opinion over 
who is impacted is at the core of the conflict between community and Anglo 
American.  
 
Since the publication of the Diversus study and Anglo American’s decision to only 
recognize two communities as officially affected by their operation the groups 
resisting the mine have called themselves the “Atingidos pela Anglo American” (the 
Affected by Anglo American). Since mid-2011 the “Atingidos” have been holding 
frequent highly charged and emotional public hearings at State assemblies in Minas 
Gerais. These hearings are transmitted live over the internet and also stored on video 
websites such as YouTube. Image VIII is an invitation to a public hearing by the 
Atingidos to discuss the alleged Human rights violations by Anglo American. The T-
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Shirt on the left side translates as “We are all affected” (written in a bloodied effect) 
and naming the different communities which Anglo American does not recognize.  
 
 
Image 9 – Invitation to public hearing with protest t-shirts against mining 
Source: Supplied by anonymous community activists 
The opposition to Anglo American from the Conceiçao de Mato Dentro community 
enjoyed a temporary victory in June 2012 for three months when the Brazilian State 
ordered Anglo American to suspend all activities as it had been brought to the 
authorities attention by the community that there were ancient pre-historic caves in 
the proposed mining site. Since September 2012 mining activity has recommenced, 
though with certain government and State officials calling for the suspension of the 
mine in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro at the public hearings. In October 2013 it was 
reported by one of Brazil’s main financial news source Exame that Anglo American 
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are hoping to sue Eike Batista for around US$1 billion for having sold them the 
Minas-Rio project with many lies such as having agreements with landowners willing 
to sell their property as well as all the licenses needed. This has cost Anglo American 
an additional US$6 billion. I would further argue that the consistent community 
resistance from Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is also a factor contributing to Anglo 
American’s irritation with this mining project.  
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4.3 Caimanes  - contextual case study 
Los Caimanes is a very small rural community located in a remote and cut off part of 
Northern Chile 250km (160 miles) north of the capital Santiago. Caimanes has only a 
population of 1700 and lies in the fertile Valley of Pupío, most of the community 
make use of the fertile ground to grow crops such as avocado, courgettes, water 
melons and others for sale and to make their living. Most locals say they are 
descended from indigenous peoples though through the years they have forgotten 
about these traditions.  
 
The road to Los Caimanes is full of winding curves along the mountains and valleys 
once the vehicle leaves the main Chilean north-south highway. Los Caimanes is a 
small village like community which one can walk around easily by foot. Many public 
services are lacking in the community such as basic sanitation and drainage systems. I 
stayed there during a very cold period of weather and constantly felt the cold even in 
my small accommodation room. Many men spent their days drinking in one of the 
few bars from Friday night until Sunday evening and it was common to see 
intoxicated men stumbling around the main street. 
 
As Los Caimanes is so remote and isolated the community has a strong sense of 
collectiveness, there is no police presence or other public services one would expect 
in a community of this size. However, since 2005 plans to build the largest tailings 
dam in Latin America known as “El Mauro” just 8km from Caimanes has led to 
community divisions, high levels of grievances and conflict internally and with 
Pelambres mining company responsible for the dam. El Mauro dam holds 2060 
million tons of water and mining waste, and is over double the height of the London 
Eye (Sargent, 2013).  
 
The main community concerns regarding the dam surround the risk of the dam 
collapsing in an earthquake, water pollution, its use of local water supplies, and the 
impact on local agriculture. "El Mauro" is constructed on the same tectonic plate as 
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the biggest earthquake ever recorded in 1960, which measured 9.5 Richter. Local 
experts claimed that if the dam collapses the community will have just minutes to 
escape. To construct the dam underground water flows were diverted, leading to an 
80% loss of water in the valley. This has had severe impacts for local agriculture, life 
in general and culture. It has meant the local community cannot drink the water on tap 
as they believe and as shown by scientific tests the water is polluted with harmful 
toxins from El Mauro dam. Image IX shows the dam. 
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4.31 Los Caimanes and El Mauro tailings dam Timeline 
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4.32 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors 
Market 
 Pelambres (Antofagasta Mining PLC) 
 
State 
 Ministry of Environment 
 Head of College of Physicians 
 Federal Police  
 
Civil Society 
 Local community residents’ Defence Committee 
 France Libertes – French social justice NGO  
 Red Ambiental del Norte – Chilean environmental justice NGO 
 London Mining Network – UK based mining affected communities NGO 
 Two different lawyers defending Caimanes community against Pelambres 
 
4.33 Economic activity in Caimanes 
Los Caimanes is an isolated village with a floating population of between 800 -1500 
at any time of the year. It does not have its own municipality or elected government 
councillors, instead the village belongs to the municipality of Los Vilos. However, as 
the small coastal town of Los Vilos is located 47km away down from the valley or a 
one hour car journey the aggregated economic activity data for Los Vilos is not 
accurate for specifically describing los Caimanes economic activity.  
 
However, in accordance with those interviewed in Caimanes for this research 
(Interviewee code D1) most residents work evenly between supplying services to 
other nearby mining projects (not El Mauro dam) and working in agriculture. As such 
the community of Caimanes though fairly dependent on mining is not dependent on 
El Mauro dam for their economic livelihoods. 
  168 
4.34 Corporate Strategies with the local community  
Since 2005 Pelambres mine planned to build one the largest tailings dams in South 
America. From the outset Pelambres faced community opposition to the proposed 
project due to fears around safety. Pelambres response was to fight the conflict in the 
courts with a community leader and landowner Vicente Ulloa. In 2006 Vicente Ulloa 
won the court battle and Pelambre’s response via its owners the Luksic family 
(Chile’s wealthiest family) appealed and made an out of court offer for settlement and 
purchase of Vicente Ulloa’s land. 
 
In 2007 Vicente Ulloa and his lawyer did a deal for US$24m with Pelambres mine to 
sell his land for El Mauro tailings dam. This lead to a deep division with Caimanes 
community which still exists up until the present day. Indeed it should be stated that 
Pelambres attempted continuously to hold dialogue and negogiate with the Caimanes 
Defence committee throughout 2010 and 2011, however no agreements were reached. 
 
Pelambres entered into negotiations and dialogue with Claudio and his defence 
committee in 2009. Pelambres’ strategy was to pay for resettling the whole of 
Caimanes to a new location safe from El Mauro tailings dam. However as Claudio 
explained to me (and in many press reports): 
“Our people have lived here for over 500 years they (Pelambres) have to move away 
and close down here! They want to send us away and pay for new homes but if they 
do then they owe us compensation for that and to all of us, not just to some” 
(interviewee code, Community leader, D1 p.) 
 
By mid 2010 the dialogue had not advanced much and were full of heated arguments 
between both parties. Pelambres sensed they were not welcome in Caimanes. The 
village was painted in anti-Pelambres graffiti and slogans with several houses flying 
black flags to show their collective mourning at the plight of Caimanes. Therefore 
Pelambres CSR strategy was to remain low key, and the only programme was the 
sponsoring of a children’s football tournament and the offering of free wi fi internet to 
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Caimanes. In 2012 Pelambres also financed the building of a sewage system for 
Caimanes via the municipality for several million dollars. 
 
Pelambres decided to take a lawsuit against Claudio and his lawyers for “illegally” 
blocking their payment of the US$5m donation to the rest of Caimanes in mid 2010. 
Pelambres also ordered for a change of community leadership and did not want to 
continue in talks with Claudio and the other leaders. Pelambres claimed openly as per 
my interviewees and in Chilean newspaper The Clinic’s article that Claudio and his 
co-leaders were after personal economic gain and therefore they wanted a change in 
community leaders.  
 
In order to show their anger 11 local community residents including three Caimanes 
Defence Committee members (not including Claudio) barricaded themselves in a 
school in September 2012 and went on hunger strike. Pelambres’ next strategy was to 
send in a bishop from the region to the school to act as negotiator with between 
mining company and community. 
 
In general Pelambres strategy towards the accusations and claims made at them by the 
community and NGOs around the safety of the dam and its impacts to local water 
sources has been that of negation. Pelambres categorically denies that their talings 
dam is polluting the local water sources with dangerous inhumane toxins despite tests 
and reports by the Chilean College of Physicians. Instead Pelambres has used the 
Chilean Ministry of Health to prove the contrary and even sent a representative of the 
Ministry of Health to Caimanes community to drink local water in front of the 
community to substantiate his claim.  
 
The strategy of denial and acquittal of all accusations of negative impacts made by 
communities and civil society actors is also heavily employed by Pelambres. In 
addition Pelambres also utilizes the argument of being in compliance with legislation 
and working together with the government.  
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Image 10 – El Mauro tailings dam 
 
Source: Colectivo audiovisual de registro de la memoria histórica de Caimanes 
 
4.35 Community strategies towards Pelambres 
Back in 2004 the then community leader Vicente Ulloa anticipated the worst for 
Caimanes when becoming aware of Pelambres’ proposed tailings dam just 8km away. 
Vicente, the main landowner of where El Mauro was to be built defended the 
community by taking legal action against Pelambres and taking part in various street 
protests and marches against the proposed mining project. In 2006 Vicente Ulloa was 
successful in his legal challenge against Pelambres mine, which is owned by Chile’s 
wealthiest family, the Luksic.  
 
In 2007 Vicente Ulloa and his lawyer did a deal for US$24m with Pelambres mine to 
sell his land for El Mauro tailings dam. Vicente decided also to donate a sum of 
around US$1m to the Caimanes community leaders. This sudden change caused 
outrage amongst much of the community who felt betrayed, and what was a very 
closely knit community quickly became divided up until today with one side taking 
the other to court over accepting the donations from Vicente Ulloa.  
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A new neighbourhood committee was born in 2007 lead by one very passionate, 
expressive and vocal leader called Claudio Fuentes. Along with his other co-leaders 
equally as courageous they decided to mobilize the community against Pelambres 
mine. These leaders were also trade union leaders at mining companies so had the 
knowhow of how to mobilize groups. Claudio and his supporters are very active at 
engaging the national and international media. There are many video reports and 
articles by national and European journalists of the group’s struggles and resistance 
on the internet. 
 
As noted during the field vist to Caimanes the majority of the community are with the 
Caimanes Defence Committee and against Pelambres mining company. However, the 
community is now divided as a minority still hopes to inherit part of the generous 
donation promised by previous leader Vicente Ulloa. The new community leaders 
have also taken a much more direct and aggressive approach towards mobilizing 
against Pelambres, For example the leaders often block the main access road to the 
mine with burning tyres (See image IX) to protest and request for more mineral water 
for the community. The leaders have also painted anti-Pelambres mining slogans 
around the public areas of the village and several houses have black flags to show 
their mourning for the situation upheaval they are undergoing with regards to El 
Mauro tailings dam. (See image 10). 
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Image 11 – Caimanes Defence Committee member blocking access route 
to mine 
 
Source: http://airepurovalpo.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/pueblo-de-caimanes-corta-ruta-de.html 
The group of Caimanes defence committee leaders around 12 locals in 2010 went on 
hunger strike in defence of their plight in the hope Pelambres would offer the 
community new housing in another location on the community’s terms and 
conditions. Pelambres sent a Bishop to negotiate an end to the hunger strike and offer 
the community a resettlement deal, only on their terms as a mining company. The 
hunger strikers did not accept and after becoming very weak ended the strike after 88 
days. Claudio Fuentes and three other leaders were invited twice to the French 
parliament to receive bravery medals for their resistance to Pelambres. Indeed it 
should be stated that Pelambres attempted continuously to hold dialogue and 
negogiate with the Caimanes Defence committee throughout 2010 and 2011, however 
no agreements were reached. 
 
Cladio Fuentes and his lawyers were also taken to court by Pelambres mine for 
preventing the donations of money to other community members, which in March 
2013 Claudio successfully defended in court. This was seen as an important victory 
by the community over Pelambres, and has made relations with the mining company 
even worse. Claudio claimed also that Pelambres offered him a blank cheque (in the 
Chile se Moviliza documentary aired on national Chilean television in 2013) in the 
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hope he would stop resisting and mobilizing the community against the mine with 
roadblocks and protests and by featuring in press reports.  
 
In May 2014 the Caimanes defence committee achieved another victory against 
Pelambres’ El Mauro dam. According to Vasquez (2014) in an on-line news report 
the Chilean justice courts categorized el Mauro dam as “ruinous” and ordered it to 
reduce its capacity by 40% in order to mitigate risks to the nearby community in 
Caimanes.  
Image 12 – Anti Pelambres message in Caimanes Street 
  
Source – Own photo 
 
The above message translates as “The Defence committee will fight until death 
against Pelambres Mining company. We will fight for our rights as citizens. We will 
not allow Pelambres Mining company to abuse us as they think they can change our 
way of thinking by buying people. The caricature figure of the man is Andronico 
Luksic the wealthiest man in Chile and one of the wealthiest in Latin America, owner 
of Pelambres Mining company. 
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4.4 Colla community context 
The Colla of Río Jorquera are a small group of 88 people or 35 - 40 families living 
scattered across the mountainous valley road that connects Chile with Argentina from 
the town of Tierra Amarrilla around 1000m altitude up to around 3500m altitude 
higher up the road. At the highest point of the road just before the border crossing to 
Argentina at around 4500m is where Kinross Gold’s Maricunga Gold mine is located. 
There are several other gold and copper mines located in this region, many of which 
use the same access road where the Colla live to travel to and from their mines. The 
nearest large city to the Colla community is that of Copiapó, which is located over 
800km north of the capital Santiago in the driest desert of the world, the Atacama. 
Just 200km south is the Huasco Valley where the Diaguita people live with Barrick 
Gold’s Pascua Lama goldmine. Image 12 shows a map of where the Kinross Gold 
Maricunga.   
 
The Colla community no longer speak the language of their ancestors; they only 
speak Spanish and have lost many of their traditions. However, as their president 
explained to me they still continue to follow their transhumance custom where they 
herd their livestock (mainly sheep) from one grazing ground to another, as from 
lowlands to highlands, with the changing of seasons. The Colla as a people have also 
received recognition by The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) as a “Living Human Treasure” in September 2012, being 
the only indigenous group in Chile to receive such acknowledgement. 
 
The Colla people also cultivate crops such as alfafa in the small flat areas between 
mountains, which they use for own consumption and also for selling. Overall the 
Colla community repeatedly expressed to me their great satisfaction and desire to live 
in peace and harmony with pachamama or nature, just as they had done for so many 
years and generations. The Colla community consider the land where they live as 
their territory even though legally the land belongs to the Chilean State. In a similar 
way to the Diaguitas to the south the Colla do not recognize the Spanish colonization 
in the 16
th
 Century which later lead to the birth of Chile. 
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Image 13 – Location of Kinross Gold Maricunga Mine in Region III of 
Chile 
 
Source: Kinross Gold website 
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4.41 Timeline of Colla Community – Kinross Gold 
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4.42 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society sectors 
Market 
 Kinross Gold 
State 
 Chilean justice courts 
 National government Ministry of Environment 
 CONADI – National body for Indigenous Peoples’ Development 
 
Civil Society 
 Local community residents’ association 
 Lawyer representing community 
 UNESCO 
 
4.43 Economic Activity for Los Colla 
As with the case of Los Caimanes the Colla of Río Jorquera community which is even 
smaller consists of around 40 families living high up in the mountains on the road to 
the Maricunga mine. Nonetheless, the municipality that addresses the Colla of Río 
Jorquera community is that of Tierra Amarrilla located three hours by car from the 
Colla residents and between 80km – 130km from the homes of the Colla residents. 
Therefore as with the case of Caimanes the economic data for Tierra Amarrilla should 
be considered as inappropriate for the approximately 40 families of the Colla of Río 
Jorquera.  
 
Nonetheless as ascertained from the interviews with Colla community members most 
of the families make their living from subsistence farming of alfafa and sheep rearing 
which forms a central part of their indigenous identity (Interviewee Code B1, 
Communtiy leaders p.). It should also be mentioned that a few of the male residents 
have worked in artisanal mining and even one of the younger male members had been 
hired as a trainee at the Maricunga mine. Overall, from the interviewees it was 
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apparent that the Colla of Río Jorquera community are not dependent on the 
Maricunga mine and instead and dependent on the land and water for their 
livelihoods. 
 
4.44 Corporate engagement stategies with the local community  
Since 2005 Kinross Gold has worked with the Colla community as part of the CSR 
programme and donated items such as fences, health insurance subsidies and modest 
college scholarships to some Colla residents. Kinross have also offered capacity 
building courses such as cake baking, all of which the Colla community perceive as 
too little for dealing with their main grievances. Since 2007 Kinross and the Colla 
community have also been discussing the development of an ethno/eco tourism 
project for the community. 
 
Officially for Kinross the main influence strategy with their local communities is to 
be a “good neighbour” and to always leave communities several Kinross executives I 
spoke with in Chile in 2009 (Interviewee code B3). Kinross also aim to be a good 
neighbour as stated in the CSR policy known as the Ten Kinross Guiding Principles 
(website consulted 30
th
 July, 2013). 
 
Examples of influence strategies used by Kinross Maricunga include offering partial 
school scholarships to some of the Colla’s children as well as contributing towards 
health visit costs for the Colla. Kinross Gold has also organized entrepreneurship 
courses for the local community Colla such as for making cup cakes and commencing 
an eco/ethno-tourism project. Kinross also donated fences to a Colla farmer so he can 
keep his animals safe from the road, this is the social responsibility case study Kinross 
highlights on its Community section of their corporate website. Kinross Gold 
Maricunga set their whole terms of engagement for their relationship and influence 
strategy with the Colla around what they refer to as the Protocolo in Spanish which 
can be translated as a Cooperation Agreement.  
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The Cooperation Agreement (a confidential document which the Colla allowed me to 
access) states that both the Colla community of the Jorquera River and its affluent 
will use a Dialogue Table as an instance for their mutual cooperation, and in order for 
Kinross to socially assist the Colla people on the aforementioned areas of education, 
health and entrepreneurship. However, as stated at the start of this section on the 
Colla community, this community’s main grievance was not as they repeatedly 
expressed over the course of four years to me as wanting more social benefits. The 
community wanted the dust and environmental spills to cease from mining related 
traffic heading to and from the Maricunga mine. This subject about grievances and 
nuisance from mining traffic was what can be interpreted as being where the SLO for 
Kinross Gold can be maintained or lost.  
 
Since 2009 Kinross Gold has been in conversations with the regional Ministry of 
Public Works and the Colla community about getting the road asphalted to reduce 
dust being dispersed. In 2011-12 the road was partially asphalted and hence the dust 
problem was improved. However it seems Kinross did not resolve all of the Colla’s 
grievances as the community continued to complain about dust, chemical spills by 
vehicles and hitting and killing their livestock animals on the road outside the Colla 
houses. As such the relationship has been tested in the Chilean courts, therefore 
Kinross have decided to engage with the Colla in the legal courts as deemed 
appropriate between 2011 and 2013 on these aforementioned complaints. 
 
Overall as summarized by a Kinross employee the engagement with the Colla is 
cordial yet formal at the same time: 
“Our relationship is like Peru with Chile who have diplomatic relations…where they 
have international trade as normal but at the same time they also have legal disputes 
regarding on border at the international criminal court in The Hague. It’s the same 
for us, on the one hand we have good day to day relations with the Colla we partner 
with them in environmental monitoring of the mine road, we give them social benefits 
and assistance yet they are also suing us for complaint and issues related to the road” 
(Interviewee code B4, Community relations executive Kinross Maricunga). 
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The strategy of denial and acquittal of all accusations of negative impacts made by 
communities is also heavily employed by Kinross. 
 
4.45 Community strategies towards Kinross Maricunga 
Thus with the beginning of mining operations by Kinross Gold at Maricunga, the 
sudden surge in new heavy duty mining vehicles passing right by the Colla people’s 
houses along the dirt road was the source of the main complaints despite the mine 
being located 20km from the nearest community members. This is because the road 
although an official international road connecting Chile with Argentina was hardly 
used by vehicles on a frequent basis. This international road was also just a narrow 
dirt track full of large holes (between 2008 and 2010 when I last visited the mine).  
 
According to Colla leaders (interviewee code B1) the Colla community had to be 
proactive in 2005 and literally knock of the doors of the Maricunga mine to start some 
sort of dialogue. Thereafter came the protocol for framing and governing the 
relationship. As the Colla people became increasingly frustrated with the dust 
pollution and chemical spills and injuring of their livestock animals by vehicles 
traveling to and from the mine some residents created road blocks on at least two 
occasions. 
 
However, the main strategy used by the Colla people is that of legal litigation against 
Kinross Gold. The Collla of Río Jorquera have the aid of a non-Colla woman lawyer, 
Solange who now lives in the community married to one of the leaders. Solange has 
defended the community against the environmental impacts of a few mining 
companies. It is alleged by mining company officials that the Colla community has 
managed to obtain several hundred thousand dollars in out of court settlements.  
 
Images 13 and 14 show large and high plumes of dust caused by vehicles going to and 
from the mine being carried by the wind to the Colla’s houses, livestock and alfafa 
plantations (See image 13 and 14). 
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Image 14 and 15 – Mining vehicles leaving dust plume by Colla houses 
 
Source: Own photography 
 
Source: Own photography 
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Image 16 –Myself with Colla member at his house next to access road to 
mine 
 
Source: Own photography  
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4.6 Paracatu community context 
The largest gold mine in Brazil located in the historic city of Paracatu in north 
western Minas Gerais state, 230km west from the national capital Brasilia (See image 
16). The city of 85,000 was founded under colonial rule due to its gold deposits, 
however has also since become an agricultural power. Indeed before the arrival of the 
mine 1987 most of the local population made their living from artisanal mining 
whereby they would pan for their own gold using their own makeshift equipment and 
then sell the gold they extracted the same day in the city centre 
 
The open cast gold mine, in operation since 1987 is only 2km from the city centre and 
also borders with Maroon communities such as Sao Domingos and several others. 
Maroon communities known as Quilombolas in Portuguese are the descendants of 
African slaves who were able to escape slavery and establish their own hidden 
communities hundreds of years ago. The mine also has one of Latin America’s largest 
tailings dams which is located very close to the community of Lagoa. The satellite 
image 17 allows for an appreciation of the dimensions of the mine and tailings dam in 
comparison so Paracatu a medium sized city. 
 
The Morro de Ouro mine changed hands from UK Rio Tinto to Kinross Gold in 2005. 
The mine directly employs 10% (interviewee code C8) of the formal workforce and 
also provides work to subcontractors and creates business for other products and 
services such as hotels, restaurants, housing and others. Kinross officials claim that 
one in four families has a member who works directly or directly at the mine.  
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4.61 Timeline of Morro de Ouro mine in Paracatu 
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4.62 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society 
Market 
 Kinross Gold 
 Paracatu business associations 
 Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving 
Kinross 
 Large agri-business 
 
State 
 Ministry of Environment 
 State public prosecution office 
 Minas Gerais State level politicians (temporarily) 
 Municipal government of Paracatu 
 
Civil Society 
 Dr. Samuel medical doctor and community leader resisting mine now located 
in Germany 
 Alerta Paracatu – blog critiquing the environmental and health impacts from 
the mine  
 Various neighbourhood associations bordering the minesite  
 Maroon associations and leaders (for and against the mine) 
 Caritas – Catholic social justice organization 
 Trade union 
 Various social and education based organizations partnering with Kinross. 
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4.63 Economic activity in Municipality of Paracatu 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of 
Paracatu was mainly dependent on the services and industrial sector, which includes 
mining. Paracatu has a burgeoning education sector with the growth of new 
universities and this is reflected in the services statistics. Agriculture only accounted 
for 22% of Paracatu’s GDP income. This corroborates the view from Kinross 
(interviewee code C8) that the mine diretly employs 10% of the city’s workforce. 
However, it should also be taken into account that those working in agriculture may 
not formally reveal their incomes, and many interviewees in Paracatu did state that 
agriculture employs more people than mining. However the statistics from IBGE 
contradict this argument.  
 Table 10 below shows these figures. 
Table 10 – GDP per economic sector in Paracatu, 2011 
Industry GDP amount and percentage of local 
economy 
Agriculture 426, 087, 000 reais (22%) 
Services 778,345,000 reais (40%) 
Industry (including Mining) 746,032,000 (38%) 
Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011
8
 
 
4.64 Corporate engagement strategies with the local community  
The guiding principles of Kinross’ influence strategies for maintaining its SLO are 
also the same as those of Maricunga, Chile as both mines are under the same Kinross 
Gold Corporation headquartered in Toronto, Canada. Therefore the influence 
strategies with the local community in Paracatu have been focused around being good 
neighbours, capacity building in partnerships with the local community to ensure they 
become more self-sufficient and less dependent on the mine.  
                                                 
8
 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314700&i
dtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cparacatu%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-
municipios-2011  
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Examples include their “Partners” programme where local NGOs can apply for partial 
funding for educational and cultural projects, funding for Paracatu’s main hospital, a 
community centre and a small park amongst others. However for the vast majority of 
the local community I spoke with over two years between 2011 and 2013 it was 
perceived that Kinross does the absolute minimum in terms of social responsibility 
and giving back to the community in order to comply with the law and other 
requirements. The existing social responsibility programmes are judged by most of 
the local community as too little considering how much the mining company profits 
with precious natural resources from the community’s land. In summary this 
community perspective can be summarized as a timid, closed, absent and silent 
community engagement strategy.  
 
Many of the local community residents claim that since Kinross Gold bought the mine 
from Rio Tinto relations have become colder and that Kinross is spending less on 
community investment. However, Kinross Gold officials explained to me they were 
targeting their CSR programmes more strategically for the sustainable futures of the 
local community, so that they can learn how to become self-sufficient as opposed to 
receiving hand outs and money. For example Kinross Gold believes in investing in 
capacity building programmes with the local community where there local NGOs also 
contribute money towards the initiative. 
 
 
According to the Kinross Gold website the mine in Paracatu engages heavily with the 
local community these include: 
 The local supplier pre-qualification program 
 The annual Partnership Seminar process for selection of community projects 
for support by the mine,  
 Several education and vocational training programs in partnership with the 
local schools and universities of Paracatu. 
 Active participant in the development of Paracatu’s Sustainability 
Development Plan 2030, a community-driven initiative by ADESP, the 
sustainable development agency of Paracatu. The process began in 2009 and 
involved several rounds of workshops, community discussions, and studies, all 
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designed to form consensus around the key areas of focus for the community 
in planning for its long-term sustainability. 
 
Kinross also claims on its website and in interviews with myself to conduct periodic 
dialogue with nearby affected neighbourhoods to discuss grievances around the noise 
and vibrations from the blasting of rocks and other inconviences. The company also 
has a grievance mechanism for community residents to be able to complain by 
telephone or in person at the mine. However the quality of these consultations can 
leave much to desire as explained by a community resident: 
“they (Kinross) are very open and willing to speak, if I call them now they will 
immediately in their Kinross trucks and sit down very cordially to have coffee and 
listen to us then they will tell us they will resolve our problem and say goodbye 
and that’s it! After that nothing happens ever! They are great at listening but 
never resolve anything for us they just ‘rolar rolar’ (Brazilian slang for talking 
extensively and knowing you will not help or solve the problem). So what good is 
being a good listener for us? The detonations and pollution continues!!” 
Interviewee code C7, community resident, Paracatu). 
 
Other interviewees had described the community dialogue forums held by Kinross as 
an example of the power imbalances between company and community (interviewee 
code C7). 
   
Kinross has also had numerous demands from previously evicted dweller from land it 
acquired asking for compensation due to their status as Quilombola people (Maroon) 
descendents of African slaves. The mine has had to resettle and/evict many families 
over the years as it has expanded, which has also caused great conflict. Many of the 
dwellers in neighbourhoods such as Santa Rita and Machadinho who are of Maroon 
descent did not have the legal deeds or entitlement papers to prove they owned the 
land. Such residents were therefore evicted off the land with no compensation. 
Residents of Morreiras and Alto de Colina neighbourhoods are also expecting to be 
resettled now. This land issue has caused much strife and conflict in the past. On the 
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Kinross website the company affirms it acted within the confines of national and 
international law on these issues. 
 
The Maroon settlement on the edge of the Kinross mine called Sao Domingos has 
been perhaps the most contentious for the company in terms of community 
engagement. The Maroon neighbourhood of Sao Domingos is arguably the best place 
to learn of the different dynamics and issues playing out with regards to relations 
between community and mining company. Sao Domingos borders with the mine’s 
lands. Kinross Gold has placed a fence along the community so that none of the 
residents can enter into what used to be there land and now is property of the mining 
company. The mining company also exploded a waterfall in the community as well as 
changing the course of a river that ran through the community. Sao Domingos is also 
where Kinross Gold focuses much of its CSR and community relations.  
 
The community in Sao Domingos has therefore become divided between those led by 
a university educated lady who argues they should not accept the alleged 
“breadcrumbs” of CSR in the form of a minimum salary and payment of electricity 
bills from Kinross to monitor environmental impacts from the mine in exchange for 
what consists of destroying their ancestral lands and community in the views of 
certain residents from Sao Domingos and Paracatu.  
 
However, another group who are now recognized as the official community leaders 
defend Kinross Gold and openly testify to their good relations. This has resulted in the 
lady opposing Kinross having to flee Sao Domingos due to death threats. This story 
represents the divisions in Paracatu regarding the mine and moreover the importance 
of power and influence with regards to the mining company in determining relations. 
Images 18 and 19 show scenes from Paracatu’s historic city centre and of a typical 
house in Sao Domingos maroon with my interviewees.  
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There are other much darker alleged aspects to Kinross’ community engagement 
strategy which is not publicized and operates under the radar making use of its 
tremendous local power. According to an anonymous former employee from the mine 
and other interviewees Kinross acts in mysterious ways conducting surveillance of 
any detractors and even employees to ensure they behave in a manner appropriate to 
Kinross. With regards to detractors community interviewees maintain that the mining 
company co-opts them by either hiring them as consultants or simply pays them off. 
During one of my visits to Paracatu whilst there were municipal elections a Kinross 
management representative explained to me that they had told the chamber of 
councilors to suspend a public hearing and discussion about the detonations at the 
mine because they did not want this to turn into a political issue. As such the public 
hearing was cancelled. This also demonstrates and supports the view from several 
community interviewees that the mine is “the Almighty” (todopoderoso in 
Portuguese).  
Image 17 – Map of Paracatu in Brazil 
Source: Google Maps 
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Image 18 – Satellite view of Paracatu and Morro de Ouro mine 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
4.65 Community strategies towards Kinross 
When asking the local community residents overall about their perceptions of the 
mine their first reactionary response to tell of the daily explosions of rock using 
dynamite at the mine cause cracks in many of these residents’ houses. Even more of a 
grievance was the view from the community of a toxic dust that covers their houses 
and affects their health on a daily basis.  
 
 
Unlike at the previous four communities Paracatu has no strong vocal opposition 
against the nearby mine. During the mid 2000s there was a local community leader, 
Dr. Samuel who mobilized much of the population against the mine. However, after a 
few years of several protests and media reports he left Paracatu for Germany, many 
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locals claim he was offered a sum of money to leave the mining company alone. 
Indeed they claim this story has been repeated with many others who openly criticise 
the mine. Since then Samuel has been communicating his opposition against Kinross 
Gold’s mine via an internet blog which he runs from Germany. A 60 minute 
documentary film called “Morro de Sangue” from 2008 that translates as “The 
mountain of Blood” instead of “Mountain of Gold” a play on the mine’s name, was 
also produced and available on youtube. The Morro de Sangue documentary focuses 
on all the supposed human rights violations caused by the mine including the lethal 
shooting of a young man by the mining company security staff for supposedly mining 
illegally on the company’s lands. 
 
 
Most others in the community have tried to engage and collaborate with Kinross in its 
various CSR initiatives such as “Partners” via their own NGOs. The example of Sao 
Domingos Maroon also serves as a good example here. One side of the community 
which is lead by a law graduate is hoping to litigate against Kinross for its 
environmental impacts to their ancestral lands. However, the other side of the Maroon 
who are now the official elected leaders insist on engaging in good harmonious 
relations with the Kinross and partake in CSR initiatives and allegedly receive small 
payments of money to monitor the environmental impacts to their neighbourhood. 
There have also been other examples from those in the community who were evicted 
from their land due to expansion plans by Kinross to litigate against Kinross. 
Therefore in general the community strategy in Paracatu has been one of either 
collaboration or one of conflict in which those opposed have resisted the mine 
individually and not collectively as in other mining communities. 
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Image 19 – View of Paracatu’s Muncipal Chamber 
 
Source: Paracatu.net 
Image 20 – Typical house and residents in Sao Domingos Maroon 
community
  
Source: Paracatu.net 
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4.7 Mariana community context 
Mariana is the first capital of Minas Gerais State. It is a historical and picturesque 
town of 55,000 inhabitants also founded on gold mining and slavery. Mariana is 
located within the Quadrilátero Ferrífero (the Iron Quadrangle), the size of a very 
large metropolitan city. This iron triangle is abundant with high quality iron ore mines 
and related businesses where Brazilian mining company Vale is highly active and has 
been for decades.  
 
Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, as before, when it was a State-owned 
company, it offered good quality housing to its workers based in Mariana. Such 
benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have helped create more of a dependency 
culture in Mariana on the mining industry. Though there are not any mines located 
within 5kms of Mariana just yet, there are several large iron ore mines within 20km of 
the town which is where most of the local residents go to work. The city is visibly 
very reliant on the mining industry. During my time there the city centre streets were 
inundated with men and some women in mining company overalls at certain times of 
the day. All my community respondents explained to me that there is no other 
industry in Mariana except for mining, even though in my view it has enormous 
potential due to its beauty and rich heritage. 
 
4.71 Proposed reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana 
The main issue with regards to my research subject is that of the threat of a lush and 
green mountain 4km away and visible from the city centre being mined for Iron-ore 
by Brazilian mining multinational Vale. Images 21 show the possible impacts of the 
proposed mina del rey.  The town already has several mines located 30km away 
which, has caused Mariana to increase rapidly in terms of population. It now faces a 
housing shortage, high rents and property prices, constant heavy traffic, crime and 
drug levels. Most people in the town welcome the new proposed mine due to the 
creation of jobs and income generation. Most locals work in other nearby mines or in 
services that live off or supply mining. The local economy is very mining dependent. 
Local residents told me how much of the local community was already planning to 
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extend their houses to build new rooms to rent out or buying houses in areas near the 
mine in the hope they would be given compensation by Vale. The essence of these 
anecdotes was to highlight the “wild west” culture one of my interviewees described 
the local community of possessing, one of profiteering at all costs.  
 
Several of the local community residents who have businesses confided that they are 
against the opening of Mina del Rey as the town can no longer accept more migrants, 
traffic, and inflation due to mining and hold concerns due to the potential impacts to 
their water. However, these individuals have their hands tied as their clients all come 
from the mining sector and from Vale in particular.  
4.72 Timeline of Reactivation of Mina del Rey in Mariana 
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Images 19 and 20 show some of the typical sights of Mariana. 
 
Image 21 – View of Mariana
 
Source: Flickriver.com 
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Image 22 – Two colonial churches in Mariana 
 
Source: Flickriver.com 
 
4.73 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society 
Market 
 Vale 
 Eco and Heretige tourism providers 
 Mining supplies and services, hotels, diners and small businesses serving 
Kinross 
 
State 
 Ministry of Mines and Energy 
 Ministry of Environment 
 State public prosecution office 
 Municipal government of Mariana 
 IPHAN - National Institute of Historic and Artistic Heritage 
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Civil Society 
 Academics in social movement against the reactivation of mine. 
 
4.74 Economic activity in Municipality of Mariana 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of 
Mariana was highly dependent on the industrial sector, which includes mining as it 
represents 80% of Mariana’s GDP contributions. The heretige tourism sector which 
interviewees referred to as important accounts for 19%, a much lower figure than 
mining. Agriculture only accounted for 1% of Mariana’s GDP income.  
The official figures demonstrate that Mariana is dependent on the mining sector as 
argued by interviewees (Interviewee code F1-F5). Table 11 below shows these 
figures. 
Table 11 – GDP per economic sector in Mariana, 2011 
Industry GDP amount and percentage of local 
economy 
Agriculture 17,799,000 reais (1%) 
Services 1,034,075,000 reais (19%) 
Industry (including Mining) 4,312,828,000 (80%) 
Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011
9
 
4.75 Corporate engagement strategies 
Vale also has a long history and strong tradition of social responsibility in Mariana 
and nearby as many of its workers reside in and around Mariana and work in other 
nearby towns. Mariana falls within the Quadrilátero Ferrífero (the Iron Quadrangle) 
and area roughly the size of greater London in the state of Minas Gerais full of high 
quality iron-ore mines and related businesses where Vale is highly active and has 
                                                 
9
 
http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314000&idtema
=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cmariana%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-
2011  
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been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, before when it was a 
State owned company it offered good quality housing to its workers based in Mariana. 
Vale organizes frequent cultural and musical concerns and shows in Mariana. The 
mining company also runs its emblematic stream train from Mariana for paying 
tourists to travel through the nearby countryside and mountains. Vale has built a 
modern train station with playground area and small park for children in Mariana. 
These actions and the legacy from before contribute towards a highly positive image 
of Vale from the majority of the population who work in mining or mining related 
areas. 
As argued by some of the minority academics opposed to the reactivation of the Mina 
del Rey Vale are maintaining silent over their plans for this mine though are being 
astute in engaging in more aggressive public relations in Mariana about their image 
and identity as a social responsibility corporation committed to sustainable 
development, in the hope they can secure their SLO from a local community which 
holds Vale in an even higher esteem. As put forward by one university lecturer 
Claudio: 
“The (mining) company is distributing various information (newsletter) in the homes 
of residents on their good deeds and actions that has been performing. But actually I 
realize this is just a social obligation, as it is exempt from various taxes. The company 
does not say anything about the issue of reactivation of Mina Del Rey The company 
says nothing about Mina Del Rey The company is only making propaganda about its 
"good things", related to job creation, conservation areas, development...” 
(Interviewee code F1 local resident opposing reactivation of mine, Mariana). 
 
Community strategy towards ValeA small group of academics together with a local 
councillor reacted strongly in 2011 to the news of vale’s plans to reactivate the mine 
by mobilizing collectively and holding public hearings, creating online blogs, 
petitions and holding protest marches and even holding anti-mine banners at the top 
of the colonial church during the visit of the Brazilian President. .Academics have 
worked with students on communicating more to the local community about the 
negative imapcts that reactivating the mine would bring about, however over the 
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months apathy has set in especially since Vale have remained so quiet about their 
plans. 
 
Nonetheless these academics also point to the fact that Mariana is so heavily 
dependent on mining in general (as shown by the Economy activity figure for 
Mariana above) that their mobilization will never gain the force and traction needed. 
For example the owner of a blog opposing the reactivation of the mine remains 
anonymous and would not even tell me his name in correspondence because he 
teaches engineering at a university and most of his students are from mining 
companies. one dentist who spoke out against the mine lost clients as a consequence. 
For the majority of Mariana’s residents it is a source of pride to wear a Vale uniform. 
The head of a local trade union also explained how the power of Vale is unchallenged 
by any actors and institiutions in the local community. If challenged, Vale are able to 
quite easily co-opt and obstruct any threats. (Interviewee code F4). 
Image 23 – View of Future Mine from Mariana 
 
Source: http://preservemariana.blogspot.com.br/2013/07/assine-contra-reativacao-da-mina-del.html 
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4.8 Pedra Branca de Amaparí community context 
The iron-ore mine in Pedra Branca de Amaparí belonged to Anglo American at the 
time of my visit in 2012. The mine is not located near the community of Pedra Branca 
de Amaparí, it is around 15km distance and therefore there is little dust or noise 
impact. The Pedra Branca iron-ore mine came as part of the Minas-Rio package deal 
with Eike Batista’s MMX. Therefore Anglo American were obliged to purchase the 
Amapa mine which MMX had been operating since 2007. 
4.81 Timeline of Mining near Pedra Branca de Amaparí 
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4.82 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society 
Market 
 Anglo American 
 MMX 
 Zamin Resources 
 
State 
 Municipal government of Pedra Branca 
 
Civil Society 
 Artisian miners 
 Social NGOs partner with mining company 
 
4.83 Economic activity in Municipality of Pedra Branca de Amaparí 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of 
Pedra Branca is mainly reliant on services for its economy (55%) followed by 
industry which would be the large and only mine in the region (39%). Agriculture 
only represents 6% of the GDP contribution which reflects the lack of reference by 
interviewees in the town to the agriculture sector.  
Table 12 below shows these figures. 
Table 12 – GDP per economic sector in Pedra Branca de Amaparí, 2011 
Industry GDP amount and percentage of local 
economy 
Agriculture 16,488,000 reais (6%) 
Services 147,092,000 reais (55%) 
Industry (including Mining) 102,703,000 (39%) 
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Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011
10
 
4.84 Corporate engagement strategies 
Interviews with company representatives in Pedra Branca often started off with a 
reference to the previous large American mining operations Icomi in the town until 
the 1990s, which according to them had creates a dependency culture with the 
community. Such a culture according to Anglo American employees is directly 
contrary to their corporate values with regards to local communities.  
 
Anglo American did not aim to solve all the community’s problems and instead 
wanted to transfer its belief in self sufficiency to the local community. The employees 
I spoke with from Anglo American stated that they would not do the same as Icomi 
and make the community dependent and then leave them high and dry suddenly when 
they need to leave. Instead as per the interviewees employed at Anglo American the 
mining company focuses on its own sustainability principles which are directed from 
headquarters in London. These focus areas include community income generation 
projects for self-sufficiency and local sourcing and employment. 
 
One example of Anglo American’s influence strategy was to donate 8,000 açai 
(Brazilian fruit) seedlings to local peasant farmers. Anglo American had also 
executed their award winning SEAT community development and relations 
management toolkit at Pedra Branca. Overall it seemed that Anglo American had a 
SLO and community perceptions were closely linked to private benefits accrued from 
the mining company mainly in the form of jobs there. If a local resident had a job 
there she/he was much more likely to hold a positive view of the company, if not then 
the contrary was true. Anglo American offers jobs, training, and has a social 
investment fund of several million reais which it pays to the municipal government to 
administer for local investment. 
                                                 
10
 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=160015&i
dtema=125&search=amapa%7Cpedra-branca-do-amapari%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-
dos-municipios-2011 
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4.85 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American. 
The local community in Pedra Branca has a very short history from the 1990s at most. 
There had been isolated incidents of community protest against the mine due to 
electricity outages caused by rainstorms. The majority of the local residents hope to 
work at the mine and complain if not given work there, however as in all the mining 
communities. In general there were not highly negative perceptions of the mine and 
certainly no organized community mobilization against the mine. Some residents 
complained about the vibration from the heavy industrial train that passes through the 
town causing damage to the structures and walls of basic houses.  
 
One local resident referring to a land rights dispute where MinCorp have evicted him 
off their land, similar to GoldMin in Chile and Brazil. The resident had been mining 
for gold on the land MMX/Anglo American bought. Together with 17 other artisanal 
miners evicted from the landthey would be taking legal action against Anglo America 
and also shaming them with video footage on the internet. It was evident that the local 
economy is dependent on the mine. However, locals were unsatisfied with the amount 
of CSR investment made by Anglo American in 2012 especially when comparing to 
Icomi from decades past and even MMX who apparently were more generous to the 
community.  
 
In 2013 Anglo American decided to sell its major share in the mine to Indian based 
mining company Zamit Resources. Pedra Branca is a small municipality of around 
11,000 inhabitants in the far northern state of Amapa (see image 22). From Sao Paulo 
it takes four hours by plane to arrive to the state capital Macapa. To put into context 
the dimension of Brazil the equator line passes through Macapa, whereas the tropic of 
Capricorn passes through Sao Paulo. From Macapa to Pedra Branca it is a further 
180km. 
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Image 24 – Map of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in relation to Brazil 
 
Source: Google Maps 
In most interviews and conversations with local residents I was told about the 
importance of understanding the historical and political context surrounding the State 
and town. This is because the state only came into existence in 1943 separating from 
the larger Pará state to the south. Amapá borders with French Guyana and is 
strategically located in equatorial waters in the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
Amapa is around the size of England, yet with a total population of just 700,000 
(about 80 times less than England’s population), therefore much of the state is 
uninhabited. Amapa’s economy took off in 1953 when American mining company 
Icomi found large deposits of Manganese and began massive operations to mine this 
near Pedra Branca de Amaparai in the town of Serra de Navio. Icomi brought much 
development to Amapa and practically managed the State in terms of providing 
education, hospitals and commerce and overall this was highly appreciated by the 
local community who viewed it as superior to the rest of Brazilian standards. 
However by the 1990s Icomi had started to abandon Amapa and then the Federal and 
State government became the main drivers of the economy. 
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The importance of this on the local culture and identity is in having created a 
paternalistic mentality. According to my interviewees the local community expect 
many free hand outs from the State. The State senator for Amapa is a well known 
long time Brazilian politician José Sarney often linked with acts of paternalism for 
winning votes. The education standards in Amapa are much lower than that of the 
southern half of Brazil. Northern and North Eastern Brazil in many aspects and 
regions are more akin to sub-Saharan Africa. José Sarney has helped increased the 
population of Amapa by inviting many impoverished families from the even poorer 
State of Maranhao with the promise of land and some money. Underage prostitution 
is rife in Amapa and even encouraged by some of the parents of the girls despite 
being illegal. Apart from mining there is also much agriculture in niche fruits such as 
açai berries and forestry plantations 
 
The history of Pedra Branca de Amaparí where the mine is located is short, as it was 
founded in 1992 due to mineral exploration. An important freight train railway 
crosses through Pedra Branca from the large mine down to the port where the 
minerals are shipped to other parts of the world. The town has very poor 
infrastructure, few sections of the roads are paved for pedestrians. There are several 
supermarkets and pharmacies and even banks with ATMs. (See image 23 for a view 
of a typical street in Pedra Branca) 
 
 The railway line is a source of contention with the local community who complain 
about its vibrations that crack their houses or how intoxicated people have been hit 
and injured by the train. Before the arrival of Anglo American the few local residents 
of Pedra Branca made a living from artisanal mining, however Anglo American 
evicted them having acquired the land for mining iron-ore. Another source of conflict 
is with the alleged pollution of the main river which locals living near the river claim 
has killed most of the fish. However, the numbers of such locals are very low of 
around 20-25 people. Anglo American claimed that the pollution was due to Icomi 
from years ago.  
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Image 25 - view of a typical street in Pedra Branca 
 
Source: http://emanoelreis.wordpress.com/2013/03/25/pedra_branca_buracos_lam/  
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4.9 Barro Alto community context 
This small town of Barro Alto has just 9,000 people is located in the central Brazilian 
state of Goías. It is 220km by road from the Brazilian capital Brasilia and 45km from 
the nearest medium sized town that has urban infrastructure, called Goianense.  (See 
image 24 for a map). Therefore it is isolated and in the middle of a green, rural and 
fertile region. The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized 
around 60 years ago as a municipality.  
4.91 Timeline for Anglo American in Barro Alto 
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4.92 Key stakeholders from the market, state and civil society 
Market 
 Anglo American 
 Local commerce, accommodation provisers, and small businesses. 
 
State 
 Municipal government of Barro Alto 
 
Civil Society 
 CARE – International NGO partners with Anglo American 
 Agenda Pública – Sao Paulo based Revenue Transparency focused NGO  
 
4.93 Economic activity in Municipality of Barro Alto 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics the municipality of 
Barro Alto is mainly reliant on services for its economy (56%) followed by industry 
which would be the large and only mine in the region (29%). Agriculture represents 
the least income to the local GDP with 25% of the GDP.  
Table 13 below shows these figures. 
Table 13 – GDP per economic sector in Barro Alto, 2011 
Industry GDP amount and percentage of local 
economy 
Agriculture 16,488,000 reais (25%) 
Services 147,092,000 reais (56%) 
Industry (including Mining) 102,703,000 (29%) 
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Source: Municipal statistical report, 2011
11
 
4.94 Corporate engagement strategies 
When Anglo American finally arrived to operate in 2006 they spent a year building 
community relations before constructing their mining operations as it was essential 
for the company to understand the local context in order to gain good community 
relations. 
As with other Anglo American operations the company guides its community 
engagement by the corporate set values around helping communities become self-
sufficient via entrepreneurship projects, skills training programmes and capacity 
building of local government in revenue transparency and investment of Anglo 
American’s social fund. 
 
In order to meet these community engagement strategies Anglo American has 
partnered with external NGOs who are now based in Barro Alto working on social 
and entrepreneurship projects in the hope to supply milk and trees to Anglo American 
that include CARE, Reprolatina and Agenda Publica. 
  
The hope is also for local small scale farmers to grow vegetables to supply Anglo 
American’s cafeteria as part of a local development imitative. Like in the urban centre 
of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Pedra Branca Anglo American also provides a 
social investment fund to the municipal government to spend on public services. 
Anglo American partners with an NGO from Sao Paulo based in Barro Alto called 
Agenda Publica that builds capacity in local government on how to be more 
transparent, accountable and invest strategically the tax revenues paid by Anglo 
American. The company has also paid for the construction of a new hospital for the 
community. Overall most the local community I spoke were in favour of Anglo 
American and grateful for their presence.  
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http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=520320&idtema
=125&search=goias%7Cbarro-alto%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011  
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In late 2012 Anglo American was awarded the prize for most sustainable company in 
Brazil by the prestigious Brazilian Revista Exame (a business review) for its open and 
transparent dialogue at the annual community Forum started since 2007 and in 
addition for its partnerships and results with Care and Agenda Publica. Anglo 
American states its aim is to build local capacity so that it is not dependent upon them 
as their mine expects to close in around 40 years, and the company feels the 
responsibility to leave behind a legacy making the community self-sufficient. 
 
However, in the coming years Anglo American expects to start mining for nickel 
closer to the residents of Barro Alto and in their sight. Based on the community 
perceptions in Barro Alto this probably will not be as much of an issue as that of 
employment and generating local economic opportunities, however environmental 
impact will most certainly give any detractors another reason to oppose the company. 
 
4.95 Community influence strategies towards Anglo American 
The population was 40% lower before Anglo American started construction of their 
Nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012), the rapid increase in population has been due to 
speculation and anticipation of financial gains and opportunities from the mine.  
Anglo American’s mining operations and processing plant is located some 10km 
away approximately from Barro Alto, therefore environmental and visual impacts are 
almost minimal to the local community. Barro Alto has a very strong air of a small 
town setting in the old far west of the USA, as shown in films. The town lacks many 
modern features of other Brazilian urban centres, as well any more historical ones 
such as churches and colonial buildings. 
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Image 26 – Map of Barro Alto in relation to Brazil 
 
The population grew by 50% from 6000 to 9000 in just a few years due to the 
expectation around employment and income related opportunities from the 
commencement of operations at Anglo American’s mine in Barro Alto. Due to the 
recent history and the fact people moved there on speculation of gold mining there is 
not a collective identity or even a civic or civil society culture. Most people are 
materially and financially driven. The community had been lead to believe the 
mineral there was gold and that they would become wealthy as a result of new mining 
operations. They also see the minerals there as very much belonging to them and not 
to the Brazilian State as is the case legally. Thus it is clear to see that Barro Alto very 
much welcomed the mining project. 
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Image 27 – Aerial view of Barro Alto 
 
 
After a year the construction phase of the mine started in 2007 this meant an influx of 
several thousand male manual workers from all over Brazil. Once the mining 
operations were built the community was expecting to maximize financial gains 
renting out rooms, properties, supplying the mine, selling products and services to 
mining personnel assuming that the majority of the new mining workers and 
executives would reside in Barro Alto, however, this was not the case and still up 
until today is not the case. The fact that mining executives in particular do not live in 
Barro Alto and that the mining bonanza never materialized as locals expect is the 
major source of contention amongst a vocal minority. 
 
This collective anger manifested itself in particular every November from 2008 at 
Anglo American’s annual local forum. Anglo American use this forum to make 
announcements to the local community about its coming year operations; hiring and 
social investment plans and needs in the hope that potential local suppliers and 
employees would apply for work and contracts. 
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However, according to my interviewees from Anglo American and from their funded 
NGO partner CARE there is little skilled capacity in the local community to supply 
and work for Anglo American. Furthermore, as per my mining company interviewees, 
the local residents were trying to charge extortionate rental fees for a low standard 
room or house in a very basic village/town, with few modern facilities, no good 
private schools or hospitals and therefore did not meet minimum living standards 
required by mining company executives or supervisors. Certain local community 
residents I interviewed counter argued that Barro Alto should be much better since 
Anglo American’s arrival and additional tax revenues and instead it has not improved 
as much as it should have. 
 
The issue of environmental impact did not seem to concern locals. The staunchest 
critics of Anglo American explained all they wanted was for a certain family member 
to get a job there or to be able to supply the mine with a certain product or service. In 
the first three of four annual local forums certain local community residents shouted, 
protested and insulted Anglo American. Until 2010-11 there seemed to be a higher 
level of conflict.  
 
The following table offers a summary of the context cases presented above. 
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Table 14 - Summary of Context Cases 
 Description of 
Stakeholders 
Extent of 
conflict 
Environmental 
Issues 
Social Issues Key NGO 
and 
Activist 
organizatio
ns 
Current 
Economic 
Activity 
US 
Dollar 
Costs of 
mining 
project 
Huasco 
Valley 
Barrick Gold – Second largest Gold 
mining company in the world. 
Rural community of around 5,000 
inhabitants. Divided into 35 formal 
neighbourhood associations 
Local elected government. 
National politicians supporting the 
suspension of Pascua Lama. 
Ministry of environment 
Corporate/Community 
Lawyers/Mediators 
Parish Church 
Water Vigilance Board/Wealthy 
farmers 
Comunidad Agrícola Huasco 
Altinos – Indigenous farmers 
opposed to large scale mining in the 
High level of 
conflict. Majority of 
community is 
against large scale 
mining in the 
Valley. Frequent 
anti mining protests 
over last decade. 
Legal challenges to 
Barrick. Chilean 
courts forced Pascua 
to suspend 
operations in April 
2013. 
Threat to glaciers 
and water sources 
from mining at top 
of mountains. Water 
supply has 
diminished. 
Cyanide spills at 
minesite (lead to 
suspension of 
mine). 
Influence and co-
optation strategies 
by Barrick have 
angered and 
divided much of 
local community. 
OLCA 
Protest Barrick 
Local Church 
Agriculture 
cooperative 
Huasco Alto 
 
Agriculture $8.5bn 
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Valley. 
OLCA – Environmemtal Justice 
activist organization based in 
Santiago – very active in the Huasco 
Valley  
Protest Barrick – Canadian based 
activist organization holds Barrick 
Gold accountable for actions. 
Mining Watch Canada - activist 
organization on Canadian mining 
company around the world. 
 
Conceiçao 
de Mato 
Dentro 
Anglo American – one of the largest 
mining companies in the world. 
Multiple rural communities affected 
by mincduct construction. 
CIMOS – organized affected rural 
community residents. 
Atingidos pelo mineiroduto (The 
affected by the mineduct) 
Two State level politicians opening 
backing more regulation and even 
suspension of the mineduct 
construction work. 
Governmental Environmental 
licencing authorities 
Urban community – Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro 
High conflict level.  
Numerous public 
hearings 
Calls from State 
environmental 
authorities to 
suspend works due 
to irregularities in 
licencing process in 
June 2014. 
Alleged forced 
evictions of Maroon 
residents from their 
lands. 
Construction work 
temporarily 
suspended for three 
months in 2012 
Impacts to water 
sources.  
Detonations and 
dust. 
Destruction of the 
highest waterfall in 
the State symbol of 
the eco-tourism 
industry. 
Hyper inflation in 
mining towns 
affecting rent and 
accommodation 
shortage. 
Influx of thousands 
of male migrants 
to work in 
construction. 
Increased traffic. 
Workers in Anglo 
American’s supply 
chain in Conceiçao 
de Mato Dentro 
working in slave-
like condition 
including men 
from Haiti in 2014. 
Threat to Eco-
GESTA 
CIMOS 
State Prosector 
Services 
sector 
$8.8bn 
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State Public Prosecutor 
GESTA – University activist and 
research group 
 
 
Alleged security 
surveillance of 
activist/community 
gatherings 
 
Tourism image of 
town and 
transformation to a 
mining identity. 
Resettlements and 
evictions from 
land. 
Caimanes Pelambres (Antofagasta Minerals 
listed on FTSE100 stock exchange). 
Caimanes defence committee – 
strong community leaders 
Ministry of Environment 
Head of College of Physicians – 
tested water to prove it is toxic 
Federal Police – worked with Head 
of College of Physicians 
Local community residents’ Defence 
Committee 
France Libertes – French social 
justice NGO  
Red Ambiental del Norte – Chilean 
environmental justice NGO 
London Mining Network – UK 
based mining affected communities 
NGO 
Two different lawyers defending 
Caimanes c community against 
Pelambres 
High level of 
conflict 
Road blocks by 
community 
members on road to 
tailings dam. 
Community leaders 
locked themselves 
in school for over 
100 days in 2010 to 
go on hunger strike. 
Community Vs 
Company court 
battles. 
Pelambres mine 
fined over US$3 in 
2013 for non 
compliance with 
environmental rules. 
Capacity of dam 
reduced by 40% due 
to court order in 
2014. 
 
Threat of dam 
breaking and 
flooding in 
earthquake. 
Toxins from tailings 
dam contaminating 
local water supplies 
according to 
community and 
their tests. 
No potable or 
drinking water 
available according 
to community. 
Divided 
community due to 
compensation 
payment by 
Pelambres. 
 
France Libertes 
– French social 
justice NGO  
Red Ambiental 
del Norte – 
Chilean 
environmental 
justice NGO 
London 
Mining 
Network – UK 
based mining 
affected 
communities 
NGO 
Agriculture 
and Services 
$600mn 
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Colla Kinross Gold – World’s 4
th largest 
Gold mining company from Canada. 
Chilean justice courts 
National government Ministry of 
Environment 
CONADI – National body for 
Indigenous Peoples’ Development 
Local community residents’ 
association 
Lawyer representing community 
UNESCO 
Medium-High.  
Several court 
litigations by Colla 
to Kinross for 
environmental 
impact to them and 
their livlihoods. 
However on a daily 
basis they also 
collaborate on CSR 
projects. 
Dust pollution from 
traffic. 
Chemical spills on 
road and territory. 
Hitting of livestock 
by mining vehciles. 
Mining traffic 
prevents the 
transhumance 
tradition of the 
Colla who migrate 
with sheep over 
summer and 
winter. 
Feel stigmatized 
and discriminated 
by mining 
companies for 
being indigenous. 
None Agriculture $290m for 
expansion 
costs only in 
2010. 
Paracatu Kinross Gold– World’s 4
th largest 
Gold mining company from Canada. 
Paracatu business associations – 
supportive of Kinross 
Mining supplies and services, hotels, 
diners and small businesses serving 
Kinross 
Large agri-business cooperative – 
powerful local actor supportive of 
Kinross. 
Ministry of Environment – Regulate 
the mine’s environmental impacts 
State public prosecution office – 
Medium 
Lots of comments 
of alleged abuse by 
the mine of power 
influencing local 
institutions and 
actors for own 
benefit. 
Divided community. 
Sao Domingos 
Maroon former 
President left under 
death threats. 
Several street 
marches and 
Daily detonations of 
rock and land at the 
mine causes dust 
pollution and 
structural damage to 
basic housing near 
the mine. 
The use of cyanide 
and arsenic for gold 
mining according to 
a doctor is putting 
the health of locals 
seriously at risk. 
Destruction and 
diversion of rivers 
and waterfalls 
Divided 
community due to 
who works at mine 
and who accepts 
and receives CSR 
benefits. 
High levels of 
crime attributed on 
new migrants 
coming in search 
of work at the 
mine. 
Increased traffic.  
Currently there 
is scant activist 
resistance to 
the mine due to 
what 
community 
informants 
refer to as the 
excessive 
power and fear 
the mine 
wields.   
Services and 
Mining 
$1.45bn 
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there for the local community to 
defends rights against large actors 
such as the mine. 
Minas Gerais State level politicians 
(temporarily) – from Paracatu and 
critical of the mine 
Municipal government of Paracatu – 
local councillors some in favour and 
some against. 
Dr. Samuel medical doctor and 
community leader resisting mine 
now located in Germany 
Alerta Paracatu – blog critiquing the 
environmental and health impacts 
from the mine  
Various neighbourhood associations 
bordering the minesite  
Maroon associations and leaders (for 
and against the mine) 
Caritas – Catholic social justice 
organization critical of the mine. 
Trade union – critical of mine’s 
conduct with employees. 
Various social and education based 
organizations partnering with 
Kinross. 
protests against the 
mine several years 
ago.  
affects livelihoods 
of some rural based 
community 
members. 
Deforestation. 
Mariana Vale – World’s largest Iron-Ore 
mining company. 
Low-Medium Some clearing of 
trees. The main fear 
is of the potential 
environmental 
This mine, and 
mining overall 
governs and rules 
None. Mining No data 
available 
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Eco and Heritage tourism providers 
Mining supplies and services, hotels, 
diners and small businesses serving 
Kinross 
Ministry of Mines and Energy 
Ministry of Environment 
State public prosecution office 
Municipal government of Mariana 
IPHAN - National Institute of 
Historic and Artistic Heritage 
Academics in social movement 
against the reactivation of mine. 
impact should the 
mine reopen. 
the city. 
Due to the 
dependence on 
mining there is 
excessive traffic, 
high rents, 
shortage of 
accommodation, 
overall high prices. 
Pedra 
Branca 
Anglo American – large 
multinational mining company 
MMX – Brazilian mining company  
Zamin Resources – Indian mining 
company operating in Latin America 
Municipal government of Pedra 
Branca 
Artisanal miners 
Social NGOs that partner with 
mining company 
 
Low Claims about 
polluting a river 
near the mine. 
Dust dispersed 
around town from 
the wheels of the 
SUVs driving 
through. 
Vibrations from 
train passing 
through town 
damaging local 
housing. 
None. Services and 
Mining 
$1.5bn 
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Barro Alto Anglo American– large 
multinational mining company 
Local commerce, accommodation 
providers, and small businesses. 
Municipal government of Barro Alto 
CARE – International NGO partners 
with Anglo American 
Agenda Pública – Sao Paulo based 
Revenue Transparency focused 
NGO 
Low None Not making the 
local economic 
investment the 
local community 
had hoped for and 
expected. 
None. Services $1.2bn 
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5.0 Findings Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This analysis of findings chapter is presented in a series of eight tables for each 
mining community showing the Environmental impact, Social impact, Economic 
impact, Extent of conflict, Strength of collective action, Corporate strategies; and 
Community strategies illustrated by quotes and the different relevant 
coding/constructs. 
 
The field research concluded that from the eight mining communities, the four higher 
conflict cases are more self sufficient and economically independent from their 
nearby mining projects than the four lower conflict communities who rely more on 
their nearby mining projects for their livelihoods. In summary when a community is 
independent and therefore non-dependent on a nearby mining project for its livelihood 
and well-being, this community can (temporarily) withhold the SLO creating a 
difficult environment in which to operate, which is an essential resource, from the 
mining company, therefore the local community in this situation holds some power 
and can dictate the terms of reference for the relationship. As a result the mining 
companies backed by the State will attempt to claw back this power from the 
independent communities using diverse strategies to essentially create some level of 
community dependence and hence an easier and more tranquil working environment 
dto conduct mining. 
 
 However if the local community is dependent on the nearby mining projects for its 
own well-being and livelihoods and it desires to influence the mining company’s 
behaviour, it will have to attempt to negotiate better terms of company behaviour in 
return for the continued supply of an SLO or a conflict free business environment. By 
considering the local community’s demands and grievances via CSR strategies for 
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example, despite being dependent on the nearby mining project for its own well-
being, a company can strengthen its SLO and external image.  
Appendix D summarizes the main differences and similarities between the more 
independent and more dependent communities on the nearby mining projects. 
focusing on how a historical and socio-economic dependence or non-dependence on 
mining has led to the above types of influence strategies from mining companies and 
manifestations of conflict in the two types of mining communities. 
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Table 15 – Findings Analysis of Huasco Valley 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
The main 
community 
grievances 
surrounding the 
impacts from 
mining 
activities in the 
Huasco Valley 
are centred 
around the 
usage, depletion 
and pollution of 
the scarce water 
supply which is 
located in the 
driest region of 
the planet – 
northern Chile.  
Water for the 
residents of the 
Huasco Valley 
is essential for 
their way of life 
as small and 
Access to 
clean water 
supplies, also 
has a direct 
adverse social 
impact as it 
threatens the 
traditional way 
of life of the 
Diaguita 
people. 
Respondents 
had 
complained 
that their crops 
had suffered 
from less 
irrigation. 
Farming is a 
way of life and 
provides the 
identity of 
these 
communities; 
The economic 
impact of the 
mine 
construction 
has not widely 
benefited Alto 
del Carmen 
municipality. 
Due to the 
community’s 
overall 
rejection of the 
mine Barrick 
decided to 
focus its CSR 
attention 
elsewhere to 
Vallenar. 
Nonetheless 
Barrick has 
invested in 
social projects 
such as 
ceramics and 
High – the 
mine is 
currently 
suspended by 
the Chilean 
courts and 
has been 
since April 
2013. 
Widespread 
community 
rejection of 
the mine 
however, the 
community is 
divided as to 
whether it 
should accept 
compensation 
or benefits 
payments 
from Barrick 
for the 
negative 
Highest of the 
eight 
communities. 
However, any 
collective 
action is 
impeded by 
the fact that 
the 
community is 
divided into 
two groups 
between 
those who 
want to 
negotiate and 
those who do 
not want to 
negotiate 
with Barrick. 
Community 
was well 
mobilized by 
local 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
Co-optation/ Divide and 
Rule/Obstruction strategy 
“they were crazy about finding 
local community residents willing 
to participate in their CSR and 
social investment projects. They 
sent social and psychological 
assistants to go knocking on 
everybody’s doors to see what 
information they could find out so 
they could manipulate them and 
also try to get them involved in 
their social projects.” (Interviewee 
code E2, Community leader and 
elected local politician). 
Interviewees explained what they 
believe were the motives of 
Barrick’s public support for 
promoting Indigenous recognition 
by the Chilean State of some 
Collective resistance 
– to the proposed 
proposed Pascua Lama 
project via marches, 
protests, anti-Pascua 
Lama social media 
campaigns. 
Maintain Independence 
- Collective rejection to 
Collaboration (in Alto 
del Carmen) with 
Barrick Gold by majority 
to participate and in CSR 
projects.  
“I have to be very 
careful before going to 
any social events..you 
know I love Chilean 
folklore culture well 
whenever I am invited to 
any local social events 
such as rodeo shows or 
concerts the first 
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medium scale 
farmers. This is 
a way of life the 
Diaguita people 
cherish greatly 
and do not want 
to trade for any 
other way of life 
as per my 
interviewees, 
such as from an 
elderly resident 
Cristina who 
owns a large 
grape farm in 
the valley: 
“Here we have 
peace and 
tranquility but 
Barrick will 
force us out of 
here when they 
finish our water 
supplies. We 
won’t be able to 
stay here in our 
valley then, how 
can we? We 
don’t want to 
leave this for a 
city and all the 
stress that 
comes with that 
life..NO of 
course not!” 
therefore 
without access 
to water they 
would not be 
able to 
continue with 
their culture, 
as stated in the 
earlier quote 
(in 
Environmental 
imapact 
column) by 
Cristina. There 
were also at 
least three 
deaths of 
workers at the 
mine site of 
Pascua Lama 
between 2011 
and 2012. 
 
In addition to 
the necessity 
of water for 
personal 
health, hygiene 
and for 
sustaining a 
traditional 
livelihood, 
water also has 
a cultural and 
internet 
courses with 
the most 
vulnerable and 
poorest 
members of 
Alto del 
Carmen 
community. 
The most 
significant 
economic 
impact was the 
US$65m 
investment 
paid to the 
valley’s 
wealthiest 
landowners via 
their Water 
Vigilence 
Board to 
manage the 
water supply 
to the rest of 
the Huasco 
Valley. 
Very few jobs 
were 
reportedly 
given to the 
local 
community 
residing 
nearest to 
impacts.  community, 
leader, OLCA 
environmenta
l justice 
activist 
organization 
and church 
since 2001. 
(Interview 
codes E1-2). 
residents in the Huasco Valley. In 
line with Urkidi and Walter (2011) 
the interviewees explained it was 
to gain official legitimacy and 
endorsement by a Diaguita 
community largely created by the 
mining company itself.  Barrick 
also published a book on Diaguita 
Identity that claims the true 
historical identity of the people is 
in mining and that agriculture is 
more recent. 
“…so that they (Barrick) can say 
to the Diaguitas, the government 
and the world “look at us and how 
much we care about the Diaguita 
people’s identities. We have good 
intentions we want to help the 
community in a good and genuine 
way” but the true intentions for 
Barrick was to co-opt and pacify 
the local community so they could 
start mining and destroy the 
Valley…they are very smart!” 
(Interviewee code E3, 
Representative, Parish Church Alto 
del Carmen). 
 
“…it became much more difficult 
to fight and defeat the mine once 
those shameless businessmen who 
own most of the farms here sold 
out to Barrick. Those shameless 
question I would ask is 
“who is financing it? Is 
it Barrick? Is it the local 
municipality that has 
been completely coopted 
by Barrick? If so, I can’t 
go otherwise they will 
take photos of me there 
with headlines in the 
press saying, “Don 
Orlando attends the 
event sponsored by 
Barrick” even when I 
didn’t know they 
sponsored it. We are an 
independent people, we 
don’t need Barrick” 
(Interviewee Code, E3, 
Local community leader) 
 
“…..none of us were 
interested in their “little 
demeaning courses and 
workshops.” What can 
they teach us about 
being Diaguitas?! We 
are Diaguitas and land 
and water are essential 
to us, not these courses 
about artisanal goods 
and pottery! Just the 
most vulnerable, humble 
dear old ladies accepted 
and agreed to take part 
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(Interviewee 
code E3, Dona 
Cristina, Grape 
Farmer, P.) 
The local priest 
Father Manuel 
also made an 
interesting 
argument about 
how the 
Diaguita’s 
identity would 
be destroyed if 
they left the 
valley due to the 
destruction from 
mining: 
“As long as they 
(the Diaguitas) 
stay divided 
they won’t find 
their Identity. 
Their Identity is 
in their 
Collectiveness. 
You can’t be 
Diaguita in an 
urban area.” 
Interviewee 
code E4, Local 
Priest, P., 
 
recreational 
purpose. 
Barbara 
reminisced 
about earlier 
years when 
they were able 
to play, swim 
and even wash 
dishes in their 
nearby rivers 
and streams. 
Nowadays this 
is not possible. 
Pascua Lama 
by Barrick 
Gold.  
people receive US$60m from 
Barrick. I can’t believe that! They 
have a lot of power in the valley. 
Now they are on the mine’s side 
and just us the small people are 
left to fight that mine. We don’t sell 
out for money to that mine like that 
group.” (Interviewee codes E2). 
 
“they (Barrick Gold) try to buy us 
with their social responsibility so 
we will look away and ignore their 
destruction of our glaciers and 
water.” (Interviewee code E1, 
Local Indigenous community 
leader, Huasco Valley p.) 
 
“El Morro mine offered me the 
keys to a brand new 4x4 pick-up 
truck..of course I said no, I knew 
they were trying to buy me. As for 
Barrick it also buys silence and 
people here.” (Interviewee code 
E3, Representative, Parish Church 
Alto del Carmen). 
 
“Barrick in their Diaguita 
publications speak about ceramics 
and knitting. They are 
Manipulating their (Diaguita) 
but none of us 
(laughing).  We showed 
them we don’t want or 
need them in our 
valley!” (Interviewee 
code E1, Local 
community leader) 
 
“Once a girl from el 
Morro came here 
offering us social 
projects and economic 
help but I refused as I’ve 
always worked hard for 
things in my life, I don’t 
need this help that’s why 
I would sell myself” 
“thanks to the lord my 
hands are good and my 
brain is in working order 
so why do I need that 
mine? I can sell a CD of 
my music and live off 
that so I’m not going to 
sell myself for something 
that would be bread for 
today and hunger for 
tomorrow” (Interviewee 
Code, E3, Local 
community leader) 
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Identity for their own good. 
Barrick does it to divert the 
attention to the secondary elements 
of the Identity and not to teach the 
parts of territory and water and 
language which are the Primary 
ones. Barrick finance the 
Indigenous New Year of the 
sun…They’ve created 22 
communities here from three to get 
more internal conflict going on. 
divided the three diaguita groups 
into 22, so this creates conflict and 
disunites the people. (Interviewee 
code E3, Representative, Parish 
Church Alto del Carmen). 
In observational data I also 
witnessed how the Mining Industry 
including representatives from 
Barrick invited critical activists 
OLCA (who defend the Huasco 
Valley against Barrick Gold) to sit 
down and dialogue with them after 
OLCA had intruded to protest 
against CSR and mining into the 
Sheraton Hotel in October 2011 at 
the Social Responsibiliuty for 
Mining conference.  
Abuse of power 
“Barrick have people in the local 
government to change rural zones 
into urban ones, so they can build 
and construct  here. If we become 
“I don’t need handouts 
from Barrick or from the 
government I brought up 
my kids by my own hard 
work. That’s what being 
a Diaguita is about it is 
about hard work and not 
accepting handouts from 
others. We are 
independent people and 
proud we don’t need 
mining companies and 
the government!” 
(Interviewee code E2, 
Orlando, Local Politician 
and Community Leader) 
 
Legal resistance 
Legal courts and 
litigation to stop mine. 
With lawyer Luis 
Sanchez managed to 
suspend the mining 
operations with a court 
order in April 2013. 
 
Collaboration – The 
very same group 
litigating against Barrick 
lead by by Sandra and 
lawyer Luis Sanchez has 
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Urban according to the 
government we won’t be able to 
continue with many of our customs 
such as cooking with wood, having 
chickens, rabbits.  
The mine and government never 
the tell the whole story about 
urbanizing the community they 
always leave out the negative 
aspects”. (Interviewee Code, E3, 
Local community leader) 
Create community dependency 
“Barrick together with the 
Municipal government changed the 
community from being self-
sufficient to becoming dependent 
on them.” (Interviewee codes E1-
E3). 
 
Seek legitimacy from non-affected 
communities 
Disingenuous behaviour (to 
obstruct) 
 
decided to enter into a 
joint participation 
agreement with Barrick 
Gold in May 2014, 
which could lead to 
generous benefits 
sharing. This clearly 
contradicts the Refusal 
to Collaborate strategy 
taken by the other half of 
the community and 
therefore demonstrates 
the great existing divide 
within the Huasco 
Valley community.   
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Table 16 – Findings Analysis of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro  
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
Many locals are 
complaining 
that the Passa 
Sete creek water 
that passes 
through the 
villages of Agua 
Quente and 
Jassém is now 
unfit for 
consumption 
and has an 
almost 
minimum flow. 
The Pereira and 
Vargem grande 
streams are also 
unfit both for 
human 
consumption 
and use, such as 
bathing or 
washing dishes 
according to 
two of my 
One of the 
biggest 
complaints 
from the local 
community 
there is that of 
being 
unlawfully 
evicted from 
their land and 
property by 
State security 
forces to allow 
Anglo 
American to 
mine for iron 
ore.  
This, along 
with other 
forms of 
alleged 
intimidation to 
leave the land, 
to NGO 
Positive for the 
urban centre. 
The local 
community 
were able to 
charge 
multiples 
times more 
rent for rooms 
and housing, 
all restaurants 
were full and it 
was 
impossible to 
ever find a 
hotel room. 
However, this 
led to 
hyperinflation 
in the town, 
with the price 
of most things 
such as land 
and food 
High – 
community 
are fighting 
for the 
mining 
project to be 
suspended at 
the very least 
so authorities 
can take stock 
of the 
environmenta
l damage so 
far and then 
make Anglo 
American 
comply with 
the 
environmenta
l regulations 
that were 
agreed.  
High – aided 
by multiple 
external 
organizations 
and a well 
educated 
group of 
community 
leaders. 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
 
Co-optation/Divide and 
Rule/Obstruction strategy 
Another company, the Brazilian 
iron ore giant MMX, had initially 
purchased this Minas-Rio project 
in 2007 and later sold it to Anglo 
American in 2008.  
MMX’s initial strategy to gain 
entry to the area, as explained by 
several rural community 
informants (interview codes H1 – 
H5), was how in 2007 one of 
Batista’s representatives arrived in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro making 
enquiries into the possibility of 
buying up land for horse breeding 
and farming. Unsuspecting local 
community residents helped him 
and sold land to the representative, 
Collective resistance 
–. 
REASA social 
movement organization 
for community to defend 
its rights against the 
mineduct has helped 
with collective resistance 
in protest marches, 
public hearings, 
community meetings, 
social media, reports. 
 
Maintain independence 
“Yesterday we heard the 
testimonies of people 
who said they did not 
need and never needed 
the jobs that Anglo has 
to offer, that tranquility 
is priceless” 
(Interviewee code H1, 
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interviewees 
from the region. 
Fernanda 
claimed, “even 
the cows turn 
away from the 
stream and 
refuse to drink 
from it…” 
(Interviewee 
code H1, 
Fernanda, 
Communtiy 
leader) 
according to 
one interviewee 
the community 
has gone for 
many days 
without any 
access to water. 
(Interviewee 
code H2, 
Pamela 
community 
Leader). 
In Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro 
interviewees 
and civil society 
reports, such as 
by Gesta 
(2013), point to 
the mining 
construction’s 
members and 
researchers in 
the area by 
mining 
company 
security 
personnel and 
state police is 
according to 
the residents 
an abuse of 
their human 
rights. 
Examples 
include threats 
and 
intimidation to 
rural 
community 
residents who 
did not want to 
leave to sell 
their land and 
be possibly 
resettled by 
Anglo 
American. 
 
“We used to 
use the 
streams for 
drinking, 
bathing, 
washing 
increasing. though became suspicious once 
they noticed how much the 
representative had bought. Soon 
after, it was revealed that the land 
had been bought for mining and 
not agriculture-related activities. 
The local community in the rural 
parts of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro 
felt cheated from that moment and 
lost trust in mining companies, 
therefore either did not provide or 
withheld their SLO. 
 
“it’s difficult for us to be united 
because of how the company has 
segregated us via their 
resettlements for example 
Communities Munbuca and 
Ferragem, no longer exist. There 
are families of these two 
communities here and there, 
scattered (Interviewee code H1, 
Local community Leader 
Fernanda, P.) 
 
“I'll give you an example, in my 
community, the company (Anglo 
American) after months of 
problems with installation of the 
septic tanks, the company met with 
the community and asked for a 
chance. The community has given 
Local community Leader 
Fernanda, P.) 
“I brought up my kids 
perfectly well without the 
help of Anglo 
(American) so why 
would I need them to 
help raise my 
grandchildren? We don’t 
need them here for their 
help. We are well and 
better off without them 
here causing great 
impact to our lives.” 
(Interviewee code H2, 
Maroon Community 
Resistance Leader, 
Transcripts p.) 
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work which 
destroyed the 
state’s highest 
waterfall 
(Cachoeira do 
Tabuleiro), as 
well as the 
polluted rivers 
and streams 
mentioned in 
the previous 
grievance 
section on 
water. 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro is 
in addition 
considered to be 
the ecotourism 
capital of Minas 
Gerais state due 
to the number of 
areas of natural 
preservation 
nearby. The 
local 
community has 
also complained 
of many 
detonations 
from nearby 
mining 
operations 
resulting in dust 
and noise 
pollution for 
clothes, 
cooking our 
meals, 
washing the 
dishes and 
pots…for 
everything…an
d now we 
cannot! It’s 
hard…and 
inhumane.” 
(Interviewee 
code H1, 
Local 
community 
Leader 
Fernanda) 
With 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro 
being an 
ecological 
centre in the 
region, the 
local 
community 
hold the 
environment in 
high regard. 
Community 
members also 
complained 
that Anglo 
American 
buried natural 
and has over 1 years of chances 
and they still can not solve the 
issue of the installation of septic 
tanks. Nothing they do works. The 
community is in disbelief and 
demoralized” (Interviewee code 
H1, Local community Leader 
Fernanda) 
“Anglo has tried to "influence" in 
my community offering benefits in 
other communities as well and they 
only offer these benefits for the 
few, to deploy discord among 
neighbors and even 
relatives…there have even been 
threats. 
Seek legitimacy from non-affected 
communities 
Interviewees had stressed that 
Anglo American had focused on 
building relations with the urban 
centre of this region and that in the 
beginning the mining company 
was very well received (interview 
codes H1-3)  
Anglo American has barely 
engaged with the rural community 
and largely ignored them: 
“….community relations? Social 
responsibility? Sincerely sir I 
cannot make any comments about 
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residents. water springs 
considered for 
their 
traditional 
medicinal 
properties in 
the Mumbuca 
community 
due to the new 
tailings dam 
being 
constructed. 
Newly 
resettled 
elderly 
community 
members also 
complained 
that their new 
homes 
provided for 
by Anglo 
American did 
not take into 
account the 
importance of 
a certain type 
of window 
they are 
accustomed to 
and 
furthermore 
that having an 
orchard and 
garden for 
growing fruit 
that because the mining company 
has NO relation with us. We don’t 
exist in their eyes. All they want is 
to buy our land and massacre this 
place but we have no relations.” 
(Interviewee code H2, Rural 
community Maroon resident, Agua 
Quente, Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro) 
 
Disingenuous behaviour (to 
obstruct) 
Constant denial of any accusations 
of negative environmental impacts 
to nearby communities. Refusing 
to acknowledge the Diversus report 
that identified multiple 
communities as affected and 
impacted by the mineduct 
construction. Anglo American 
denied the legitimacy of this report 
and instead have commissioned 
their own report.  
 
“Anglo attends some of our 
REASA meetings and hears our 
grievances about small broken 
items to issues about water but 
they have never provided an 
acceptable solution” (interview 
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is highly 
important for 
their local 
culture. 
In December 
2013 Anglo 
American 
published a 
Statement 
denying these 
accusations 
and insisting it 
was in 
compliance 
with Brazilian 
law and best 
practice 
international 
standards in its 
social and 
environmental 
performance in 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro. 
 
Other social 
impacts 
included the 
arrival of 
hundreds of 
lowly educated 
male migrants 
from North 
codes H1-3) 
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Eastern Brazil 
and even Haiti. 
This caused a 
strain on local 
police 
resources. 
Also lead to a 
shortage in 
available 
accommodatio
n and 
threatened the 
historical and 
ecological 
identity of the 
town and area. 
Together with 
excessive 
traffic and 
other social 
problems some 
local residents 
are regretting 
the approval of 
the minedict as 
demonstrated 
by Fernanda 
and Paula from 
the rural 
community. 
Fernanda even 
commented 
that in July the 
urban centre of 
Conceiçao de 
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Mato Dentro 
saw a ugly 
side of the 
mining project 
after around 
400 
subcontracted 
miners went 
on the 
rampage many 
shirtless after 
having lost 
their jobs. 
These workers 
also set fire to 
the nearby 
located Anglo 
American 
employee 
accommodatio
n site (this can 
be viewed on 
Internet video 
website 
youtube – 
accessed 26
th
 
July, 2013). 
In April 2014 
Brazilian 
authorities also 
discovered 
illegal Haitian 
workers in 
slave like 
conditions 
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working at a 
supplier of 
Anglo 
American’s 
mining project. 
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Table 17 - Findings Analysis of Caimanes 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
Community and 
NGO 
interviewees 
and reports 
allege El Mauro 
tailings dam 
represents a 
threat to the 
lives of 
Caimanes 
community if it 
fails to 
withstand a 
strong 
earthquake. 
These actors 
also claim the 
tailings dam has 
been polluting 
local water 
sources making 
it undrinkable 
for even 
animals 
according to 
The behaviour 
by Pelambres 
mining 
company 
according to 
interviewees 
has divided the 
community. 
Multiple 
families were 
also resettled 
from their 
lands before 
the 
construction of 
El Mauro 
tailings dam. 
Has impacted 
the sales of 
local produce.  
“That mining 
tailings dam is 
polluting the 
valley and 
many of us 
grow crops, 
avocados, 
courgettes, 
watermelons…
so that dirty 
and polluted 
water from the 
dam will 
contaminate 
our crops and 
then who is 
going to buy 
them when 
they hear they 
come from 
Caimanes? 
High – 
Played out in 
the courtroom 
over the past 
few years.  
Community 
leaders 
blockaded 
themselves 
into local 
school on 
hunger strike 
for around 
100 days in 
2010.  
Frequent road 
blocks to 
tailings dam 
by 
community 
leaders. 
Strong social 
media 
High – Strong 
community 
leaders. 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
 
Co-optation/Divide and 
Rule/Obstruction strategy 
“they’ve (Pelambres) offered me a 
blank cheque before so I stop 
giving them problems but I will 
never accept until I get justice for 
ALL of us in the community” 
(Interviewee code D3, Clint 
Community Leader). 
Community, NGO and legal 
representative interviewees 
repeatedly stated how the 
compensation offer by Pelambres 
to the community via a wealthy 
landowner has completely divided 
a once united community. 
 
“..that bishop was clearly paid by 
Collective resistance  
“Our people have lived 
here for over 500 years 
they (Pelambres) have to 
move away and close 
down here! They want to 
send us away and pay 
for new homes but if they 
do then they owe us 
compensation for that 
and to all of us, not just 
to some.” (Interview 
code D1, Local 
community defender, 
Claudio, Los Caimanes).  
 
11 of the community 
leaders blockaded 
themselves into a school 
in late 2010 for around 
100 days to go on a 
hunger strike demanding 
solution to their problem. 
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scientific tests 
carried out by 
the Chilean 
college of 
Physicians. 
Pelambres are 
offering lots of 
money to the 
municipality 
for us to have 
better public 
services if we 
accept then we 
become 
dependent on 
them! Then 
Pelambres will 
be able to do 
as they please 
with us and we 
will be 
dependent on 
them without 
our crops and 
livestock.” 
(Interviewee 
code D1, Los 
Caimanes 
Community 
Defence leader 
Carlos) 
campaign 
with video 
documentarie
s attracting 
foreign 
activists and 
researchers. 
Protest 
marches in 
Santiago and 
even one at 
the Annual 
General 
Meeting of 
the holding 
company 
Antofagasta 
PLC in 
London, UK 
in 2013. 
Pelambres he was a Pelambrino! 
He said that Pelambres was 
willing to pay us eleven hunger 
strikers and our families generous 
compensation but we said NO! 
Again they are always trying to 
divide us and make us fight 
amongst ourselves. We insisted we 
will only accept a deal if it is for 
everyone in Caimanes! And we will 
not let them tell us who can and 
cannot be our leader!” 
(Interviewee code D1, Carlos, local 
community activist in Defence 
Committee, Los Caimanes) 
The hunger strike lasted nearly 90 
days but with no agreement. 
During 2011 and 2012 the 
Pelambres influence strategy was 
even more low key as they were 
suing the Caimanes Defence 
Committee’s leader and lawyers, 
so for legal reasons could not 
engage and had to maintain their 
distance. Up until the current day 
the same Caimanes Defence 
Committee leaders are in place and 
Pelambres’ influence strategy 
remains confined to legal 
questions. The question of how 
Pelambres’ El Mauro dam divided 
Los Caimanes community was the 
main concern in an article the 
Guardian newspaper in April 2014 
titled “Chilean dam can't hold back 
This was a highly visible 
campaign and reported 
on national news and 
earned the leaders 
medals for their bravery 
and trips to France by 
the French government. 
Maintain independence 
 
Legal resistance 
The Caimanes defence 
committee’s lawyers 
have been instrumental 
in their resistance to the 
tailings dam taking the 
conflict to the 
courtrooms. 
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the hatred: Residents say the dam 
linked to the Los Pelambres copper 
mine 'created so much inequality 
that it broke the town” (Guardian 
website, accessed 30
th
 April, 2014) 
Disingenuous Behaviour  
“They even manipulate 
information and systems to prove 
they are responsible. They 
(Pelambres) are tipped off when an 
environmental inspector is coming 
to assess the water in their dam to 
ensure it is not coming from our 
community’s water table. They 
tamper with mechanical things 
there and manage to show that 
they are not using our 
water…they’re very clever we 
know as we have insider 
information from the mine people 
there working who feel for us what 
we are going through inform us”. 
 (Interviewee code D1, Community 
Leader resisting tailings dam) 
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Table 18 – Findings Analysis Colla de Río Jorquera 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
The topic of 
dust pollution 
was the main 
grievance 
expressed by 
the Colla 
community in 
Chile. The dust, 
according to 
informants and 
observation 
from the Colla 
community, is 
caused by 
heavy-duty 
mining traffic 
passing by on a 
small road 
adjacent to the 
homes of the 
Colla people. 
This dust settles 
on their small 
plots of land 
where they 
Harming of 
livestock and 
transhumance 
cultural life 
Mining 
vehicles have 
killed a few of 
the Colla 
people’s 
livestock (a 
donkey and a 
horse) and this 
they regard as 
a threat to their 
culture as 
exclaimed by 
Jennifer, a 
Colla lady: 
“If only our 
animals could 
talk they would 
have so much 
to say about 
how the 
None High – 
Played out  
 
High – Strong 
community 
leaders. 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
 
Ungenerous 
Kinross Gold, according to my 
Colla interviewees (Interviewee 
code B1), had not been 
approaching them despite them and 
their farms being affected by large 
amounts of dust pollution from the 
passing mining traffic going to the 
Maricunga mine. However, the 
Colla community took the 
initiative according to their leaders 
about initiating engagement with 
the mining company.  
 
Kinross Gold are also avoiding 
road access via the Colla 
community as much as possible for 
their new mining projects in order 
to avoid potential future conflict 
Collective resistance  
 
Legal resistance 
Aided by a lawyer the 
Colla community of Río 
Jorquera have taken 
numerous lawsuits 
against Kinross 
Marcunga on the issue of 
environmental impacts. 
The Colla community 
summarized his 
newfound self-esteem, 
confidence and feeling 
of empowerment in 
dealing with the mining 
companies proposing 
projects in what he 
regards as his people’s 
territory: 
“I take great satisfaction 
from seeing those 
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grow alfalfa and 
sheep graze. 
The dust is a 
problem for the 
crops and for 
the different 
animals such as 
sheep and 
donkeys. There 
have also been 
hazardous 
chemical and 
fuel spills by 
mining-related 
traffic passing 
by on the road 
adjacent to the 
Colla people’s 
homes and land. 
mining 
companies 
treat 
them….those 
animals are 
sacred to us.” 
(Interviewee 
code B1, Colla 
Community 
Leaders) 
  
with the Colla. Nonetheless, as 
according tointerviewees from the 
Colla community (Interviewee 
code B1), Kinross has been very 
ungenerous with their social 
responsibility investment 
programme, offering only around 
US$20,000 in total for an 
agriculture production programme. 
 
Examples of influence strategies 
used by Kinross Maricunga as a 
response to the demands for more 
social responsibility by the local 
community include offering partial 
school scholarships to some of 
Colla’s children as well as 
contributing towards health visit 
costs for the Colla people. Kinross 
Gold has also organized 
entrepreneurship courses for the 
local Colla community, such as 
making cupcakes and commencing 
an eco/ethno-tourism project. 
Kinross Gold also donated fences 
to a Colla farmer so he could keep 
his animals safe from the road; this 
is the social responsibility case 
study Kinross Gold highlights on 
its Community section of their 
corporate website. Kinross Gold 
Maricunga set their whole terms of 
engagement for their relationship 
and influence strategy with the 
managers having to fly 
from Canada and come 
to my humble and basic 
house to sit down here 
where you are and 
negotiate with me, with 
us the brutes and poor 
Indians as they refer to 
us.” (Interviewee code 
B1, Colla community 
President) 
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Colla around what they refer to as 
the Protocolo in Spanish which can 
be translated as a Cooperation 
Agreement. For the Colla 
community Kinross Maricunga has 
been far too ungenerous with its 
investment to them. 
Disingenuous Behaviour  
The Colla community described 
nearby Kinross Maricunga as 
disingenuous on multiple 
occasions after making repeated 
promises to respect their land and 
animals yet continuously their 
subcontracted vehicles had 
chemical spills on the road outside 
their houses, drove too fast raising 
a dust plume over their land and 
livestock and also ran over killing 
their animals. Colla leader Ricardo 
described Kinross Maricunga as: 
 “they give with one hand and take 
with another.” (Interviewee code 
B1, Colla Community Leaders.) 
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Table 19 - Findings Analysis – Paracatu 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
The main 
grievance from 
the residents 
living in the 
central and 
northern part of 
Paracatu 
(closest to 
Brazil’s largest 
opencast gold 
mine) is related 
to toxic dust and 
noise pollution 
as well as heavy 
daily tremors 
from 
detonations 
which damage 
houses and 
building 
structures. 
Many local 
residents 
believe that the 
mine represents 
Internal 
conflicts and 
divisions over 
the years. 
Many families 
had been 
evicted from 
their lands 
some years 
ago when the 
mine was 
expanding and 
building a new 
tailings dam. 
Only 60 
families, those 
with the 
correct and 
authentic 
property titles 
and deeds 
were given 
resettlement 
by Kinross 
Very high. 
Interviewees 
confirmed 
without the 
mine the city 
would most 
likely collapse 
as it employs 
one in four 
working 
adults. 
Medium – 
High 
grievance 
levels. 
 
Weak 
collective 
resistance. 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
 
Obstruction strategies 
A former employee from the mine 
Gilson explained that that once a 
person starts to work for the mine 
they attempt take over that 
person’s life. Gilson (interviewee 
code C11) continued to relay that 
many of his friends who got jobs 
there later stopped speaking and 
socializing with him as, their 
bosses ordered them to stop mixing 
with those external to the 
company.  
Gilson added that the mine 
brainwashes employees in the first 
Introduction week and then 
throughout their time at working 
there. According to Gilson the 
mine also has many spies around 
the town who watch where and 
Collective resistance  
Low collective resistance 
due to the dependence on 
the mine. 
Divided community 
“Love and hate….All 
love from our side and 
hate from the other side 
(referring to the defected 
previous leader).” 
(Interviewee code C3, 
Sao Domingos Maroon, 
Woman community 
resident). 
“Sao Domingos is 
divided because of 
problems with water and 
pollution. The company 
want to invest there to 
win the community over 
so they can continue 
destroying their land 
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a danger to the 
health of the 
local 
community as it 
uses excessive 
amounts of 
arsenic, which 
causes cancer. 
The link 
between the 
dust blown in 
from the mine 
and cancer rates 
in the city has 
not been 
proven, 
however, many 
locals including 
medical doctors 
believe this link 
exists. 
 
In addition local 
residents often 
referred to the 
mine as 
“destroying the 
city” due to its 
size and 
constant 
growth. One 
local resident 
like many 
others 
between 2008 
and 2009. 
Many of those 
living in these 
areas of Santa 
Rita and 
Machadinho 
were forced 
out of their 
homes and 
lands a few 
years ago and 
now reside in 
an area close 
to the mine 
called Bela 
Vista. The 
community of 
Machadinho 
was mainly a 
Maroon 
community 
and therefore 
protected by 
the Brazilian 
State; however 
in this case 
Kinross was 
still able to 
gain access to 
the land from 
the Brazilian 
State for their 
tailings dam. 
what employees are doing. At 
work supervisors and managers 
would tell workers they shouldn’t 
be going to certain bars and 
speaking to certain people after the 
weekend.  
 
In March and April of 2014 a 
former Kinross manager contacted 
me via email wishing to inform me 
in confidentiality about certain 
unethical practices which the 
mining company conducts. The 
manager’s emails (excerpts in C39) 
speak about the persecution of 
(current and former) employees, 
trade unions, social movements 
and critical voices in the 
community. This informant further 
accused Kinross Paracatu of lying, 
manipulating and omitting 
information in order to sell a false 
image of it being socially 
responsible. 
 
With relation to opposing and 
critical voices the mining company 
according to the former manager 
claims has an intelligence service 
that denigrates, intimidates and 
attacks those who are willing to 
speak out and defend the 
near to the Quilombo. 
The company have their 
discourse that doesn’t 
convince they say they 
are environmentally 
friendly and have good 
relations with the 
community, value people 
but it’s not convincing. 
They don’t give 
responses to the 
population.” 
(Interviewee code C37, 
NGO Worker, Paracatu). 
 
Changing/Dynamic 
community positions 
I was informed by 
representatives from 
Barrick Gold that vocal 
opponents of the 
company had previously 
been in favour of the 
company and even 
collaborated with them 
in the past. I also 
observed how after my 
first field visit that a 
NGO Director had 
clearly changed positions 
from being critical of 
Kinross to being in 
favour now that he was 
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complained: 
“…I’m fed up of 
constantly 
cleaning this 
black dust that 
comes from the 
mine, if I clean 
my house in the 
morning it’s 
covered in dust 
by night again! 
My husband 
can’t sleep well 
either because 
of the vibration 
sounds coming 
from the mine 
all night long 
and he has to 
wake up early to 
go to work.” 
(Interviewee 
code C10, local 
resident, 
Paracatu) 
Another lady 
who lives near 
the mine 
complained 
that: 
“I sometimes 
can’t breathe 
properly, the 
  community. In short Kinross 
anticipate problems by giving out 
“breadcrumbs” in the form of CSR 
to pacify any potential conflict and 
maintain its power unchallenged.  
 
Ungenerous/Disingenuous 
Behaviour/Co-optation  
Many of the interviewees in 
Paracatu claimed that the mine 
does the absolute minimum in 
order to continue mining in peace, 
as mentioned earlier. At Paracatu, 
interviewees claimed the mining 
company had executives who were 
false and insincere and multiple 
interviewees used a colloquial term 
to describe Kinross’ actions and 
social responsibility as (“Só para 
inglés ver”) which translated 
means “Just for the English to see” 
and relates to a period after slavery 
was abolished in Brazil and the 
British would check Portuguese 
boats arriving at Brazil for slaves. 
Usually the top deck was clean; 
however, underneath where the 
British could not see there were 
many slaves. Therefore in Brazil 
this phrase is used in a similar way 
that Greenwashing is used to refer 
to disingenuous CSR. 
collaborating with them 
on a CSR project.  
One interviewee even 
confessed how he had 
changed positions since 
Kinross bought the mine 
from Rio Tinto in 2005: 
“Sometimes I publically 
defended the company 
for free when it was 
RPM and “The Doctor” 
was attacking the 
company. I didn’t agree 
with that it was 
terrorism. I protested in 
the streets. Today it 
would be difficult for me 
to do that again with 
these relations they have. 
Because I believed in 
those people in 
management back when 
it was RPM they seemed 
more committed, been 
here for a long time, 
their kids were born 
here. Today I can’t 
defend them as I don’t 
believe in them. I have 
reservations about their 
external policy.” 
(Interviewee code C15, 
Journalist, Paracatu) 
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dust gets in my 
throat and eyes, 
always 
irritating, it’s 
terrible!” 
(Interviewee 
code C10, local 
resident, 
Paracatu). 
There was also 
a visit to an 
elderly couple 
who live in a 
rural house just 
metres from the 
mine. The 
couple have 
been without 
drinking water 
for years due to 
nearby mining 
activities. The 
couple used to 
get their 
drinking water 
from a stream 
that passes 
through their 
property. They 
can no longer 
either use the 
water from their 
stream to 
irrigate their 
plants or give it 
 
Other interviewees in Paracatu also 
used the term “enrola” on many 
occasions for speaking about their 
community relations. This 
Brazilian expression means to 
agree with somebody in a 
patronizing manner promising you 
will help or solve their problem, 
however never actually doing so. 
One local politician described 
Kinross’ identity as the following: 
“Their identity is that of an 
alligator’s always smiling but 
when you turn your back they 
attack.” (Interviewee code C6, 
Local Cultural and Entrepreneur 
leader, Paracatu) 
One local NGO executive 
illustrated this disingenuous 
corporate behaviour by telling me 
how the mining company had 
acted some years ago to gain a 
social responsibility certification: 
“The mine always wins 
international awards. Someone 
who was working there told me an 
international organization came 
here and even the bosses start to 
clean up and those who are 
considered as the lowest skilled 
workers are put in a truck and 
This phenomena of 
frequently changing 
towards the mine 
positions is explained as 
a result of Kinross’ co-
optation strategies by 
several interviewees who 
used the terms of 
“bought off” and 
“silenced” (Interview 
codes C2 – C4, C6, C10 
– C12, C18, C21, C23, 
C25, C28-29, C33, C37). 
Apathetic/Individualisti
c 
“These days people 
participate less they all 
just care about their own 
lives. People with money 
close themselves off to 
the world if they have a 
bed, house and car they 
don’t care about other 
people’s problems. 
People are becoming 
increasingly 
individualistic here in 
Paracatu” (Interviewee 
code C37, NGO Worker, 
Paracatu). 
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to their cows, 
which has had a 
direct impact on 
their well-being 
and livelihoods. 
However, as 
they live 
isolated and 
alone without 
neighbours, 
there is only an 
elected 
councillor and 
the couple’s 
daughter who 
are trying to 
help this 
couples’ cause. 
 
taken to the forest and left there for 
the day so that the foreign visitors 
can assess the mine for the award. 
Once the foreigners leave the truck 
goes back for the low skilled 
workers. I was told this by 
someone who was taken to the 
forest.” (Interviewee code C37, 
NGO Worker, Paracatu). 
 
“They (the mining company) make 
certain investments mainly linked 
to the local council so they can 
continue with their practice of 
infecting public authorities, I 
consider they do this to avoid 
being legally required to do what 
they should do for the local 
community (Interviewee code C7, 
local community leader, Paracatu). 
 
Many interviewees used the words 
“bought off” and “silenced” when 
explaining what happened to the 
critical voices of the mine in the 
community. (Interview codes C2 – 
C4, C6, C10 – C12, C18, C21, 
C23, C25, C28-29, C33, C37). 
 
Divide and Rule/Create 
Dependent 
It was also clear from 
interviewees that despite 
the grievances with the 
mine they could not do 
much as the community 
at large was dependent 
on it for jobs. Incomes 
and livelihoods.  
“Yes we are depedent on 
the mine, the mine 
created that dependency 
which wasn’t neessary.” 
(Interviewee code C2, 
Local Councillor, 
Paracatu). 
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dependence  
One striking and potent quote from 
Claudia who works in social-
related projects for the local 
community describes in her view 
using the “teach a man to fish” 
proverb as being the disingenuous 
nature of Kinross’ social 
responsibility as well as its ulterior 
motives of creating dependency on 
behalf of the community. 
“I’ve already taken part (in their 
social responsibility programmes) 
and I was able to see and I was 
able to be up close…(Kinross) is 
very deceitful… they pretend to do 
lots of capacity building social 
responsibility to make people more 
independent but in truth they just 
make people become more in need 
of their help; instead of teaching 
them to fish they give them a 
chewed up fish.” (Interviewee code 
C6, Local Cultural and 
Entrepreneur leader, Paracatu). 
“The company just leaves crumbs 
in the community, they paint a 
church they put their name here 
and there. But they’re taking our 
wealth. The best jobs are not for 
people from here they come from 
outside.” 
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Importantly, the word 
“breadcrumbs” (migalhas in 
Portuguese) was used to describe 
Kinross’ CSR and overall positive 
contribution to the local 
community in 10 of the interviews 
(C1-4, 6, 7, 12, 25, 28, 32, 37 and 
39). 
 
 
Divide and Rule 
In Sao Domingos Maroon adjacent 
to the mine the community mainly 
made up of relatives has been 
divided. One side, the lead by the 
previous President a law graduate 
is very sceptical of Kinross’ CSR 
and refuses to accept it seeing it as 
co-optation and a license to destroy 
their sacred and environment. The 
other side of Sao Domingos now 
lead by a lady with basic education 
is very much in favour of 
collaborating with Kinross in CSR 
projects. According to multiple 
interviewees (C2 – C4, C6, C10 – 
C12, C18, C21, C23, C25, C28-29, 
C33, C37) Kinross Gold pays 
“breadcrumbs” to the Sao 
Domingos leaders in capacity 
building courses, electricity bills 
and half minimum salary (US$160) 
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per month to monitor 
environmental impacts.  
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Table 20 – Findings Analysis Mariana 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
At Mariana 
there are great 
concerns about 
possible 
contamination 
to the local 
water supplies 
which come 
from natural 
springs in the 
mountains 
where the mine 
is planned, 
should it be 
approved. This 
water is not 
treated as it is in 
other larger 
cities. Therefore 
if mining just 
4km from the 
city centre, 
where the city’s 
water supplies 
originate from, 
The main 
objections 
from a 
minority of the 
Mariana 
residents, who 
are mainly 
non-native 
academics 
(interview 
codes F1-2 and 
F4), was that 
the city was  
already over 
full capacity 
with regard to 
population, 
traffic, housing 
availability 
and inflation. 
Mariana could 
not cope with 
a new mine 
being operated 
just 4km from 
None so far Low –  
 
Low – 
sporadic 
pubic protests 
by local 
activists in 
2011 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
Too powerful 
The minority of mainly academics 
and students who are against the 
reactivation of the Mina del Rey 
argue that Vale, the world’s largest 
iron ore mining company, will be 
too powerful for the local Mayor to 
reject. Vale has also started a more 
aggressive public relations 
campaign in the city, which my 
interviewees believe is a form of 
co-optation of the local community 
to obtain their SLO for opening the 
new mine. As put forward by one 
university lecturer Claudio: 
“The (mining) company is 
distributing various information 
(newsletter) in the homes of 
residents on their good deeds and 
actions that they have been 
performing. But actually I realize 
this is just a social obligation, as it 
Collective resistance  
Weak – due to 
dependence on mining 
industry within the 
radius of 40km. The 
town is economically 
dependent on mining.  
 
“We do not have the 
populations support  ... 
Only a few demonstrate 
against the proposed 
project, of those few, 
even less do something 
concrete here .... In 
Mariana, the people are 
very individualistic (each 
only thinks about 
himself, and his own 
short-term benefit.) its 
very sad ......There are 
also many city residents 
working in this company, 
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the risk of water 
contamination 
would be high, 
as per my 
interviewees 
and the blog 
posts on the 
internet
12
. 
However, these 
same 
interviewees 
(interview codes 
F1-5) believed 
strongly that the 
rest of the local 
population 
would not be so 
concerned about 
contamination 
to their local 
water supplies 
as long as there 
were jobs. 
the centre due 
to excess 
traffic, noise, 
migration, 
limited 
accommodatio
n and high 
inflation ( 
interview 
codes F1-2 and 
F4). The mine 
in essence 
would worsen 
the 
community’s 
quality of life. 
Other 
grievances 
were related to 
the visual 
impact of the 
proposed mine 
which would 
be visible from 
the historic 
city centre. As 
explained by 
Claudio whilst 
we were 
driving in his 
car inside the 
city: 
is exempt from various taxes. The 
company does not say anything 
about the issue of the reactivation 
of Mina Del Rey. The company 
says nothing about Mina Del Rey. 
The company is only making 
propaganda about its "good 
things", related to job creation, 
conservation areas, development 
...” (Interviewee code F1, local 
community resident opposing 
mine, Mariana). 
 
“I think the economic power of 
mining exerts is very strong 
influence in the community, 
especially regarding the economic 
and political control of the city. 
This creates a dependency anda n 
almost survival of the local 
economy on mining due to a lack 
of long term government policies. 
Mining companies rule the cities.” 
(Interviewee Code F4, Trade 
Union Representative, Mariana) 
“Yes I agree with your paragraph 
below about mining company 
power, not forgetting the huge 
number of co-opted or corrupted 
leaders linked the community or 
this creates a certain 
dependency.” 
(Interviewee code F1, 
local community resident 
opposing mine, 
Mariana).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
  http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/  http://marianaviva.blogspot.com.br/ 
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“Look at that! 
(pointing to a 
terrible traffic 
jam due to 
passing mining 
trucks driving 
at 5m.p.h) This 
is what we 
have to bear 
every day now, 
there´s 
nowhere to 
rent, space for 
cars, the city is 
full so if that 
mine reopens 
here the city 
will 
collapse…I 
and my wife 
will leave for 
sure.”. 
(Interviewee 
code F1, Local 
community 
resident 
opposing 
opening of 
mine, 
Mariana) 
  
the trade union movement of 
mining itself.” (Interviewee Code 
F4, Trade Union Representative, 
Mariana) 
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Table 21 - Findings Analysis Pedra Branca 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
Overall – Low 
Interviewees 
(interview codes 
A1- A4) 
complained 
about the dust 
that is dispersed 
from the wheels 
of the mining 
vehicles 
circulating in 
the town; one 
local resident 
who was suing 
Anglo 
American for 
having 
prevented him 
from mining on 
their land 
summarized the 
dust problem as: 
“I told the 
company lawyer 
Locals would 
like more of a 
positive social 
impact from 
the mine.  
It has been 
positive and 
attracted much 
of the new 
population 
who have 
arrived from 
nearby States 
as economic 
migrants. 
Low  
 
Low – 
sporadic 
pubic protests 
due to 
electricity 
cuts 
Responsible 
According to most local 
community interviewees Anglo 
American is a responsible actor but 
could do more in terms of 
investment in local infrastructure, 
services and jobs. 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
Ungenerous 
Anglo were not as generous as 
Icomi the previous mine in the area 
who provided a hospital, high 
quality schools, stores and benefits 
for employees and their families. 
Anglo American’s strategy with 
the community is linked to the 
sustainability of the local 
community: 
“Anglo American wants the 
following…referring back to Icomi 
Collective resistance  
 There are very few and 
weak resistance 
strategies as the 
community is not united 
and has a short history. 
The only one small 
group trying to resist the 
mine in 2012 was a 
group of artisanal miners 
who had been forced off 
the land by Anglo 
American. 
“For others the company 
is good, for those recent 
migrants, they have jobs 
for them. But for us the 
roots from here, the 
owners of the mines from 
52 years, for us the 
company is being really 
bad, bad. I tell you, 
honestly if they don’t 
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whilst you’re 
driving around 
in your air 
conditioned 
(Toyota) hi-lux 
the minerals are 
all falling out of 
your vehicles in 
the town and 
affecting us as it 
spreads around 
especially from 
the wheels.” 
(Interviewee 
code A1, long 
term resident 
and critical 
voice, Pedra 
Branca de 
Amaparí) 
the inevitable, they closed their 
doors and everyone was left high 
and dry and now everyone fears 
that Anglo American will do the 
same. So everything we do today is 
related to income generation or 
education. There’s no point in 
coming here proposing a project 
not linked to this. It’s all about the 
future”. 
 
resolve this I will and I 
promise I will cut off the 
road with my group 
having a protest and they 
won’t have access to the 
mine! We will also put a 
video of their 
environmental crimes on 
the internet for the world 
to see” (Interviewee 
Code A1, Artisan miner 
and long term resident, 
Pedra Branca 
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Table 22 – Findings Analysis Barro Alto 
Environmen
tal impact 
Social 
impact 
Economic 
impact 
Extent of 
conflict 
Strength 
of 
collective 
action 
Corporate influence 
strategies (by construct) 
Community 
influence strategies 
(by construct) 
None Locals would 
like more of a 
positive social 
impact from 
the mine.  
Anglo 
American also 
claim they 
kept negative 
social impact 
to a minimum 
during 
construction 
phase. In 2007 
the 
sustainability 
management 
decided to 
keep the 
hundreds of 
construction 
workers 
housed away 
from the centre 
It has been 
positive and 
attracted much 
of the new 
population 
who have 
arrived from 
nearby States 
as economic 
migrants. 
Low  
 
Low – 
sporadic 
pubic protests 
at Anglo 
American’s 
annual forum 
Responsible 
According to most local 
community interviewees Anglo 
American is a responsible actor but 
could do more in terms of 
investment in local infrastructure, 
services and jobs. 
 
In line with Anglo American’s way 
of working with local communities 
they decided to partner with 
external NGOs who have set up 
operations in Barro Alto. One 
example is that of international 
NGO Care which is focused on 
social and entrepreneurship 
projects with milk, agriculture and 
trees. The hope is also for local 
small-scale farmers to grow 
vegetables to supply Anglo 
American’s cafeteria as part of a 
local development initiative. Like 
in the urban centre of Conceiçao de 
Collective resistance  
Very weak currently. 
However some years ago 
the aggrieved business 
owners resisted at 
corporate opportunities 
afforded by Anglo 
American. 
Anglo American in 
Barro Alto started to 
hold annual open and 
public forums from 2008 
during the construction 
phase of the mine. The 
purpose of these forums 
was to communicate to 
the local community the 
mine’s intentions with 
regard to local 
purchasing, recruitment, 
social responsibility 
strategies, social fund 
payments to local 
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of Barro Alto 
despite 
knowing many 
locals were 
hoping to rent 
their rooms 
and houses to 
these migrant 
workers. The 
reason for this 
decision was 
in order to 
avoid potential 
social conflict 
between locals 
and the new 
workers. The 
workers were 
housed several 
kilometres 
from Barro 
Alto. This 
according to 
Miguel, the 
head of 
sustainability 
was an 
intelligent 
decision in 
hindsight: 
“..in order to 
reduce 
possible 
conflicts and 
disturbances 
Mato Dentro and Pedra Branca, 
Anglo American also provides a 
social investment fund to the 
municipal government to spend on 
public services. Anglo American 
have partnered with an NGO from 
Sao Paulo based in Barro Alto 
called Agenda Publica that builds 
capacity in local government on 
how to be more transparent, 
accountable and invest 
strategically the tax revenues paid 
by Anglo American. The company 
has also paid for the construction 
of a new hospital for the 
community. Overall most members 
of the local community I spoke to 
were in favour of Anglo American 
and grateful for their presence. 
(Interviewee code G2, Community 
residents Barro Alto). 
Corporate Irresponsibility  
Ungenerous 
Those with minimarket stores and 
other businesses were the most 
aggrieved because they felt Anglo 
American should be doing more to 
develop the town’s infrastructure 
and also lead by example by 
having its executives live in barro 
Alto and not in another larger city 
40km away. 
government, amongst 
other items. However, at 
the first annual forums 
the aggrieved local 
businesspeople used 
them as opportunities to 
voice their concerns and 
protest against what they 
saw as a lack of social 
responsibility and local 
investment by Anglo 
American. However, 
Miguel explained that 
his team managed to 
show to the rest of the 
community that they 
were a good company 
and therefore the 
protesters eventually 
stopped attending the 
forums 
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with the local 
community we 
housed the 
construction 
workers for 
one year some 
kilometres 
from here. 
This prevented 
many social 
tensions and 
conflicts from 
occurring.”  
(Interviewee 
code G1, 
Anglo 
American 
Social 
Performance 
Manager, 
Barro Alto), 
“Anglo American are not ethical in 
their treatment of the community. 
They only hire people 
recommended by workers and 
friends there, there is nepotism. 
The company should do much 
more for the town to develop it so 
it can grow. The managers don’t 
live here otherwise they would 
spend more money and help the 
economy. Why do they live in 
Goianianese?”  (Interviewee code, 
G4, Shopkeeper, Barro Alto) 
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5.2 Historical context – High Conflict cases 
The historical context is an important aspect for explaining how the two groups of 
higher and lower conflict communities became less dependent and more dependent 
respectively on the nearby mining projects. The higher conflict and more independent 
communities include the Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla communities in Chile 
and Conceiçao de Mato Dentro rural communities in Brazil. In the cases of the 
Huasco Valley and Colla communities in northern Chile, interviewees from there 
explicitly made mention of their respective rich pre-Hispanic histories of fighting 
previous invaders such as the Incas and Spanish in order to save and defend their 
identities. These communities therefore also needed to do the same to maintain these 
identities in the present era of neo-colonization by foreign mining companies. 
Barbara, the indigenous leader from the Diaguita community in the Huasco Valley 
explained this point clearly  
“we were the first People the Spanish encountered upon entering Chile from 
Peru, and the Spaniards killed our Cacique in front of his family, yet we 
continued fighting even as the slaves of the Spanish….we burned down La 
Serena (town located 400km south) twice, when it belonged to the 
Spanish…they called us the ‘Valiant Campillay’, apparently it’s documented 
in a library somewhere in Spain, so we kept the Valley for our people and they 
the Spanish stayed near the coast…….so if we allow all these proposed mega 
mines into our valley it will turn into a mining valley and our culture will die. 
We want the mining companies to leave so we can keep our identity, culture 
and water which is life!” (Interviewee code E1, Indigenous Community 
leader) 
 
This indicates that from a historical perspective of before the Spanish conquest of 
what is today northern Chile in the 16
th
 Century, that the Diaguita community fought 
for their independence and autonomy and gained this right allowing them to live 
peacefully in the Huasco Valley and higher elevations free from the interference of 
the Spanish conquistadores. This view of the Diaguita and Huasco Valley history is 
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also shared by my other interviewees from the region and knowledgeable experts as 
well as by Standen (2011). Therefore this sensation of being independent from 
“outsiders” has been engrained in the Diaguita community for centuries and 
generations. Given this heritage, the arrival of one of the largest gold mining 
companies in the world to the Huasco Valley to mine their mountains for gold was 
highly objected to by the local community. The Diaguita people living in the Huasco 
Valley claim they were content living their own unique way of life growing grapes, 
avocados, vegetables amongst other crops in harmony with the environment and 
nature. The Diaguita people’s dependence and future well-being is directly tied to the 
land and water, with Mother Nature or as they refer to it as Pachamama. 
 
With regard to the Colla of the River Jorquera community, their ancient history and 
self-reliance is very similar to that of the Diaguita people. The Colla people are 
considered as “cousins” of the Diaguitas and are located just 200km north of the 
Huasco Valley. The Colla, similarly to the Diaguita, have survived for centuries 
without large-scale mining, making their livelihoods mainly as shepherds herding 
sheep and growing alfalfa high up the Andes Mountains. The Colla do have a history 
of recent artisanal small scale mining similar to that in the Huasco Valley; however, 
this type of mining was carried out by the Colla and Diaguita people themselves who 
take full leadership and ownership of the mining – hence without the involvement of 
outsider companies or miners.  
 
In addition, as put forward by several of my interviewees from within the Huasco 
Valley and external knowledgeable experts, the Colla people having lived so long 
independently of any involvement or assistance from outsiders, also have a natural 
mistrust of anyone who comes from outside their community, especially foreigners in 
search of mining their natural resources. During an improvised car ride to the nearest 
small town, Alto del Carmen a woman resident kind enough to offer me a lift who 
was campaigning for her husband to be elected as councillor from the “Spanish” side 
of the Valley in the Huasco Valley explained how on her Spanish side of the valley 
the people are more open, welcoming, and trusting compared to the Diaguita side 
where people are less trusting and closed especially to outside. The reason being as 
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explained by the lady was that the Diaguita had always lived isolated here in a closed 
way so they are not accustomed to meeting and co-existing with outsiders; they are 
suspicious of people who come from outside unlike her side of the valley which is 
mainly descended from the Spanish. 
 
The Colla community has also grown stronger as an independent community in recent 
years as affirmed by their own leader, the community relations officer at Kinross and 
by two external knowledgeable experts; this community throughout the past three 
decades has become politicized after winning legal disputes over land rights via their 
logging trade union, which therefore has made them more confident and skilled in 
challenging large multinational mining companies. The Colla community over the 
years has grown in self-confidence that it can beat big businesses such as a large 
grape farmer they defeated in their claim for compensation for farming in what they 
consider as their indigenous territory. Indeed the Colla community has managed to 
take mining companies to court and gain compensation from them demonstrating their 
non-reliance and lack of fear of these nearby mining projects. Moreover, the Colla 
community has shown its strength of power in relation to the mining companies, 
thereby tipping the balance of power towards them as a community in line with 
Frooman’s (1999) model of power and dependence. 
 
The rural communities of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Caimanes in Chile are also 
at least 200 years old. They have never previously had large-scale related mining 
located very close to their settlements. Like the previous two Chilean communities, 
they were founded on agriculture and up until today are still agriculture-based 
communities, making them independent from mining and self-sufficient. In the case 
of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, a few of the rural communities were established over 
200 years ago by descendants of African slaves escaping slavery to set up their own 
communities by themselves known as Quilombo or Maroon in English. Therefore the 
struggle for independence has been at the roots and origins of the Conceiçao De Mato 
Dentro rural communities. 
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Community members in some of the Conceiçao de Mato Dentro rural communities 
and at Caimanes also made reference to history though much more recent history than 
at the Huasco Valley and the Colla community. At Conceiçao de Mato Dentro the 
historical context was mentioned on occasions by one of the community leaders 
Fernanda who explained that her community is not dependent upon mining and is 
self-reliant: 
“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries 
here….mining is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land and are 
happy with that but mining impacts all of this. We also used to really enjoy 
going to the waterfall and playing in the water but we can’t do that anymore 
as they have destroyed the waterfall which is the highest in this State for 
mining.” (Interviewee code H1, Community Leader, Transcripts) 
All four higher conflict communities had a strong feature of independence and 
resilience installed in them from the moment they were formed hundreds of years ago. 
The communities have much shared and collective history, which is linked to their 
dependence on Mother Nature or pachamama for their future well-being. It is clear to 
understand from this historical perspective why these communities would be against 
giving the proposed nearby mining projects their critical resource of an SLO. Doing 
so could jeopardize their traditional ways of living.   
 
5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases 
In stark contrast to the histories of the high conflict cases, mining was a core part of 
the past of the four lower conflict cases. In the case of Paracatu, the city was founded 
over 200 years ago by Portuguese explorers searching for gold, therefore gold mining 
forms part of the city’s historical identity. The Portuguese, according to my 
interviewees, found an abundance of gold and consequently soon built the city of 
Paracatu in order to send the precious mineral back to the Portuguese royal family in 
Portugal. Therefore several interviewees compared the current day process of sending 
the gold back to Canada via airplane and ship as a continuation of the early days of 
Paracatu in the 18
th
 Century. 
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However, large scale mining, as is the case at the Morro de Ouro (Gold Hill) mine run 
by Kinross today, only began in the late 1980s when it was substantially smaller than 
today. Agriculture also forms a very important part of Paracatu’s economy; however, 
it is located far from the mine and therefore does not directly compete or threaten the 
mining activity. The Morro de Ouro locals in Paracatu used to make their living by 
artisanal mining, or gold panning and at the end of the day would walk to the city 
centre and sell their gold discoveries. Therefore the idea of gold mining is not foreign 
at all in Paracatu and moreover, having the largest opencast gold mine in Brazil just a 
few kilometres from the city is a situation that all local residents under the age of 35 
are familiar with since they can remember. One of my interviewees, a lady aged 31 
born and raised in Paracatu explained:  
“as a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. 
Everyone my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, 
so it is not a foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a 
new mine is being built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local 
politician and local resident) 
The large Morro de Ouro mine, now owned by Kinross Gold, has been in operation 
for over 26 years since 1987. As Paracatu has grown to become more dependent on 
municipal tax revenues, employment and in terms of local economy on the mine over 
time, the mine has also successfully obtained the necessary legal licences as well as 
the SLO for several expansions including new very large tailings dams (supposedly 
some of the largest in South America).  
 
In the case of Mariana, as with Paracatu, both are located in the State of Minas Gerais 
(General Mines in English). Mariana was the first capital of Minas Gerais State, 
founded 300 years ago after discovering gold there, similar to Paracatu. The main 
employer in the town has always been the mining sector through many different 
companies either mining companies or related suppliers to the sector.  
 
Mariana falls within the Quadrilátero Ferrífero (the Iron Quadrangle), an area 
roughly the size of greater London in the State of Minas Gerais abundant with high 
  264 
quality iron ore mines and related businesses where the mining company Vale is 
highly active and has been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, 
as before, when it was a State-owned company, it offered good quality housing to its 
workers based in Mariana. Such benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have 
helped create more of a dependency culture in Mariana on the mining industry. 
Though there are not any mines located within 5kms of Mariana just yet, there are 
several large iron ore mines within 20km of the town which is where most of the local 
residents go to work. Unlike Paracatu, Mariana does not have a significant 
agricultural sector, therefore mining is even more important to the town which means 
a higher dependency level on mining companies.  
 
The small town of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in northern Brazil was a small village of 
fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 2000 and by 2012 the population had grown to over 
12,000. The reason for this accelerated growth can be explained by the arrival of 
large-scale mining in 2008. Before the arrival of large mining companies, local 
indigenous and other small communities had been engaging in artisanal gold mining. 
Located just 12km from Pedra Branca is the town of Serra de Navío, which was 
founded in the 1950s by the US mining company “Icomi” which mined manganese. 
As all local community and mining company interviewees explained to me, Icomi 
took a paternalistic approach to doing business in the region. In the 1950s the 
population in the State (the size of England) was under 100,000 therefore Icomi was 
the major and only actor there.  
 
Icomi built American style villages, infrastructure, housing, streets, high quality 
schools and a hospital. Therefore all native local community residents with whom I 
spoke look back with much fondness of the period when Icomi were mining and 
practically governing the area. This paternalistic approach, i.e. of taking the State’s 
role, created a dependency culture, which can be observed today, and was claimed to 
be true by the majority of my informants in Amapa State. It is the main underlying 
explanation offered by my interviewees (from both the mining company and local 
community) for the current state of relations and community expectations with the 
mining company. It can be posited that the small villages of Pedra Branca and Serra 
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de Navio only exist because of the arrival of large-scale mining operations in the past 
60 years. In short, Pedra Branca de Amaparí and its localities have known nothing 
else other than mining and are thus dependent on the industry. 
 
The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized around 60 
years ago as a municipality. The population was 40% lower before Anglo American 
started the construction of their nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012). As explained by 
my interviewees, most of the local community are economic migrants or their parents 
came from other regions of Brazil once there was news about an apparently large gold 
mine in the town. The lure of this mine brought many new migrants to the area, in the 
late 1970s up until today, hoping to make money directly or indirectly from the mine. 
Therefore the main reason most of the 8,000 people are in Barro Alto is because of 
the mine; the historical context of mining speculation brought many of these residents 
from other areas to the locality to make a better life for themselves financially. 
 
The contrast between the historical contexts of the four higher and lower conflict 
community groups is evident. The higher conflict cases started life as communities at 
least over 200 years ago based around agriculture as a way of life and identity. These 
four communities also confronted bigger colonial powers in order to fight for their 
independence and autonomy over 200 years ago. These events have lived in the 
collective memories of the local residents, most of whom can trace their families back 
over many generations. Therefore if a large multinational mining company enters 
their territory to carry out massive mining-related operations with certain 
environmental and social impacts on the traditional and historical ways of lives lived 
by the locals, it will not be accepted. The local communities in these four locations 
were never dependent upon mining or on any other institution. They have thrived for 
decades as independent people living in relative peace off the land and Mother 
Nature. Therefore trying to suddenly make them dependent to an extent on large-scale 
nearby mining after so many years of independence is a difficult challenge for a 
mining company or any other organization.  
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On the other hand, the four lower conflict communities were born and founded as a 
result of mining. Without mining, these towns would not even be here today. In the 
cases of Barro Alto and Pedra Branca these small towns owe their existence to the 
presence of the large mines currently in operation in these municipalities. Therefore 
the dependency link between local community and mine is very clear to comprehend 
from a historical viewpoint. In line with Frooman’s (1999) argument, the future 
welfare of both organization (mining company) and stakeholder (local community) 
are tied to one another and, as quoted earlier, Anglo American do state on their 
website that there is a mutual dependence between them and their local community. 
In communities where dependence is so high towards the nearby mining projects it is 
also understandable why levels of conflict are much lower, as shown in Table 4 (with 
the exception of Paracatu which has a recent history of conflict against the Morro de 
Ouro mine). In more independent and autonomous communities, who fear the impacts 
from large-scale mining, conflict and hence a non-granting of an SLO is a distinct 
possibility for those with a strong collective memory, as also seen in Table 4. The fact 
that there is much less resistance in communities which have a strong history and 
identity of mining, also supports the claims made by authors such as Gramling and 
Freudenburg (2006), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and Walsh et al., (1997). 
 
5.31 Summary  
At the lower conflict communities it can be perceived on the surface that some of the 
complaints around the mining company impacts are similar in nature to Paracatu and 
the higher conflict communities, such as with the environment and health as well as 
grievances around the ungenerous nature of mining companies. However, upon closer 
inspection one can distinguish some fundamental differences in the type of grievances 
between Paracatu, higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water 
was one of the main problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, 
though not given so much concern at the lower conflict communities. In the three 
cases of Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto, it is the minority who hold grievances 
against their nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. 
There is also much more of a perceived negative impact on people’s land and 
livelihoods at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower 
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conflict communities. At these lower conflict communities there were more 
complaints related to the impacts on the social and economic fabric from mining and 
also more about how ungenerous the mining companies were being with giving back 
to the community.  
 
At Paracatu and the lower conflict communities, residents were reaching out to offer 
their SLO to the nearby mining companies though they wanted much more in return 
for this by way of economic benefits. As stressed earlier, the higher conflict 
communities claim they are not willing to negotiate their water, health or land with 
the mining companies for social responsibility and jobs. At the very least they are 
willing to sell out for generous compensation packages on their own terms. When 
comparing Paracatu with the higher conflict communities the similarities between 
grievances and impacts are clear. One could go further by saying that the grievances 
around the alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by 
the community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research. 
Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher 
conflict community?  
 
The answer can be accounted for by the influence strategies used by the mining 
company and by the community for being more accepting of these grievances. This is 
where the discussion returns to the topic of dependence and power as posited by 
Frooman (1999), though in the context of mining company local community relations 
from the case studies researched.  
 
In the following section I proceed to discuss the various stages I observed mining 
companies undergo to gain their SLO from the local communities at higher and lower 
conflict communities throughout the mining cycle. In addition I highlight the different 
community collective behaviour and action, or lack of it in response to these different 
mining company influence strategies, which ultimately determine the classification of 
the cases as higher or lower conflict communities. 
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5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining SLO  
Based on my research data and a publication by ICMM (2012), I propose a model of 
community relations’ stages between mining companies and their local communities 
in a Brazilian and Chilean context as shown in Table 22. More specifically, this 
model focuses on the different mining company influence strategies to gain an SLO 
from the local community at the various different stages of the mining cycle. In order 
to understand the table and analysis below, it is important to briefly explain the 
mining cycle. According to the International Council on Mining and Metal’s 
Community Development Toolkit and Hugo Herrera Carvajal, Project Process 
Manager of Barrick Gold Pascua Lama, Chile in 2008 the mining cycle consists 
mainly of the following stages: 
 Exploration – According to ICMM (2012) small teams, working on short time 
horizons across dispersed areas in a short timeframe. Carvajal (2008) explains 
that there is drilling and tunnelling that happens at this phase, which would 
need the detonation of explosives. The mining company wants to establish at 
this point whether there are enough minerals to make it financially viable to 
build and develop a large scale mining operation in the location. 
 
 Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences – the literature on 
this stage mentions that technical studies are made to determine the financial 
and legal viability, which includes an environmental impact assessment. The 
literature however, does not make any reference to land acquisition at any of 
the mining stages. However, based on my field research and conversations 
with mining experts, I argue that it is also at this stage that mining companies 
need to buy as much of the land needed where they believe the mineral is 
located and this can mean very large areas. This land can also have private 
owners therefore negotiations about land acquisition or resettling of people 
also commences here if appropriate. In my case studies, only Kinross 
Maricunga and Anglo American at Barro Alto did not have important land 
acquisition or resettlement issues. 
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 Construction and Development – this is asserted by ICMM (2012) as well as 
my mining company interviewees as the most intense in terms of impacts on 
the local community. Therefore there is the potential for harming community 
relations mainly due to the high influx of migrant construction workers to the 
location and the additional money being spent by these workers.  
 
In more technical terms Carvajal (2008) argues that this stage consists of pre-
stripping, which involves removing the worthless rock that is together with 
the mineral reserves. At the same time there is construction of facilities for 
extraction, processing, transportation, energy supply infrastructure and 
transport access (roads, railways, ports, airports) to and from the mine site. 
Therefore there would also be considerable impact on the local community in 
terms of the environment, dust and noise pollution. 
 
 Operations – According to ICMM (2012) this is the most stable stage where 
community relations can be enhanced as construction of the mine is complete. 
However, the technical explanation by Carvajal (2012) would infer that the 
potential for impacts on the local communities is quite high and adverse. 
Carvajal (2008) separates the operations or production phase into three 
different stages of Extraction, Processing, and Smelting and Refining. 
 
Extraction removes the mineral from the mine. The main processes involved 
are drilling and blasting of rocks, and loading and transportation of the 
materials to their destinations. Processing which includes leaching for gold 
mining aims to increase the concentration of metals by the use of chemicals 
such as sulfides which include cyanide and arsenic for gold mining. Thirdly 
there is Smelting and Refining which consists of the separation of the metals 
contained in concentrates. This is done by melting metals, through industrial 
processing known as fire refining and refining by Electrowinning. The 
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potential to cause harm to local communities’ health, livelihoods and 
environments is apparent from the above description. 
 
 Closure – this important final stage refers to the end of the mine which is 
usually decades after the initial exploration. However, it is not relevant at the 
moment for any of my case studies. 
 
The International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) whose mission is to help 
improve sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining company 
members, which include three of the four companies examined in my research Anglo 
American, Barrick Gold and Vale (ICMM website consulted 25
th
 August, 2013), 
published a similar table to Table 6 given below. The table titled “Description of 
phases of the mining project cycle and company/community interactions” was 
included in ICMM’s 2012 publication titled “Community Development Toolkit”. 
Under each stage of the mining cycle, ICMM include a short and generic text of 
between 70-100 words describing the mining company activities, community 
grievances and recommendations for improving relations. The table also has a column 
for “suggested community development activities” linked to tools. The ICMM’s table 
considers the following six mining cycle stages: Exploration, Feasibility, 
Constructions, Operations, Decommissioning and Closure, and Post Closure. 
However due to the nature of my case studies I align my data into the following four 
mining cycle stages for my analysis in Table 6 and subsequently: 
1. Exploration and initial mining licences/permits 
2. Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
3. Construction and Development 
4. Operations 
 
It should be stated that the four stages are not clearly defined and separate, as also 
claimed by the ICMM (2012) many of the mining activities and community 
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engagement overlap across the various stages of the mining cycle. Table 6 below goes 
beyond the ICMM one in terms of more detail about what takes place at each stage of 
the mining cycle and in terms of including mining company influence strategies 
followed by community response strategies using specific case studies; it is also more 
dynamic and process natured, explaining the events from one stage to the next in the 
mining cycle. This contrasts with the ICMM table which focuses mainly on the 
mining company and a little on possible general community grievances and 
perceptions though nothing on community action and responses. Therefore I argue 
that such a consideration and attempt to theorize mining company community 
relations from a more detailed, dynamic and dual perspective has not been considered 
by the literature and I hope to address this gap (see Table 22). 
 
These following influence strategy stages are the result of analyzing my four higher 
conflict cases. It should be noted that as Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is a newer mining 
project it is only relevant up until stage three of Table 22. Below I offer an overview 
of the six main stages of mining company influence strategies in Table 22. 
 
Table 23 – mining company influence strategies and community response 
strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities  
 
Mining company influence strategy at 
the different stages of mining cycle 
Local community response strategy to 
mining company  
Exploration and initial mining licences  
1. Geologists conduct tests on the 
soil for minerals. There is also 
initial land acquisition for mining 
– Maintain low profile while 
obtaining mining licences and 
permits. 
Limited response, as community are 
unaware of these tests. In the case of 
Pascua Lama there was an over 20-year 
lag between exploration and application 
for legal permits. 
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Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
2. Determine the mine to be 
economically viable. 
Communicate success of initial 
engagement with certain urban 
community groups highlighting 
future economic investment 
benefits and new jobs the mining 
project will bring to the region. 
Announce social responsibility 
intentions to give back to 
community with the aim of 
securing the SLO. Begin land 
acquisition process for mining and 
necessary resettlement of 
communities who currently live 
on the land destined for mining. In 
addition begin compiling 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
studies in order to obtain the 
necessary environmental and 
mining permits and licences to 
start constructing the mine. 
 
Complaints about the lack of 
transparency and ethics around the way 
land is being bought for mining. Concern 
escalates with each environmental 
licence approval process in specific on 
the potential environmental impacts on 
the community.  
Community leaders call to external actors 
such as NGOs, lawyers or state 
prosecution for assistance. Members of 
the affected (rural) community are 
annoyed that their concerns around the 
negative impacts on their lives from the 
proposed mine are being ignored by the 
mining company and that instead it 
chooses to focus on social responsibility. 
The rural community begins to view this 
as a co-optation strategy. 
The community strengthens its 
collectiveness in this adversity and anger 
with external actor assistance. Become 
more entrenched in their positions and 
view the situation as “them versus us”. 
More and larger mass protests, more 
collective action and more press 
coverage of their resistance. 
Construction and Development stage 
3. The company receives its 
necessary mining licences and 
permits. As a result of heightened 
A minority within the rural and affected 
communities accepts participating in the 
CSR programme as beneficiaries, usually 
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community mobilization and 
resistance, the company increases 
its effort to talk with the rural 
communities and becomes very 
proactive in offering generous 
CSR-related benefits (in health, 
education, income generation) to 
the more aggrieved and impacted 
community groups. Offer 
compensation to few powerful 
local community actors. However, 
still offer few jobs to the local 
community residents; most go to 
skilled workers from other 
regions. Still offer no credible 
solutions to the adverse 
environmental and social impacts 
including those of resettlement. 
lowest income and schooling levels. Also 
a minority but powerful group in the 
local community who accept generous 
compensation are silenced and co-opted. 
They become dependent on the mining 
company and offer their SLO.  
Many also now after seeing the mining 
company win its licences and permits 
become resigned to its presence in the 
community and to its negative impacts.  
The majority of the community perceive 
the CSR as a form of co-optation to 
induce dependency on the mining 
company and hence gain an SLO to do as 
they please with the region. This majority 
refuse to collaborate with the mining 
company in any way including not 
participating in any corporate sponsored 
event. 
There are more grievances around 
impacts from mining on water, land, 
quality of life and culture. Some in the 
community are now speaking of 
demanding financial compensation from 
the mining company for the damages 
incurred to their lives by the mining 
activities. This creates some internal 
divisions amongst those opposed to the 
mine who want it to stop and leave the 
region. 
As few work at the mine, being largely 
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self-sufficient from agriculture, they do 
not have divided loyalties and are able to 
resist the mining company’s CSR and 
behaviour.  
Results in more continued protests (now 
from different fragmented groups) 
against the mining project and also 
collective legal action to cease 
operations, with success in some cases. 
Construction and Development/Operations stage 
4. Marked by years of negative 
community perceptions, protests 
and now temporary suspensions in 
mining activities ordered by the 
courts of justice due to community 
complaints, the company retreats 
from dialogue attempts and from 
the public eye. The company 
realizes they have not obtained 
their SLO from the community 
and this has brought bad publicity 
and harmed its reputation. 
 
The company continues with 
social responsibility programmes 
with a minority of the rural 
community and with the urban 
community as before but with a 
lower public profile. 
 
The mining company also faces 
financial challenges for funding its 
The community continue to mistrust the 
mining company and the government. 
They continue to complain and protest 
about the negative impacts from mining 
operations on their water, land and 
human rights.  
Their aim continues to be for the mining 
company to respect environmental 
impact agreements and/or for the 
company to stop mining operations for 
good. Many are also now demanding 
financial compensation for the damages 
incurred from mining activities. The 
internal divisions within the rural 
community grow between those in favour 
of negotiating with the mining company 
and those totally opposed to any 
dialogue. 
The majority prefer to remain 
independent from the mine and count on 
the assistance of external actors such as 
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operations due to the protests, lost 
time from being suspended and 
workers’ strikes and action.  
lawyers, state prosecution and NGOs in 
their resistance for justice and their 
livelihoods. 
5. Engagement with the affected 
rural communities is mainly 
through lawyers and litigation at 
the courts or state prosecution 
meetings. 
Protests continue against the mine by 
certain community sections whilst others 
negotiate through lawyers for huge 
amounts of financial compensation. 
There are now two divided internal 
groups within the affected rural 
community. 
  
 
Barrick Gold also addressed the contentious subject of the reconstruction of the 
Diaguita indigenous identity around 2006 by promoting and lobbying on behalf of the 
community to the government for them to be recognized as indigenous. Barrick Gold 
invested heavily with the most impoverished and vulnerable Diaguita groups in the 
Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as Diaguitas. Once relations 
with this Diaguita group were good Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then 
explained to the group that they qualified for indigenous people’s status as Diaguitas 
and that they would help them with their application to the Chilean government. 
Recognition as Diaguitas also meant access to additional State social benefits, so it 
had economic advantages. Thus once this friendly group was officially recognized as 
Diaguitas by the Chilean State, Barrick Gold were able to communicate that the 
Diaguita indigenous community were in favour of them and enjoyed good relations. 
Barrick Gold even apparently invited some of these friendly Diaguitas to their annual 
general meetings of shareholders in Toronto, Canada to demonstrate these good 
relations and supposed SLO. Nonetheless the majority of the Diaguitas in the Huasco 
Valley were not interested in or influenced by Barrick Gold and remained against the 
mining project from the perspective of my interviewees.  
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However, interviewees such as church clergyman Manuel, community leaders 
Barbara and Sandra (Interviewee code E1) in a geography thesis by Standen (2011) 
jointly stressed the need for a critical examination of what and why Barrick Gold did 
what it did regarding the Diaguita identity. These critical voices claim that Barrick 
Gold firstly was championing the case for the government to recognize the Diaguita 
people as indigenous because the multinational knew there was a good probability of 
this happening. Therefore the company took the visible ownership and leadership of 
the issue in the hope of gaining legitimacy or an SLO in eyes of the local community 
as a responsible actor with the Diaguita people, with whom they had already 
established good relations via social responsibility initiatives. It would also permit 
Barrick Gold to publicly show it has Diaguita community leaders defending and 
supporting the Pascua Lama mining project, and thus an SLO. 
 
These findings and interpretations corroborate with a quote in Urkidi and Walter 
(2011) around the influence strategies of Barrick Gold around gaining community 
acceptance from manipulating the Diaguita identity and community: 
‘‘The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to 
conduct workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a 
nonexistent Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have 
raised false leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the 
media, discrediting the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable 
divisions between community members and their neighbours. All these actions have 
led to confusion and they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita 
Huascoaltinos.’’(Letter to Canadian parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino 
Agricultural Community, May 2009. P689, 2011) 
 
In an attempt to show their acceptance in the region, Barrick Gold showcase on their 
website a letter from August 2007 signed by six different neighbourhood associations 
underscoring their support for Barrick Gold and Pascua Lama operating in the region. 
However, it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood representatives 
who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del Carmen municipality in the 
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Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the Water Vigilance Board, the group 
that received US$6m from Barrick Gold. The other five representatives who signed 
the letter of approval are from the town of Vallenar and from Huasco which is even 
further away near the coast therefore adding strength to the argument that Barrick 
Gold chose to focus its efforts on gaining legitimacy from a more distant urban 
community. 
 
In short, Barrick Gold has attempted to implement several different strategies to 
influence the local community’s perceptions and relations with the mining company 
to gain their acceptance, cooperation, trust and most importantly their SLO. 
 
Table 24 – Mining company influence strategies and community response 
strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.  
 
Mining company influence strategy at 
different stage of Mining Cycle 
Local community response strategy to 
mining company  
Exploration and initial mining licences  
1. Geologists conduct tests on the 
soil for minerals. There is also 
initial land acquisition for mining 
– Maintain low profile while 
obtaining mining licences and 
permits 
Community expectations of local 
economic opportunities heightened at the 
prospect of a large multinational mining 
company developing a large mine near 
community. 
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
2. Determine the mine to be 
economically viable. 
Communicate success of initial 
engagement with nearby urban 
community highlighting future 
Community becomes excited at the 
prospect of new jobs and business 
opportunities. New migrants begin 
arriving at the town also in the hope of 
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economic investment benefits and 
new jobs the mining project will 
bring to the region. Announce 
social responsibility intentions to 
buy locally and give back to 
community with the aim of 
securing the SLO. However, doing 
so in a careful and measured way 
to manage expectations around 
levels of local investment. Begin 
land acquisition process for 
mining.  
 
Resettlement of communities who 
currently live on the land destined 
for mining is limited and lower 
than in the higher conflict 
communities.  
 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
studies pass through with limited 
opposition and company 
maintains consistent dialogue with 
the community. 
 
benefiting economically.  
People begin to buy new properties and 
make extensions to their homes in the 
hope of profiting by renting out their 
properties in the near future. This creates 
the start of housing speculation and local 
inflation. 
 
Construction and Development stage 
3. The company receives its 
necessary mining licences and 
permits and therefore begins 
construction of the mines. 
 
Brings in hundreds of construction 
The fact that few local residents have 
been selected to work at the mine irritates 
many in the community, though they 
decide to wait until it is operational to see 
if they can gain employment then. Also 
they are not able to rent out their rooms 
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workers who are housed 
separately to the local community 
in order to minimize social unrest. 
 
However, still offer few jobs to 
the local community residents; 
most go to skilled workers from 
other regions.  
Company is concerned at lack of 
local government capacity in 
dealing with and reinvesting a 
sudden new influx of revenue 
from the mining company.  
and properties to new workers. 
Local businesses are starting to become 
disappointed that their projected new 
sales are not materializing from this new 
mine. The business community is 
beginning to feel unsettled. 
However the mining company has started 
its social responsibility programme with 
the local community in areas such as 
capacity building, education and 
entrepreneurship, which pleases those 
who participate. 
A divide starts to form between those 
who benefit from the mine and those who 
do not. 
Construction and Development/Operations stage 
 
The company rolls out more of its 
social responsibility programmes. 
It also participates in more local 
purchasing for its mining 
operations. Announces plans to 
invest in public services such as a 
hospital, technical college and 
park or plaza.  
 
However, most of the skilled jobs 
are offered to those from outside 
the community. 
 
 
This situation exacerbates the internal 
divisions between those who are 
benefiting and those who are not from 
the mine in terms of employment, 
income generation opportunities and 
social responsibility benefits. 
Prices in the community start to rise and 
those not earning from mining-related 
activities complain even more. 
At the mines where there is a significant 
impact, such as in Paracatu, certain local 
residents become aggrieved from noise, 
tremors, threats to health and safety.  
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Those against the mine due to the 
adverse impacts and/or non-recipients of 
economic benefits try to mobilize and 
protest. 
 
4. The mine quashes mobilization 
attempts with counter-
mobilization tactics, community 
influence strategies, co-optation 
and divide and rule.  
It engages with local community 
about its social responsibility 
strategy, local hiring and 
purchasing strategy and of its 
importance to the local economy. 
The main implied message is there 
is a mutual interdependence where 
one cannot thrive without the 
other.  
Those with grievances hold negative 
perceptions of the mine but do not 
attempt to mobilize again as they 
understand the immense power of the 
mine in the local community. 
Understanding the local community is 
dependent on the mine. Some of the 
opponents of the mine switch sides 
towards partnering with the mine in its 
social responsibility projects, taking the 
approach that it is better to try and 
change from inside than from the outside. 
 
 
Below I detail the local community influence strategies used by the four different 
mining companies at the four different local communities in Chile and Brazil, which 
are aimed at creating some level of dependence and ultimately winning over an SLO. 
 
5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and 
community contexts 
One of the factors for the lower conflict communities is the mutual dependence 
between the mining company and the community (as confirmed on the Anglo 
American website (so this would include Barro Alto and Pedra Branca though the 
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latter was sold in early 2013). At the higher conflict cases the mining companies are 
not solving communities’ most cited grievances. Moreover, the most referred to 
desire from higher conflict community members was for the mining projects to cease 
and stop mining permanently. Therefore these higher conflict communities are 
reluctant to even offer their SLO to the nearby mining projects. Also, the extent to 
which companies even could respond to community grievances such as water and 
land is questionable, given that these elements are core resources required in large 
quantities by large-scale mining.  
 
Nonetheless, the mining companies at both higher conflict and lower conflict 
communities used influence strategies as per Frooman (1999) in order to gain their 
SLO via creating some level of mutual dependence, with the exception of the rural 
communities of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in Brazil. These rural communities in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro claim to experience severe environmental and human 
rights abuses which they have publically expressed on multiple occasions, yet Anglo 
American refuses to recognize these rural communities as a legitimate stakeholder, 
and more so their complaints as legitimate therefore implying that an SLO is not 
needed from these actors. Anglo American has instead chosen to focus on the urban 
centre of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro with its influence strategies, where it has largely 
made progress with creating a mutual dependence, better relations and gaining an 
SLO. Therefore this is another strategy mining companies can use for grappling with 
their SLO, i.e., to deny a certain community which is opposed to the mine from being 
a legitimate stakeholder with power and urgency, as per Mitchell et al. (1997). In 
essence this converts such a group into what Mitchell et al. (1997) denominate as a 
“dangerous stakeholder”.  
 
At the other higher conflict communities, the mining companies (Barrick Gold, 
Pelambres and Kinross) were also reported by my interviewees as having ignored 
them as legitimate stakeholders from the outset. In these three communities it also 
took substantial protesting and mobilization in various forms for the nearby impacted 
on communities to be recognized as legitimate and powerful stakeholders by the three 
respective mining companies. From there on the mining companies began to engage 
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in influence strategies in the form of CSR to create some level of dependence or 
loyalty from the local community, enough to be able to gain their SLO. It seems that 
for certain mining companies ignoring their staunch opponents and critical voices is 
understood to be the best strategy for addressing them. 
 
The mining projects that have an SLO are also the ones with lower conflict 
communities. The communities who supply the SLO generously at Paracatu, Mariana, 
Pedra Branca and Barro Alto are also highly dependent on their nearby mining 
projects. Therefore this mutual dependence between mining company and community 
exists, as also affirmed on Anglo American’s website. Therefore the challenge for the 
mining companies operating there (Anglo American, Kinross and Vale) is to balance 
this dependency because an over dependent local community would become a strain 
on resources. However, at the same time the mining companies are aware they cannot 
abuse their power and not give anything back to the communities, thus they need 
influence or social responsibility strategies in order to maintain their respective SLO. 
Mining companies understand even though they hold power and the communities are 
largely dependent on them they are also dependent on the communities for a place to 
operate, human and physical resources, suppliers, security, infrastructure amongst 
other features for an SLO. Without access to these assets the mining projects would 
not be able to operate.  
 
With reference to the higher conflict communities, I would argue they, in contrast, are 
not dependent upon their nearby mining projects. This is the first challenge facing the 
mining companies so they therefore attempt to create a certain level of dependency on 
them for the local communities, in contrast to the lower conflict communities. The 
companies need the local communities to have some sort of need for them in order to 
create a mutual dependence and therefore be in a position to negotiate their SLO 
(Frooman, 1999). One other strategy is to simply ignore the stakeholder group when a 
mining project has multiple community stakeholders, such as at Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro. In this case the mining company chose to ignore the self-sufficient rural 
community and address the more dependent one in the urban area. 
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It is interesting to note that in conversations with officials from these mining 
companies as well as from studying their corporate websites and communications 
materials, there was total consensus that the CSR philosophies are geared towards 
helping capacitate local communities to become independent and self-sufficient and 
therefore not have to rely on the mining company. The old proverb of Give a man a 
fish and you feed him for a day; Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime, 
was quoted by officials from Kinross and Anglo American to summarize their 
approaches to communities. The most interesting aspect of this is how at the higher 
conflict communities the residents are already emancipated and independent. These 
communities do not feel the need for mining, nor do they want mining. Indeed these 
communities make their livelihoods via agriculture and therefore are in direct 
competition with mining for access to water and land. Therefore it is possible to infer 
that the communities in these four cases possess the power and choose not to supply 
the SLO to their nearby mining projects. 
 
Through manipulative influence strategies such as paying large sums of money to 
certain groups to buy their loyalties, or trying to manipulate the local community’s 
identity, as with the Huasco Valley, or by ignoring communities and the impacts to 
them, as at Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and the Colla, mining companies have tried to 
sidestep the question of an SLO. Furthermore attempts which could be construed as 
dependence creating, such as sponsoring cultural events at Huasco Valley and 
Caimanes, offering courses and gifts at Colla, Huasco Valley and Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro, or even making alleged threats, still have not succeeded in creating a desired 
mutual dependence at these four higher conflict communities. Table 24 compares and 
contrasts both categories of communities.  
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Table 25 - Comparison between higher conflicts and lower conflict 
communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies 
and Ability to mine without Community Resistance. 
 Community 
Dependency 
on mining 
Level of 
negative 
impacts 
from mining 
Mining company 
influence strategy 
on local 
community  
Ability to mine without 
conflict 
Huasco 
Valley 
Low High Tried and 
unsuccessful in 
creating mutual 
dependence via co-
optation and CSR. 
No – Multiple large street 
protests and lawsuits. 
Courts ceased operations 
now. Big media campaign 
against mine. 
Conceiçao 
de Mato 
Dentro 
Low High Co-opt and gain 
support of urban 
community. No 
recogniztion of 
rural communities 
who claim to be 
affected. 
No – Multiple protests. 
Courts ceased operations in 
past. 
Caimanes Low High Tried and 
unsuccessful in 
creating mutual 
dependence via co-
optation and CSR 
No – Multiple large street 
protests and lawsuits. Big 
media campaign against 
mine. 
Colla Very Low High Do minimum CSR 
and distance 
relations as much 
as possible. 
No – Lawsuits and had 
several roadblocks to mine. 
Paracatu High High Do minimum CSR, 
co-opt critical 
opponents, 
maintain a level of 
community 
dependence to 
maintain power 
Mainly Yes 
Mariana Very High N/A (would 
be high) 
Public relations Yes 
Pedra 
Branca 
Very High Low  Do minimum CSR 
and try to make 
community more 
independent 
Yes 
Barro 
Alto 
Very High Low Do minimum CSR 
and try to make 
community more 
independent 
Yes 
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5.2 Historical context – Higher Conflict cases 
The historical context is an important aspect for explaining how the two groups of 
higher and lower conflict communities became less dependent and more dependent 
respectively on the nearby mining projects. The higher conflict and more independent 
communities include the Huasco Valley, Caimanes and Colla communities in Chile 
and Conceiçao de Mato Dentro rural communities in Brazil. In the cases of the 
Huasco Valley and Colla communities in northern Chile, interviewees from there 
explicitly made mention of their respective rich pre-Hispanic histories of fighting 
previous invaders such as the Incas and Spanish in order to save and defend their 
identities. These communities therefore also needed to do the same to maintain these 
identities in the present era of neo-colonization by foreign mining companies. 
Barbara, the indigenous leader from the Diaguita community in the Huasco Valley 
explained this point clearly  
“we were the first People the Spanish encountered upon entering Chile from 
Peru, and the Spaniards killed our Cacique in front of his family, yet we 
continued fighting even as the slaves of the Spanish….we burned down La 
Serena (town located 400km south) twice, when it belonged to the 
Spanish…they called us the ‘Valiant Campillay’, apparently it’s documented 
in a library somewhere in Spain, so we kept the Valley for our people and they 
the Spanish stayed near the coast…….so if we allow all these proposed mega 
mines into our valley it will turn into a mining valley and our culture will die. 
We want the mining companies to leave so we can keep our identity, culture 
and water which is life!” (Interviewee code E1, Indigenous Community 
leader) 
 
This indicates that from a historical perspective of before the Spanish conquest in the 
16
th
 Century of what is today northern Chile, that the Diaguita community fought for 
their independence and autonomy and gained this right allowing them to live 
peacefully in the Huasco Valley and higher elevations free from the interference of 
the Spanish conquistadores. This view of the Diaguita and Huasco Valley history is 
also shared by my other interviewees from the region and knowledgeable experts as 
well as by Standen (2011). Therefore this sensation of being independent from 
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“outsiders” has been engrained in the Diaguita community for centuries and 
generations. Given this heritage, the arrival of one of the largest gold mining 
companies in the world to the Huasco Valley to mine their mountains for gold was 
highly objected to by the local community. The Diaguita people living in the Huasco 
Valley claim they were content living their own unique way of life growing grapes, 
avocados, vegetables amongst other crops in harmony with the environment and 
nature. The Diaguita people’s dependence and future well-being is directly tied to the 
land and water, and with Mother Nature or Pachamama as they refer to her. 
 
With regard to the Colla of the River Jorquera community, their ancient history and 
self-reliance is very similar to that of the Diaguita people. The Colla people are 
considered to be “cousins” of the Diaguitas and are located just 200km north of the 
Huasco Valley. The Colla, similarly to the Diaguita, have survived for centuries 
without large-scale mining, making their livelihoods mainly as shepherds herding 
sheep and growing alfalfa high up the Andes Mountains. The Colla do have a history 
of recent artisanal small scale mining similar to that in the Huasco Valley; however, 
this type of mining was carried out by the Colla and Diaguita people themselves who 
take full leadership and ownership of the mining – hence without the involvement of 
outsider companies or miners.  
 
In addition, as put forward by several of my interviewees from within the Huasco 
Valley and external knowledgeable experts, the Colla people having lived so long 
independently of any involvement or assistance from outsiders, also have a natural 
mistrust of anyone who comes from outside their community, especially foreigners in 
search of mining their natural resources. During an improvised car ride to the nearest 
small town, Alto del Carmen, a resident kind enough to offer me a lift was 
campaigning for her husband to be elected as councillor from the “Spanish” side of 
the Valley in the Huasco Valley. She explained how on her Spanish side of the valley 
the people are more open, welcoming and trusting compared to the Diaguita side 
where people are less trusting and closed, especially to outsiders. The reason being, as 
explained by the lady, was that the Diaguita had always been isolated here and lived 
in a closed way so they were not accustomed to meeting or co-existing with outsiders; 
  287 
they are suspicious of people who come from outside, unlike those on her side of the 
valley who are mainly descended from the Spanish. 
 
The Colla community has also grown stronger as an independent community in recent 
years as affirmed by their own leader, the community relations officer at Kinross and 
by two external knowledgeable experts; this community throughout the past three 
decades has become politicized after winning legal disputes over land rights via their 
logging trade union, which therefore has made them more confident and skilled in 
challenging large multinational mining companies. The Colla community over the 
years has grown in self-confidence, believing that it can beat big businesses such as 
the large grape farmer they defeated in their claim for compensation for farming in 
what they consider as their indigenous territory. Indeed the Colla community has 
managed to take mining companies to court and gain compensation from them, 
demonstrating their non-reliance and lack of fear of these nearby mining projects. 
Moreover, the Colla community has shown its strength of power in relation to the 
mining companies, thereby tipping the balance of power towards them as a 
community in line with Frooman’s (1999) model of power and dependence. 
 
The rural communities of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Caimanes in Chile are also 
at least 200 years old. They have never previously had large-scale related mining 
located very close to their settlements. Like the previous two Chilean communities, 
they were founded on agriculture and up until today are still agriculture-based 
communities, making them independent from mining and self-sufficient. In the case 
of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, a few of the rural communities were established over 
200 years ago by descendants of African slaves escaping slavery to set up their own 
communities by themselves known as Quilombo or Maroon in English. Therefore the 
struggle for independence has been at the roots and origins of the Conceiçao De Mato 
Dentro rural communities. 
 
Community members in some of the Conceiçao de Mato Dentro rural communities 
and at Caimanes also made reference to history though much more recent history than 
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the Huasco Valley and Colla communities. At Conceiçao de Mato Dentro the 
historical context was mentioned by one of the community leaders Fernanda who 
explained that her community is not dependent upon mining and is self-reliant: 
“we used to make well known cheeses, biscuits and sweet pastries 
here….mining is not part of what we do, we have cows and our land and are 
happy with that but mining impacts on all of this. We also used to really enjoy 
going to the waterfall and playing in the water but we can’t do that anymore 
as they have destroyed the waterfall, which is the highest in this State, for 
mining.” (Interviewee code H1, Community Leader, Transcripts) 
All four higher conflict communities had a strong feature of independence and 
resilience installed in them from the moment they were formed hundreds of years ago. 
The communities have much shared and collective history, which is linked to their 
dependence on Mother Nature or pachamama for their future well-being. It is clear to 
understand from this historical perspective why these communities would be against 
giving the proposed nearby mining projects their critical resource of an SLO. Doing 
so would jeopardize their traditional ways of living.   
 
5.3 Historical context – Low Conflict cases 
In stark contrast to the histories of the higher conflict cases, mining was a core part of 
the past of the four lower conflict cases. In the case of Paracatu, the city was founded 
over 200 years ago by Portuguese explorers searching for gold, therefore gold mining 
forms part of the city’s historical identity. The Portuguese, according to my 
interviewees, found an abundance of gold and consequently soon built the city of 
Paracatu in order to send the precious mineral back to the Portuguese royal family in 
Portugal. Therefore several interviewees compared the current day process of sending 
the gold back to Canada via airplane and ship as a continuation of the early days of 
Paracatu in the 18
th
 Century. 
 
However, large scale mining, as is the case at the Morro de Ouro (Gold Hill) mine run 
by Kinross today, only began in the late 1980s when it was substantially smaller than 
today. Agriculture also forms a very important part of the Paracatu’s economy; 
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however, it is located far from the mine and therefore does not directly compete or 
threaten the mining activity. The Morro de Ouro locals in Paracatu used to make their 
living by artisanal mining, or gold panning and at the end of the day would walk to 
the city centre and sell their gold discoveries. Therefore the idea of gold mining is not 
foreign at all in Paracatu and moreover, having the largest opencast gold mine in 
Brazil just a few kilometres from the city is a situation that all local residents under 
the age of 35 are familiar with for as long as they can remember. One of my 
interviewees, a lady aged 31 born and raised in Paracatu explained:  
“As a young child I grew up seeing the mine, it is all I have ever known. 
Everyone my age or younger here does not know a Paracatu without the mine, 
so it is not a foreign body to us like it might be in other communities where a 
new mine is being built.” (Interviewee code C1 Anastasia – Daughter of local 
politician and local resident) 
The large Morro de Ouro mine, now owned by Kinross Gold, has been in operation 
for over 26 years since 1987. As Paracatu has grown to become more dependent on 
municipal tax revenues, employment and, in terms of local economy, on the mine 
over time, the mine has also successfully obtained the necessary legal licences as well 
as the SLO for several expansions including new very large tailings dams (allegedly 
some of the largest in South America).  
 
In the case of Mariana, as with Paracatu, both are located in the State of Minas Gerais 
(General Mines in English). Mariana was the first capital of Minas Gerais State, 
founded 300 years ago after discovering gold there, similarly to Paracatu. The main 
employer in the town has always been the mining sector through many different 
companies either mining companies or related suppliers to the sector.  
 
Mariana falls within the Quadrilátero Ferrífero (the Iron Quadrangle), an area 
roughly the size of greater London in the State of Minas Gerais, abundant with high 
quality iron ore mines and related businesses where the mining company Vale is 
highly active and has been for decades. Vale therefore has a strong legacy in Mariana, 
as before, when it was a State-owned company, it offered good quality housing to its 
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workers based in Mariana. Such benefits, in addition to a reliance on mining, have 
helped create more of a dependency culture in Mariana on the mining industry. 
Though there are no mines located within 5kms of Mariana yet, there are several large 
iron ore mines within 20km of the town which is where most of the local residents go 
to work. Unlike Paracatu, Mariana does not have a significant agricultural sector, 
therefore mining is even more important to the town which means a higher 
dependency level on mining companies.  
 
The small town of Pedra Branca de Amaparí in northern Brazil was a small village of 
fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 2000 and by 2012 the population had grown to over 
12,000. The reason for this accelerated growth can be explained by the arrival of 
large-scale mining in 2008. Before the arrival of the large mining companies, local 
indigenous and other small communities had been engaging in artisanal gold mining. 
Located just 12km from Pedra Branca is the town of Serra de Navío, which was 
founded in the 1950s by the US mining company “Icomi” which mined manganese. 
As all local community and mining company interviewees explained to me, Icomi 
took a paternalistic approach to doing business in the region. In the 1950s the 
population in the State (the size of England) was under 100,000 therefore Icomi was 
the major and only actor there.  
 
Icomi built American style villages, infrastructure, housing, streets, high quality 
schools and a hospital. Therefore all native local community residents with whom I 
spoke look back with much fondness on the period when Icomi were mining and 
practically governing the area. This paternalistic approach, i.e. of taking the State’s 
role, created a dependency culture, which can be observed today, and was claimed to 
be true by the majority of my informants in Amapa State. It is the main underlying 
explanation offered by my interviewees (from both the mining company and local 
community) for the current state of relations and community expectations of the 
mining company. It can be posited that the small villages of Pedra Branca and Serra 
de Navio only exist because of the arrival of large-scale mining operations in the past 
60 years. In short, Pedra Branca de Amaparí and its localities have known nothing 
else other than mining and are thus dependent on the industry. 
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The town of Barro Alto was only established and officially recognized around 60 
years ago as a municipality. The population was 40% lower before Anglo American 
started the construction of their nickel mine in 2006 (Grisotto, 2012). As explained by 
my interviewees, most of the local community are economic migrants or their parents 
came from other regions of Brazil once there was news about an apparently large gold 
mine in the town. The lure of this mine brought many new migrants to the area, in the 
late 1970s up until today, hoping to make money directly or indirectly from the mine. 
Therefore the main reason most of the 8,000 people are in Barro Alto is because of 
the mine; the historical context of mining speculation brought many of these residents 
from other areas to the locality to make a better life for themselves financially. 
 
The contrast between the historical contexts of the four higher and lower conflict 
community groups is evident. The higher conflict cases started life as communities at 
least over 200 years ago based around agriculture as a way of life and identity. These 
four communities also confronted bigger colonial powers in order to fight for their 
independence and autonomy over 200 years ago. These events have lived in the 
collective memories of local residents, most of whom can trace their families back 
over many generations. Therefore if a large multinational mining company enters 
their territory to carry out massive mining-related operations with certain 
environmental and social impacts on the traditional and historical ways of lives lived 
by the locals, it will not be accepted. The local communities in these four locations 
were never dependent upon mining or on any other institution. They have thrived for 
decades as independent people living in relative peace, off the land and in harmony 
with Mother Nature. Therefore trying to suddenly make them dependent to an extent 
on large-scale nearby mining after so many years of independence is a difficult 
challenge for a mining company or any other organization.  
 
On the other hand, the four lower conflict communities were born and founded as a 
result of mining. Without mining, these towns would not even be here today. In the 
cases of Barro Alto and Pedra Branca these small towns owe their existence to the 
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presence of the large mines currently in operation in these municipalities. Therefore 
the dependency link between local community and mine is very clear to comprehend 
from a historical viewpoint. In line with Frooman’s (1999) argument, the future 
welfare of both organization (mining company) and stakeholder (local community) is 
tied up with each another and, as quoted earlier, Anglo American do state on their 
website that there is a mutual dependence between them and their local community. 
In communities where dependence is so high on the nearby mining projects, it is also 
understandable why levels of conflict are much lower, as shown in Table 4 (with the 
exception of Paracatu which has a recent history of conflict against the Morro de 
Ouro mine). In more independent and autonomous communities, who fear the impacts 
of large-scale mining, conflict and hence a non-granting of an SLO is a distinct 
possibility for those with a strong collective memory, as also seen in Table 4. The fact 
that there is much less resistance in communities which have a strong history and 
identity of mining, also supports the claims made by authors such as Gramling and 
Freudenburg (2006), McAdam and Boudet (2012) and Walsh et al., (1997). 
 
5.3.1 Summary  
In the lower conflict communities it can be perceived on the surface that some of the 
complaints around the mining company impacts are similar in nature to Paracatu and 
the higher conflict communities, such as with the environment and health as well as 
grievances around the ungenerous nature of mining companies. However, upon closer 
inspection one can distinguish some fundamental differences in the type of grievances 
between Paracatu, higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water 
was one of the main problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, 
though not given so much concern at the lower conflict communities. In the three 
cases of Mariana, Pedra Branca and Barro Alto, it is the minority who hold grievances 
against their nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. 
There is also much more of a perceived negative impact on people’s land and 
livelihoods at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower 
conflict communities. At these lower conflict communities there were more 
complaints related to the impacts on the social and economic fabric from mining and 
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also more about how ungenerous the mining companies were being with giving back 
to the community.  
 
At Paracatu and the lower conflict communities, residents were reaching out to offer 
their SLO to the nearby mining companies though they wanted much more in return 
for this by way of economic benefits. As stressed earlier, the higher conflict 
communities claim they are not willing to negotiate their water, health or land with 
the mining companies for social responsibility and jobs. At the very least they are 
willing to sell out for generous compensation packages on their own terms. When 
comparing Paracatu with the higher conflict communities, the similarities between 
grievances and impacts are clear. One could go further by saying that the grievances 
around the alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by 
the community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research. 
Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher 
conflict community?  
 
The answer can be accounted for by the influence strategies used by the mining 
company and by the community for being more accepting of these grievances. This is 
where the discussion returns to the topic of dependence and power as posited by 
Frooman (1999), though in the context of mining company/local community relations 
from the case studies researched.  
 
In the following section I discuss the various stages I observed mining companies 
undergo to gain their SLO from the local communities at higher and lower conflict 
communities throughout the mining cycle. In addition I highlight the different 
community collective behaviour and action, or lack of it, in response to these different 
mining company influence strategies, which ultimately determine the classification of 
the cases as higher or lower conflict communities. 
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5.4 Mining company influence strategies for attaining an SLO  
Based on my research data and a publication by ICMM (2012), I propose a model of 
community relations’ stages between mining companies and their local communities 
in a Brazilian and Chilean context, as shown in Table 22. More specifically, this 
model focuses on the different mining company influence strategies to gain an SLO 
from the local community at the various different stages of the mining cycle. In order 
to understand the table and analysis below, it is important to briefly explain the 
mining cycle. According to the International Council on Mining and Metal’s 
Community Development Toolkit and Hugo Herrera Carvajal, Project Process 
Manager of Barrick Gold Pascua Lama, Chile in 2008 the mining cycle consists 
mainly of the following stages: 
 Exploration – According to ICMM (2012) small teams, working on short time 
horizons across dispersed areas in a short timeframe. Carvajal (2008) explains 
that drilling and tunnelling happen at this phase, which would need the 
detonation of explosives. The mining company wants to establish at this point 
whether there are enough minerals to make it financially viable to build and 
develop a large scale mining operation in the location. 
 
 Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences – the literature on 
this stage mentions that technical studies are undertaken to determine the 
financial and legal viability, which includes an environmental impact 
assessment. The literature however, does not make any reference to land 
acquisition at any of the mining stages. However, based on my field research 
and conversations with mining experts, I argue that it is also at this stage that 
mining companies need to buy as much of the land needed where they believe 
the mineral is located and this can mean very large areas. This land can also 
have private owners therefore negotiations about land acquisition or resettling 
of people also commences here if appropriate. In my case studies, only 
Kinross Maricunga and Anglo American at Barro Alto did not have important 
land acquisition or resettlement issues. 
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 Construction and Development – this is asserted by ICMM (2012) as well as 
my mining company interviewees as the most intense in terms of impacts on 
the local community. Therefore there is the potential for harming community 
relations mainly due to the high influx of migrant construction workers to the 
location and the additional money being spent by these workers.  
 
In more technical terms Carvajal (2008) argues that this stage consists of pre-
stripping, which involves removing the worthless rock that is joined to the 
mineral reserves. At the same time there is the construction of facilities for 
extraction, processing, transportation, energy supply infrastructure and 
transport access (roads, railways, ports, airports) to and from the mine site. 
Therefore there would also be considerable impact on the local community in 
terms of the environment, through dust and noise pollution. 
 
 Operations – According to ICMM (2012) this is the most stable stage where 
community relations can be enhanced as construction of the mine is complete. 
However, the technical explanation by Carvajal (2012) would infer that the 
potential for impacts on the local communities is quite high and adverse. 
Carvajal (2008) separates the operations or production phase into three 
different stages: Extraction, Processing, and Smelting and Refining. 
 
Extraction removes the mineral from the mine. The main processes involved 
are drilling and blasting of rocks, and loading and transportation of the 
materials to their destinations. Processing, which includes leaching for gold 
mining, aims to increase the concentration of metals by the use of chemicals 
such as sulfides which include cyanide and arsenic for gold mining. Thirdly 
there is Smelting and Refining which consists of the separation of the metals 
contained in concentrates. This is done by melting metals, through industrial 
processing known as fire refining, and refining by Electrowinning. The 
potential to cause harm to local communities’ health, livelihoods and 
environments is apparent from the above description. 
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 Closure – this important final stage refers to the closing of the mine which is 
usually decades after the initial exploration. However, it is not relevant at the 
moment for any of my case studies. 
 
The International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) whose mission is to help 
improve sustainable development performance of its 21 large mining company 
members, which include three of the four companies examined in my research Anglo 
American, Barrick Gold and Vale (ICMM website consulted 25
th
 August, 2013), 
published a similar table to Table 6 given below. Their table titled “Description of 
phases of the mining project cycle and company/community interactions” was 
included in ICMM’s 2012 publication “Community Development Toolkit”. Under 
each stage of the mining cycle, ICMM included a short and generic text of between 
70-100 words describing the mining company activities, community grievances and 
recommendations for improving relations. Their table also has a column for 
“suggested community development activities” linked to tools. ICMM’s table 
considers the following six mining cycle stages: Exploration, Feasibility, 
Constructions, Operations, Decommissioning and Closure, and Post Closure. 
However due to the nature of my case studies I align my data with the following four 
mining cycle stages for my analysis in Table 6 and subsequently: 
5. Exploration and initial mining licences/permits 
6. Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
7. Construction and Development 
8. Operations 
 
It should be stated that the four stages are not clearly defined and separate, as also 
claimed by the ICMM (2012) many of the mining activities and community 
engagement overlap across the various stages of the mining cycle. Table 6 goes 
beyond the ICMM table in terms of more detail about what takes place at each stage 
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of the mining cycle and in terms of including mining company influence strategies 
followed by community response strategies using specific case studies; it is also more 
dynamic and process natured, explaining the events from one stage to the next in the 
mining cycle. This contrasts with the ICMM table which focuses mainly on the 
mining company and a little on possible general community grievances and 
perceptions, though nothing on community action and responses. Therefore I argue 
that such a consideration and attempt to theorize mining company community 
relations from a more detailed, dynamic and dual perspective has not been considered 
by the literature and I intend to address this gap (see Table 22). 
 
These following influence strategy stages are the result of analyzing my four higher 
conflict cases. It should be noted that as Conceiçao de Mato Dentro is a newer mining 
project it is only relevant up until stage three of Table 22. Below I offer an overview 
of the six main stages of mining company influence strategies in Table 22. 
 
Table 26 – Mining company influence strategies and community response 
strategies according to mining cycle stage at higher conflict communities  
 
Mining company influence strategy at 
the different stages of mining cycle 
Local community response strategy to 
mining company  
Exploration and initial mining licences  
6. Geologists conduct tests on the 
soil for minerals. There is also 
initial land acquisition for mining 
– maintain low profile while 
obtaining mining licences and 
permits. 
Limited response, as community is 
unaware of these tests. In the case of 
Pascua Lama there was a 20-year plus 
lag between exploration and application 
for legal permits. 
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
7. Determine the mine to be Complaints about the lack of 
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economically viable. 
Communicate success of initial 
engagement with certain urban 
community groups highlighting 
future economic investment 
benefits and new jobs the mining 
project will bring to the region. 
Announce social responsibility 
intentions to give back to 
community with the aim of 
securing the SLO. Begin land 
acquisition process for mining and 
necessary resettlement of 
communities who currently live 
on the land destined for mining. In 
addition begin compiling 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
studies in order to obtain the 
necessary environmental and 
mining permits and licences to 
start constructing the mine. 
 
transparency and ethics around the way 
land is being bought for mining. Concern 
escalates with each environmental 
licence approval process, specifically on 
the potential environmental impacts on 
the community.  
Community leaders’ call to external 
actors such as NGOs, lawyers or state 
prosecution for assistance. Members of 
the affected (rural) community are 
annoyed that their concerns around the 
negative impacts on their lives from the 
proposed mine are being ignored by the 
mining company and that instead it 
chooses to focus on social responsibility. 
The rural community begins to view this 
as a co-optation strategy. 
The community strengthens its 
collectiveness in this adversity and anger 
with external actor assistance. Becomes 
more entrenched in its positions and 
views the situation as “them versus us”. 
More and larger mass protests, more 
collective action and more press 
coverage of their resistance. 
Construction and Development stage 
8. The company receives its 
necessary mining licences and 
permits. As a result of heightened 
community mobilization and 
resistance, the company increases 
A minority within the rural and affected 
communities accepts participating in the 
CSR programme as beneficiaries – 
usually lowest income and educational 
levels. Also a minority but powerful 
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its effort to talk with the rural 
communities and becomes very 
proactive in offering generous 
CSR-related benefits (in health, 
education, income generation) to 
the more aggrieved and impacted 
upon community groups. Offers 
compensation to a few powerful 
local community actors. However, 
still offers few jobs to the local 
community residents; most go to 
skilled workers from other 
regions. Still offers no credible 
solutions to the adverse 
environmental and social impacts, 
including those of resettlement. 
group in the local community who accept 
generous compensation are silenced and 
co-opted. They become dependent on the 
mining company and offer their SLO.  
Many also now, after seeing the mining 
company win its licences and permits, 
become resigned to its presence in the 
community and to its negative impacts.  
The majority of the community perceives 
the CSR as a form of co-optation to 
induce dependency on the mining 
company and hence gain an SLO to do as 
they please within the region. This 
majority refuses to collaborate with the 
mining company in any way including 
not participating in any corporate 
sponsored event. 
There are more grievances around 
impacts from mining on water, land, 
quality of life and culture. Some in the 
community are now speaking of 
demanding financial compensation from 
the mining company for the damages 
incurred to their lives by the mining 
activities. This creates some internal 
divisions amongst those opposed to the 
mine who want it to stop and leave the 
region. 
As few work at the mine, being largely 
self-sufficient from agriculture, they do 
not have divided loyalties and are able to 
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resist the mining company’s CSR and 
behaviour.  
Results in more continued protests (now 
from different fragmented groups) 
against the mining project and also 
collective legal action to cease 
operations, with success in some cases. 
Construction and Development/Operations stage 
9. Marked by years of negative 
community perceptions, protests 
and now temporary suspensions in 
mining activities ordered by the 
courts of justice due to community 
complaints, the company retreats 
from dialogue attempts and from 
the public eye. The company 
realizes it has not obtained its 
SLO from the community and this 
has brought bad publicity and 
harmed its reputation. 
 
The company continues with 
social responsibility programmes 
with a minority of the rural 
community and with the urban 
community as before but with a 
lower public profile. 
 
The mining company also faces 
financial challenges for funding its 
operations due to the protests, lost 
time from being suspended and 
The community continues to mistrust the 
mining company and the government. It 
continues to complain and protest about 
the negative impacts from mining 
operations on its water, land and human 
rights.  
Its aim continues to be for the mining 
company to respect environmental 
impact agreements and/or for the 
company to stop mining operations for 
good. Many are also now demanding 
financial compensation for the damages 
incurred from mining activities. The 
internal divisions within the rural 
community grow between those in favour 
of negotiating with the mining company 
and those totally opposed to any 
dialogue. 
The majority prefers to remain 
independent from the mine and counts on 
the assistance of external actors such as 
lawyers, state prosecution and NGOs in 
their resistance, both for justice and their 
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workers’ strikes and action.  livelihoods. 
10. Engagement with the affected 
rural communities is mainly 
through lawyers and litigation in 
courts or at state prosecution 
meetings. 
Protests continue against the mine by 
certain community sections whilst others 
negotiate through lawyers for huge 
amounts of financial compensation. 
There are now two divided internal 
groups within the affected rural 
community. 
  
Barrick Gold also addressed the contentious subject of the reconstruction of the 
Diaguita indigenous identity around 2006 by promoting and lobbying on behalf of the 
community to the government for them to be recognized as indigenous. Barrick Gold 
invested heavily with the most impoverished and vulnerable Diaguita groups in the 
Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as Diaguitas. Once relations 
with this Diaguita group were good Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then 
explained to the group that they qualified for indigenous people’s status as Diaguitas 
and that they would help them with their application to the Chilean government. 
Recognition as Diaguitas also meant access to additional State social benefits, so it 
had economic advantages. Thus once this friendly group was officially recognized as 
Diaguitas by the Chilean State, Barrick Gold was able to communicate that the 
Diaguita indigenous community were in favour of and enjoyed good relations with 
them. Barrick Gold even apparently invited some of these friendly Diaguitas to their 
annual general meetings of shareholders in Toronto, Canada to demonstrate these 
good relations and supposed SLO. Nonetheless the majority of the Diaguitas in the 
Huasco Valley were not interested in or influenced by Barrick Gold and remained 
against the mining project from the perspective of my interviewees.  
 
However, interviewees such as church clergyman Manuel, community leaders 
Barbara and Sandra (Interviewee code E1) in a geography thesis by Standen (2011) 
jointly stressed the need for a critical examination of what and why Barrick Gold did 
what it did regarding the Diaguita identity. These critical voices claim that Barrick 
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Gold firstly was championing the case for the government to recognize the Diaguita 
people as indigenous because the multinational knew there was a good probability of 
this happening. Therefore the company took visible ownership and leadership of the 
issue in the hope of gaining legitimacy or an SLO in eyes of the local community as a 
responsible actor with the Diaguita people, with whom they had already established 
good relations via social responsibility initiatives. It would also permit Barrick Gold 
to publicly show it has Diaguita community leaders defending and supporting the 
Pascua Lama mining project, and thus an SLO. 
 
These findings and interpretations corroborate with a quote in Urkidi and Walter 
(2011) on the influence strategies of Barrick Gold around gaining community 
acceptance from manipulating the Diaguita identity and community: 
“The company has brought in professionals from other parts of the country to 
conduct workshops on the ‘traditional’ Diaguita crafts, essentially inventing a 
nonexistent Diaguita culture and denying the ethnicity of our community. They have 
raised false leaders, who are now attending meetings with the company and the 
media, discrediting the real leaders of the community and creating irreconcilable 
divisions between community members and their neighbours. All these actions have 
led to confusion and they have weakened the identity of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos.” 
(Letter to Canadian parliament by the Diaguita Huasco–Altino Agricultural 
Community, May 2009. P689, 2011) 
 
In an attempt to show their acceptance in the region, Barrick Gold showcase on their 
website a letter from August 2007 signed by six different neighbourhood associations 
underscoring their support for Barrick Gold and Pascua Lama operating in the region. 
However, it is important to note that only one of the neighbourhood representatives 
who signed the letter of approval was from the Alto del Carmen municipality in the 
Huasco Valley. This representative is also on the Water Vigilance Board, the group 
that received US$6m from Barrick Gold. The other five are from the towns of 
Vallenar and Huasco, the latter being even further away near the coast, therefore 
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adding strength to the argument that Barrick Gold chose to focus its efforts on gaining 
legitimacy from a more distant urban community. 
 
In short, Barrick Gold has attempted to implement several different strategies to 
influence the local community’s perceptions and relations with the mining company 
to gain their acceptance, cooperation, trust and most importantly their SLO. 
 
Table 27 – Mining company influence strategies and community response 
strategies according to mining cycle stage at lower conflict communities.  
 
Mining company influence strategy at 
different stage of Mining Cycle 
Local community response strategy to 
mining company  
Exploration and initial mining licences  
5. Geologists conduct tests on the 
soil for minerals. There is also 
initial land acquisition for mining 
– maintain low profile while 
obtaining mining licences and 
permits 
Community expectations of local 
economic opportunities heightened at the 
prospect of a large multinational mining 
company developing a large mine near 
community. 
Feasibility – Land acquisition and legal permits/licences 
6. Determine the mine to be 
economically viable. 
Communicate success of initial 
engagement with nearby urban 
community highlighting future 
economic investment benefits and 
new jobs the mining project will 
bring to the region. Announce 
social responsibility intentions to 
Community becomes excited at the 
prospect of new jobs and business 
opportunities. New migrants begin 
arriving at the town also in the hope of 
benefiting economically.  
People begin to buy new properties and 
make extensions to their homes in the 
hope of profiting by renting out their 
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buy locally and give back to 
community with the aim of 
securing the SLO. However, doing 
so in a careful and measured way 
to manage expectations around 
levels of local investment. Begin 
land acquisition process for 
mining.  
 
Resettlement of communities who 
currently live on the land destined 
for mining is limited and lower 
than in the higher conflict 
communities.  
 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
studies pass through with limited 
opposition and company 
maintains consistent dialogue with 
the community. 
 
properties in the near future. This creates 
the start of housing speculation and local 
inflation. 
 
Construction and Development stage 
7. The company receives its 
necessary mining licences and 
permits and therefore begins 
construction of the mines. 
 
Brings in hundreds of construction 
workers who are housed 
separately to the local community 
in order to minimize social unrest. 
 
The fact that few local residents have 
been selected to work at the mine irritates 
many in the community, though they 
decide to wait until it is operational to see 
if they can gain employment then. Also 
they are not able to rent out their rooms 
and properties to new workers. 
Local businesses are starting to become 
disappointed that their projected new 
sales are not materializing from this new 
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However, still offer a few jobs to 
the local community residents; 
most go to skilled workers from 
other regions.  
 
Company is concerned at lack of 
local government capacity in 
dealing with and reinvesting a 
sudden new influx of revenue 
from the mining company.  
mine. The business community is 
beginning to feel unsettled. 
However the mining company has started 
its social responsibility programme with 
the local community in areas such as 
capacity building, education and 
entrepreneurship, which pleases those 
who participate. 
A divide starts to form between those 
who benefit from the mine and those who 
do not. 
Construction and Development/Operations stage 
8. The company rolls out more of its 
social responsibility programmes. 
It also participates in more local 
purchasing for its mining 
operations. Announces plans to 
invest in public services such as a 
hospital, technical college and 
park or plaza.  
 
However, most of the skilled jobs 
are offered to those from outside 
the community. 
 
 
This situation exacerbates the internal 
divisions between those who are 
benefiting and those who are not from 
the mine in terms of employment, 
income generation opportunities and 
social responsibility benefits. 
Prices in the community start to rise and 
those not earning from mining-related 
activities complain even more. 
At the mines where there is a significant 
impact, such as in Paracatu, certain local 
residents become aggrieved from noise, 
tremors, threats to health and safety.  
Those against the mine due to the 
adverse impacts and/or non-recipients of 
economic benefits try to mobilize and 
protest. 
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9. The mine quashes mobilization 
attempts with counter-
mobilization tactics, community 
influence strategies, co-optation 
and divide and rule.  
It engages with local community 
about its social responsibility 
strategy, local hiring and 
purchasing strategy and of its 
importance to the local economy. 
The main implied message is that 
there is a mutual interdependence 
where one cannot thrive without 
the other.  
Those with grievances hold negative 
perceptions of the mine but do not 
attempt to mobilize again as they 
understand the immense power of the 
mine in the local community. 
Understanding the local community is 
dependent on the mine. Some of the 
opponents of the mine switch sides 
towards partnering with the mine in its 
social responsibility projects, taking the 
approach that it is better to try and 
change from inside than from the outside. 
 
Below I detail the local community influence strategies used by the four different 
mining companies at the four different local communities in Chile and Brazil, which 
are aimed at creating some level of dependence and ultimately winning over an SLO. 
 
5.5 Discussion of mining company influence strategies and historical and 
community contexts 
One of the factors for the lower conflict communities is the mutual dependence 
between the mining company and the community (as confirmed on the Anglo 
American website (so this would include Barro Alto and Pedra Branca though the 
latter was sold in early 2013). In the higher conflict cases the mining companies are 
not solving communities’ most cited grievances. Moreover, the most referred to 
desire from higher conflict community members was for the mining projects to cease 
and stop mining permanently. Therefore these higher conflict communities are 
reluctant to even offer their SLO to the nearby mining projects. Also, the extent to 
which companies even could respond to community grievances such as water and 
land is questionable, given that these elements are core resources required in large 
quantities by large-scale mining.  
  307 
 
Nonetheless, the mining companies at both higher conflict and lower conflict 
communities used influence strategies as per Frooman (1999) in order to gain their 
SLO via creating some level of mutual dependence, with the exception of the rural 
communities of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro in Brazil. These rural communities in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro claim to experience severe environmental and human 
rights abuses which they have publically expressed on multiple occasions, yet Anglo 
American refuses to recognize these rural communities as a legitimate stakeholder, 
and more so their complaints as legitimate therefore implying that an SLO is not 
needed from these actors. Anglo American has instead chosen to focus on the urban 
centre of Conceiçao de Mato Dentro with its influence strategies, where it has largely 
made progress with creating a mutual dependence, better relations and gaining an 
SLO. Therefore this is another strategy mining companies can use for grappling with 
their SLO, i.e. to deny a certain community which is opposed to the mine from being 
a legitimate stakeholder with power and urgency, as per Mitchell et al. (1997). In 
essence this converts such a group into what Mitchell et al. (1997) denominate as a 
“dangerous stakeholder”.  
 
At the other higher conflict communities, the mining companies (Barrick Gold, 
Pelambres and Kinross) were also reported by my interviewees as having ignored 
them as legitimate stakeholders from the outset. In these three communities it also 
took substantial protesting and mobilization in various forms for the nearby impacted 
on communities to be recognized as legitimate and powerful stakeholders by the three 
respective mining companies. From there on the mining companies began to engage 
in influence strategies in the form of CSR to create some level of dependence or 
loyalty from the local community, enough to be able to gain their SLO. It seems that 
for certain mining companies, ignoring their staunch opponents and critical voices is 
understood to be the best strategy for addressing them. 
 
The mining projects that have an SLO are also the ones with lower conflict 
communities. The communities who supply the SLO generously at Paracatu, Mariana, 
  308 
Pedra Branca and Barro Alto are also highly dependent on their nearby mining 
projects. Therefore this mutual dependence between mining company and community 
exists, as also affirmed on Anglo American’s website. So, the challenge for the 
mining companies operating there (Anglo American, Kinross and Vale) is to balance 
this dependency because an over dependent local community would become a strain 
on resources. However, at the same time the mining companies are aware they cannot 
abuse their power and not give anything back to the communities, thus they need 
influence or social responsibility strategies in order to maintain their respective SLO. 
Mining companies understand even though they hold power and the communities are 
largely dependent on them, they are also dependent on the communities for a place to 
operate, human and physical resources, suppliers, security, infrastructure, amongst 
other features, for an SLO. Without access to these assets the mining projects would 
not be able to operate.  
 
With reference to the higher conflict communities, I would argue they, in contrast, are 
not dependent upon their nearby mining projects. This is the first challenge facing the 
mining companies so they therefore attempt to create a certain level of dependency on 
them for the local communities, in contrast to the lower conflict communities. The 
companies need the local communities to have some sort of need for them in order to 
create a mutual dependence and therefore be in a position to negotiate their SLO 
(Frooman, 1999). One other strategy is to simply ignore the stakeholder group when a 
mining project has multiple community stakeholders, such as at Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro. In this case the mining company chose to ignore the self-sufficient rural 
community and address the more dependent one in the urban area. 
 
It is interesting to note that in conversations with officials from these mining 
companies as well as from studying their corporate websites and communications 
materials, there was total consensus that the CSR philosophies are geared towards 
helping capacitate local communities to become independent and self-sufficient and 
therefore not have to rely on the mining company. The old proverb of Give a man a 
fish and you feed him for a day; Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime, 
was quoted by officials from Kinross and Anglo American to summarize their 
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approaches to communities. The most interesting aspect of this is how at the higher 
conflict communities the residents are already emancipated and independent. These 
communities do not feel the need for mining, nor do they want mining. Indeed these 
communities make their livelihoods via agriculture and therefore are in direct 
competition with mining for access to water and land. Therefore it is possible to infer 
that the communities in these four cases possess the power and choose not to supply 
the SLO to their nearby mining projects. 
 
Through manipulative influence strategies such as paying large sums of money to 
certain groups to buy their loyalties, or trying to manipulate the local community’s 
identity, as with the Huasco Valley, or by ignoring communities and the impacts on 
them, as at Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and the Colla, mining companies have tried to 
sidestep the question of an SLO. Furthermore, attempts which could be construed as 
dependence creating, such as sponsoring cultural events at Huasco Valley and 
Caimanes, offering courses and gifts at Colla, Huasco Valley and Conceiçao de Mato 
Dentro, or even making alleged threats, still have not succeeded in creating a desired 
mutual dependence at these four higher conflict communities. Table 24 compares and 
contrasts both categories of community.  
 
Table 28 – Comparison between higher conflict and lower conflict 
communities in terms of dependence, mining company influence strategies 
and ability to mine without community resistance. 
 Community 
Dependency 
on mining 
Level of 
negative 
impacts 
from mining 
Mining company 
influence strategy 
on local 
community  
Ability to mine without 
conflict 
Huasco 
Valley 
Low High Tried and 
unsuccessful in 
creating mutual 
dependence via co-
optation and CSR. 
No – Multiple large street 
protests and lawsuits. 
Courts ceased operations 
now. Big media campaign 
against mine. 
Conceiçao 
de Mato 
Dentro 
Low High Co-opt and gain 
support of urban 
community. No 
recognition of rural 
No – Multiple protests. 
Courts ceased operations in 
past. 
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communities who 
claim to be 
affected. 
Caimanes Low High Tried and 
unsuccessful in 
creating mutual 
dependence via co-
optation and CSR 
No – Multiple large street 
protests and lawsuits. Big 
media campaign against 
mine. 
Colla Very Low High Do minimum CSR 
and distance 
relations as much 
as possible. 
No – Lawsuits and had 
several roadblocks to mine. 
Paracatu High High Do minimum CSR, 
co-opt critical 
opponents, 
maintain a level of 
community 
dependence to 
maintain power 
Mainly Yes 
Mariana Very High N/A (would 
be high) 
Public relations Yes 
Pedra 
Branca 
Very High Low  Do minimum CSR 
and try to make 
community more 
independent 
Yes 
Barro 
Alto 
Very High Low Do minimum CSR 
and try to make 
community more 
independent 
Yes 
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6.0 Discussion 
 
In this discussion chapter I intend to focus mostly on my contribution to theory and 
secondly to practice. Nonetheless, I begin with a brief summary of the main findings 
section for the benefit of the reader. In addition I will also attempt to acknowledge the 
limitations of my research and finally discuss further research. Within my 
contribution I aim to make an analysis of and I contribute to: 
 Confirming extant theory 
 Extending extant theory 
 New theoretical development 
 Refuting extant theory 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
In order to place my discussion into context I provide a synthesis of the findings from 
the previous chapter in which I categorized the eight case studies into two different 
groups of four; one pertaining to higher and the other to lower conflict communities. I 
compared and contrasted the two sets of cases according to their historical and 
economic contexts, main mining related grievances and mining company influence 
strategies and community responses throughout the mining cycle.  
 
I argued that the four higher conflict communities did not have a history of large-scale 
mining operations, unlike the four lower conflict communities. Instead the higher 
conflict communities had a history of being small-scale farmers in isolated and rural 
areas. They also had longer histories and lower levels of migration from other regions 
as opposed to the lower conflict communities, which received many migrants due to 
the economic growth, spurred on by the mines. This implied that the residents of the 
higher conflict communities are more attached to their land and communities than the 
lower conflict communities. Very few local community members of the higher 
conflict communities worked at the mines in contrast to the lower conflict 
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communities where many locals did work at the mines directly or indirectly as the 
main source of employment. The economy at the lower conflict communities was 
centred on the mines, therefore most local businesses and services catered to 
employees, suppliers and others associated with the mine whereas the communities at 
the higher conflict communities did not have this close link to the mines for their 
livelihoods. The agricultural-based livelihoods indeed at the higher conflict 
communities depended on the same resources as mining, such as water and land. 
Moreover the residents of the higher conflict communities do not want change to 
occur and experience their villages being transformed from rural to mining-centred.  
The reason for this is that they feel the mine threatens their tranquil way of life as 
farmers and/or identities of indigenous peoples, as in the case of Huasco Valley and 
the Colla or as descendants of Maroon people in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and 
Paracatu. Furthermore they did not want to transform from being independent to 
dependent on the mining projects. 
 
In terms of the main mining related grievances, I separated these into three groups, 
higher conflict communities, Paracatu and lower conflict communities because the 
case of Paracatu is unique in that it experiences high levels of grievance yet lower 
levels of community conflict. 
 
I noted some fundamental differences in the type of grievances between Paracatu, 
higher and lower conflict communities. Firstly, the issue of water was one of the main 
problems at the higher conflict communities and at Paracatu, though not highlighted 
as much at the lower conflict communities. In the three cases of Mariana, Pedra 
Branca and Barro Alto the minority in the community hold grievances against their 
nearby mining projects in contrast to the higher conflict communities. There is also 
much more of a perceived negative impact on people’s land and livelihoods at the 
higher conflict communities and at Paracatu as opposed to the lower conflict 
communities. At these lower conflict communities there were nevertheless more 
complaints related to how ungenerous the mining companies were being about giving 
back and sharing their wealth with the community.  
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As stressed earlier, the higher conflict communities claim they are not willing to 
negotiate their water, health or land in return for social responsibility and jobs from 
the mining companies. At the very least they are willing to sell their land and lives for 
a very generous compensation package but on their own terms. When comparing 
Paracatu with the higher conflict communities, the similarities between grievances 
and impacts are clear. I would go further and say that the grievances around the 
alleged impacts on the environment and health at Paracatu, as asserted by the 
community, are among the harshest of the different cases in my research.  
 
Therefore one is left with the question of why is Paracatu not classed as a higher 
conflict community? The answer can be accounted for by the successful influence 
strategies used by the mining company that exploit the dependence of the community 
on their mine for their economy and livelihoods. This is where I return to the topic of 
dependence and power as posited by Frooman (1999) though in the context of my 
mining company local community relations.  
 
6.2 Stages of mining company – community relations throughout the 
mining cycle 
I next compared and contrasted the two sets of higher conflict and lower conflict 
communities’ relations with the mines in line with the different stages of mining 
cycles to offer a more process oriented perspective of how mining company 
community relations and conflict evolve over time. At the higher conflict 
communities the mining companies were much less communicative at the exploration 
stage than they were with the lower conflict mining companies. For example Anglo 
American in Barro Alto conducted dialogues with the community from when their 
geologists first conducted exploratory studies on the land near the communities, 
unlike in the higher conflict communities. 
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At the feasibility stage much more activity took place between the mining company 
and local community. In the higher conflict communities the mining companies began 
buying the land once they had realized that underground was full of highly valuable 
minerals such as gold or iron ore and in the case of Caimanes that the community’s 
lands would be ideal for one of Latin America’s largest tailing dams. The process of 
land acquisition at these communities was plagued with controversy as land was 
bought in unethical, non-transparent and even illegal ways via land grabs in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro. In contrast at the lower conflict communities there were 
fewer conflicts around purchasing the land for mining in Pedra Branca and Barro 
Alto. In Paracatu also when the main mine site was bought in 1987 there was little 
controversy. However, since Paracatu has been expanded it has had to resettle and 
evict communities from their land and this process appears to be likely in the near 
future for Mariana.  
 
All mining companies tried aggressively to get the local communities on their side 
whilst applying for the necessary mining permits and licences. At the higher conflict 
communities, promises of social responsibility and jobs were not enough to convince 
locals of the benefits of the mining projects however. Nonetheless, the mining 
companies did manage to win some friends from within the higher conflict 
communities such as wealthy and powerful businessmen in Huasco Valley and 
Caimanes. In Conceiçao de Mato Dentro most of the urban community was happy to 
collaborate with the mining company in expectation of rapid local economic growth 
and benefits from mining.  In return, Anglo American also officially recognized these 
two communities as affected community stakeholders whilst the highly discontent 
communities near the project who claim to be impacted on by the mining project were 
not officially recognized by the mining company. Meanwhile the lower conflict 
communities were on the whole happy to accept large, new, nearby mining projects, 
in anticipation of new business opportunities and/or jobs. 
 
Once the higher conflict mines had their necessary permits and licences to mine at the 
construction stage of the mine, the communities began to feel the strong adverse 
impacts on their water, land, livelihoods (as mentioned earlier on grievances). This 
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led to collective action spearheaded by external actors such as lawyers, State 
prosecution units, NGOs and academics, including frequent street protests, council 
assemblies, hearings and meetings, social media campaigns, roadblocks and even a 
hunger strike in Caimanes for the negative impacts and threats to end. At the lower 
conflict communities, the residents began to feel some of the same impacts but did not 
complain as much as they overlooked these side effects in anticipation of prospering 
economically. 
 
At the higher conflict communities, the mining companies and their supporters were 
now starting to counter-mobilize against the community mobilizations and win over 
some of the detractors by varying influence strategies such as: 
 Offering large payments and social responsibility programmes  
 Allegedly manipulating in the form of taking the initiative on strengthening 
and empowering local indigenous groups’ identities who are not recognized 
by the local indigenous community leaders in the Huasco Valley 
 Allegedly manipulating local political elections and leaders 
 Allegedly even harming detractors by damaging their vehicles, intimidating 
them by following and spying on them.  
 
These tactics related to divide and conquer strategies in terms of gaining an SLO 
worked to an extent in Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Caimanes; 
however, the majority of the rural communities remained opposed to the projects 
though now more divided and fragmented. 
 
As the construction phases drew to an end in the lower conflict communities, the 
complaints against increased traffic, noise and high inflation on all items and services 
began to surface. Moreover, the communities who had been waiting for many years to 
make huge sums of money from the mining projects realized it was not happening as 
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the mining company executives were not living in the town nor was the company 
investing as much as they had previously hoped for in the community.  
 
The conflict at the higher conflict communities increased after the communities 
realised that the mining companies were dividing them. After many mobilization 
attempts they were able at all four communities to obtain court orders for the mines to 
be temporarily suspended on the grounds of environmental or cultural adverse 
impacts, which caused high amounts of costs to the mining companies. As already 
mentioned, Pascua Lama in Huasco Valley remains suspended today and the Federal 
State Prosecution in Brazil has recommended the same happen again to Anglo 
American’s project in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, the largest in the world.  
 
At the lower conflict communities, the grievances from a minority manifested 
themselves into attempts to mobilize in a similar way to the higher conflict 
communities such as protests, assembly hearings, social media campaigns at Paracatu 
and Mariana, and legal court action at Pedra Branca, Paracatu and Mariana. However 
the might and power of the mining companies was too much for these collective 
action attempts and quashed them by counter-mobilizing or by influencing local 
politicians, also known as lobbying. It seemed that because most local employment 
and economic activities depended on the nearby mining projects, that any collective 
resistance to this would be met by mining companies and the government, thus 
neutralizing them. This was also an example of the limitations of social movement 
theory within the context of company conflict in the developing world.  
 
Despite local residents feeling highly aggrieved from the mining company’s impacts 
on their lives, they were not able to present a strong enough challenge as the mine 
was, as claimed by several of my interviewees, a “necessary evil”. Nonetheless at the 
higher conflict communities the dwellers were not on the whole dependent upon the 
nearby mining projects for work, income or social responsibility benefits, instead it 
was a minority who were overall quiet and fearful of reprisals from those neighbours 
opposing the mine. Those in favour of the mines kept a low profile and were reluctant 
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to speak to me.  In these communities the local residents had the power and placed 
fear into those with divergent views about the mining companies.  
 
Diagram 1 (on page xx) is a model based on the findings. It summarizes the main 
overall contributions emanating from my findings. In the remaining section I proceed 
to discuss my research findings in terms of how they confirm, extend and refute 
current theory as well as offering a new theoretical and practical contribution.  
 
6.3 Independence and Dependence as determinants of conflict 
As far as confirming theory, the research findings provide data to corroborate the 
main theoretical propositions emanating from Frooman’s seminal 1999 publication on 
the link between resource dependence and stakeholder influence strategies – in 
particular with Frooman’s third proposition at the end of his paper. 
Proposition 1: When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder 
will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm. (p.202). 
Proposition 1 relates to the four higher conflict communities. As argued, the findings 
suggest that the four higher conflict community cases have a degree of power over the 
mining companies. However, the four different communities are less willing to accept 
the mining companies. As Frooman (1999) professes, at the core of resource 
dependence theory is the concept that a firm’s need for resources, in this case 
community acceptance or a conflict free environment to extract minerals without 
social disturbance, provides opportunities for others to gain control over it.  
 
Furthermore, each of the cases has had instances of community roadblocks to the 
mines as a way of expressing their discontent with these mines, and thus shutting off 
their ability to operate temporarily. Other examples include street painting with anti-
mining messages painted where the communities reside, extensive social media 
campaigns attacking two of these mining companies, a hunger strike by community 
residents which made international news, and many different film documentaries at 
three of the communities showing the grievances and adverse impacts inflicted by the 
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nearby mines. These instances demonstrate that there are low levels of community 
acceptance of the mining companies. In these cases the community members 
engaging in these acts are not interested in receiving CSR, employment and the 
further so-called developmental benefits promised by the mining companies.  
 
It is therefore important to explain why the mining companies are partially dependent 
on the local communities at the higher conflict communities, whereas this does not 
hold true at the lower conflict cases. The reason for this, as alluded to earlier, relates 
to the fact that the overall community position is against the mine’s presence due to 
its negative impacts on the communities’ lives. In these four higher conflict 
communities the majority of the population is independent of the mine (see lower 
section of the Diagram 1 model) though dependent on things that will be damaged by 
mining and, most importantly for them, their water supply. Furthermore the majority 
of people in these communities do not want to move from being independent to being 
dependent on mining. 
 
In the case of the four lower conflict communities there was also sufficient data to 
support Frooman’s (1999) assertions around resource dependence and stakeholder 
influence strategies, as expressed in his second proposition.  
Proposition 2: When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will 
choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm. (p.202)  
This relates to the findings around the four lower conflict cases. These four 
communities interestingly also hold grievances towards mining; however, they are 
dependent on the nearby mining projects more than the higher conflict cases, for their 
livelihoods and have been for decades. Mining is a way of life in these communities; 
it is not new or a foreign body. This implies that the communities have a certain level 
of dependence on the mining companies for their livelihoods which is much higher 
than that in the higher conflict communities.  
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Therefore in the field research I was able to affirm Frooman’s second proposition that 
the community would use indirect usage strategies to influence the mining companies. 
Moreover, the majority of the residents of these four lower conflict communities were 
in favour of the mines staying in their communities; they are dependent upon them. 
Furthermore, the communities would like to see a more generous spending and 
investment in their town as opposed to the higher conflict communities who argue as 
being uninterested in any such social investment from the mines. A common phrase 
heard in these communities which summarizes well the lower conflict community 
perception of the mining companies is that they do not give back as much as they 
should considering how much they take out from our community. In short, community 
members felt they were getting an unfair deal from the mining companies. Despite 
this acceptance of mining at three of the four communities, there were widespread 
complaints against adverse environmental, health and/or social impacts, quite similar 
to those of the higher conflict communities. It would appear the communities were 
willing to trade off negative impacts from the mines for more economic and CSR 
benefits. 
 
Therefore in the lower conflict communities the residents take a usage strategy of 
engaging and entering into a more peaceful dialogue with the mining companies, 
essentially asking them to change their CSR behaviour by spending more in the local 
community and also hiring more local residents for work at the mine in return for 
social harmony, acceptance or an SLO. Secondly, these communities also plead with 
the companies to respect environmental and health regulations; however, their 
responses are in contrast to the higher conflict communities which take a more 
aggressive and direct approach to influencing the mining company. 
 
In conclusion, the data from the field can confirm Frooman’s first proposition around 
the importance of non-mining dependent communities holding power when allying 
with external actors and importantly being able to reject or withhold nearby mining 
companies’ approaches for an SLO. Moreover, it is important to stress that 
withholding an SLO by a community should be considered as temporary. The space 
of mining company community relations is dynamic due to the different influence 
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strategies being employed by mining companies, the State and civil society actors. 
Therefore the concept of SLO should be considered as a temporary resource 
susceptible to the influence strategies of larger and more powerful actors, namely 
large corporations.  
 
Similarly, when communities are also more dependent on nearby mining companies 
their future well-being is tied to that of the firms’ well-being and therefore they will 
utilize usage strategies to negotiate better social investment, local tax payments and 
the hiring of local labour. This can be seen in Diagram 1 in the upper section of the 
model where the more dependent communities are willing to receive social 
responsibility benefits and have dialogue with the mining companies. The 
recommendation to mining companies here is to empower communities to jointly 
monitor negative impacts from the mine so that all harm can be minimized and 
benefits maximized. 
 
However, one of the criticisms levelled against Frooman’s (1999) theory and at other 
stakeholder theorists, relates to their assumptions that stakeholders such as consumers 
or community groups can just simply “withhold” critical resources as they please; 
therefore Frooman (1999) fails to consider the necessary ingredients needed for such 
collective action to take place by these stakeholder groups. However, authors such as 
King (2008) and den Hond and de Bakker (2007) argue that this process of 
stakeholder collective action needs further analysis and cannot be assumed as a given, 
as posited by resource dependence theorists such as Frooman (1999).  
 
The findings from this present research demonstrate how the higher conflict 
communities were able to come together via mobilizing structures and external 
resources such as lawyers, state prosecution departments and NGOs (lower section of 
Diagram 1), whereas the lower conflict communities were not able to collectively 
mobilize due to their high levels of dependence on the nearby mining projects (higher 
section of Diagram 1). Despite frequent attempts to mobilize all four of the lower 
conflict communities, leaders and momentum were quelled ultimately by the power of 
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the mining companies and the higher levels of dependence the communities had on 
them. 
 
Despite the apparent confirmation of Frooman’s first two propositions using the data 
analyzed for this current research, it is highly important to underscore the dynamic, 
complex and fuzzy nature of categorizing stakeholders as independent and/ 
dependent. The data collated and analyzed from this present research helps to 
highlight the simplicity in Frooman’s stakeholder influence strategy model. Freeman 
(1994) classifies focal organization and stakeholder in a binary sense as either 
independent, or dependent on the other. However the data from this thesis shows that 
community positions are ever changing, dynamic and moving from independent to 
dependent and vice versa due to mainly corporate and State influence strategies. This 
is why Diagram 1 has Dependent – Independent communities on a dynamic 
continuum where communities and moreover groups within communities can be 
placed temporarily. Over time, depending on mining company and State influence 
strategies along with community strategies, these groups will move along the 
independence/dependence continuum. Therefore the assumption around stakeholders 
being either independent or dependent on an organization should be reconsidered as a 
continuum with degrees of independence and dependence that are expected to change 
over time.   
Diagram 1 is a model based on the findings. This model summarizes the main overall 
contributions emanating from the findings. The remaining section proceeds to discuss 
the research findings in terms of how they confirm, extend and refute current theory 
as well as offering a new theoretical and practical contribution.  
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Diagram 1 – Model of how community dependence levels on mining affects 
company/community relations
13
 
 
 
6.4 The importance of social movements theory for understanding 
community conflict 
Continuing with social movement related theories, one of the major arguments 
propelled by social movement theorists is that strong feelings of grievances by groups 
in society rarely lead to collective action (Zald and McCarthy, 1977;  McAdam et al., 
                                                 
13
 Though the focus of this research falls on companies and communities, the role of the State cannot 
be ignored therefore it is addressed in the Practical Contribution section below. To have included the 
State would have fallen outside the research scope.   
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2001; King, 2008). This argument certainly holds true at the four lower conflict 
communities where many interviewees reported grievances regarding the nearby 
mining company; nevertheless, there was little or no collective action to address this 
(as shown in the upper section of Diagram 1). 
 
King (2008) uses social movement theory to examine stakeholder collective 
influence, therefore it is a key and relevant paper for this study. The reason for its 
importance is because he attempts to focus specifically on how collective action is 
necessary for stakeholders to influence corporations, a consideration ignored by 
Frooman (1999). As a reminder, King (2008) categorizes the extensive social 
movement theory into the three following sections for explaining why some groups 
are able to overcome the obstacles:  
4. Mobilizing structures  
a. Organization strength  
b. Resource endowment 
5. Corporate (political) opportunities, and  
6. Framing processes.  
 
The findings affirm the importance of the first point of mobilizing structures, and in 
particular organization strength. Mobilizing structures according to King (2008) 
provide individuals with outlets and spaces to communicate their grievances and 
come to common understandings or shared meanings around certain issues or 
grievances. Furthermore, King (2008) refers to organization strength within 
mobilizing structures as determining whether groups can execute Frooman’s (1999) 
withholding and usage theories. In other words, stakeholders need some sort of 
organization in order to engage in collective behaviour and action, such as a trade 
union or a neighbourhood community group which meets on a regular basis.  
 
Without such mobilizing structures, King (2008) argues that grievances would fail to 
mobilize – from his review of the social movements literature. The current findings 
strongly support the significance of organizational strength within mobilizing 
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structures and this is depicted by how, in the higher conflict communities, 
organization strength was strong and close-knit in nature. In all four communities 
there is an organized committee leading the resistance against the mine with capable 
leaders, whereas the lower conflict communities do not possess such organizations 
within which they can openly discuss their shared grievances about the mining 
projects, or talk about how to deal with their shared problems or perceptions 
regarding the mining-related impacts. 
 
6.5 How CSR and Stakeholder theories fit with the findings 
With regard to the third research question of how CSR and stakeholder theory 
addresses and explains levels of mining company community conflict and relations, 
the findings also confirmed some of the theory and propositions in the academic 
literature. The data that confirmed these findings were categorized under the higher 
order code construct of Corporate Irresponsibility. The two main lower order 
constructs in turn were “Corporate influence to create community dependence” and 
“Corporate influence to obstruct critical voices” both with the aim of maintaining 
and/or strengthening corporate hegemony in the community. The term ‘corporate 
hegemony’ refers to how the mining companies can continue to operate in extracting 
minerals from the ground without being challenged or threatened by community 
and/or civil society actors. This concept differs from SLO or community acceptance 
because it is more consistent and coherent with the idea of corporate influence of 
local communities and civil society, as relevant from a CSR or stakeholder theory 
perspective. It also further extends the criticisms made by authors such as Owen and 
Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013) against the SLO concept as the findings focus 
on the how and mechanics of mining companies quests for securing community 
acceptance. The literature that critiques the SLO concept on the basis of ignoring 
power imbalances does not highlight unethical and irresponsible corporate practices 
in the pursuit of the SLO or community acceptance or the local environment free of 
conflict. This thesis goes further and highlights the corporate influence strategies, 
which are deemed as immoral, unethical and irresponsible by many affected 
community members that mining companies utilize. 
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6.6 Corporate influence to create community dependence  
A commonly voiced concern of more educated community members interviewed in 
the Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Paracatu, Mariana and Barro Alto was 
that the mining companies were “buying” the acceptance of the most vulnerable, 
humble and lowly educated people in the community via piecemeal CSR investments 
such as biscuit making courses or paying very low amounts of money to monitor 
environmental impacts. This point was classed under the Co-optation first order code, 
referring to an argument posited by Kraemer et al. (2013) from their research on how 
a Vedanta Resources mining company co-opted a community leader who had been 
opposing the mine. Admittedly this argument in turn takes a more normative or 
ethical lens by questioning the morality of such a corporate influence strategy. This 
co-optation strategy can be considered as a strategy to increase the dependence of 
communities on the mining projects and therefore leverage more mining company 
power. 
 
In another example of co-optation, which led to further divisions within the 
community or a divide and rule scenario for Barrick, was how the company was 
accused by community leaders of creating their own indigenous leaders and 
community so these actors could publically represent the mining company in a 
favourable light. Some of the community interviewees (E1-3 and E5) referred to this 
as a form of divide and rule corporate strategy. This finding confirms the claims made 
in the publication by Urkidi and Walter (2011) that Barrick Gold were creating their 
own “false indigenous leaders” in the Huasco Valley who were friendly towards the 
mining company. It can be inferred that by helping to create their own friendly 
Diaguita communities, Barrick was also leveraging its power to make the community 
more dependent on it and in turn increasing its own power. The previously cited 
example of Kinross Paracatu with the Maroon community in Sao Domingos, can also 
be interpreted as a divide and rule strategy whereby the previous community president 
was opposed to negotiating or collaborating with Kinross on CSR. This former, 
university educated president sees CSR investment as a form of carte blanche for 
Kinross to do as it pleases to their land and water under the monitoring of dust 
pollution by locally co-opted community leaders. However, Kinross have managed to 
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convince the current community president to accept collaboration in CSR 
programmes, donation of a community centre and a half-monthly minimum salary 
payment for monitoring environmental impacts (interviewee code C1-C5, C13 and 
C35-37). This has resulted in a division and conflict within the community leading to 
the former president leaving due to receiving death threats for trying to legally 
prevent Kinross from operating near the community. 
 
A further, related example of a corporate influence strategy aimed at creating 
community dependency and hence increasing corporate power was that of Barrick 
Gold in Pascua Lama investing heavily in the most impoverished and vulnerable 
Diaguita groups in the Huasco Valley before they were officially recognized as 
Diaguitas (interviewee codes E1-3). Once relations with this Diaguita group were 
good, Barrick Gold, according to my sources, then explained to the group that they 
qualified for indigenous people’s status as Diaguitas and that they would help them 
with their application to the Chilean government. Recognition as Diaguitas also meant 
access to additional State social benefits so it had economic advantages. Thus once 
this friendly group was officially recognized as Diaguitas by the Chilean State, 
Barrick Gold were able to communicate that the Diaguita indigenous community were 
in favour of them and enjoyed good relations. In short CSR can actually be interpreted 
as a form of corporate irresponsibility due to the divisions, mistrust and conflict it 
generates within communities. However, if this makes for less community resistance 
in order to conduct mining activities then many mining companies would see a clear 
benefit. 
 
6.7 Corporate influence strategy to obstruct critical voices 
The findings additionally corroborate the criticisms levelled by authors such as 
Banerjee and Bonnefous (2010) and Banerjee (2011), around corporate stakeholder 
strategies for managing civil society actors, including detractors of the company. 
Barrick Gold has always claimed via its official website that the only critical voices 
against its Pascua Lama project are not from the Huasco Valley. In a similar example 
to that of the Greenpeace one used by Banerjee and Bonnefous (2010), I was able to 
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see an improvised obstruction strategy unfold at the Social Responsibility Mining 
Conference in Santiago, Chile 2011 when the mining industry and consultant 
organizers invited OLCA, the activist organization opposing Pascua Lama, to sit 
down and partake in dialogue after a group of around ten of them had entered the 
Sheraton hotel with anti-mining and CSR banners and musical instruments. A few 
minutes after being convinced to sit down in the conference room an OLCA member 
stood up and threw a jar of water at the panel of mining industry speakers and then 
security guards ejected the OLCA members by force.  
 
The OLCA participants had felt, as in the case of Greenpeace in France (Banerjee and 
Bonnefous, 2010), as if they were being co-opted and legitimizing the Social 
Responsibility for Mining Conference, to which they, as an organization, are 
fundamentally opposed. From the perspective of power, such an obstruction strategy 
can be deemed as suppressing the threat from OLCA or Greenpeace to the large 
organization’s hold of power. 
 
Another example of a corporate obstruction strategy to community detractors can be 
appreciated in the case of Caimanes, Pelambres which has taken the community 
leader to court along with his lawyers for attempting to block a compensation 
payment to one minor proportion of the community. This community leader Claudio 
and an activist from Santiago repeated on several occasions to me and journalists that 
they felt they were being persecuted by the mine.  
 
One example of an obstruction strategy (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011) frequently 
referred to amongst interviewees, was that of discrediting oppositional voices from 
the community and civil society.  An executive at Anglo American (Interviewee code 
H6) also claimed that the main State prosecutor who was opposing the mine duct in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro had ulterior political motives for his actions.  
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At Paracatu, Kinross employees also discredited three of the local community critical 
voices as either motivated by financial reasons, mental disturbance or losing rational 
thought. Indeed all those with critical voices in the community were dismissed and 
discredited by Kinross employees as illegitimate. A common dismissal and 
discrediting strategy employed by the mining companies (in particular by Barrick 
Gold, Pelambres, and Kinross Paracatu) in this investigation, is the claim they have 
conducted their own independent scientific investigation or research on the supposed 
negative impact, be it environmental, water, or risk to community health and safety, 
and found that everything is in legal compliance. In these cases it can be seen how the 
mining company utilizes the State as a legitimizer of its actions and position. This in 
turn also maintains the hegemony of corporate power by marginalizing or co-opting 
critical voices. 
 
Some community interviewees in Paracatu also alleged that the mining company used 
co-optation as a strategy to buy critical opposition actors by offering them work as 
consultants, and as a consequence the detractors were silenced.  
 
In addition under the construct of Corporate Irresponsibility was the code of 
disingenuous corporate behaviour for data such as how community residents 
complained that the quality of dialogue and consultation left much to be desired. This 
was reported most at Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro and Paracatu where, 
as reported earlier, interviewees argued the mining companies were willing to listen 
but did not take appropriate or indeed any actions based on this dialogue.  
 
A final first order construct under the Corporate Irresponsibility higher order code is 
that of Community Fatigue, which also confirms the argument made by Collins et al. 
(2005) that community actors can become exhausted and lose their fight, passion and 
interest in the debate with the corporation over time. Community residents and 
external actors from the Huasco Valley, Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Caimanes and 
Paracatu underlined the importance of fatigue being a factor in communities 
becoming more passive and less resistant due to the extensive amounts of time and 
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resources required to contest actions, reports and policies proposed by the mining 
companies. This point was especially stressed by a community leader (Sandra, 
interviewee code E3, Huasco Valley) that they had become tired of marching and 
protesting for ten years against Barrick to no avail, so instead they preferred now to 
negotiate terms of compensation and collaboration with the mining company. This is 
the outcome the mining companies had desired, according to some interviewees. 
 
In the following section I continue to analyze how my findings extend relevant extant 
theory.  
 
6.8 Extending extant theory 
In his review of the social movements literature, King (2008) posits that one of the 
main factors that inhibit collective action is the free rider problem whereby many 
participants do not fulfil their necessary roles and responsibilities within the collective 
group in the hope of still gaining an equal share of the rewards. Secondly there is a 
perceived risk of failure in overturning the target organization or government; 
members do not feel confident of victory. Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous 
section, there is a lack of organizational structure to encourage mobilization via 
dissemination of shared grief and meanings. However, the data from this thesis 
indicate this theory of inhibiting factors should be extended further to include the 
concept of dependence from Frooman (1999) which King (2008) and other social 
movement scholars overlook. 
 
The findings based on the lower conflict communities indicate that if a community is 
economically dependent on the mine for its livelihood, residents would not be able to 
create the necessary mobilizing structures, despite holding grievances towards the 
mine’s adverse impacts. Such mobilizing structures would include ones where they 
can openly discuss their shared grievances about the mining projects, or talk about 
how to deal with their shared problem amongst themselves or perceptions regarding 
the mining-related impacts. A community that is highly dependent on a company for 
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its livelihood will not mobilize against it as the community’s future well-being is tied 
to the company’s (Frooman, 1999). In short, attempts to mobilize collectively are 
neutralized by the economic dependence of the community on the mining company, 
whereby the majority are directly or indirectly economically dependent on the mine 
for their livelihoods (as depicted in the upper section of Diagram 1). The balance of 
power is thus concentrated with the mining company in such a situation. 
 
Furthermore when lower conflict communities did attempt to mobilize and manifest 
their collective grievances against the nearby mining projects, these companies 
counter-mobilized, obstructed and stopped these events from taking place or replied 
with their own collective manifestation to show strong community support. By doing 
this, the mining company wanted to demonstrate it had a solid SLO or community 
support, as also posited by Kraemer et al. (2013) from their study on community 
resistance towards a mining company in India.   
 
Therefore, one of the main intended contributions of this thesis, is to argue that social 
movement theory-related concepts are not applicable in contexts when there are 
higher levels of dependence of communities on nearby, high impact operations who 
also wield higher levels of power in community relations, as demonstrated in the 
upper section of Diagram 1. Thus in the context of collective action towards 
companies by local communities within the social movement literature, I put forward 
that the question of dependence should be considered in order to understand the 
likelihood of collective action.  
 
6.9 New theoretical contribution 
From an affected communities perspective, I propose a theory of how levels of 
dependence on nearby mining projects determine whether communities are able to 
engage in collective action to resist these mining projects, as shown in the central 
section of Diagram 1.  
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A first contribution to theory is aimed at problematizing Frooman’s (1994) model of 
stakeholder influence strategies. The analysis of findings from this present community 
perspective research underlines the dynamism, complexity and constant change when 
attempting to categorize stakeholders under the concepts of being either Independent 
or Dependent on the focal organization. The situation in practice, as shown from 
empirical evidence from mining affected communities, is neither binary nor 
straightforward.  
 
This thesis research shows how stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories work 
in practice within the eight mining communities from an affected communities 
perspective. At the crux of the notions of independent and dependent stakeholders is 
the issue of power, knowing who has the power over a critical resource such as an 
environment free of community resistance determines who is dependent (Frooman, 
1994). This is a question that the current research addresses. There is no clear-cut 
answer, especially since community members were and still are constantly changing 
their positions towards the nearby mining projects as a result of corporate and State 
influence strategies.  
 
Nevertheless the one unique contribution this research offers is that it shows 
empirically how a focal organization, such as a mining company, leverages its power 
to influence often under the guise of CSR initiative in order to induce an independent 
community to become more dependent on it for its livelihood and survival. Secondly 
this study additionally demonstrates an array of corporate obstruction strategies 
(Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2010) to certain civil society groups and community 
leaders who fight for collective identity or who have juxtaposed ideological values 
around large companies. Such actors are understood by mining companies as non-co-
optable, or not interested in collaboration and thus can never be made dependent like 
other civil society actors. 
 
As such, one should question the validity of the assumption that communities have 
the power to hold and grant an SLO. The findings of this thesis (taken from an 
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affected communities perspective) would argue that communities alone do not 
possess the power to turn on and off an SLO like a tap in accordance with Owen and 
Kemp (2012); and Parsons et al (2013). As the mining companies are able to 
determine via their own discourse what counts as an SLO they can supress 
community resistance, as also asserted by Parsons et al (2013).  Instead communities 
need many resources including other allies for this to happen even momentarily. 
Mining companies and the State will answer back via influence strategies and try to 
turn on the SLO tap to enable a working environment sufficient for conducting the 
extraction of minerals without conflict and resistance. 
 
It would appear that mining companies are bewildered when stakeholders refuse to 
enter into negotiations with them over ways they can collaborate and benefit instead 
of persisting with their collective resistance. The corporate response to this is to 
employ obstruction strategies such as discrediting and marginalizing detractors via 
their own research, tests and public relations/communications. In such cases though 
companies cannot convert the independent to becoming dependent they can reduce 
the independent group’s ability to control the critical resource of a conflict free 
operations environment.  
 
As such, this criticism of Frooman’s (1994) model lends further support to authors 
such as Collins et al. (2005), Jensen and Sandstrom (2011) and Banerjee (2011), who 
all observe that stakeholder theory fails to take account of the complexities in the 
political economy brought about by globalization that has seen unclear boundaries 
between different actors and institutions. Moreover, stakeholder theory does not 
account for corporate use and leverage of power to quell stakeholder resistance.   
 
I propose that if a community is dependent upon a nearby mine, yet has highly 
negative perceptions and many grievances emanating from the mine’s impacts, the 
community mobilizing structures will most probably fail if they attempt to resist the 
mine. Therefore an important contribution of this research is to explain this lack of 
collective resistance in dependent communities via mining company influence 
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strategies, such as counter-mobilization, CSR for co-optation and obstruction 
strategies, to maintain its control and power. In addition, the mining company in such 
contexts would also be able to call on its influence with State institutions and local 
government to legitimize its actions and also influence in the dilution of community 
resistance in the name of progress and development.  
 
In summary, the data analyzed (from an affected communities perspective) indicates 
that it is not possible to have a successful social movement with collective action if 
there is simultaneous dependence for livelihoods on the target organization. If 
communities are independent from mining, or self-sufficient in terms of livelihoods, 
and have this independence threatened by the impacts of the nearby mining projects, 
then segments of these communities, together with external actors such as NGOs, 
lawyers and State representatives, are likely to challenge the nearby high impact 
operations, as is the case of the four higher conflict communities.  
 
Therefore an important contribution to theory from this study is for social movements 
and resource dependence-related theories to acknowledge the importance of one 
another. The social movements literature does not address the subject of power and 
dependence of the target organization or institution on the movement. Though King 
(2008) criticises the resource dependence literature for not considering social 
movements, thinking about how collective action can take place and thus makes a 
contribution that social movement scholars and literature should consider the 
implications of dependency and power-related theories when researching conflicts 
between high impact operations with local communities. 
This chapter on contributions finishes with the following propositions based on 
Diagram 1: 
 The higher the level of dependence on mining the lower the probability of 
conflict.   
o The higher the level of dependence on mining the more likely any 
community resistance will be short-lived and ineffective, if possible at 
all. 
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 The higher the level of independence from mining the higher the probability 
of conflict. 
o The higher the level of independence from mining the higher the 
probability of mobilizing collective resistance together with other 
external actors against mining. 
 If corporations feel their opportunity to operate in peaceful and resistance free 
circumstances is at threat from mobilized communities, they will seek to 
influence and manage these groups into becoming more dependent on the 
company via collaborating, partnering and/or accepting benefits. 
o If these groups refuse to accept the co-optation and influence 
strategies, corporations will use obstruction strategies such as 
discrediting and ignoring the groups and instead focus on trying to co-
opt other groups within the community to demonstrate they have local 
support so that they can operate in peaceful and conflict free 
circumstances. 
 
7.0 Practical Contribution – Implications for how Mining 
Activity should be governed 
 
7.1 Recommendations for States  
It is evident that mining leads to community conflict in many cases (Ocmal, 2013; 
Ejolt, 2014). The current research indicates that levels of community independence 
and dependence can be linked to levels of conflict between mining projects and 
affected communities. The research also reveals that the situation of dependence and 
independence of communities is not static but constantly changing in accordance with 
external conditions and influences from the political economy (including the State, 
civil society groups and mining companies).  
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Though the focus of this research has been on mining companies and affected 
communities, the significance of the State’s role must be acknowledged in these 
contexts. If the State is ultimately responsible for and has a duty towards the welfare 
and well-being of its citizens as enshrined in international law it should protect its 
people including from other non-state actors such as mining companies.  
1. Recommendation: As such the first recommendation is simply for States to 
uphold and abide by the international human rights related laws that 
correspond to them as stated in Pillar One in the UNGPs (Ruggie, 2011). 
 
However, as I was often reminded by interviewees from the different communities, 
the foreign mining companies were in the communities having been invited by their 
respective national governments, and it was the responsibility of the government to 
ensure their human rights were protected. Indeed community interviewees in 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Huasco Valley, Paracatu and Caimanes recalled how they 
do not even blame companies for what they deem as their irresponsible behaviour as 
this forms part of their DNA of profit maximization. However, as posited by those 
interviewees, it is their government that should prevent corporations from and hold 
them accountable for abuse that impacts on citizens. Developing country States view 
large-scale mining as a source of growth, development, progress, jobs and revenue. 
Therefore States and governments are often in a difficult position about whether to 
give more importance to local community grievances and concerns or the wider 
national economy. In reality, as interviewees at Paracatu stated, the mine is a 
necessary evil as it provides significant tax revenues, employment and growth to the 
local economy.  
 
The most relevant legal instrument governments used for granting licences to mining 
companies upon consideration of their impacts to communities are Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs). Governments around the world including in Latin 
America are also beginning to implement relevant soft law guidelines, such as the UN 
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) discussed earlier.  
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However EIAs and the UNGPs do not directly address the subject of power 
imbalances and consent between businesses and affected community groups, which 
this thesis has highlighted. These aforementioned instruments focus on consultation 
and not on consent or approval by those who will be affected. Power remains with the 
State in the case of the EIA and with the company and State in the UNGPs.  
 
It is important to mention that EIAs and the UNGPs do not speak about empowering 
communities to lead in the identification of (potential) impacts or even to participate 
with business and the State as an equal partner in having a decision as to whether the 
business project can (continue to) operate if communities in their majority reject 
certain projects, on the grounds of human rights.  
 
The UNGPs, like much of the other voluntary guidance and tools, are set from a 
business perspective, especially the Operational Principles which companies pay most 
attention to. The Operational Principles like EIAs focus on reducing/mitigating the 
negative impacts and harm to affected actors such as communities and workers. The 
EIAs, UNGPs and other guidance do not attempt to curtail the power of business to 
continue doing business or even be held accountable for corporate irresponsibility 
such as negative impacts on the environment. EIAs and the UNGPs and other similar 
voluntary guides do not advocate to companies that in certain circumstances they 
should refrain from commencing or engaging in a certain commercial endeavor in 
order to respect human rights. The ethos of the UNGPs is that business can always 
operate in a manner that conforms to respecting human rights by mitigating (not 
eliminating) impacts. The emphasis on these aforementioned instruments is about 
impact mitigation and not on impact elimination.  
 
2. Recommendation: As such governments should firmly bear in mind the 
shortcomings in EIAs, the UNGPs and other similar voluntary guidelines with 
regards to power imbalances between large corporations and affected 
communities.  
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Other State agencies (not the same ones overseeing the EIA) should empower 
communities who wish to remain independent from mining to address the 
power imbalances to make an informed choice and decision as to whether to 
reject mining outright if they feel it threatens their livelihoods, human rights 
and in turn their independence from mining.  
 
International law has certain policies which, in theory, if implemented by national 
States, can help at least indigenous communities veto mining projects should they be 
in the majority against the installation of a new mine nearby. This includes ILO 
Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP). Article 10 states. “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly 
removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, 
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement 
on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return”. The 
Chilean and Brazilian have ratified this convention and they are currently publically 
debating the implementation of this.  
 
These recommendations around legally empowering communities with the power to 
decide over projects that affect them and their livelihoods is much more difficult to 
implement in practice in the contemporary globalized neo-liberal world. Furthermore, 
with the possibility of corporate and State backed influence strategies on 
communities, it is even more difficult for such empowerment to be effective in 
practice. For example consider the example of petroleum companies resolving the 
challenge of indigenous community consent by asking members “How much does 
your consent signature cost?” This is a real situation in parts of South America, as a 
director from an indigenous rights NGO pointed out recently at a university seminar 
in May 2014 in Copenhagen.  
 
This suggests there are important questions pertaining to the How of gaining consent. 
Gaining consent from an indigenous community might conceal an unethical approach 
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with heavy co-optation behind it by the mining company and even the State to attain 
their objective of consent.  
 
3. In short EIAs, the UNGPs and other practitioner tools, guidance and 
frameworks ask for compliance and indicators as evidence. States should 
require companies and its own agencies to document all influence strategies 
and processes used to comply with these environmental and social/human 
rights guidance frameworks in order to provide a deeper and more complete 
picture of how human rights are being respected. In other words the story 
behind these indicators and ticks of compliance. State and private sector actors 
should place the emphasis on gaining the affected community perspective as 
the preferred methodology for doing so. 
 
The questions around influence strategies to eliminate community resistance, whether 
by the State or corporations, are essentially ethical rather than legal. Companies in 
this present research were not openly conducting illegal practices to influence local 
communities. CSR is not illegal, nor is co-optation, nor is dividing and ruling 
communities, nor are obstruction strategies. It is not possible to take legal action 
against a company for using such strategies for community manipulation purposes. 
Instead these are intelligent approaches employed by actors with power, such as 
corporations and the State to influence certain outcomes, and in the context of this 
research a community resistance free environment for mining. The question then 
becomes whether these influence strategies are ethical and if not, how can the State or 
civil society actors regulate or prevent this?  
4. Recommendation: The Chilean and Brazilian States should work on 
developing legally enforceable policy and guidelines around How the process 
of Indigenous Consent for extractives projects should be conducted. Such a 
discussion and policy should explicitly address how to address the issue of 
influence and co-optation strategies by more powerful and interested actors 
such as the mining companies, its business partners and even the State itself.  
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5. State’s should strongly promote one of the central propositions of the UNGPs 
around encouraging corporations to use their leverage or influence to pressure 
and lobby other companies along their value chain and State actors for the 
good of human rights. This can also be interpreted as Responsible Lobbying 
and goes completely against the type of lobbying or influence strategies which 
this thesis documents that go against the human rights of many in the 
communities.  
 
States need to debate firstly the impacts large mining corporations have on their 
people, whether the benefits clearly outweigh the costs or not. Perceptions of affected 
groups are necessary for such exercises, more so than the judgment of company 
executives or judges in courtrooms. After all who can really decide and determine 
whether human rights are being impacted on or not? At the crux of this problem is the 
perspective of the affected party, who is most often the disenfranchised, who has their 
life, livelihood and future decided for them by the State and increasingly so by the 
private sector.  In short, mining needs to be governed more for, and even by, those 
who are (potentially) impacted on by it for the sake of a fairer society. If affected 
communities held more power and truly had the ability to issue and withhold a legal 
licence to operate as opposed to the vague SLO concept, it would be a more effective 
response to corporate irresponsibility.  
 
Essentially it is the State who holds, grants and has the ability to withhold any legal 
license to operate. This means the State approves whether they will be willing to 
allow a mining company to operate and impact on its communities for which it has a 
duty of care including a community where the residents in their majority are opposed 
to such a mine. In such situations (which are commonplace around the world) one 
should ask “Should the State go ahead and grant the licence to a mining project, 
despite the overall rejection from the community? Does the State know best for the 
community’s welfare and well-being? Should the State give priority to community 
desires or to the economic gains for the nation as a whole?” Such tough questions can 
provide initial high-level answers to how mining activity can be governed. 
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In the light of a more globalized world with a shrinking State and growing reliance on 
the private sector, the State needs to take a stronger role in fulfilling its duties to its 
citizens and not delegating these responsibilities to companies. Companies are profit 
maximization organizations whose main purpose for existence is not to ensure the 
respect of citizens. Corporations are not legally bound to protect the human rights of 
citizens. Such a duty falls within the jurisdiction of States therefore governments need 
to fulfill their responsibilities and duties to protecting and respecting communities 
from human rights impacts by firms and irresponsibility caused by companies. 
 
Corporate responsibility on the other hand is a complex and subjective notion that can 
mean responsible business behaviour to one group and simultaneously represent 
irresponsible conduct to another affected party. Dealing with corporate accountability, 
irresponsibility or access to remedy for affected citizens is where States should focus 
their governance on mining activities. Currently there is much talk about how mining 
can be self-governed by mining companies and their own industry sector associations 
such as ICMM in order to be more responsible but far too little concrete action on this 
subject by State institutions. Whilst States have remained quiet around governing 
mining responsibly the private sector and NGOs have been very proactive around 
self-governance. As already mentioned the self-governance of mining deals with 
making the activity a more responsible necessary evil (a contradiction in terms) 
instead of ever eliminating all the negative impacts and irresponsibility by ceasing 
mining operations altogether. In order to do States would need to force companies to 
forgo potential business in favour of the human rights of communities. 
 
7.2 Recommendations to mining companies 
It is therefore in the interests of mining companies to act as ethically and transparently 
as they possibly can when dealing with local communities, government and civil 
society. Though this may sound naïve and too moralistic a recommendation from a 
PhD researcher such as myself, the evidence publically available of large 
multinational mining companies unable to gain community acceptance due to such 
unethical behaviour is clear. 
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Mining companies within my research such as Barrick Gold and Anglo American, 
which feature in the higher conflict communities, as well as others mentioned 
previously such as Newmont Mining responsible for the Conga mine in Peru and 
Vedanta Resources for the bauxite mine in Odisha in India, have all faced serious 
threats to losing their community acceptance in certain mining projects in 2013 and 
all four companies’ share prices were down by an average of 50% in late 2013 from 
their highs. I do not wish to make a causal attribution to a drop in share price with 
community conflicts due to the macro economic factors negatively impacting on 
mining companies’ share prices also; however, in the case of Barrick Gold and 
Newmont Mining, it is clear to see their respective share prices dropped at the same 
time as the negative court rulings in Chile and Peru against the mining projects. 
 
1. If a community does not consent to a mining project, it is most likely to be a 
better business and ethical decision not to try and create some level of 
community dependency on the mine at a later stage and win over community 
support, as suggested by the practical guidance literature on community 
relations. The previous cases show this does not yield positive results. Mining 
companies should not underestimate the persistence, knowledge, support and 
tenacity of communities, who are against mining projects in their backyards in 
developing world regions, to force the project to be delayed, suspended and 
even unviable.  
 
Local communities and civil society organizations are astute, well-informed, educated 
and well supported with infrastructure and they will publically denounce any CSR 
strategies as manipulation tactics. These conflicts, as Barrick Gold, Anglo American, 
Vedanta Resources and Newmont Mining have learned, are a risk for their corporate 
image and reputation also, further making the case against trying to win over 
acceptance from communities where there is little consent for mining. 
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There is a plethora of extractives sector guidance literature which appears 
sophisticated as well as an abundance of specialist consultants highly trained and 
skilled in the social sciences who will claim it is possible to obtain an SLO from a 
situation where there is no community consent for mining; via strategies such as 
dialogue and partnership however, one only needs to point to the examples of India, 
Chile, Peru, Argentina and Brazil as recently mentioned. Such guides and consultants 
have self-serving motives to encourage mining companies to take the risk in engaging 
with CSR strategies with the local communities in the hope of an SLO.  
 
However, I do not wish to sound opposed or negative towards these well thought out 
and designed community relations/investment guidance materials as I believe, based 
on my findings and research from an affected communities perspective, that they do 
serve a valuable purpose when used in contexts of lower conflict communities or in 
communities where mining activity is welcomed.  
 
In higher conflict communities where mining companies engage in influence 
strategies that go beyond the principles of these community relations guides, such as 
those related to divide and rule, obstruction of critical voices, lobbying government, 
intimidating detractors amongst others, the good work they are probably doing in 
accordance with these guides is cancelled out and not appreciated by the local 
community or other relevant actors.  
2. Recommendation: The main recommendation I would like to make to mining 
companies also related to the concept of leverage in the UNGPs (as I 
recommend to States). Companies should actively have policies, acts on and 
communicate on how they are influencing their business partners, suppliers 
and State counterparts for the protection and respect of human rights (of 
affected communities). 
 
However, I also would make the recommendation to mining companies to follow the 
detailed community relation’s best practice guides in communities where there is 
clear overall acceptance of mining as was clearly the case in Barro Alto and Pedra 
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Branca (both managed by Anglo American at the time of my research). Anglo 
American in particular followed their award winning Socio-Economic Assessment 
Toolbox (SEAT) for maintaining good community relations and maximizing their 
contribution to local development. This was possible because the communities overall 
supported the nearby mining projects and were dependent on them for employment 
and their livelihoods. Importantly the communities were not directly impacted by the 
mines as they live over 15km from the minesite. I would argue that the main 
principles and approaches from this extensive practitioner guidance material have 
changed little since the initial World Bank publications around a decade ago in 2005 
so therefore experienced practitioners have little to contribute to the guides in current 
times. I would also argue that these guides do not need additional content for the aim 
of achieving good community relations, respecting human rights and contributing to 
the local community. This practitioner guidance if followed works well where mining 
activity is accepted by the nearby communities. 
 
3. Recommendation: In cases of community acceptance of mining activity 
companies should follow the best in practice guidance literature on 
community relations. 
 
My data suggest that regardless of the amounts of local investment and attempts to 
engage with the local community in line with the extant practical guidance, mining 
companies may not obtain community acceptance if trust were to be lost early on in 
the mining cycle, such as in the case of Pascua Lama where vital information about 
the environmental impact on water was omitted from the community, a clear example 
of corporate irresponsibility. Trying to implement the practical guidance from the 
various toolkits once trust has been lost and promises repeatedly broken by the mining 
company is likely to be futile when trying to gain a community acceptance. 
 
Secondly, the practical guidance literature on improving mining company community 
relations makes scant mention of how certain communities and civil society actors 
can interpret CSR as manipulative strategies aimed at dividing and ruling, lobbying, 
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creating false leaders or co-optation. The literature overlooks this highly important 
practice that takes place at mining operations and is intrinsically linked with social 
responsibility strategies. The failure to recognize the risk of certain community 
groups interpreting mining company CSR efforts as manipulation and co-optation 
underscores the dominance of the company perspective of imposing its idea of what is 
responsible and good for the nearby communities. This leads back to the topic of 
power imbalances, which need to addressed by companies themselves, such as by 
providing resources so that communities can become empowered by independent 
actors such as lawyers, NGOs or academics.  
 
Mining companies should be aware of how their influence and even social 
responsibility strategies may be perceived by the community at large and consider 
whether they would be interpreted as co-optation, manipulation and divide and rule 
tactics. This is important because it directly impacts on the community’s acceptance 
of the mining project or in other words the granting of an environment free of 
conflict. Again one strategy for addressing this complex question is by consistently 
engaging in dialogue with a cross section of local community members and leaders, 
and moreover discussing these sensitive and complex issues around community 
perceptions of their actions. This implies the need for a mining company to accept a 
certain level of modesty and humility, and relinquish power over to impacted 
communities. 
4. Recommendation: Understand and act on the perceptions of critical voices in 
the community regarding any CSR or influence strategies. This means going 
beyond complying with what the current practical guidance on community 
relations and human rights around just consulting communities. My 
suggestion here is that should large mining companies perceive the majority of 
the community reject mining outright on their doorstep then they should 
respect these wishes (together with the host State) and not impose mining 
operations even with CSR. Large scale mining cannot operate with minimal 
impacts to water, environmental and social fabric, regardless of how much it is 
mitigated.  
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Even by employing CSR as an influence strategy to gain local community 
support and comply with international standards such as the UNGPs should be 
ruled out by companies. This creates internal community divisions and 
accusations of unethical and irresponsible co-optation practices for the sake of 
complying with CSR and Human rights related compliance. Mining 
companies should always be prepared to know and show How they became 
compliant with human rights and /or CSR related indicators. The approach and 
process of compliance with such criteria is where companies can be judged for 
their degree of ethics and responsibility by society. 
 
5. Mining companies must begin to try to understand the world from the 
perspective of those in the community who are opposed to their actions and 
impacts. This includes companies trying to also view CSR from a critical 
perspective in contrast to the present where they view it amongst other things 
as a solution to overcoming resistance. This emphasis on the business case for 
CSR or in other words how CSR can benefit the mining company needs to be 
lessened. Instead mining companies should listen to what the what the main 
community groups are requesting of them, including calls of ceasing 
operations. 
 
It should be acknowledged that for any extractives sector company to implement the 
sophisticated guidance literature on gaining acceptance from nearby communities is a 
complex task when considering the main extraction activities of these companies, 
together with the dynamics and politics at local, national and international level. 
However, mining companies should at the very least be transparent about their 
relations with all stakeholders including government actors, NGOs and any local 
community members. A lack of transparency by extractives sector companies 
generates mistrust and suspicion from the majority of affected local actors 
 
As a final point, it should be clarified that being transparent does not guarantee 
winning over the trust or SLO from the local community; this is an unqualified 
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assumption made by extractive sector practitioners. The data from my research do not 
refer to transparency as the key issue for gaining good community relations; instead it 
was the level of independence or dependence on/from the extractives industry that 
gave most insight into whether communities would or would not collectively resist 
the project. 
 
8.0 Conclusion 
In summary, the following determinants, from an affected communities perspective, 
are seen as significant in determining the positions community members take towards 
nearby mining projects in the eight case studies in Brazil and Chile: 
 Levels of dependence and independence of mining affected communities on 
mining for their livelihoods. 
 Levels of corporate and State backed influence strategies. 
 Levels of resources for mobilization such as finance, civil society partners, 
lawyers, the State. 
  
The more independent communities who do not rely on the nearby mines for their 
livelihoods and well-being were opposed to them, whereas those who were 
economically dependent, be that directly or indirectly, were largely unopposed to the 
mines. I have taken care in choosing to use the word “unopposed” because these more 
dependent communities were not necessarily content with the nearby mining projects.  
In fact many held negative sentiments towards the mines, concluding that the mines 
were a “necessary evil” for the community in that despite their negative impacts they 
as a community were dependent on them. I also concluded that the four more 
independent communities had more of a conflict natured relationship with their 
nearby mining projects whereas the more dependent communities had lower conflict 
relations.  
 
Nonetheless, when speaking of community relations this implies more than just 
sentiment or perceptions, it involves behaviour and action. Therefore, despite the 
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existence of negative perceptions of the nearby mining projects at all eight 
communities I visited, only at four of them did the communities attempt to mobilize 
collectively and resist the mines on a regular basis. At these higher conflict 
communities, groups were able to convert their negative sentiment into group action 
against the mines. This situation was not possible at the lower conflict communities 
mainly as a result of the high levels of economic dependence on the nearby mining 
projects for jobs, the local economy and CSR related investment. At the four lower 
conflict communities when groups attempted in the past to mobilize they were swiftly 
quashed with counter-mobilization or co-optation tactics by the large mining 
companies and even local government working in collaboration with those 
companies.  
 
This final point also makes a new contribution to the literature by suggesting to social 
movement scholars that they should consider the notion of dependency when 
researching on communities mobilizing against businesses. A large company, as 
opposed to a government or State, as is usually researched in the social movements 
literature, is a different context. Traditional social movements literature pits aggrieved 
groups against the State in a zero-sum game which is very different from the context 
of a local community dealing with a nearby mining project. Traditional social 
movements research that considers protesters mobilizing for their ideologies, beliefs 
and convictions differs from that of local communities who may feel aggrieved due to 
the environmental and socio-economic impacts from mining on their lives, which has 
less to do with ideologies and beliefs. The protester groups in much of the social 
movements literature groups cannot be easily persuaded or influenced by the 
corporate influence strategies, which include social responsibility programmes, also 
with manipulation tactics such as lobbying government, dividing and ruling the 
communities, and co-optation, as reported in this thesis. 
 
For stakeholder theory scholars, a suggestion is that they also consider the concepts of 
dependency, power and collective action from social movements literature if 
researching company/community relations and conflict. The many academic 
publications that are in the majority a-theoretical yet write about extractives sector 
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company conflicts with mining companies, should also consider using resource 
dependence and social movements-related theories as frameworks to help explain 
their findings and major arguments to give them greater academic robustness. For 
example, the descriptive publications on mining company/community conflict and 
relations, such as those by Kapeleus, 2002, Gifford and Kestler, 2008, Garvin et al., 
2009, Duarte, 2010 and Newenham-Kahindi, 2011, that explain how mining 
company/community relations strategies are not effective with local communities and 
that there is conflict, should also consider the concept of dependence or independence 
levels from the nearby (proposed) mining projects. This would allow authors to 
contribute to the resource dependence, social movements and stakeholder theoretical 
literatures. 
 
The extensive mining company relations practical guidance literature would argue 
that conflict and negative community sentiment need not occur if mining companies 
followed their principles and recommendations. However, in the real context, based 
on this field research more caution should be placed around the implementation of 
these CSR policies as often they stoke the fire of internal conflict and divisions within 
communities. CSR and community relations policies should also be thought of by 
academics and practitioners as sources of contention, conflict and ironically of 
corporate irresponsibility. CSR does not guarantee a win-win or shared value 
scenario. This division renders the communities who are resisting mining projects 
even weaker.  
 
In addition the practical and academic literature surrounding concepts of CSR, 
Resource Dependence and SLO must be challenged based on the findings of this 
community perspective based research in terms of how much power they assume 
communities hold. The SLO concept implies communities have the power to turn on 
and off a tap of SLO for extractive projects. However, the reality is that it is much 
more complex. The communities can in unison with other actors such as civil society 
actors, lawyers, the State and others all turn the tap of SLO off, albeit it must be 
stressed this is temporary and done via the legal courts. Knowing when the SLO is 
lost, gained or in between is an almost impossible task. Mining companies do not stay 
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static whilst communities attempt to turn off the SLO to them; the companies will use 
their own influence strategies to turn the tap back on and to be able to conduct their 
business in a problem-free way. 
 
This problem with existing theory and concepts aligns with the notion that 
stakeholder and CSR theories must be researched and theorized within the context of 
globalization and the political economy. There are many different actors with varying 
aims and strategies for achieving their aims in these areas of contention, such as in 
mining communities. These actors are positioned at different levels such as 
international, national, local and their positions also change over time influenced by 
the actions of other actors. The scenario of mining company community relations is 
messy and not a clear-cut binary one and should therefore not be simplified. 
 
8.1 Further Research 
Research should focus on the dynamics of company/community relations within a 
temporal context; focusing on how the different positions change over time and the 
different influences from different actors, which induced these shifts in positions. This 
would also help reveal the how and the process behind the communications of mining 
companies who proclaim some form of CSR and human rights credentials and 
compliance. It would also be interesting to research to what extent the concept of 
Leverage (Ruggie, 2011) for the respect of human rights is exercised by extractive 
sector companies. Such research would enter the realm of a political economy agenda 
and would help scholars and practitioners understand and visualize how 
company/community relations and conflict unfold in practice over time. 
 
One other possible avenue for future research would be to speak to mining companies 
about the data I managed to capture and see if it were possible to conduct action or 
ethnographic research with their executives from the start of a mining cycle, post 
exploration stage, at a controversial mining project in terms of community conflict. 
The main research question worthy of asking here would be “How are community 
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relations strategies implemented by mining companies?” Such a research question 
would assist in learning why so many mining companies do not obtain the SLO they 
desire from following the practitioner guidance material.  
 
Furthermore, such research could understand more closely how and if an SLO is 
possible from a community which is initially against the mining project. Such factors 
could include internal organizational ones, ensuring all community concerns are 
considered in the construction, development and operations stages of the mine and the 
social responsibility and community relations strategy throughout the cycle, which is 
something researchers Kemp and Owen (2013) have argued does not currently happen 
in mining company. They compare the way mining companies deploy their 
community relations executives with that of firefighters who only go out to work in 
order to put out fires. These authors mean by this analogy that community relations 
staff do not work consistently in consulting and engaging with the local community 
throughout the mining cycle, instead they work intensively during the construction 
phase and then take a peripheral role once the mine is operating.   
 
In other words it would be interesting to test my findings of what does not work with 
community relations strategies at all eight mining communities and try to address 
these shortcomings from the outset of the mining project to see if there is an overall 
SLO after some years. Such research admittedly would require several years of 
frequent site visits and interviews therefore would be of a longitudinal nature. 
Furthermore, this research I believe would provide a useful insight into the often cited 
internal struggles and tensions between corporate headquarters and mining sites with 
regard to the use and implementation of the community relations guidance tools. 
Conducting such research from an organizational culture and identity theory 
perspective would afford it a more robust theoretical foundation and potential 
contribution to both academic literature and practice. 
 
A shorter future research based on my findings could be to explore the perceptions of 
why community relations in a mining context face such challenges in spite of the vast 
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practical assistance available from consultants and organizations on a more mass 
scale. This could include interviewing multiple extractive sector community actors 
such as leaders, politicians, NGOs, religious figures and mining company executives 
by taking advantage of the communications technologies available today such as 
skype, low cost international phone calls and email. There are several social media 
groups in existence today made up of dozens of mining company community relations 
executives, which could provide interesting access to data. Furthermore such research 
could be conducted in line with the proposed framework by Banerjee (2011) where 
data to explain conflict and good relations would be categorized according to the role 
of the State, civil society and the market. 
 
Finally it would also be interesting to research in more depth “How community 
relations evolve during the mining cycle” allowing the testing of my initial 
proposition on this question. Doing so would allow me to refine my theory. 
Researching archival data from the Internet would also be an important and valuable 
addition to the interviews as well as conducting longitudinal ethnographic field 
research. The findings from such research would also contribute towards creating a 
database of community characteristics and attributes regarding their level of place 
attachment, social network ties, history, type and socio-economic situation, amongst 
others, to see how they have responded to mining company influence and social 
responsibility strategies throughout the various stages of the mining cycle. 
 
8.2 Limitations 
One important limitation was related to access to data by mining companies. I was not 
afforded interviews by Barrick Gold, Pelambres, Anglo American’s Minas – Rio 
project in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro or Vale. The fact that Anglo American was 
willing to give me open doors access for its then Pedra Branca project and its award 
winning Barro Alto project but yet not for the much larger Minas – Rio project is a 
telling indictment of the levels of conflict and sensitivity surrounding the latter. 
Nonetheless an executive from Anglo American’s headquarters in London did agree 
to a meeting with me to discuss all three mining projects. 
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Another limitation related to access is the unequal amount of time I physically spent 
at each community and the types of interviewees I was able to interview. I was not 
able to visit each of the eight communities the same number of times, spend the same 
number of days at each one or speak to the same number of people from the different 
actor groups including the mining company. Though they should not have to be 
identical in numbers due to the difference in sizes of communities, it would have been 
better if I could have spent longer in Conceiçao de Mato Dentro speaking with more 
community residents. However, to counter this limitation I spent much more time 
conducting frequent post-field visit interviews over Internet communications such as 
skype with community leaders. I was also able to watch three public hearings after my 
field visit, over the Internet, of the community airing its grievances at the mining 
company’s impacts to their lives at the State and Federal prosecution forum. 
 
A final limitation relates to duration of stays at the communities and I feel my data 
could have been enriched by living longer amounts of time in each community to gain 
a better and deeper understanding of the social fabric of the communities, the 
dynamics of the different community positions, levels of dependence on the nearby 
mining companies and responses to CSR. Nonetheless I did feel by the end of my data 
collection that I had met the criteria of data saturation whereby I was obtaining highly 
similar data from different interviews and interviewees within each community. 
 
8.3 Final Reflection 
I initially started this research looking to find some answers as to why mining 
company/community relations were still poor despite the sophisticated practical 
advice and guidance that exists. I was convinced, like many of those in the private 
sector and in NGOs that support extractive sector firms, that the answer lied within 
the sphere of companies. This includes how companies just need to embed better and 
deeper processes into their organizations of how they deal with and impact on 
communities. After my field research (as an independent student) over recent years, I 
learned that the minority, such as some academics and NGOs, have a fundamental and 
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credible argument. That is to say, understanding the community perspective is 
essential to understanding why perceptions of mining companies are negative. It is 
necessary for extractives companies to understand the community perspective well in 
order to see why relations are poor and why they are often not welcomed by the 
community. The inputting of tools and policies from inside a company does not seem 
to improve community relations or perceptions.  
 
The issues of power and dependency as underscored in my thesis are also pertinent to 
making sense of company/community relations. For example I would argue that the 
thought of constructing a large-scale mine near a large city such as New York, 
Toronto, London, Sydney, Rio de Janeiro and others would seem highly unlikely and 
unimaginable. The residents of these cities would not be in favour of such a project as 
they are quite content with their lives. Should not the dwellers of rural communities 
equally, if not as more content as the urban residents from wealthy cities, enjoy the 
same right to a life free from the impacts of nearby large scale mining? 
 
If the majority of a community in the developing world is opposed to a mining project 
from the outset and content with its own way of life, then that should be respected just 
as companies and States would respect the wishes of well educated white 
communities in the developed world who might be residing near large unexplored 
mineral deposits.  
 
Whilst the enforcement of law is much weaker in developing nations compared to 
those in developed countries that help defend and protect communities against any 
unwanted mining projects, I argue that multinational companies should use the same 
criteria and these stricter laws (often from their home State) when dealing with 
communities in the developing world. In the end I have come to see this research 
question and subject as a matter of ethics, values and doing what one believes is right. 
These topics are complex and their understanding varies from person to person.    
  354 
References 
Aaltonen, K., & Kujala, J. (2010) A project lifecycle perspective on stakeholder 
influence strategies in global projects. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 26(4), 
pp.381-397. 
 
Abers, R. N. (2007) Organizing for governance: building collaboration in Brazilian 
river basins. World Development, 35(8), pp.1450-1463. 
 
Anguelovski, I. (2011). Understanding the dynamics of community engagement of 
corporations in communities: the iterative relationship between dialogue processes 
and local protest at the Tintaya copper mine in Peru. Society and Natural Resources, 
24(4), 384-399. 
 
Anglo American website http://angloamerican.com/development/social/community-
engagement/engagement consulted 20th July, 2013 
 
Anglo American Position Statement in response to Human rights violation claims 
(2013) http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1023845/jump 
accessed 31st May, 2014 
 
Banerjee, S. B. (2001) Corporate citizenship and indigenous stakeholders. Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship, 2001(1), pp.39-55. 
 
Banerjee, S. B., & Bonnefous, A. M. (2011). Stakeholder management and 
sustainability strategies in the French nuclear industry. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 20(2), 124-140. 
 
  355 
Banerjee, S. B. (2011) Voices of the Governed: towards a theory of the translocal. 
Organization, 18(3), pp.323-344. 
 
Banerjee, S. B. (2011). Embedding sustainability across the organization: A critical 
perspective. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10(4), 719-731. 
 
Barrick Gold website accessed 3
rd
 July, 2013 
 
Bastida, E, Irarr zabal, R; and Labó, R (2005). Mining Investment and Policy 
Developments: Argentina, Chile and Peru in Ei source book 
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Mining%20Investment%20&%20Policy%20Devel
opments,%20Argentina,%20Chile%20&%20Peru.pdf accessed 29
th
 May, 2014. 
 
Bebbington, A., Humphreys Bebbington, D., Bury, J., Lingan, J., Muñoz, J.P. and 
Scurrah, M. (2008). Mining and social movements: struggles over livelihood and rural 
territorial development in the Andes. World Development, 36(12), pp. 2888-2905 
 
Benford, R and Snow, D (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, Annual Review Sociology, (26) pp.611–633 
 
Berry, G. R. (2003). Organizing Against Multinational Corporate Power In Cancer 
Alley The Activist Community as Primary Stakeholder. Organization & Environment, 
16(1), 3-33. 
 
Blaikie, N. (2007) Approaches to social enquiry: Advancing knowledge. Polity. 
 
  356 
 
Business and human rights resource centre (2013) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901
/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1_.pdf accessed 12th February, 2014 
 
Calvano, L (2008) Multinational Corporations and Local Communities: A Critical 
Analysis of Conflict. Journal of Business Ethics, 82(4) pp. 793–805. 
 
Camera de Deputados (2013) Ambientalistas consideram retrocesso o projeto do novo 
Código de Mineração http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/MEIO-
AMBIENTE/451188-AMBIENTALISTAS-CONSIDERAM-RETROCESSO-O-
PROJETO-DO-NOVO-CODIGO-DE-MINERACAO.html accessed 31st May, 2014  
 
Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and 
constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. Administrative 
science quarterly, 50(2), 167-199. 
 
Chile se Moviliza (2013) Los Caimanes, Video documentary accessed 3
rd
 July, 2013 
 
Cimos (2013) http://cimos.blog.br/reasa/conceicao-do-mato-dentro-e-regiao/ accessed 
20
th
 September, 2013 
 
Clarkson, M. E. (1995) A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating 
corporate social performance. Academy of management review, 20(1) pp.92-117. 
 
  357 
Código de Mineraçao Brasil http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-
Lei/Del0227.htm accessed 30th May, 2014 
 
Collins E, Kearins K, Roper J. (2005). The risks of relying on stakeholder 
engagement for the achievement of sustainability. Electronic Journal of Radical 
Organization Theory 9(1).. 
 
Creswell, J. and Miller, D. (2000). Determining Validity in Qualitative Enquiry, 
Theory into Practice, 39(3) summer. 
 
Dasgupta, K. (2013). Vedanta's India mining scheme thwarted by local objections 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/aug/21/india-
dongria-kondh-vedanta-resources-mining#! The Guardian online 21
st
 August, 2013 
accessed 9
th
 September, 2013 
 
Davis, R. and Franks, D.M. (2011, October). The costs of conflict with local 
communities in the extractive industry. In First International Seminar on Social 
Responsibility in Mining (pp. 19-21). SRMining. 
 
Den Hond, F., and De Bakker, F. G. (2007) Ideologically motivated activism: How 
activist groups influence corporate social change activities. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(3), pp.901-924. 
 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada DFAID (2009) 
Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy 
for the Canadian International Extractive Sector http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx 
accessed 9
th
 September, 2013 
  358 
 
Devlin, J. and Tubino, D. I. (2012) Contention, participation, and mobilization in 
environmental assessment follow-up: the Itabira experience. Sustainability: Science, 
Practice, & Policy, 8(1), pp.106-115. 
 
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), pp. 
65-91. 
 
Duarte, F. (2010) Corporate social responsibility in a Brazilian mining company: 
‘official’ and divergent narratives, Social Responsibility Journal, 6(1), pp. 4-17. 
 
Edmondson, A. C., and McManus, S. E. (2007) Methodological fit in management 
field research. Academy of management review, 32(4), pp1246-1264. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), pp. 532-550. 
 
Eisenhardt, K and Graebner, M (2007) Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
Challenges, Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), pp. 25–32. 
 
Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World (New in Paper). Princeton University Press. 
 
  359 
First Peoples Worldwide (2013) Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC Falls 
Short from FPW website (http://firstpeoples.org/wp/mining-councils-new-
commitment-to-fpic-falls-short/)  
 
Freeman, R. E. (1984) Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: 
Pitman 
 
Franklin, J in The Guardian online (2014) Chilean dam can't hold back the hatred 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/chile-los-pelambres-copper-mine-
antofagasta-broken-town (accessed 30th April, 2014) 
 
Freeman, R.E., Wicks, A.C. and Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder theory and “the 
corporate objective revisited”. Organization Science, 15(3), pp. 364-369. 
 
Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(2), pp. 191-205. 
 
Garvin, T., McGee, T.K., Smoyer-Tomic, K.E. and Aubynn, E.A (2009). 
“Community company relations in gold mining in Ghana”, Journal of Environmental 
Management, 90, pp. 571-586. 
 
Gesta (2013) Ficha Tecnica – Conceiçao de Mato Dentro accessed online 13th 
September, 2013 http://conflitosambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/info.php?id=253 
 
Gifford, B. and Kestler, A. (2008). Toward a theory of local legitimacy by MNEs in 
developing nations: Newmont mining and health sustainable development in Peru. 
Journal of International Management, 14(4), pp. 340-352. 
  360 
 
Gramling, R. and Freudenburg, W.R. (2006). Attitudes toward offshore oil 
development: A summary of current evidence, Ocean & Coastal Management, 49(7), 
pp. 442-461. 
 
Grisotto, R (2012) Política de boa vizinhança, Revista Exame 
http://planetasustentavel.abril.com.br/noticia/desenvolvimento/politica-boa-
vizinhanca-733873.shtml accessed 9th December, 2012. 
 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In 
N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105-117). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Haalboom, B. (2012). The intersection of corporate social responsibility guidelines 
and indigenous rights: Examining neoliberal governance of a proposed mining project 
in Suriname. Geoforum, 43(5), 969-979. 
 
Henriques, I., Sharma, S. (2005).  Pathways of stakeholder influence in the Canadian 
Forestry Industry.  Business Strategy and the Environment 14: 384–398. 
 
Hendry, J. R. (2005) Stakeholder influence strategies: An empirical exploration. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 61(1), pp.79-99. 
 
ICMM (2012) Mining has a growing role in economic development and poverty 
reduction from ICMM website http://www.icmm.com/role-in-economy-and-trends 
(accessed 1
st
 September, 2013). 
 
  361 
ICMM (2013) ICMM responds to First Peoples Worldwide critique of Indigenous 
Peoples and Mining Position Statement from ICMM website 
http://www.icmm.com/page/96314/publications/documents/icmm-responds-to-first-
peoples-worldwide-critique-of-indigenous-peoples-and-mining-position-statement  
 
IFC (2007) Stakeholder engagement: A good practice handbook for companies doing 
business in emerging markets. International Finance Corporation. Accessed online 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_Sta
keholderEngagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES accessed 2
nd
 September, 2013 
 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (2012) Gross Domestic Product of 
Municipalities – 2011 – Conceiçao de Mato Dentro 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?codmun=311750&idtema=
125&search=minas-gerais|conceicao-do-mato-dentro|produto-interno-bruto-dos-
municipios-2011&lang=_EN accessed 2
nd
 June, 2014. 
 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (2012) Gross Domestic Product of 
Municipalities – 2011 – Paracatu 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314700&i
dtema=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cparacatu%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-
municipios-2011 accessed 2
nd
 June, 2014. 
 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (2012) Gross Domestic Product of 
Municipalities – 2011 – Mariana 
http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=314000&idtema
=125&search=minas-gerais%7Cmariana%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-
2011 accessed 2
nd
 June, 2014. 
 
  362 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (2012) Gross Domestic Product of 
Municipalities – 2011 – Pedra Branca de Amaparí 
http://www.cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=160015&i
dtema=125&search=amapa%7Cpedra-branca-do-amapari%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-
dos-municipios-2011 accessed 2
nd
 June, 2014. 
 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (2012) Gross Domestic Product of 
Municipalities – 2011 – Barro Alto 
http://cidades.ibge.gov.br/xtras/grafico_cidades.php?lang=&codmun=520320&idtema
=125&search=goias%7Cbarro-alto%7Cproduto-interno-bruto-dos-municipios-2011 
accessed 2
nd
 June, 2014. 
 
Instituto Humanitas Unisinos (2012) Convenção 169 da OIT: o descaso brasileiro. 
Entrevista especial com Carolina Bellinger 
http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/512272-convencao-169-da-oit-o-descaso-
brasileiro-entrevista-especial-com-carolina-bellinger accessed 30th May, 2014 
 
Johnson, B. (1987) Examining the validity structure of qualitative research, 
Education; Winter 1997; 118, 2; Research Library p. 282 
 
Jones, A. and Thomas, A. (2013) Anglo American $4bn hit on Brazil project, 
Financial Times, 29
th
 January, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f2e3cee-69e6-11e2-
a80c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2beS3Hd5w accessed 2
nd
 August, 2013. 
 
Jones, T.M. (1995) Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and 
economics. Academy of management review, 20(2), pp. 404-437. 
 
  363 
Kemp, D., Owen, J. R., Gotzmann, N., & Bond, C. J. (2011) Just relations and 
company–community conflict in mining. Journal of business ethics, 101(1), pp.93-
109. 
 
Kemp, D. and Owen, J.R. (2013) Community relations and mining: Core to business 
but not “core business”. Resources Policy, 38(4), pp. 523-531. 
 
Kinross Gold website consulted 30
th
 July, 2013 http://www.kinross.com/corporate-
responsibility.aspx/guiding-principles.aspx 
 
Klandermans, B. (2004) The demand and supply of participation: Social-
psychological correlates of participation in social movements. The Blackwell 
companion to social movements, pp.360-379. 
 
Kotze, C. (2012) South American mining sector to continue as resource-based 
economy in Mining Weekly (Online magazine) 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/south-american-mining-sector-to-continue-as-
resource-based-economy-2012-06-15 (accessed 1
st
 September, 2013). 
 
Laplume, A. O., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. A. (2008). Stakeholder theory: Reviewing a 
theory that moves us. Journal of management, 34(6), 1152-1189. 
 
Lertzman, D and Vredenburg, H (2005) Indigenous Peoples, Resource Extraction and 
Sustainable Development: An Ethical Approach, Journal of Business Ethics, 56 
pp.239–254. 
 
  364 
McAdam, D., Boudet, H. S., Davis, J., Orr, R. J., Richard Scott, W., & Levitt, R. E. 
(2010). Site Fights: Explaining Opposition to Pipeline Projects in the Developing 
World.  Sociological Forum, 25 (3) pp. 401-427.  
Margolis, J.D., and Walsh, J.P. (2003).  ‘Misery loves companies:  rethinking social 
initiatives  by business’.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 48, 268-305. 
 
Mannarini, T., Roccato, M., Fedi, A., & Rovere, A. (2009) Six factors fostering 
protest: predicting participation in locally unwanted land uses movements. Political 
Psychology, 30(6), pp.895-920 
 
Manrique, R. (2013) Dos tercios de proyectos mineros con EIA aprobado tienen 
retraso por conflictos sociales, http://gestion.pe/economia/dos-tercios-proyectos-
mineros-eia-aprobado-tienen-retraso-conflictos-sociales-2076484 Gestión (newspaper 
accessed 18
th
 September, 2013).  
 
Mapuexpress (2014) Comunicado Comité de Defensa de Caimanes ante declaración 
por obra ruinosa del Tranque el Mauro http://mapuexpress.org/comunicado-comite-
de-defensa-de-caimanes-ante-declaracion-por-obra-ruinosa-del-tranque-el-mauro/ 
accessed 21
st
 May, 2014 
 
Miningfacts.org (2012) http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/Does-mining-
cause-social-conflict/#sthash.06EQyGWm.dpuf  (Accessed 24
th
 August, 2013).  
 
Mining Watch Canada (2014) Barrick Gold Hit with Quebec Class Action - Follows 
Shareholder Suits in Ontario and US  http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/barrick-gold-
hit-quebec-class-action-follows-shareholder-suits-ontario-and-us (Acessed 15th May, 
2014) 
 
  365 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. 
Academy of management review, 22(4), 853-886. 
 
Morse, J.M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K. and Spiers, J. (2002) Verification 
Strategies for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1(2). 
 
Nestor and Springer (2013) BSR insight: Six Ways for the Extractives Sector to 
Improve Stakeholder Engagement http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/bsr-insight-
article/six-ways-for-the-extractives-sector-to-improve-stakeholder-engagement 
website accessed 13th July, 2013 
 
Newell, P. (2005). Citizenship, accountability and community: the limits of the CSR 
agenda. International Affairs, 81(3), 541-557. 
 
Newenham-Kahindi, A.M. (2011) A global mining corporation and local 
communities in the Lake Victoria zone: The case of Barrick Gold multinational in 
Tanzania. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(2), pp. 253-282. 
 
OCMAL, (2013) Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, 
www.conflictosmineros.net, accessed 10
th
 June, 2013. 
 
Owen, J. R., & Kemp, D. (2013). Social licence and mining: A critical perspective. 
Resources Policy, 38(1), 29-35. 
 
 
  366 
Özkaynak, B., Rodriguez-Labajos, B., Arsel, M., Avcı, D., Carbonell, M.H., 
Chareyron, B., Chicaiza, G., Conde, M., Demaria, F., Finamore, R., Kohrs, B., 
Krishna, V.V., Mahongnao, M., Raeva, D., Singh, A.A., Slavov, T., Tkalec, T., 
Yánez, I., Walter, M., Živčič, L., (2012) Mining Conflicts around the World: 
Common Grounds from Environmental Justice Perspective, EJOLT Report 7, 
 
Parsons, R., Lacey, J., & Moffat, K. (2014). Maintaining legitimacy of a contested 
practice: How the minerals industry understands its ‘social licence to operate’. 
Resources Policy, 41, 83-90. 
 
Phillips, R.A. (1997).  Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness.  Business Ethics 
Quarterly 7: 51-66 
 
Pizarro, C. (2010) Caimanes: Un pueblo dividido por la plata de los Luksic, The 
Clinic online, 27
th
 November, 2010 (online newspaper consulted 4
th
 July, 2013 
http://www.theclinic.cl/2010/11/27/caimanes-un-pueblo-dividido-por-la-plata-de-los-
luksic/) 
 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2012) Mining in the Americas 
http://www.pwc.com/en_CA/ca/mining/publications/pwc-mining-in-the-americas-
2012-03-en.pdf (accessed 1
st
 September, 2013). 
 
Reporter Brasil (2014) Fiscalização volta a flagrar escravidão em megaobra da Anglo 
American http://reporterbrasil.org.br/2014/05/fiscalizacao-volta-a-flagrar-escravidao-
em-megaobra-da-anglo-american/ (accessed 16
th
 May, 2014) 
 
  367 
Revista Exame (2013) A Anglo American contra Eike Batista 
http://exame.abril.com.br/blogs/primeiro-lugar/2013/10/10/a-anglo-american-contra-
eike-batista/ accessed 10
th
 October, 2013 
 
Rowley, T and Moldoveanu, M (2003) When will stakeholder groups act? An interest 
and identity based model of stakeholder group mobilization, Academy of 
Management Review, (28) 2, pp. 204-219. 
 
Sandberg, J. (2005) How Do We Justify Knowledge Produced Within Interpretive 
Approaches?, Organizational Research Methods, 8(1). 
 
Sandelowski, M. (1986) The Problem of Rigor in Qualitative Research, Advances in 
Nursing Science, vol. 8, pp. 27–37. 
 
Sargent, A (2013) El Mauro" Tailings-Dam Pits Community Against the Oligarchy in 
Chile http://upsidedownworld.org/main/chile-archives-34/4335-qel-mauroq-tailings-
dam-pits-community-against-the-oligarchy-in-chile accessed 11th August, 2013 
 
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. (2009). Introduction to the Special Issue: 
Globalization as a Challenge for Business Responsibilities. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
19(3). 
 
Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J. F., and Silverman, D. (Eds.). (2004) Qualitative 
research practice. Sage. 
 
Shriver, T. E., & Kennedy, D. K. (2005) Contested Environmental Hazards and 
Community Conflict Over Relocation. Rural sociology, 70(4) pp. 491-513. 
  368 
 
Silverman, D. (2000) Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, London: 
Sage. 
 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In 
S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations. Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall. 
 
Taillant, J. D (2013) http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Los-Glaciares-
de-Barrick-Gold-version-20-mayo-2013-ENGLISH-small.pdf accessed 30th August, 
2013 
 
Urkidi, L. (2008) Movimientos anti-mineros: el caso de Pascua-Lama en Chile. 
Revista Iberoamericana de Economía Ecológica (REVIBEC), (8), pp. 63-77. 
 
Urkidi, L. (2010) A glocal environmental movement against gold mining: Pascua-
Lama in Chile. Ecological Economics, 70(2), pp. 219-227. 
 
Urkidi, L. and Walter, M. (2011) Dimensions of environmental justice in anti-gold 
mining movements in Latin America. Geoforum, 42(6), pp. 683-695. 
 
Van Maanen, J. (2011) Tales of the field: On writing ethnography. University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Vasquez, V (2014) Caimanes logra importante victoria judicial contra el Grupo 
Luksic online news report http://eldesconcierto.cl/caimanes-anota-fallo-judicial-
  369 
contra-grupo-luksic-pero-sigue-bajo-amenaza-de-tranque-el-mauro/ accessed 4
th
 June, 
2014. 
 
Vega, F. (2012). La cruzada de Jean Paul Luksic, Revista Capital online, October 
2012 (online magazine consulted 3
rd
 July, 2013) http://www.capital.cl/poder/la-
cruzada-de-jean-paul-luksic/ 
 
Walsh, E. J., Warland, R. H., & Smith, D. C. (1997) Don't burn it here: Grassroots 
challenges to trash incinerators. Penn State University Press. 
 
Whetten, D (2006) Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of 
Organizational Identity Journal of Management Inquiry, 15 pp. 219-234. 
 
Zandvliet, L. and Anderson, M. (2009) Getting it Right Making Corporate–
Community Relations Work, Greenleaf  Publishing Ltd. 
 
Zorilla, C (2014) Illegal arrest and illegitimate mining in Intag Valley (Ecuador) in 
EJOLT on-line http://www.ejolt.org/2014/04/illegal-arrest-and-illegitimate-mining-
in-intag-valley-ecuador/ accessed 14
th
 May, 2014 
  370 
Appendix A 
Table – Details of interviews and interviewees with Identification Code from field research. (Mining company officials are highlighted in 
blue). Names kept anonymous for confidentiality purposes 
Interviewee Case Study Context of Interview Dates of 
meetings or 
communication 
Duration of 
interview(s) 
conversatio
ns 
Interviewee 
Code (if 
quoted in 
thesis) 
Referenced 
Interviewee 
transcript/ 
page 
number 
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo 
American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and 
six local government officials. 
Community relations 
coordinator, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
6-11/01/12 3 hours total A2 395 
  371 
Health & Safety 
manager and Dam 
Specialist, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 1 hour   
Two basic operators, 
mining operators, 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 30 minutes   
Explorations manager, 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 30 minutes   
20 new entrant 
employees from local 
community at Anglo 
American Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Company and Community 
Identity 
8/1/12 1.5 hours   
Head of HR and 
sustainability, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
8/1/12 1 hour   
  372 
history 
Two experienced 
miners, mining 
operators, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
8/1/12 45 minutes   
Head of Institutional 
Relations, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
In person and Skype calls 
with Jarilon Relations with 
local community, company 
and community identity, 
local history 
8/1/12 3 hours and 
two Skype 
conversation
s 
  
Trade union leader Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 15 minutes A4  
 President of the 
municipal chamber, 
Pedra Branca 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 30 minutes A3  
Long term resident in 
Pedra Branca also an 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations and Conflict with 
local community, company 
9/1/12 45 minutes A1 391 
  373 
ex independent gold 
miner currently suing 
Anglo American 
and community identity, 
local history 
Together with JVisits 
to four residents in 
Pedra Branca area 
from Anglo American  
we drove around 30km 
to deliver hundreds of 
Açai seedlings 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 4 hours   
Head of Social 
Assistance at local 
government 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 15 minutes   
Representatives of 
Environmental agency 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 30 minutes A4  
Former Federal 
politician now Head of 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
10/1/12 30 minutes   
  374 
Municipal Education history 
Four Local residents in 
town including a 
pharmacy owner 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 1 hour A4  
Head of CSR Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
11/1/12 2 hours   
       
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed 
Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders 
repeatedly over this time period.  
  
Vice President 
Corporate Affairs, 
Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Corporate identity, culture, 
CSR policy, Community 
Relations - Drivers and 
Perceptions 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 and 
21/10/11 
2 hours and 
several 
email 
exchanges 
  
Community Relations 
officer, Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Corporate Identity, 
community relations, CSR 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 
8 hours of 
shadowing 
and 
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Chile - Drivers and Perceptions 24/10/11 conversation
s 
Focus group with 11 
executives from 
Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Focus group on Corporate 
Identity with individual 
and collective drawings 
and discussion 
24/10/11 3 hours   
Community relations 
officer, replacing 
Carolina 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Community history, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
19/10/12 2 hours   
 (Colla Community 
Leaders) and two 
women leaders 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Relations with 
neighbouring mines, 
reasons behind these 
relations, their Identity and 
Culture 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010, 
25/10/11 and 
20/10/12 
5 hours B1 411 
       
Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email 
and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross 
executives and four local government representatives. 
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Locally Elected 
Councillor 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Spoke on a daily basis over 
15 days, made field visits 
together, exchanged email 
communication. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
15/03/12, 08-
09/12, 01/13 - 
04/13 
18 hours 
approximate
ly 
C2 416 
Long term resident Paracatu, 
Brazil 
In Paracatu, London and 
over email. Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
11/08/12 and 
01/13 – 04/13 
4 hours  C1  
Barber Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
18/11/11 30 minutes C12  
Four Field visits to 
Sao Domingos 
Paracatu, Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
16/11/11, and 
three times 
5 hours C3   
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Quilombo (Maroon) 
next to mine. Spoke to 
eight residents  
Brazil affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
between 08-09/12 
Head of Afro-
Brazilian NGO and 
former candidate for 
local councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
18/11/11 and four 
times between 08-
09/12 
5 hours C4 435 
Head of Sao 
Domingos 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
internal conflicts, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16/11/11, 29-
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
3 hours  C36  
Medical Doctor and 
former elected local 
councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Two visits to neighbouring 
communities to the mine 
and one interview in office. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
19/11/11, 
21/11/11 and 
05/09/12 
5 hours C5  
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impacts from mine 
local cultural leader, 
social 
entrepreneurship 
initiative 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
5 hours C6 457 
Socialist party and 
neighbourhood leader 
and activist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
17/11/11 1 hour C7 474 
Now Former Director 
of Community 
Relations and 
Communications, 
Kinross Gold 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
engagement, investment, 
identity and culture. 
19/11/11, 
06/09/12 and 
16/01/13 
6 hours C8  
10 Kinross Gold Cross 
Section Management 
Executives 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions, and identity 
and culture 
06/09/12 1.5 hours C13  
Community Relations Paracatu, Visited social projects 06/09/12 and 2 hours C14  
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Officer Brazil financed by Kinross and 
spoke to the project 
managers and beneficiaries  
16/01/13 
Community Relations 
Officer 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Visited two community 
leaders to speak about 
community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
06/09/12 4 hours C15  
Local café owner Paracatu, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
- community relations  
19/11/11 and 
04/09/12 
45 minutes C35  
Local entrepreneur 
leader  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
19/11/11 1,5 hours C9  
Visits together with 
Councillor to four 
families living besides 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Impacts from mining on 
community and relations 
and perception of the mine 
19/11/11 4 hours C10  
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the mine 
community leader lost 
land years ago due to 
tailings dam. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20/11/11 and 
31/08/12 
2 hours C11  
President of Trade 
Union at Kinross Gold  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Worker relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
10/09/12 
2 hours C12 492 
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
email 10/02/13 
2 hours C37 511 
Focus group session 
with 12 students aged 
11 – 17  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
22/11/11 1,5 hours C38  
Radio journalist, and Paracatu, Community history, 22/11/11, 5 hours C15 498 
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wife well known local 
radio and TV 
journalist  
Brazil identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
04/09/12 and 
06/09/12 radio 
interview 
head of hospital 
management 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/11/11 30 minutes C16  
Lawyer Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/11/11 15 minutes C17  
Long term resident 
and Secretary of 
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
29/08/12 1 hour C18  
Lady who works in 
Culture and Education 
and civil society 
campaigner, also 
mother of Community 
relations official  from 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
29/08/12 40 minutes C19  
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Kinross 
State Deputy politician 
and was socialist 
mayor candidate 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
30/08/12 1.5 hours C20  
elderly hotel owner 
and landowner 
affected by mine 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 1 hour C21  
Sociology Lecturer 
and his students at 
Finom University in 
Paracatu who did his 
Master’s thesis on Sao 
Domingos Maroon 
and its Identity 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
07/09/12 3 hours C22  
 (Priest) of Paracatu Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
1.5 hours C23  
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impacts from mine 
Ex-employee of Mine Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Culture and identity of 
mining company.  
07/09/12 2 hours C11  
owner of local 
newspaper, 
environmental NGO 
and former anti-
mining activist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 30 minutes C24  
well known in 
community to 
opposing mine and 
own neighbours in 
Maroon. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
02/09/12 2 hours C25  
Owner of 
Environmental NGO 
and also former critic 
of Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
10/09/12 1 hour C26  
local cultural and 
artistic leader and 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
03/09/12 2 hours C27  
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hotel owner affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Community leader 
fighting construction 
of other mine near his 
home and also former 
dam engineer at 
Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
09-15/01/13 Met, spoke 
and drove 
around 
everyday to 
meet other 
residents. 
6 hours 
approximate 
C28  
Parents of lady 
Kinross official took 
me to interview, 
affected by dam 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/01/13 1 hour C29  
Neighbourhood leader, 
located nearest to 
tailings dam 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/01/13 1 hour C30  
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Elderly couple living 
very near mine, 
isolated and without 
water supply 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/01/13 1 hour C31  
President of Municipal 
Chamber and Elected 
Councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/01/13 30 minutes C32  
Communications 
officer from municipal 
government 
  16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
2 hours C33  
Two local journalists Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
10/01/13 30 minutes C34  
Former Kinross 
Manager 
Email Mining company influence 
strategies with community 
and government 
03-04/14  C39 519 
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Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local 
community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 
1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant 
  
Archeoastronomer, 
and defender of Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
03/10/12 3 hours   
Lawyer defending Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Community, identity, 
culture, relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
03/10/12 30 minutes   
Community Relations 
consultant for 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
06/10/12 and 
26/10/12 
2 hours   
Community activist 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
Between 07/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
6 hours 
approximate 
D1 521 
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perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Community leader 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
4 hours 
approximate 
  
Parents of Community 
leaders who are former 
Community Leaders 
against Pelambres 
mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
08/10/12 1 hour   
40 different local 
community residents 
including priest 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Going from house to house 
to collect signatures for 
Protection Remedy to hand 
to courts. Perceptions of 
Dam, history of personal 
and community conflict 
with mine, identity, culture, 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
Conversatio
ns between 
10 – 120 
minutes 
with each 
participant 
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Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. 
Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did 
not get access to company officials to discus this community conflict. 
  
Local environmental 
activist representing 
OLCA and candidate 
for councillor 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20/10/12 and 
consequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
2 hours   
Elderly grape farmer 
who gave me 
accommodation 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20-27/10/12 5 hours 
approximate
ly 
  
Niece of elderly grape 
farmer lady and local 
indigenous leader 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Travelled with her to local 
community meetings and 
spoke of history of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
21-27/10/12 and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
12 hours 
approximate
ly 
E1 525 
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identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
09/13 
Local Priest Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23 and 26/10/12 2 hours E3 549 
local indigenous 
leader and candidate 
for councillor and 
former mine worker 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/10/12 2 hours E2 545 
Non-participant 
observation at 
community meeting 
lead leaders to 
convince community 
to sign and join their 
collective class action 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/10/12 3 hours E2  
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against Barrick Gold 
local community 
resident and artist 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
23/10/12 30 minutes E2  
Three sons-in-Laws of 
eldery grape farmer 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
Local Shopkeeper Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
24/10/12 15 minutes   
 local community 
leader and activist 
against mine 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
82 year old resident of 
the valley 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
26/10/12 1 hour   
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perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Bishop of Copiapo, 
150km from Huasco 
Valley 
Copiapo, 
Chile 
Met at cathedral to speak 
about refusal to accept 
US$1m donation from 
Barrick, mining company 
community relations and 
conflicts. 
29/10/12 20 minutes   
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. 
Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at 
universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor 
and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company. 
  
Local resident sat next 
to me on bus, whose 
husband works as a 
miner 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 1 hour   
Local burger and beer 
stand owner and 
community leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 30 minutes   
Opposing figure to Mariana, History of personal and 6/12/12  and  3 hours F1 558 
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mine and girlfriend, 
young technical 
engineering teacher 
Brazil community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
 Local elected 
councillor 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
6/12/12 2 hours F5 574 
NGO Director owns 
social NGO and also 
works for Kinross in 
Paracatu 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
7/12/12 2 hours F3 568 
Sociology lecturer Mariana, 
Brazil 
Interview and several email 
exchanges - History of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
7/12/12 2 hours and 
four email 
exchanges 
F2 565 
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Mine, impacts from mine 
History Professor and 
wife Sociology 
Professor  
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Interview and also gave 
class for History students at 
University. History of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
9/12/12 and 
14/12/12  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
3 hours   
Mining worker’s trade 
union leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Email exchange of 
questions relating to 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/12/12 Two lengthy 
emails 
F4 570 
Three young sales 
assistants at chocolate 
store 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
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Barber Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
Café store owner Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 20 minutes   
15 University students 
from guest lecture at 
Univerdade Federal de 
Ouro Preto 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 1 hour   
Public Prosecutor Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 1 hour   
Bishop of Mariana Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
12/12/12 30 minutes   
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impacts from mine 
       
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, 
four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local 
councillor 
  
Director of 
Communities, Anglo 
Nickel Head Office 
Sao Paulo 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
28/12/13 1 hour   
Head of CARE NGO 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19/01/13 1 hour G2 579 
officer at Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
by Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Several site visits to social 
projects. History of mining 
company – community 
relations, conflict, 
community perceptions, 
19-22/01/13 4 hours G2  
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identity and positions. CSR 
initiatives. 
Secretary, Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
by Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19-22/01/13 1hour   
Head of Community 
relations, Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19 and 22/01/13 2 hours G1 575 
Three teenagers who 
attend music school 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 1 hour   
Cleaner at CARE, 
Local Resident, Barro 
Alto 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Community identity and 
culture and perceptions of 
Anglo 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
local supermarket Barro Alto, History of mining company 19/01/13 45 minutes G3  
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owner Brazil – community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
elderly lady, husband 
and daughter critical 
of Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
21/01/13 1 hour G4 580 
Two boys on rural 
farm beneficiaries of 
Anglo’s social 
investment 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 30 minutes   
Local councillor Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
Couple who are local 
activists and leaders 
for civil rights and 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
21/01/13 1 hour   
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anti-corruption perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
Head of Agenda 
Publica NGO for 
strengthening local 
government capacity 
and transparency, 
financed by Anglo 
American 
20/01/13 History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Local 
government corruption and 
capacity 
21/01/13 1 hour   
Manager Community 
relations, Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 1 hour G5 581 
Taxi Driver to airport Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
23/01/13 3 hours G6 581 
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Summary: Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community 
members, two State prosectors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive 
  
local resident and 
Maroon community 
leader affected by 
mine 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H2 594 
Pamela, local 
community resident 
 
 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1.5 hours H3 599 
Fernanda, local 
community resident 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
1.5 hours 
and weekly 
skype 
exchanges 
until 10/13  
H1 582 
Coordinator at Public 
Prosector;s office on 
Social Movements 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
25/01/13 1 hour H4 600 
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Local community 
leader 
 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 30 minutes   
Machado, Public 
Prosecutor 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H5 602 
Community relations 
head at Barro Ato 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
15/01/13 15 minutes   
Head of Social 
Performance, Anglo 
American, London HQ 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Social 
investment 
12/02/13 1.5 hours H6 603 
Former, Head of 
Social Performance, 
Anglo American, 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
20/02/13 30 minutes   
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London positions. 
       
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside 
the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and 
practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and 
conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my 
research phenomenon. 
  
London Business 
School, focuses on 
critical CSR 
My 
presentation 
of Colla case 
study at Egos 
The need to critically 
analyse and focus on 
community perspective and 
less on corporate as it is a 
given. 
09/07/11 20 minutes   
Community Leader of 
community near 
several mines in far 
northern Chile 
His own 
community in 
Sierra Gorda, 
several  
Met at social responsibility 
for mining conference in 
Santiago and also spoke 
over phone one year later. 
Community organization, 
relations with mining 
companies and identity 
20-22/10/11 and 
10/11/12 
2 hours   
Facebook “Mining Participated in Asked questions around the July 2012 Six   
  402 
company – community 
relations in Conga, 
Peru” page 
social forum 
over two 
week.  
drivers for protest and 
conflict in Conga and about 
community identity and its 
importance 
questions 
and answers 
Social movement 
activist for indigenous 
people’s and 
filmmaker 
Huasco 
Valley 
Phone and in person 
interviews. Filmed 
documentary and stayed at 
Clementina’s farm. Spoke 
about drivers of 
community perceptions and 
positions of Barrick Gold 
20/07/12 (phone), 
emails and 
17/10/12 
2 hours and 
three emails 
  
Community Activist in 
Lancashire against 
Fracking 
Her 
community’s 
action against 
extractive 
sector project 
in UK context  
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
30/06/12 and 
10/07/12 
2 hours   
Activists of NGO 
“Frack Off” as well as 
several local 
community members 
Fracking in 
Lancashire 
At community meeting 
about local fracking 
proposals. Community 
motives for protest or for 
30/06/12 30 minutes   
  403 
in Lancashire indifference 
Couple defending 
community against 
nearby coal mine in 
Merthyr Tydfill – UK 
context of such 
conflicts 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
5 days spent talking with 
couple and their friends on 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine. 
8/7/12-12/7/12 8 hours   
Four Local councillors 
in Merthyr Tydfill 
about nearby coal 
mine 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine 
10/07/12 1.5 hours   
Academic - Cardiff 
School of Planning 
and Geography, 
focuses on local 
community 
movements against 
mining and climate 
change in Wales  
Community 
movements in 
general 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization. 
Several email 
exchanges 
between July – 
October, 2012 
3 lengthy 
emails 
received 
  
  404 
Master’s class of 
Environmental law at 
Unisantos university, 
Brazil 
Brazilian 
communities 
in general 
affected by 
mining 
Identities, culture, relations 
with companies, history 
and environmental impacts 
22/08/12 1.5 hours   
Head of community 
relations, Petrobras 
Sao José dos Campos 
refinery, Brazil 
Local 
community 
relations  
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
15/09/12 1.5 hours   
Head of Social 
Development, Anglo 
American, Santiago, 
Chile 
Local 
community 
relations at 
Chilean mines 
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
09/10/12 1 hour   
Professor - Social 
Movements academic 
Social 
movements in 
CSR context 
Email exchanges Motives 
for protest and for non-
protest in mining 
communities 
25/10/12 1 detailed 
email reply 
  
Professor - Sociologist 
in sustainability at 
Universidad Católica, 
Social 
movements 
and 
community 
Why communities react the 
way they do towards 
mining in Chile 
31/10/12 1 hour   
  405 
Chile participation 
Head of Sustainability, 
National Mining 
Company, Chile 
Mining 
company –
community 
relations in 
Chile, in 
particular 
about Colla 
Motives and reasons for 
mining company 
community relations in 
Chile and how to improve 
these 
08/11/12 1 hour   
Director of 
Community relations, 
Collahuasi Mine (part 
owned by Anglo 
American), Santiago, 
Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
12/11/12 30 minutes   
mining company 
community relations 
consultant, Santiago, 
Chile 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
13/11/12 40 minutes   
Professor - Renowned 
Chilean anthropologist 
Mining 
company 
History, Identity and 
Drivers behind company - 
14/11/12 1 hour   
  406 
for Northern 
Indigenous 
communities. 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
community relations and 
conflicts 
Social and Community 
Auditor Barrick Gold 
Peru and Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations and 
CSR 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts and Identity. 
27/11/12 30 minutes   
Environmental activist 
on mining 
communities 
especially in Huasco 
Valley 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
Capitalism, mining 
companies, Chilean 
government, reason why 
mining is permitted so 
easily in Chile - 
philosophical 
28/11/12 and  and  
consequent f 
email contact 
until 09/13 
1.5 hours   
researcher and activist 
– anti mining in 
Northern Chile, 
defender of 
Indigenous peoples 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
ILO169, Indigenous 
identity, mining 
community - conflicts in 
Chile, drivers of 
community positions 
29/11/12 1 hour   
Head of Indigenous 
Affairs, Chilean 
Government- 
mining 
company – 
Drivers behind local 
indigenous community 
relations with mining 
14/11/12 and 
0212/12 
1.5 hours   
  407 
government indigenous 
community 
relations  
company in northern Chile.  
Human geographer 
Academic, Director 
Sustainability Centre, 
Universidad Católica 
Chile 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations/posit
ions 
How to present my data of 
different perceptions and 
positions  
03/12/12 1 hour   
 
Sustainability 
Manager, Alcoa, 
Brazil 
Company - 
community 
relations in 
company 
operations in 
Amazon and 
South East 
Brazil 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
18/12/12 1 hour   
Leading sociologist on 
Social movements, 
Collective action in 
extractives sector 
communities in USA 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
action in 
extractives 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
01/12/12 1 email 
reply 
  
  408 
sector 
co-author of book 
analysing factors of 
community 
mobilization of LNG 
plants in USA 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
action in 
extractives 
sector in her 
book 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
18/12/12 1 email 
reply 
  
Business Development 
Director at Zamin 
Resources Mining 
company, bought over 
Pedra Branca mine 
from Anglo American 
December 2012. 
Mining 
company –
community/go
vernment 
relations in 
South 
America  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
07/01/13 1.5 hours   
Professor - Political 
Sciences, University 
of Brasilia, Social 
movement researcher 
Social 
movement in 
Brazil, 
literature, 
Paracatu 
community 
Factors leading to 
collective action in Brazil 
with case of Paracatu that 
she knows 
17/01/13 1 hour   
  409 
Mining in Peru 
focused Academics, 
practitioners, NGO 
representatives, Anglo 
American 
governmental relations 
at conference on 
Extractives in Peru at 
UCL 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Peru 
Impacts of mining and Peru 
and drivers of company - 
community relations  
04/03/13 6 hours   
Retired Head of 
Mining Operation, Rio 
Tinto 
Mining 
company 
operations and 
community 
relations in 
South 
American 
Mining company strategies 
for community relations  
Monthly meetings 
since 05/05/13 
10 hours   
Head of international 
NGO on communities 
affected by mining 
Mining 
company – 
community 
conflict in 
South 
America 
Mining company – 
community conflict in 
South America 
30/08/13 1 hour   
  410 
Interviewee Case Study Context of Interview Dates of 
meetings or 
communication 
Duration of 
interview(s) 
conversatio
ns 
Interviewee 
Code (if 
quoted in 
thesis) 
Referenced 
Interviewee 
transcript/ 
page number 
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo 
American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and 
six local government officials. 
Community relations 
coordinator, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
6-11/01/12 3 hours total A2  
Health & Safety 
manager and Dam 
Specialist, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 1 hour   
Two basic operators, 
mining operators, 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 30 minutes   
Explorations manager, Pedra Branca, Relations with local 7/1/12 30 minutes   
  411 
Anglo American Amapa, Brazil community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
20 new entrant 
employees from local 
community at Anglo 
American Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Company and Community 
Identity 
8/1/12 1.5 hours   
Head of HR and 
sustainability, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
8/1/12 1 hour   
Two experienced 
miners, mining 
operators, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
8/1/12 45 minutes   
Head of Institutional 
Relations, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
In person and Skype calls 
with Jarilon Relations with 
local community, company 
and community identity, 
8/1/12 3 hours and 
two Skype 
conversation
s 
  
  412 
local history 
Trade union leader Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 15 minutes A4  
 President of the 
municipal chamber, 
Pedra Branca 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 30 minutes A3  
Long term resident in 
Pedra Branca also an 
ex independent gold 
miner currently suing 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations and Conflict with 
local community, company 
and community identity, 
local history 
9/1/12 45 minutes A1  
Together with JVisits 
to four residents in 
Pedra Branca area 
from Anglo American  
we drove around 30km 
to deliver hundreds of 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 4 hours   
  413 
Açai seedlings 
Head of Social 
Assistance at local 
government 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 15 minutes   
Representatives of 
Environmental agency 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 30 minutes A4  
Former Federal 
politician now Head of 
Municipal Education 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 30 minutes   
Four Local residents in 
town including a 
pharmacy owner 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 1 hour A4  
Head of CSR Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
11/1/12 2 hours   
  414 
history 
       
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed 
Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders 
repeatedly over this time period.  
  
Vice President 
Corporate Affairs, 
Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Corporate identity, culture, 
CSR policy, Community 
Relations - Drivers and 
Perceptions 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 and 
21/10/11 
2 hours and 
several 
email 
exchanges 
  
Community Relations 
officer, Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Corporate Identity, 
community relations, CSR 
- Drivers and Perceptions 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 
24/10/11 
8 hours of 
shadowing 
and 
conversation
s 
  
Focus group with 11 
executives from 
Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Focus group on Corporate 
Identity with individual 
and collective drawings 
and discussion 
24/10/11 3 hours   
Community relations 
officer, replacing 
Colla 
Community, 
Community history, 
identity, culture, relations 
19/10/12 2 hours   
  415 
Carolina Chile with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
 (Colla Community 
Leaders) and two 
women leaders 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Relations with 
neighbouring mines, 
reasons behind these 
relations, their Identity and 
Culture 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010, 
25/10/11 and 
20/10/12 
5 hours B1  
       
Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email 
and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross 
executives and four local government representatives. 
  
Locally Elected 
Councillor 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Spoke on a daily basis over 
15 days, made field visits 
together, exchanged email 
communication. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
15/03/12, 08-
09/12, 01/13 - 
04/13 
18 hours 
approximate
ly 
C2  
  416 
Long term resident Paracatu, 
Brazil 
In Paracatu, London and 
over email. Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
11/08/12 and 
01/13 – 04/13 
4 hours  C1  
Barber Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
18/11/11 30 minutes C12  
Four Field visits to 
Sao Domingos 
Quilombo (Maroon) 
next to mine. Spoke to 
eight residents  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, and 
three times 
between 08-09/12 
5 hours C3   
Head of Afro-
Brazilian NGO and 
former candidate for 
local councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
18/11/11 and four 
times between 08-
09/12 
5 hours C4  
  417 
Head of Sao 
Domingos 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
internal conflicts, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16/11/11, 29-
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
3 hours  C36  
Medical Doctor and 
former elected local 
councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Two visits to neighbouring 
communities to the mine 
and one interview in office. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
19/11/11, 
21/11/11 and 
05/09/12 
5 hours C5  
local cultural leader, 
social 
entrepreneurship 
initiative 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
5 hours C6  
Socialist party and 
neighbourhood leader 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
17/11/11 1 hour C7  
  418 
and activist  perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Now Former Director 
of Community 
Relations and 
Communications, 
Kinross Gold 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
engagement, investment, 
identity and culture. 
19/11/11, 
06/09/12 and 
16/01/13 
6 hours C8  
10 Kinross Gold Cross 
Section Management 
Executives 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions, and identity 
and culture 
06/09/12 1.5 hours C13  
Community Relations 
Officer 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Visited social projects 
financed by Kinross and 
spoke to the project 
managers and beneficiaries  
06/09/12 and 
16/01/13 
2 hours C14  
Community Relations 
Officer 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Visited two community 
leaders to speak about 
community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
06/09/12 4 hours C15  
  419 
impacts from mine 
Local café owner Paracatu, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
- community relations  
19/11/11 and 
04/09/12 
45 minutes C35  
Local entrepreneur 
leader  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
19/11/11 1,5 hours C9  
Visits together with 
Councillor to four 
families living besides 
the mine 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Impacts from mining on 
community and relations 
and perception of the mine 
19/11/11 4 hours C10  
community leader lost 
land years ago due to 
tailings dam. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20/11/11 and 
31/08/12 
2 hours C11  
President of Trade 
Union at Kinross Gold  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Worker relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
10/09/12 
2 hours C12  
  420 
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
email 10/02/13 
2 hours C37  
Focus group session 
with 12 students aged 
11 – 17  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
22/11/11 1,5 hours C38  
Radio journalist, and 
wife well known local 
radio and TV 
journalist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
22/11/11, 
04/09/12 and 
06/09/12 radio 
interview 
5 hours C15  
head of hospital 
management 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/11/11 30 minutes C16  
Lawyer Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
23/11/11 15 minutes C17  
  421 
impacts from mine 
Long term resident 
and Secretary of 
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
29/08/12 1 hour C18  
Lady who works in 
Culture and Education 
and civil society 
campaigner, also 
mother of Community 
relations official  from 
Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
29/08/12 40 minutes C19  
State Deputy politician 
and was socialist 
mayor candidate 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
30/08/12 1.5 hours C20  
elderly hotel owner 
and landowner 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
31/08/12 1 hour C21  
  422 
affected by mine impacts from mine 
Sociology Lecturer 
and his students at 
Finom University in 
Paracatu who did his 
Master’s thesis on Sao 
Domingos Maroon 
and its Identity 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
07/09/12 3 hours C22  
 (Priest) of Paracatu Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
1.5 hours C23  
Ex-employee of Mine Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Culture and identity of 
mining company.  
07/09/12 2 hours C11  
owner of local 
newspaper, 
environmental NGO 
and former anti-
mining activist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 30 minutes C24  
  423 
well known in 
community to 
opposing mine and 
own neighbours in 
Maroon. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
02/09/12 2 hours C25  
Owner of 
Environmental NGO 
and also former critic 
of Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
10/09/12 1 hour C26  
local cultural and 
artistic leader and 
hotel owner 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
03/09/12 2 hours C27  
Community leader 
fighting construction 
of other mine near his 
home and also former 
dam engineer at 
Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
09-15/01/13 Met, spoke 
and drove 
around 
everyday to 
meet other 
residents. 
C28  
  424 
6 hours 
approximate 
Parents of lady 
Kinross official took 
me to interview, 
affected by dam 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/01/13 1 hour C29  
Neighbourhood leader, 
located nearest to 
tailings dam 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/01/13 1 hour C30  
Elderly couple living 
very near mine, 
isolated and without 
water supply 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/01/13 1 hour C31  
President of Municipal 
Chamber and Elected 
Councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
11/01/13 30 minutes C32  
  425 
impacts from mine 
Communications 
officer from municipal 
government 
  16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
2 hours C33  
Two local journalists Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
10/01/13 30 minutes C34  
Former Kinross 
Manager 
Email Mining company influence 
strategies with community 
and government 
03-04/14  C39  
       
Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local 
community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 
1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant 
  
Archeoastronomer, 
and defender of Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
03/10/12 3 hours   
  426 
Lawyer defending Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Community, identity, 
culture, relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
03/10/12 30 minutes   
Community Relations 
consultant for 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
06/10/12 and 
26/10/12 
2 hours   
Community activist 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Between 07/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
6 hours 
approximate 
D1  
Community leader 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
4 hours 
approximate 
  
  427 
Parents of Community 
leaders who are former 
Community Leaders 
against Pelambres 
mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
08/10/12 1 hour   
40 different local 
community residents 
including priest 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Going from house to house 
to collect signatures for 
Protection Remedy to hand 
to courts. Perceptions of 
Dam, history of personal 
and community conflict 
with mine, identity, culture, 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
Conversatio
ns between 
10 – 120 
minutes 
with each 
participant 
  
       
Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. 
Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did 
not get access to company officials to discus this community conflict. 
  
Local environmental 
activist representing 
OLCA and candidate 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
20/10/12 and 
consequent email 
contact until 
2 hours   
  428 
for councillor perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
09/13 
Elderly grape farmer 
who gave me 
accommodation 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20-27/10/12 5 hours 
approximate
ly 
  
Niece of elderly grape 
farmer lady and local 
indigenous leader 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Travelled with her to local 
community meetings and 
spoke of history of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
21-27/10/12 and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
12 hours 
approximate
ly 
E1  
Local Priest Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
23 and 26/10/12 2 hours E3  
  429 
impacts from mine 
local indigenous 
leader and candidate 
for councillor and 
former mine worker 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/10/12 2 hours E2  
Non-participant 
observation at 
community meeting 
lead leaders to 
convince community 
to sign and join their 
collective class action 
against Barrick Gold 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/10/12 3 hours E2  
local community 
resident and artist 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
23/10/12 30 minutes E2  
Three sons-in-Laws of 
eldery grape farmer 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
  430 
Mine, impacts from mine 
Local Shopkeeper Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
24/10/12 15 minutes   
 local community 
leader and activist 
against mine 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
82 year old resident of 
the valley 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1 hour   
Bishop of Copiapo, 
150km from Huasco 
Valley 
Copiapo, 
Chile 
Met at cathedral to speak 
about refusal to accept 
US$1m donation from 
Barrick, mining company 
community relations and 
29/10/12 20 minutes   
  431 
conflicts. 
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. 
Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at 
universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor 
and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company. 
  
Local resident sat next 
to me on bus, whose 
husband works as a 
miner 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 1 hour   
Local burger and beer 
stand owner and 
community leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 30 minutes   
Opposing figure to 
mine and girlfriend, 
young technical 
engineering teacher 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
6/12/12  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
3 hours F1  
 Local elected 
councillor 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
6/12/12 2 hours F5  
  432 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
NGO Director owns 
social NGO and also 
works for Kinross in 
Paracatu 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
7/12/12 2 hours F3  
Sociology lecturer Mariana, 
Brazil 
Interview and several email 
exchanges - History of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
7/12/12 2 hours and 
four email 
exchanges 
F2  
History Professor and 
wife Sociology 
Professor  
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Interview and also gave 
class for History students at 
University. History of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
9/12/12 and 
14/12/12  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
3 hours   
  433 
Mine, impacts from mine 
Mining worker’s trade 
union leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Email exchange of 
questions relating to 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/12/12 Two lengthy 
emails 
F4  
Three young sales 
assistants at chocolate 
store 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
Barber Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
Café store owner Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 20 minutes   
15 University students 
from guest lecture at 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
11/12/12 1 hour   
  434 
Univerdade Federal de 
Ouro Preto 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Public Prosecutor Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 1 hour   
Bishop of Mariana Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 30 minutes   
       
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, 
four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local 
councillor 
  
Director of 
Communities, Anglo 
Nickel Head Office 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
28/12/13 1 hour   
  435 
Sao Paulo perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
Head of CARE NGO 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19/01/13 1 hour G2  
officer at Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
by Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Several site visits to social 
projects. History of mining 
company – community 
relations, conflict, 
community perceptions, 
identity and positions. CSR 
initiatives. 
19-22/01/13 4 hours G2  
Secretary, Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
by Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19-22/01/13 1hour   
Head of Community 
relations, Anglo 
Barro Alto, History of mining company 
– community relations, 
19 and 22/01/13 2 hours G1  
  436 
American Brazil conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
Three teenagers who 
attend music school 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 1 hour   
Cleaner at CARE, 
Local Resident, Barro 
Alto 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Community identity and 
culture and perceptions of 
Anglo 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
local supermarket 
owner 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19/01/13 45 minutes G3  
elderly lady, husband 
and daughter critical 
of Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
21/01/13 1 hour G4  
  437 
Two boys on rural 
farm beneficiaries of 
Anglo’s social 
investment 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 30 minutes   
Local councillor Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
Couple who are local 
activists and leaders 
for civil rights and 
anti-corruption 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
21/01/13 1 hour   
Head of Agenda 
Publica NGO for 
strengthening local 
government capacity 
and transparency, 
financed by Anglo 
American 
20/01/13 History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Local 
government corruption and 
capacity 
21/01/13 1 hour   
  438 
Manager Community 
relations, Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 1 hour G5  
Taxi Driver to airport Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
23/01/13 3 hours G6  
       
Summary: Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community 
members, two State prosectors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive 
  
local resident and 
Maroon community 
leader affected by 
mine 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H2  
Pamela, local 
community resident 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
26/01/13 1.5 hours H3  
  439 
 
 
positions. 
Fernanda, local 
community resident 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
1.5 hours 
and weekly 
skype 
exchanges 
until 10/13  
H1  
Coordinator at Public 
Prosector;s office on 
Social Movements 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
25/01/13 1 hour H4  
Local community 
leader 
 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 30 minutes   
Machado, Public 
Prosecutor 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H5  
  440 
Community relations 
head at Barro Ato 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
15/01/13 15 minutes   
Head of Social 
Performance, Anglo 
American, London HQ 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Social 
investment 
12/02/13 1.5 hours H6  
Former, Head of 
Social Performance, 
Anglo American, 
London 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
20/02/13 30 minutes   
       
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside 
the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and 
practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and 
conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my 
research phenomenon. 
  
London Business My The need to critically 09/07/11 20 minutes   
  441 
School, focuses on 
critical CSR 
presentation 
of Colla case 
study at Egos 
analyse and focus on 
community perspective and 
less on corporate as it is a 
given. 
Community Leader of 
community near 
several mines in far 
northern Chile 
His own 
community in 
Sierra Gorda, 
several  
Met at social responsibility 
for mining conference in 
Santiago and also spoke 
over phone one year later. 
Community organization, 
relations with mining 
companies and identity 
20-22/10/11 and 
10/11/12 
2 hours   
Facebook “Mining 
company – community 
relations in Conga, 
Peru” page 
Participated in 
social forum 
over two 
week.  
Asked questions around the 
drivers for protest and 
conflict in Conga and about 
community identity and its 
importance 
July 2012 Six 
questions 
and answers 
  
Social movement 
activist for indigenous 
people’s and 
filmmaker 
Huasco 
Valley 
Phone and in person 
interviews. Filmed 
documentary and stayed at 
Clementina’s farm. Spoke 
about drivers of 
community perceptions and 
20/07/12 (phone), 
emails and 
17/10/12 
2 hours and 
three emails 
  
  442 
positions of Barrick Gold 
Community Activist in 
Lancashire against 
Fracking 
Her 
community’s 
action against 
extractive 
sector project 
in UK context  
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
30/06/12 and 
10/07/12 
2 hours   
Activists of NGO 
“Frack Off” as well as 
several local 
community members 
in Lancashire 
Fracking in 
Lancashire 
At community meeting 
about local fracking 
proposals. Community 
motives for protest or for 
indifference 
30/06/12 30 minutes   
Couple defending 
community against 
nearby coal mine in 
Merthyr Tydfill – UK 
context of such 
conflicts 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
5 days spent talking with 
couple and their friends on 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine. 
8/7/12-12/7/12 8 hours   
Four Local councillors 
in Merthyr Tydfill 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
10/07/12 1.5 hours   
  443 
about nearby coal 
mine 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine 
Academic - Cardiff 
School of Planning 
and Geography, 
focuses on local 
community 
movements against 
mining and climate 
change in Wales  
Community 
movements in 
general 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization. 
Several email 
exchanges 
between July – 
October, 2012 
3 lengthy 
emails 
received 
  
Master’s class of 
Environmental law at 
Unisantos university, 
Brazil 
Brazilian 
communities 
in general 
affected by 
mining 
Identities, culture, relations 
with companies, history 
and environmental impacts 
22/08/12 1.5 hours   
Head of community 
relations, Petrobras 
Sao José dos Campos 
refinery, Brazil 
Local 
community 
relations  
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
15/09/12 1.5 hours   
  444 
Head of Social 
Development, Anglo 
American, Santiago, 
Chile 
Local 
community 
relations at 
Chilean mines 
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
09/10/12 1 hour   
Professor - Social 
Movements academic 
Social 
movements in 
CSR context 
Email exchanges Motives 
for protest and for non-
protest in mining 
communities 
25/10/12 1 detailed 
email reply 
  
Professor - Sociologist 
in sustainability at 
Universidad Católica, 
Chile 
Social 
movements 
and 
community 
participation 
Why communities react the 
way they do towards 
mining in Chile 
31/10/12 1 hour   
Head of Sustainability, 
National Mining 
Company, Chile 
Mining 
company –
community 
relations in 
Chile, in 
particular 
about Colla 
Motives and reasons for 
mining company 
community relations in 
Chile and how to improve 
these 
08/11/12 1 hour   
  445 
Director of 
Community relations, 
Collahuasi Mine (part 
owned by Anglo 
American), Santiago, 
Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
12/11/12 30 minutes   
mining company 
community relations 
consultant, Santiago, 
Chile 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
13/11/12 40 minutes   
Professor - Renowned 
Chilean anthropologist 
for Northern 
Indigenous 
communities. 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
History, Identity and 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
14/11/12 1 hour   
Social and Community 
Auditor Barrick Gold 
Peru and Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations and 
CSR 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts and Identity. 
27/11/12 30 minutes   
  446 
Environmental activist 
on mining 
communities 
especially in Huasco 
Valley 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
Capitalism, mining 
companies, Chilean 
government, reason why 
mining is permitted so 
easily in Chile - 
philosophical 
28/11/12 and  and  
consequent f 
email contact 
until 09/13 
1.5 hours   
researcher and activist 
– anti mining in 
Northern Chile, 
defender of 
Indigenous peoples 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
ILO169, Indigenous 
identity, mining 
community - conflicts in 
Chile, drivers of 
community positions 
29/11/12 1 hour   
Head of Indigenous 
Affairs, Chilean 
government 
Government- 
mining 
company – 
indigenous 
community 
relations  
Drivers behind local 
indigenous community 
relations with mining 
company in northern Chile.  
14/11/12 and 
0212/12 
1.5 hours   
Human geographer 
Academic, Director 
Sustainability Centre, 
Universidad Católica 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations/posit
How to present my data of 
different perceptions and 
positions  
03/12/12 1 hour   
  447 
Chile ions 
 
Sustainability 
Manager, Alcoa, 
Brazil 
Company - 
community 
relations in 
company 
operations in 
Amazon and 
South East 
Brazil 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
18/12/12 1 hour   
Leading sociologist on 
Social movements, 
Collective action in 
extractives sector 
communities in USA 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
action in 
extractives 
sector 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
01/12/12 1 email 
reply 
  
co-author of book 
analysing factors of 
community 
mobilization of LNG 
plants in USA 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
action in 
extractives 
sector in her 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
18/12/12 1 email 
reply 
  
  448 
book 
Business Development 
Director at Zamin 
Resources Mining 
company, bought over 
Pedra Branca mine 
from Anglo American 
December 2012. 
Mining 
company –
community/go
vernment 
relations in 
South 
America  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
07/01/13 1.5 hours   
Professor - Political 
Sciences, University 
of Brasilia, Social 
movement researcher 
Social 
movement in 
Brazil, 
literature, 
Paracatu 
community 
Factors leading to 
collective action in Brazil 
with case of Paracatu that 
she knows 
17/01/13 1 hour   
Mining in Peru 
focused Academics, 
practitioners, NGO 
representatives, Anglo 
American 
governmental relations 
at conference on 
Extractives in Peru at 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Peru 
Impacts of mining and Peru 
and drivers of company - 
community relations  
04/03/13 6 hours   
  449 
UCL 
Retired Head of 
Mining Operation, Rio 
Tinto 
Mining 
company 
operations and 
community 
relations in 
South 
American 
Mining company strategies 
for community relations  
Monthly meetings 
since 05/05/13 
10 hours   
Head of international 
NGO on communities 
affected by mining 
Mining 
company – 
community 
conflict in 
South 
America 
Mining company – 
community conflict in 
South America 
30/08/13 1 hour   
Interviewee Case Study Context of Interview Dates of 
meetings or 
communication 
Duration of 
interview(s) 
conversatio
ns 
Interviewee 
Code (if 
quoted in 
thesis) 
Referenced 
Interviewee 
transcript/ 
page 
number 
Summary - Pedra Branca, Amapa, Brazil: 7 days and one visit with two telephone interviews one year after. Interviewed 12 Anglo 
American executives, Conducted Focus Group and Drawing activity with 20 new local recruits, 10 local community residents and 
  450 
six local government officials. 
Community relations 
coordinator, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
6-11/01/12 3 hours total A2  
Health & Safety 
manager and Dam 
Specialist, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 1 hour   
Two basic operators, 
mining operators, 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 30 minutes   
Explorations manager, 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
7/1/12 30 minutes   
20 new entrant 
employees from local 
community at Anglo 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Company and Community 
Identity 
8/1/12 1.5 hours   
  451 
American Anglo 
American 
Head of HR and 
sustainability, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
8/1/12 1 hour   
Two experienced 
miners, mining 
operators, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
8/1/12 45 minutes   
Head of Institutional 
Relations, Anglo 
American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
In person and Skype calls 
with Jarilon Relations with 
local community, company 
and community identity, 
local history 
8/1/12 3 hours and 
two Skype 
conversation
s 
  
Trade union leader Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 15 minutes A4  
 President of the Pedra Branca, Relations with local 9/1/12 30 minutes A3  
  452 
municipal chamber, 
Pedra Branca 
Amapa, Brazil community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
Long term resident in 
Pedra Branca also an 
ex independent gold 
miner currently suing 
Anglo American 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations and Conflict with 
local community, company 
and community identity, 
local history 
9/1/12 45 minutes A1  
Together with JVisits 
to four residents in 
Pedra Branca area 
from Anglo American  
we drove around 30km 
to deliver hundreds of 
Açai seedlings 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
9/1/12 4 hours   
Head of Social 
Assistance at local 
government 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 15 minutes   
Representatives of Pedra Branca, Relations with local 
community, company and 
10/1/12 30 minutes A4  
  453 
Environmental agency Amapa, Brazil community identity, local 
history 
Former Federal 
politician now Head of 
Municipal Education 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 30 minutes   
Four Local residents in 
town including a 
pharmacy owner 
Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
10/1/12 1 hour A4  
Head of CSR Pedra Branca, 
Amapa, Brazil 
Relations with local 
community, company and 
community identity, local 
history 
11/1/12 2 hours   
       
Summary: Los Colla and Kinross Maricunga, Chile – 22 days of five visit over 3.5 years. Interviewed 
Four company executives repeatedly over this period. Interviewed three Colla community leaders 
repeatedly over this time period.  
  
Vice President 
Corporate Affairs, 
Colla 
Community, 
Corporate identity, culture, 
CSR policy, Community 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 and 
2 hours and 
several 
  
  454 
Kinross Gold Chile Relations - Drivers and 
Perceptions 
21/10/11 email 
exchanges 
Community Relations 
officer, Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Corporate Identity, 
community relations, CSR 
- Drivers and Perceptions 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010 
24/10/11 
8 hours of 
shadowing 
and 
conversation
s 
  
Focus group with 11 
executives from 
Kinross Gold 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Focus group on Corporate 
Identity with individual 
and collective drawings 
and discussion 
24/10/11 3 hours   
Community relations 
officer, replacing 
Carolina 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Community history, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
19/10/12 2 hours   
 (Colla Community 
Leaders) and two 
women leaders 
Colla 
Community, 
Chile 
Relations with 
neighbouring mines, 
reasons behind these 
relations, their Identity and 
Culture 
Throughout 2009 
and 2010, 
25/10/11 and 
20/10/12 
5 hours B1  
  455 
       
Summary – Paracatu - Kinross, Brazil – 25 days of three visits over 15 months with constant email 
and telephone interviews since first visit. Interviewed 68 local community residents, 12 Kinross 
executives and four local government representatives. 
  
Locally Elected 
Councillor 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Spoke on a daily basis over 
15 days, made field visits 
together, exchanged email 
communication. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
15/03/12, 08-
09/12, 01/13 - 
04/13 
18 hours 
approximate
ly 
C2  
Long term resident Paracatu, 
Brazil 
In Paracatu, London and 
over email. Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, 
11/08/12 and 
01/13 – 04/13 
4 hours  C1  
Barber Paracatu, Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
18/11/11 30 minutes C12  
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Brazil affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
Four Field visits to 
Sao Domingos 
Quilombo (Maroon) 
next to mine. Spoke to 
eight residents  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine. 
16/11/11, and 
three times 
between 08-09/12 
5 hours C3   
Head of Afro-
Brazilian NGO and 
former candidate for 
local councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
current affairs, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
18/11/11 and four 
times between 08-
09/12 
5 hours C4  
Head of Sao 
Domingos 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Maroon Community 
history, identity, culture, 
internal conflicts, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16/11/11, 29-
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
3 hours  C36  
Medical Doctor and 
former elected local 
Paracatu, Two visits to neighbouring 
communities to the mine 
19/11/11, 
21/11/11 and 
5 hours C5  
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councillor  Brazil and one interview in office. 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
05/09/12 
local cultural leader, 
social 
entrepreneurship 
initiative 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
5 hours C6  
Socialist party and 
neighbourhood leader 
and activist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
17/11/11 1 hour C7  
Now Former Director 
of Community 
Relations and 
Communications, 
Kinross Gold 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
engagement, investment, 
identity and culture. 
19/11/11, 
06/09/12 and 
16/01/13 
6 hours C8  
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10 Kinross Gold Cross 
Section Management 
Executives 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions, and identity 
and culture 
06/09/12 1.5 hours C13  
Community Relations 
Officer 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Visited social projects 
financed by Kinross and 
spoke to the project 
managers and beneficiaries  
06/09/12 and 
16/01/13 
2 hours C14  
Community Relations 
Officer 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Visited two community 
leaders to speak about 
community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
06/09/12 4 hours C15  
Local café owner Paracatu, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
- community relations  
19/11/11 and 
04/09/12 
45 minutes C35  
Local entrepreneur 
leader  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
19/11/11 1,5 hours C9  
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impacts from mine 
Visits together with 
Councillor to four 
families living besides 
the mine 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Impacts from mining on 
community and relations 
and perception of the mine 
19/11/11 4 hours C10  
community leader lost 
land years ago due to 
tailings dam. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20/11/11 and 
31/08/12 
2 hours C11  
President of Trade 
Union at Kinross Gold  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Worker relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
10/09/12 
2 hours C12  
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
21/11/11 and 
email 10/02/13 
2 hours C37  
Focus group session 
with 12 students aged 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
22/11/11 1,5 hours C38  
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11 – 17  affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Radio journalist, and 
wife well known local 
radio and TV 
journalist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
22/11/11, 
04/09/12 and 
06/09/12 radio 
interview 
5 hours C15  
head of hospital 
management 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/11/11 30 minutes C16  
Lawyer Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/11/11 15 minutes C17  
Long term resident 
and Secretary of 
Caritas Social Justice 
NGO 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
29/08/12 1 hour C18  
Lady who works in Paracatu, Community history, 29/08/12 40 minutes C19  
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Culture and Education 
and civil society 
campaigner, also 
mother of Community 
relations official  from 
Kinross 
Brazil identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
State Deputy politician 
and was socialist 
mayor candidate 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
30/08/12 1.5 hours C20  
elderly hotel owner 
and landowner 
affected by mine 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 1 hour C21  
Sociology Lecturer 
and his students at 
Finom University in 
Paracatu who did his 
Master’s thesis on Sao 
Domingos Maroon 
and its Identity 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
07/09/12 3 hours C22  
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 (Priest) of Paracatu Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 and 
10/01/13 
1.5 hours C23  
Ex-employee of Mine Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Culture and identity of 
mining company.  
07/09/12 2 hours C11  
owner of local 
newspaper, 
environmental NGO 
and former anti-
mining activist  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
31/08/12 30 minutes C24  
well known in 
community to 
opposing mine and 
own neighbours in 
Maroon. 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
02/09/12 2 hours C25  
Owner of 
Environmental NGO 
and also former critic 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
10/09/12 1 hour C26  
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of Kinross impacts from mine 
local cultural and 
artistic leader and 
hotel owner 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
03/09/12 2 hours C27  
Community leader 
fighting construction 
of other mine near his 
home and also former 
dam engineer at 
Kinross 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
09-15/01/13 Met, spoke 
and drove 
around 
everyday to 
meet other 
residents. 
6 hours 
approximate 
C28  
Parents of lady 
Kinross official took 
me to interview, 
affected by dam 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/01/13 1 hour C29  
Neighbourhood leader, Paracatu, Community history, 11/01/13 1 hour C30  
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located nearest to 
tailings dam 
Brazil identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
Elderly couple living 
very near mine, 
isolated and without 
water supply 
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/01/13 1 hour C31  
President of Municipal 
Chamber and Elected 
Councillor  
Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Community history, 
identity, culture, current 
affairs, relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/01/13 30 minutes C32  
Communications 
officer from municipal 
government 
  16-20/11/11, 
15/03/12 and 
between 08-09/12 
2 hours C33  
Two local journalists Paracatu, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
10/01/13 30 minutes C34  
Former Kinross Email Mining company influence 03-04/14  C39  
  465 
Manager strategies with community 
and government 
       
Summary - Los Caimanes, Chile: One visit 4 days in total. In-depth interviews with two local 
community leaders and short interviews with 42 local community residents, 1 expert on the conflict, 
1 lawyer defending community and 1 company consultant 
  
Archeoastronomer, 
and defender of Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
03/10/12 3 hours   
Lawyer defending Los 
Caimanes 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Community, identity, 
culture, relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
03/10/12 30 minutes   
Community Relations 
consultant for 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of Community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Dam, impacts from mine 
06/10/12 and 
26/10/12 
2 hours   
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Community activist 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Between 07/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
6 hours 
approximate 
D1  
Community leader 
defending against 
Pelambres mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
4 hours 
approximate 
  
Parents of Community 
leaders who are former 
Community Leaders 
against Pelambres 
mine 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Dam, 
impacts from mine 
08/10/12 1 hour   
40 different local 
community residents 
including priest 
Los 
Caimanes, 
Chile 
Going from house to house 
to collect signatures for 
Protection Remedy to hand 
to courts. Perceptions of 
Between 08/10/12 
– 13/10/12 
Conversatio
ns between 
10 – 120 
minutes 
  
  467 
Dam, history of personal 
and community conflict 
with mine, identity, culture, 
with each 
participant 
       
Summary – Huasco Valley, Chile: One visit 10 days in total. Further interviews over email since. 
Interview 12 local community residents (some repeatedly), several knowledgeable experts and did 
not get access to company officials to discus this community conflict. 
  
Local environmental 
activist representing 
OLCA and candidate 
for councillor 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20/10/12 and 
consequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
2 hours   
Elderly grape farmer 
who gave me 
accommodation 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
20-27/10/12 5 hours 
approximate
ly 
  
Niece of elderly grape Huasco Travelled with her to local 21-27/10/12 and  12 hours E1  
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farmer lady and local 
indigenous leader 
Valley, Chile community meetings and 
spoke of history of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
approximate
ly 
Local Priest Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23 and 26/10/12 2 hours E3  
local indigenous 
leader and candidate 
for councillor and 
former mine worker 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
23/10/12 2 hours E2  
Non-participant 
observation at 
community meeting 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
23/10/12 3 hours E2  
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lead leaders to 
convince community 
to sign and join their 
collective class action 
against Barrick Gold 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
local community 
resident and artist 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
23/10/12 30 minutes E2  
Three sons-in-Laws of 
eldery grape farmer 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
Identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
Local Shopkeeper Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
24/10/12 15 minutes   
 local community 
leader and activist 
against mine 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1.5 hours   
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82 year old resident of 
the valley 
Huasco 
Valley, Chile 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
26/10/12 1 hour   
Bishop of Copiapo, 
150km from Huasco 
Valley 
Copiapo, 
Chile 
Met at cathedral to speak 
about refusal to accept 
US$1m donation from 
Barrick, mining company 
community relations and 
conflicts. 
29/10/12 20 minutes   
Summary: Mariana, Brazil – proposed open cast mine 4km from historic centre. One visit of 7 days. 
Interviewed 15 local community residents in person and by email. Also gave two guest lectures at 
universities and discussed my research with students. Spoke with one local government councillor 
and one Public Prosecutor Did not get access to Vale mining company. 
  
Local resident sat next 
to me on bus, whose 
husband works as a 
miner 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 1 hour   
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Local burger and beer 
stand owner and 
community leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
6/12/12 30 minutes   
Opposing figure to 
mine and girlfriend, 
young technical 
engineering teacher 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
6/12/12  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
3 hours F1  
 Local elected 
councillor 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
6/12/12 2 hours F5  
NGO Director owns 
social NGO and also 
works for Kinross in 
Paracatu 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
perceptions and conflict 
with mines 
7/12/12 2 hours F3  
Sociology lecturer Mariana, Interview and several email 
exchanges - History of 
7/12/12 2 hours and 
four email 
F2  
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Brazil personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
exchanges 
History Professor and 
wife Sociology 
Professor  
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Interview and also gave 
class for History students at 
University. History of 
personal and community 
conflict with mine, 
identity, culture, relations 
with and perceptions of 
Mine, impacts from mine 
9/12/12 and 
14/12/12  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
3 hours   
Mining worker’s trade 
union leader 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Email exchange of 
questions relating to 
History of personal and 
community conflict with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
13/12/12 Two lengthy 
emails 
F4  
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Three young sales 
assistants at chocolate 
store 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
Barber Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 30 minutes   
Café store owner Mariana, 
Brazil 
Relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 20 minutes   
15 University students 
from guest lecture at 
Univerdade Federal de 
Ouro Preto 
Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
11/12/12 1 hour   
Public Prosecutor Mariana, 
Brazil 
History of relations with 
mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
12/12/12 1 hour   
Bishop of Mariana Mariana, History of relations with 12/12/12 30 minutes   
  474 
Brazil mine, identity, culture, 
relations with and 
perceptions of Mine, 
impacts from mine 
       
Summary: Barro Alto, Brazil – One visit of 7 days. Interviewed three Anglo American executives, 
four NGO workers funded by by Anglo American, 13 local community residents and one local 
councillor 
  
Director of 
Communities, Anglo 
Nickel Head Office 
Sao Paulo 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
28/12/13 1 hour   
Head of CARE NGO 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19/01/13 1 hour G2  
officer at Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Several site visits to social 
projects. History of mining 
19-22/01/13 4 hours G2  
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by Anglo American company – community 
relations, conflict, 
community perceptions, 
identity and positions. CSR 
initiatives. 
Secretary, Head of 
CARE NGO funded 
by Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19-22/01/13 1hour   
Head of Community 
relations, Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19 and 22/01/13 2 hours G1  
Three teenagers who 
attend music school 
funded by Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 1 hour   
Cleaner at CARE, 
Local Resident, Barro 
Barro Alto, Community identity and 
culture and perceptions of 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
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Alto Brazil Anglo 
local supermarket 
owner 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
19/01/13 45 minutes G3  
elderly lady, husband 
and daughter critical 
of Anglo American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
21/01/13 1 hour G4  
Two boys on rural 
farm beneficiaries of 
Anglo’s social 
investment 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
Perceptions of Anglo 20/01/13 30 minutes   
Local councillor Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 30 minutes   
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Couple who are local 
activists and leaders 
for civil rights and 
anti-corruption 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
21/01/13 1 hour   
Head of Agenda 
Publica NGO for 
strengthening local 
government capacity 
and transparency, 
financed by Anglo 
American 
20/01/13 History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Local 
government corruption and 
capacity 
21/01/13 1 hour   
Manager Community 
relations, Anglo 
American 
Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
20/01/13 1 hour G5  
Taxi Driver to airport Barro Alto, 
Brazil 
History of mining company 
– community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
23/01/13 3 hours G6  
  478 
positions. CSR initiatives. 
       
Summary: Conceiçao de Mato Dentro, Brazil – one visit of 3 days. Interviewed 7 local community 
members, two State prosectors, two Anglo American executives and one former executive 
  
local resident and 
Maroon community 
leader affected by 
mine 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H2  
Pamela, local 
community resident 
 
 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1.5 hours H3  
Fernanda, local 
community resident 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13  and  
consequent 
frequent email 
contact until 
09/13 
1.5 hours 
and weekly 
skype 
exchanges 
until 10/13  
H1  
Coordinator at Public 
Prosector;s office on 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
25/01/13 1 hour H4  
  479 
Social Movements Brazil perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
Local community 
leader 
 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 30 minutes   
Machado, Public 
Prosecutor 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
26/01/13 1 hour H5  
Community relations 
head at Barro Ato 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
15/01/13 15 minutes   
Head of Social 
Performance, Anglo 
American, London HQ 
Conceiçao de 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. Social 
investment 
12/02/13 1.5 hours H6  
Former, Head of Conceiçao de Community relations, 20/02/13 30 minutes   
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Social Performance, 
Anglo American, 
London 
Mato Dentro, 
Brazil 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
       
Below are over 30 interviews I conducted with knowledgeable experts on my case studies who live outside 
the affected communities, also other community members, academics, company executives and 
practitioners not related to any of my case studies who work with company - community relations and 
conflicts in the extractives sector. These interviews helped shape my knowledge and understanding of my 
research phenomenon. 
  
London Business 
School, focuses on 
critical CSR 
My 
presentation 
of Colla case 
study at Egos 
The need to critically 
analyse and focus on 
community perspective and 
less on corporate as it is a 
given. 
09/07/11 20 minutes   
Community Leader of 
community near 
several mines in far 
northern Chile 
His own 
community in 
Sierra Gorda, 
several  
Met at social responsibility 
for mining conference in 
Santiago and also spoke 
over phone one year later. 
Community organization, 
relations with mining 
20-22/10/11 and 
10/11/12 
2 hours   
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companies and identity 
Facebook “Mining 
company – community 
relations in Conga, 
Peru” page 
Participated in 
social forum 
over two 
week.  
Asked questions around the 
drivers for protest and 
conflict in Conga and about 
community identity and its 
importance 
July 2012 Six 
questions 
and answers 
  
Social movement 
activist for indigenous 
people’s and 
filmmaker 
Huasco 
Valley 
Phone and in person 
interviews. Filmed 
documentary and stayed at 
Clementina’s farm. Spoke 
about drivers of 
community perceptions and 
positions of Barrick Gold 
20/07/12 (phone), 
emails and 
17/10/12 
2 hours and 
three emails 
  
Community Activist in 
Lancashire against 
Fracking 
Her 
community’s 
action against 
extractive 
sector project 
in UK context  
Community relations, 
conflict, community 
perceptions, identity and 
positions. 
30/06/12 and 
10/07/12 
2 hours   
Activists of NGO 
“Frack Off” as well as 
Fracking in At community meeting 
about local fracking 
30/06/12 30 minutes   
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several local 
community members 
in Lancashire 
Lancashire proposals. Community 
motives for protest or for 
indifference 
Couple defending 
community against 
nearby coal mine in 
Merthyr Tydfill – UK 
context of such 
conflicts 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
5 days spent talking with 
couple and their friends on 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine. 
8/7/12-12/7/12 8 hours   
Four Local councillors 
in Merthyr Tydfill 
about nearby coal 
mine 
Open cast 
coal mine in 
Merthyr 
Tydfill 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization, 
relations and perceptions of 
mine 
10/07/12 1.5 hours   
Academic - Cardiff 
School of Planning 
and Geography, 
focuses on local 
community 
movements against 
mining and climate 
Community 
movements in 
general 
Motives for activism, 
identity, community 
identity, organization. 
Several email 
exchanges 
between July – 
October, 2012 
3 lengthy 
emails 
received 
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change in Wales  
Master’s class of 
Environmental law at 
Unisantos university, 
Brazil 
Brazilian 
communities 
in general 
affected by 
mining 
Identities, culture, relations 
with companies, history 
and environmental impacts 
22/08/12 1.5 hours   
Head of community 
relations, Petrobras 
Sao José dos Campos 
refinery, Brazil 
Local 
community 
relations  
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
15/09/12 1.5 hours   
Head of Social 
Development, Anglo 
American, Santiago, 
Chile 
Local 
community 
relations at 
Chilean mines 
Engaging with local 
community over 
contentious issues and over 
social investment 
09/10/12 1 hour   
Professor - Social 
Movements academic 
Social 
movements in 
CSR context 
Email exchanges Motives 
for protest and for non-
protest in mining 
communities 
25/10/12 1 detailed 
email reply 
  
Professor - Sociologist 
in sustainability at 
Social 
movements 
Why communities react the 
way they do towards 
31/10/12 1 hour   
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Universidad Católica, 
Chile 
and 
community 
participation 
mining in Chile 
Head of Sustainability, 
National Mining 
Company, Chile 
Mining 
company –
community 
relations in 
Chile, in 
particular 
about Colla 
Motives and reasons for 
mining company 
community relations in 
Chile and how to improve 
these 
08/11/12 1 hour   
Director of 
Community relations, 
Collahuasi Mine (part 
owned by Anglo 
American), Santiago, 
Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
12/11/12 30 minutes   
mining company 
community relations 
consultant, Santiago, 
Chile 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
13/11/12 40 minutes   
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Professor - Renowned 
Chilean anthropologist 
for Northern 
Indigenous 
communities. 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Chile 
History, Identity and 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts 
14/11/12 1 hour   
Social and Community 
Auditor Barrick Gold 
Peru and Chile 
Company - 
community 
relations and 
CSR 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
conflicts and Identity. 
27/11/12 30 minutes   
Environmental activist 
on mining 
communities 
especially in Huasco 
Valley 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
Capitalism, mining 
companies, Chilean 
government, reason why 
mining is permitted so 
easily in Chile - 
philosophical 
28/11/12 and  and  
consequent f 
email contact 
until 09/13 
1.5 hours   
researcher and activist 
– anti mining in 
Northern Chile, 
defender of 
Indigenous peoples 
Capitalism 
and mining 
industry 
ILO169, Indigenous 
identity, mining 
community - conflicts in 
Chile, drivers of 
community positions 
29/11/12 1 hour   
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Head of Indigenous 
Affairs, Chilean 
government 
Government- 
mining 
company – 
indigenous 
community 
relations  
Drivers behind local 
indigenous community 
relations with mining 
company in northern Chile.  
14/11/12 and 
0212/12 
1.5 hours   
Human geographer 
Academic, Director 
Sustainability Centre, 
Universidad Católica 
Chile 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations/posit
ions 
How to present my data of 
different perceptions and 
positions  
03/12/12 1 hour   
 
Sustainability 
Manager, Alcoa, 
Brazil 
Company - 
community 
relations in 
company 
operations in 
Amazon and 
South East 
Brazil 
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
18/12/12 1 hour   
Leading sociologist on 
Social movements, 
Collective action in 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
01/12/12 1 email 
reply 
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extractives sector 
communities in USA 
action in 
extractives 
sector 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
co-author of book 
analysing factors of 
community 
mobilization of LNG 
plants in USA 
Social 
movements, 
Collective 
action in 
extractives 
sector in her 
book 
Different levels of factors 
which drive communities 
to mobilize or not mobilize 
against nearby extractives 
projects 
18/12/12 1 email 
reply 
  
Business Development 
Director at Zamin 
Resources Mining 
company, bought over 
Pedra Branca mine 
from Anglo American 
December 2012. 
Mining 
company –
community/go
vernment 
relations in 
South 
America  
Drivers behind company - 
community relations and 
community positions 
07/01/13 1.5 hours   
Professor - Political 
Sciences, University 
of Brasilia, Social 
movement researcher 
Social 
movement in 
Brazil, 
literature, 
Paracatu 
Factors leading to 
collective action in Brazil 
with case of Paracatu that 
she knows 
17/01/13 1 hour   
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community 
Mining in Peru 
focused Academics, 
practitioners, NGO 
representatives, Anglo 
American 
governmental relations 
at conference on 
Extractives in Peru at 
UCL 
Mining 
company 
community 
relations in 
Peru 
Impacts of mining and Peru 
and drivers of company - 
community relations  
04/03/13 6 hours   
Retired Head of 
Mining Operation, Rio 
Tinto 
Mining 
company 
operations and 
community 
relations in 
South 
American 
Mining company strategies 
for community relations  
Monthly meetings 
since 05/05/13 
10 hours   
Head of international 
NGO on communities 
affected by mining 
Mining 
company – 
community 
conflict in 
South 
Mining company – 
community conflict in 
South America 
30/08/13 1 hour   
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Appendix B 
Examples of first rounds of coding from the initial interview transcripts based on first 
field research trip. Coding of an interview with NGO representative in Paracatu 
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Example of second order coding (IN CAPS) as per perspective (Community on 
Company’s identity) 
The mine’s vision here is all about profit maximization, just making profits. Now it’s 
even stronger with GoldMin. Their relationship with the community is about dominance. 
They leave very little behind. More moderate people here don’t want the mine to leave. 
They should have more democratic relations here. They’re not investing enough 
here………if you count the 30 years they mine here and consider 1 million reais it’s very 
little……………Kinross distributes crumbs to social projects. Each project gets around 
10, 15, 20, 30 thousand reais per project it’s very little for the amount of profits it takes 
from here in Paracatu. The Mayor has no power to get the company to pay 
more………….The company don’t listen to the population on issues of pollution. – 
UNGENEROUS, PROFIT FOCUSED, ABUSE POWER, ARROGANT 
 
The mine is not responsible for her acts or damages, cracks in houses, dust and the 
detonations. The mine doesn’t relate well with the community. people with money can 
get compensation but poor people can’t. they don’t negotiate with the community they 
negotiate with people as individuals. They divide the community…….They don’t give 
responses to the population. – IRRESPONSIBLE, UNFRIENDLY, ABUSE POWER TO 
DIVIDE AND RULE, DISINGENIOUS 
 
You see that sign about how many days they’ve had no accidents. That’s a lie. The 
managers are trained about silencing anyone who got injured there, they drive them home 
and stop them from saying anything. I’ve heard from reliable sources this is true. 
UNETHICAL AND ABUSE OF POWER 
 
The mine always wins international awards. Someone who was working there told me an 
international organization came here even the bosses start to clean up and those who are 
considered as the lowest skilled workers are put in a truck and taken to the forest and left 
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there for the day so that the foreign visitors can assess the mine for the award. Once the 
foreigners leave the truck goes back for the low skilled workers. I was told this by 
someone who was taken to the forest. – DISINGENIOUS 
 
foreigner that’s here to make profit and destroy the population. There’s nothing more 
than that. They’re controlled by shareholders around the world waiting for results and 
they have no idea of what’s happening here. In the future we could have a destroyed city, 
without work, hunger and a sick population. – PROFIT FOCUSED, FORIEGNER. 
 
The company fires people for any small thing. I know someone was fired after working 
there for twenty years his boss told him he was unmotivated. Most people leave there 
with an illness due to chemical products. – UNETHICAL AND IRRESPONSIBLE 
 
When you see the communication from the mine it makes you cry it’s so beautiful what 
they’re doing. - DISINGENIOUS  
 
The mine keeps imposing its ideas and does not dialogue or listen. – ABUSE POWER 
AND DISINGENIOUS 
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Appendix C 
In this example of coding I was categorizing the data according to four different levels of 
analysis to understand which factors were the strongest in influencing community 
positions towards mining companies. The example provided below is of the four higher 
conflict communities. The darker shaded factors point towards a stronger explanation of 
why conflict is high from a community perspective. I eventually moved on from this 
thinking by combining aspects of these factors with Frooman’s (1999) Resource 
Dependence model as elaborated in the thesis. As shown in the Findings section the data 
is arranged under some of the factors in the above figure, therefore this figure played an 
important role in my interpretation of the data. 
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Appendix D – Socio-Economic-Historic differences between 
Independent and Dependent communities with Company and 
Community influence strategies 
 
Independent Dependent 
History – Communities founded hundreds 
of years ago (pre-Hispanic in the three 
Chile cases). Founded on agriculture.  
History – Communities established and 
grown due to the discovery and exploration 
of minerals between 50 – 300 years ago in 
Brazil. First established by a mix of 
Portuguese conquerors and African 
descended slaves.  
Community Type – Rural and isolated 
with low levels of new migrants. Smaller 
populations varying between 80 – 4,500 
residents. Therefore the community is able 
to develop closer levels of attachment and 
ties with neighbours. Most locals were born 
in these communities and can trace their 
families back several generations within 
the same community. There are just several 
main surnames in these communities. 
Community Type – Urban centres of 
between 5,000 – 85,000 inhabitants. High 
levels of new migrants, communities have 
highly transient populations. Communities 
are not as able to build social ties and 
attachment with others from the 
community due to the transient nature of 
the population. Have large mining activity 
located between 2km – 20km from the 
main settlements. 
Main Economy – agriculture based 
communities. Main form of livelihoods 
from agriculture, though in Caimanes many 
of the local men work in the provision of 
the nearby mining industry.  
Main Economy – revolves around the 
nearby mining projects. The mines are the 
main employers and also generate much of 
the local economies through employment 
and businesses in hotels, restaurants, 
housing, sales of consumer goods and 
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funding of public sector and social projects. 
Main community grievances on impacts 
from mining and Mining company 
influence strategy for gaining SLO – in 
line with the stakeholder influence 
strategies proposed by Frooman (1999) I 
argue that the mining companies in my 
research also devised and executed their 
own influence strategies on their local 
communities in a bid to win their SLO 
from new communities where they were 
starting new operations, which also implies 
making these communities become 
mutually dependent on the mining 
companies, as in the case of the lower 
conflict cases. Mutual dependence as per 
Frooman (1999) gives the mining company 
more power over accessing and controlling 
the critical resource of the SLO. 
 
These influence strategies were based on 
instrumental stakeholder theory 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et 
al., 2004; Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 
1997). The mining companies in general 
attempted to take this key local community 
stakeholder into consideration with the 
objective of gaining their SLO.  
Mining company influence strategy for 
maintaining SLO – in line with the 
stakeholder influence strategies Frooman 
(1999) proposes, I argue that the mining 
companies in my research also devised and 
executed their own influence strategies on 
their local communities with the aim to 
maintain their SLO in communities where 
the majority in the community had already 
accepted them. These influence strategies 
were based on instrumental stakeholder 
theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Freeman et al., 2004; Jones, 1995; Mitchell 
et al., 1997). The mining companies in 
general attempted to take this key local 
community stakeholder into consideration 
with the objective of maintaining their 
SLO, considering the constant demands of 
more benefits sharing from the local 
communities. 
 
In these four communities the mining 
companies have already been operating for 
at least several years (in the case of 
Mariana there are many mining companies 
operating around 25km from the city, 
though the mine in question for my 
research is yet to be given full approval to 
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The mining companies sent many young 
sociologists, anthropologists and 
psychologists out to the communities to 
better understand their perspectives, ways 
of thinking and needs, as much of the 
community relations literature recommends 
for extractives sector companies. 
According to some interviewees this was 
so that the mining companies could utilize 
the information to make them dependent on 
the nearby mining projects. 
 
Tried to implement community investment 
and development policies and initiatives 
based on principles of joint partnerships, 
collaboration, capacity building and 
entrepreneurship, so that they could leave 
communities better off than they found 
them.  
 
After seeing such initiatives were not 
working in gaining their SLO, mining 
companies engaged in what can be 
considered to be co-optation tactics, which 
go against the recommendations in the 
community relations practitioner literature. 
Mining companies used their financial 
open just 4km from the city centre). 
Therefore these mining companies via their 
small community relations teams (which 
usually have at least one staff member from 
the local community) have been engaging 
and dealing with the community for several 
years at least and therefore know its 
identity, culture and needs well. 
 
The mining companies have all followed 
standard CSR and community relations 
procedures for the extractives sector as per 
publications by the IFC and ICMM for 
designing and implementing community 
development initiatives. Such initiatives 
emphasize the importance of joint 
collaboration and even joint funding where 
the communities have to find part of the 
funding for social projects, which the 
mining companies will also finance. The 
main philosophy is not to give handouts to 
the local community but to make them 
learn to become self-sufficient where they 
learn how to fish instead of receiving 
readymade fish on a plate. Typical projects 
may include entrepreneurship courses for 
making biscuits, hairdressing or 
ecotourism. Mining companies also invest 
in health, education and cultural-related 
initiatives and projects. However, it should 
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power to try and win over the support of 
influential members of the local 
communities to at least partially gain their 
SLO, leaving the local community to battle 
internally over why a certain section within 
itself is granting the SLO to the mining 
company. 
 
However, these principles of stakeholder 
theory, community relations and even co-
optation did not work to win over the local 
community’s SLO and in turn make the 
community more dependent or create a 
mutually dependent relationship with the 
nearby mining project (as with the lower 
conflict cases). The mining companies in 
these four cases have failed to reduce 
stakeholder (local community) power as 
per Frooman (1999) after years of trying 
with large sums of money and resources. 
 
 
be underlined that the amount of money 
and resources they spend in these lower 
conflict communities is significantly less 
than in the higher conflict communities. 
The reason being is that as per Frooman 
(1999) the mining companies are aware 
that there is a mutual dependence with the 
local community (as stated on Anglo 
American’s website) and therefore unlike 
with the higher conflict communities where 
the power rests with the local community, 
in these lower conflict cases the power is 
shared and both groups need each other for 
their future welfare. Thus mining 
companies can afford to spend less on 
maintaining their SLO as they know the 
local community is just as dependent upon 
them for their welfare. The quote I was 
frequently given in Paracatu is appropriate 
for summarising this argument “they (the 
mining company) do the absolute minimum 
in terms of CSR to ensure the community 
does not revolt against them.” 
Present day perspective on 
Independence/Dependence on nearby 
mining projects – feel totally independent 
of the mine. In the two indigenous 
community Chilean cases (Colla and 
Diaguita), the community explicitly sense 
Present day perspective on 
Independence/Dependence on nearby 
mining projects – the overall perception is 
that of the nearby mine as either a 
“necessary evil”, as was often quoted in 
Paracatu, to a feeling that without the mine 
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the nearby mining projects depend on their 
approval, i.e., SLO.  
 
Clearly state they do not want CSR or 
“handouts” as they refer to them from the 
mining companies.  
the town and community would cease to 
exist which was explained across all four 
lower conflict communities.  
 
More than willing to participate in mining 
company CSR programmes and would like 
even more CSR investment. 
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Appendix E - Interview Transcripts and Reflections 
 
Interviewee Code A1 – Raymundo – Long term resident in Pedra Branca and 
critical voice towards the nearby mine 
 
Rajiv: I’m interested in hearing your views about the mine to get a more balanced 
perspective. 
 
Raimundo: when I first moved here many years ago there was nobody living here most 
people I saw were English, speaking English, black creole people they spoke English and 
French and Patois. Very few Brazilian were here.  
 
Rajiv: why has this town grown so much? 
 
Raimundo: due to the mine, it’s good for job generation. But for those who have roots 
here and were and gold-miners like myself it was bad. They threw us out from where we 
were. The well in their mine belongs to me and they still haven’t paid me. They’ve stolen 
all of my stuff.  We are a group of 11 there are a total of 18 of us they evicted from the 
land. 
 
We want compensation so far the company is just running us over. The company is not 
complying with the contract we have with them. Within the Mining Conduct they have to 
respect me but they’re not. They have a lot of financial strength. They manage to I 
wouldn’t say but the justice system but influence it so when the judge comes from 
Macapa he’s been sent by the company.  
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The company lawyer told me they actually prefer to settle this is court and I wonder then 
what kind of affinity they have with the ministry of Justice in order to have that level of 
confidence! The company lawyer explained to me very frankly that Eike Batista left lots 
of problems for Anglo when they bought in and they want proof for everything they are 
going through. I told him honestly that I have documents that if I put them on the internet 
we`ll close you down, we know of environmental crimes you have committed there in 
your land where you killed the land and native protected wood. We have photos of this. 
Also of irregular practices. We were outside of their land and the company’s security 
came and told us we couldn’t film. We filmed them cutting down the protected wood. It’s 
an environmental crime. The company was fined. Last year.  
 
I told Sergio the lawyer, we’re planning to go to Brasilia with this issue. We have a right 
to income compensation the company never paid us for damages and losses. We’ve never 
been paid. We’re definitely going to Brasilia it’s just a case of setting the dates. We have 
GPS coordinates to prove the environmental crime. We’ll send it straight to Europe, that 
info will go straight to Europe.  
 
For us who are originally from here 52 years here. I am forced to commit to 
environmental crimes to feed my family, in my freezer I have monkeys and birds I hunted 
as I don’t have any money for food!!!!! It’s shameful for the company. I’m going to go 
and get it to show you the monkey (goes to freezer and brings back dead frozen monkey 
and bird). I hunted this 3-4kg bird that tastes like Turkey and environmental crime! 
 
Rajiv: what’s your perception of this company? if they were a person? 
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Raimundo: they are a person, I’d want them to put themselves in my place and comply 
with laws. I’m different, I’m religious, I love and fear God so I wouldn’t do the same 
with them. Their wealth is a lot.  
 
For others the company is good, for those recent migrants, they have jobs for them. But 
for us the roots from here, the owners of the mines from 52 years, for us the company is 
being really bad, bad. I tell you, honestly if they don’t resolve this I will and I promise I 
will cut off the road with my group having a protest and they won’t have access to the 
mine! 
 
The company violated the property rights of a colleague and they owe him money so we 
had a protest recently.  He’s ill and receives nothing.  
 
Rajiv: have you tried talking to company for example with the two people who brought 
me here? 
 
Raimundo: they’re sent, they’re sent, they’re sent they have no power their boss sends 
them over. The big boss always avoids us. That’s how Eike Batista has become the 
richest man in the world. I don’t want to owe anything to anyone apart from God and 
Jesus Christ. I just want to live within my means, within my means. I don’t believe in 
debts. Some people don’t pay their debts. I want my soul to be clean.  
 
The whole town knows the company owes us. The town is small. Most people in the 
town support the company as they depend on it. 
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I left my area in 1998 working as a gold miner by myself. 
 
Rajiv: Have you ever thought about working at the mine? 
 
Raimundo: Anglo Gold helped the independent gold miners with machinery, built houses 
for them and actually bought their gold from them. But this company doesn’t resolve 
anything. 
 
I told the company lawyer whilst you’re driving around in your air conditioned hi-lux the 
minerals are all falling out of your vehicles in the town and affecting us as it spreads 
around especially from the wheels.    
  
  506 
Interviewee code A2 Interview with Christine  – Community Relations Coordinator 
Anglo American – Pedra Branca de Amaparí  
 
My thoughts:  
Again as in previous cases talking with the community relations person she was always 
on the defensive and insinuating that the company is always right and need to educated 
the local community on what is acceptable or not. In other words set the rules in the 
relationship. 
 
In a response to what the main challenge of her job is “I used to work with soil and now I 
work with people, it’s more complicated” “Sometimes I wonder if it was worth making 
the move to Community relations, you never know in the future I could go back to 
Geology”. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rajiv: How would you compare both local communities Pedra Branca and Serra do 
Navío? 
 
Christine: Serra do Navío was the urban centre, closed and organized of Icom similar to 
Carajás in Pará state. There are rules for getting in and out of there. When Icom left there 
it became a local patrimony but there were a lot invasions and it became deteriorated with 
wooden houses in the middle. After the company left it went downhill.  
 
Pedra Branca was a small village once the mine companies started arriving such as 
Beadle who mine gold and Anglo American the town grew a lot. Here in Pedra Branca 
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most people just know Anglo American but confuse it with MMX who Anglo American 
bought 3 years ago. Beadle was also MBPA before recently. We’ve been trying to change 
people’s perceptions this year in terms of brand name to Anglo American as it used to be 
Anglo Ferrous before. 
 
Anglo American today want to consolidate themselves into one single group and uniform 
across the corporation. In Pedra Branca most people to identity us as Anglo American. 
 
Rajiv: How would you describe the local community’s identity? 
 
Christine: people used to survive from small scale agriculture for self subsistence and it’s 
the same today. Anglo American have encouraged it’s workers to move out of the 
accommodation to the town. I have actually made that move as I don’t like the 
accommodation. It’s an extension of the company, you’re in the company for 24 hours 
that way, you have no personal life! I tell everyone I sleep in my own bed, I eat my own 
food I don’t have to eat from the work refectory. I don’t have to show my identity badge 
when I come in and out of home. The company pays an amount toward your rent in the 
town, but there’s short supply of decent housing  so rent is very expensive. Most housing 
is very basic. So we bought a piece of land and constructed our own small house. I don’t 
regret it at all. It has it’s pros and cons like everything. Living in the accommodation is 
worse overall I think.  
 
Rajiv: how far is the mine from here? 
 
Christine: 13km.  
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Rajiv: Is there any environmental impact on the community from it? 
 
Christine: No none. It is open pit but nobody lives near it. But we get complaints about 
the railway line which cuts the town in two. There is a small community far from here 
what we call river people but they’re very few. Our main problem is related to the 
railway line. Our other main source of complaints comes from the increase in traffic on 
the main road because of more dust or high speeds. As it used to be a really backwards 
city, people don’t have the custom to see cars or even walk on the pavement (Interesting 
as I walked there and was annoyed to find no pavement on main streets) children playing 
in the street. 
 
Rajiv: Whe did the traffic increase? 
 
 
Christine: when MMX arrived. Not so long ago but we are getting lots of complaints lots. 
We’re creating lots of partnerships to address this with the police to get them to stop 
more drivers and with education. Once the police have their radars and monitor on the 
road people slow down but when they leave they drive fast again. We’ve had meetings 
with suppliers too with those that use heavy vehicles as you’ve been driving fast and seen 
drinking and driving so we have to keep telling them how to behave. As you know 
human beings…..it’s difficult to work with them 
 
Rajiv: now you’re working with humans and not soil as before 
 
Christine: (laughs) yes I know so each person has their own opinion and react differently. 
We speak to the owners of the suppliers and tell them what they’re drivers are doing, if 
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they continue we take their names and they can get fired.  Otherwise it’ll end up being 
very disorganized. 
 
We also have problems with the train, when the dust blows off there from the wind. We 
hear complaints that the train made lots of noise travelling in the early hours.  The train 
line was constructed when Icomi started working here in the 1960’s.  
 
Rajiv: how can the community communicate with you? 
 
Christine: we have lots of channels via email, phone, and they can come and visit us by 
foot as the town is only 5 minutes walk from here. The reason why we are in this trailer is 
located here by the entrance is exactly for community members to have easy access to us 
and so they don’t have to show their ID to get in. it’s a lot easier for them, they don’t 
have to deal with the bureaucracy of getting in. 
 
Christine shows me a communications community relations bulletin paper sent to the 
community with the different communication channels.   
 
Rajiv: are the people in the community generally literate? 
 
Christine: no not really 
 
Rajiv: what about other indirect social impacts such as the excess in men who may drink 
and generate prostitution? 
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Christine: let me show you this research from 2010 Anglo American hired ERM to 
conduct a perceptions study to find out what the main issues should be, all the positive 
and negative points. It forms part o Anglo American’s SEAT. 212 interviews in the area 
with different stakeholders on the government and company. We worked on top of the 
results here so prostitution was mentioned as a negative issue. With relation to under age 
prostitution, high rates of pregnancy and AIDS so we hired “Reprolatino” who focus on 
sexual disease education to come here and raise awareness. They started with workshops 
last year their work is really good.  
 
What else do we do? Education for adults and helping with small scale agriculture. 
(Christine shows me in the material how many people were benefited by which initiatives 
and programmes that were based on the Perception’s study). 
 
Rajiv: you live here in Pedra Branca, would do you think is the general perception of the 
mine? 
 
Christine: look……we have a small problem still called Icomi. That mine came here with 
a paternalistic mentality so it embraced everyone, hired everyone from here, gave them 
housing, they had their own amazing hospital people even came from Macapa (180km) to 
be treated here. The houses were really good also the sanitation. People from Pedra 
Branca knew about that and they wanted the same.  
 
There’s that side but on the other hand when Icomi closed up they simply closed and 
went away in a hurry. They didn’t have a mine closure plan. They just closed and went. 
This still affect us a lot. People think we should have a hospital, improve this and that, 
asphalt the town. We receive lots and lots of complaints and request such as “I want to 
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build a school, can’t you help me?”. Even things such as “we’re building a church so 
we`d like building materials for it”. Everything you can imagine…they’ll look to us for it.  
 
I remember in one focus group I took part in back when I was in the Geology department 
one guy from the local community said he thought the company should build a hospital 
here in Pedra Branca and I looked at him and thought “my god our own employee saying 
that” I stopped him and said the company is a mining company and is here to mine it pays 
its taxes duly it’s not here just taking minerals and leaving. Now if you want to build a 
hospital it’s the municipality or government who have to build it with the resources we 
give to them.  
 
Apart from the federal taxes we also pay a “social fund” of $4m reais or a % to the local 
municipality and it’s more than $4m.  
 
Rajiv: so that should be enough for paying a hospital? 
 
Christine: that money is for specific aims. There’s usually a woman who wans to improve 
her crops so she knocks on our door saying “Anglo” thinking we have resources, that’s 
why we created the Social Fund so these people go and deal with the municipality.  
 
When MMX arrived they invested very heavily socially. Most of the current projects are 
from that time. People here have noticed that and they expect us to invest the same way 
and amount. But back then they didn’t have the social fund. Now we have this fund it 
doesn`t mean we will no longer invest in any social programmes no not at all. If we see a 
project that we like or the Directors like we`ll invest in it too.  
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Rajiv: what kind of project? 
 
Christine: that’s very relative. For example one project we’ve taken on is at the jail in 
Macapa. We’re helping the prisoners get trained up. A garden. Rehabilitate the prisoners 
as it’s so hard for them to find work later. So we created a partnership for this 
programme. We actually recruited 10 ex prisoners at the Santana office. 
 
Rajiv: who took that decision for taking such a project? 
 
Christine: That was Bruno Sé he’s head of Institutional Relations. You can meet him later 
this week. The final word comes from our Director for such initiatives. They actually 
make furniture at the prison for their own enclosures it’s really cool. Even though the 
company had the social fund they still invested in this project.  
 
Rajiv: It was interesting what you said about the employee who said the company should 
build a hospital and how you countered by saying the company should only pay all it’s 
taxes and mine. What do you think is the identity of Anglo American? What makes it 
different and central features? You know Vale and MMX. 
 
Christine: Anglo focuses much more on Safety, it’s the first value and principle. In other 
miners it’s not as important. The sustainability side is growing a lot. We need to change 
our workers a little in that sense because that lad who said what he did about the hospital 
he was a new employee from the town.  
 
Rajiv: do you think what he said was incorrect? 
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Christine: At that moment I thought he was wrong , later I thought maybe he was right 
because he doesn’t understand how a company works “corporatively” this education and 
culture change work we’re doing and it takes time. 
 
Rajiv: Why did Icomi do so much then? Why was it so paternalistic? 
 
Christine: there’s a similar reality in Carajas where I lived. I saw in Serra do Navío it was 
an American style of housing, something you don’t see in Brazil everything nice, front 
lawns, water hoses like in carajas a closed community, we had strict rules about noise and 
times for arriving back. That’s what companies did back in the old times. Vale haven’t 
finished with Carajas but I’ve seen at their other places they’re building their houses in 
the middle of the local communities. People there would say “I live in the Carajas 
housing so I’m superior” so Vale’s vision is changing. Now they’re housing is integrated 
in the community as the company wants their employees to have contact with the 
community. 
 
Rajiv: Why do you think Anglo American has changed their policy and stance compared 
to Icomi from before and not being so generous socially or being paternalistic anymore? 
 
Christine: I think that the mining sector as a whole as changed, I use the example of Vale 
because Vale used to be like Icomi before it used to be advantageous for companies to be 
in control of everyone, however they were creating a financial debt, it wasn’t financially 
viable, people didn’t mix either….what I hear about Icomi is that it imported everything 
from the USA. They never bought anything locally. That paternal mentality has changed, 
and companies now encourage workers to live in the local communities.  
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Our priority here and as a whole at Anglo American is to hire locally, our problem is 
finding qualified skilled labour. For example Christine (me) left geology for community 
relations, do you think we can get somebody from the local community to replace her in 
geology? Not even in Macapa you can find anyone.  
 
Today we have our own technical institute for mining with the first group graduating. 
Workers come from other parts of Brazil such as Minas Gerais. We have that deficiency 
and we get complaints on that. 
 
Rajiv: Who’s complaining about that? 
 
Christine: From the local community and outsourced workers. Anglo today has a 
mentality where it never does social investment by itself, it does everything together in 
partnership with local municipalities and states. 
 
Rajiv: Why that? 
 
Christine: so we don’t assume all the responsibility by ourselves, we want to pursue 
something more sustainable. 
 
Rajiv: so that’s the main focus here? Sustainability. So what do you understand by 
sustainability? (Extremely heavy rains starts to downpour and is very loud as we’re in a 
mobile a trailer) 
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Christine: Anglo American wants the following…referring back to Icomi the inevitable, 
they closed their doors and everyone was left high and dry and now everyone fears that 
Anglo American will do the same. So everything we do today is related to income 
generation or education. There’s no point in coming here proposing a project not linked 
to this. It’s all about the future. The company’s already working on a closure plan as it 
will have to leave some day…the current contract is for 20 years of more mining we are 
legally obliged to develop a mine closure plan. When we leave at least the community 
would be self sufficient. So everything the company does today is linked to sustainability. 
 
Rajiv: how about detonations of rocks when mining? 
 
Chiara: The largest rock is detonated twice a week. 
 
Rajiv: do you have local communities to the mine itself? 
 
Chiara: no nobody just a few river community folk. When I worked in Vale in Pará we 
had serious problems with the local community as it was always vibrating for them so got 
lots of communities. We got a complaint the other day here too about cracked houses due 
to the train that goes past but we’ve been to see the houses and those that were built 
according to civil construction norms do not have cracks….now those houses built in 
whatever way possible they are cracked. They are houses which were built after the 
trainline which is there 50 years ago, they build houses very close to the trainline. 
 
Rajiv: How many people work here at Anglo American? 
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Christine: Just Anglo American employees we have 400 people, 200 here in Pedra 
Branca so 600 in total. If you include outsourced another 700 so 1300 in total.  
 
Rajiv: What percentage of those are from the local community. 
 
Christine: very few, around 10% maximum because of the lack of skill they have. In 
terms of outsourced workers it’s a lot higher. About 20 – 30% are born here in the state 
of Amapá.  
 
Rajiv: so the majority are from other states…. 
 
Christine goes to look up the official figures and also show me the organization chart of 
the mine to arrange future interviews.  
 
Christine: we have a problem here due to the heavy rains from last July. When the floods 
passed through the town it flooded a street over 2 metres. It also went over the railway 
line. Our railway operations had to cease. In that period they started blaming Anglo and 
wanted to close us down so this talk has been going on since July. Even though we’ve 
been helping the community and buying items to help victims of the flood. There was a 
misunderstanding between the mayor and the community and due to that……..this issue 
was left in the air. We’ve been trying to re-establish dialogue and we decided we will buy 
materials to help them. 
Christine: I’m seeing the company through new eyes now because me as Christine came 
from the Geology department…I wasn’t focused in this community part, I used to do my 
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work, come home take a shower and go to bed, I didn’t know much about this community 
relations area. Now I’m seeing the community with new eyes now I look back to my time 
at Vale I think I could have done a lot more in terms of the community. 
 
Rajiv: But what triggered that change in vision you Had? 
 
Christine: Since I got involved in the volunteer work where I helped adult learners here in 
the community and created a programme for them. So I saw it from another perspective 
and as I always tell Osiani we have to show the company internally everything we do, I 
didn`t know about any of this. People in the community know more about what we do 
that people inside the company. 
 
I am an example of this. We spoke to people in the company who didn’t know about our 
community programmes and we then realized we needed to do more. We’ve already seen 
that it’s not enough just stating what we do in the internal newsletter of the company, it’s 
the job of an ant (a constant task little by little) then we can have more face to face 
meetings. The families of workers who come here on family visit days learn more about 
our community programmes than their husbands who work here. We want to show more 
to our internal public what we’re doing with sustainability. I noticed that difference when 
I entered here. There’s so much going on that I think we should let others know.  
 
Rajiv: Do you have a voluntary programme? 
 
Christine: Yes, we do now on family finance education also how to look after your house, 
mechanics. We also hired one person from the course we taught. It’s really cool. The 
company helps us for volunteering. The focus for sustainability today is education and 
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income generation. The company won`t get involved in paternalism like buying gifts for 
the community. At Vale I don’t even remember who worked in the community relations 
department, I had no relations with them in my work in geology. 
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Interviewee Code A3 - Interview with President of Municipal Chamber, Pedra 
Branca 
 
President: from one perspective it’s a necessary evil. Mining in Brazil is seen a giant 
destruction. For our community Pedra Branca it was a really good thing. But in any large 
project in the world you get negative impacts such as prostitution, more crime, 
environmental impacts. We receive around $25 million reais per year in tax revenue so 
the benefits are huge.  
 
If the mine were to close and leave it would be a catastrophe for us. The mine has paid 
around 100 million reais by now. When they leave we`ll think about tourism, agriculture, 
education.  
 
Rajiv: what will happen when the mine leaves? 
 
President: the company is complying with it’s responsibilities and we have to make sure 
we plan for that day. They pay their taxes and have some social projects. 
 
Rajiv: do you think those social projects are enough? 
 
President: yes it is enough. It’s not just the company that has to want to develop social 
projects, society does too and our community isn’t organized enough.  
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(infers the local municipal government is not organized enough to partner with company 
on social investment). 
 
President: Anglo’s mining project is the best thing to ever happen to the state of AMap . 
Yes, there are complaints from the community such as dust, pollution, parking their truck 
in the wrong place. They’re not going to drive 100kph through the town are they? 
 
Rajiv: Not sure about that. 
 
President: which human never makes mistakes? There are some things I think they could 
change. It’s not these multinational companies that have to come here and do everything 
perfect by themselves but the world that asks them to. The world tells them they want 
ecological material. So the company needs to have that global vision. It’s the world that’s 
asking them. Do you live in Europe? Europe’e first world. Today we pay the price for 
Europe polluting and destroying their natural resources. We learn from ignorance.  
 
In my opinion there is no hell there is torture you pay before arriving there. 
 
Rajiv: how would you describe the company’s identity? 
 
President: very friendly, not perfect as only Jesus Christ was perfect, careful with their 
commitments. What is missing today is our lack of participation and responsibility as a 
society, the mayor, councillors it’s us we’re the problem. 
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Rajiv: does the Mayor think like you then? 
 
President: No, and we’ll pay the price later. And our Brazilian society…you’re light 
years ahead of us, we have land water. To get where we have we needed an illiterate 
President. Europe has much less corruption, we have lots of politicians in jail. Our culture 
is of immigrants and Indians. Indian culture is like this, it’s just that, he wants to take 
everything, but we’re in his country, and it’s wrong to see them as our guests as we’re 
their guests! Brazilians are Brazilians and Indian’s are Indians.  
 
The company has a train with such a huge social impact. I heard the company didn’t want 
to let a local resident get on there in Macapa with a fridge but it’s better they let her get 
on as it’s no big problem for them and if they didn’t she want speak badly about them. 
That affects their image in a negative way. Before Councillor I am a citizen. We all need 
to be citizens. The Anglo workers get on that bus with their Anglo badges on their 
uniforms, once they cross half way across the bridge he transforms into an employee of 
Anglo, he doesn’t spit on the ground, he doesn’t throw litter. When he comes back, half 
way over the bridge he leaves his Anglo mentality behind and he lights up his cigarette, 
he comes back totally different.  
 
I’d like more international companies to come here to teach these values to our 
community. Anglo need to get more involved in national policy and I’ve told them.     
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Interviewee Code B1 – Three Colla Leaders Interview Transcript and Notes from 
Interview 
Biodiversity is most important for their Identity and Values 
Ricardo: “If we don’t keep fighting we’’ die as a people and we’re recognized by 
UNESCO as a “Living Human Treasure” in Sep 2012, only Indigenous group so this 
strengthens Identity and desire to exist”. 
Frequently refer to 169 – they are protected as government signed. 
Ricardo: “The dust from the mines are killing off our plants, crops and livestock the 
Mines speed up the natural ecological cycle, water is also drying up” 
Ricardo: “We see life differently especially how we see nature we co-exist with nature 
unlike occidental culture. We see mountains as part of our cosmovision”.  
 
Ricardo: We have 3 lawsuits against companies for their negative impacts they have 
compensate 
 
Ricardo: Before 169 we were always fighting!! We are fighters/battlers its part of our 
culture. 
 
Ricardo: The Spanish gave the land to the COusiños they gave it to Provence we had no 
rights. 
 
Ricardo: we are aware of mining strategies of dividing and ruling us but we are strong as 
a collective community and they don’t understand that. 
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Monthly meetings ALL community in formal way. They built their own community 
centre. 
 
Ricardo: Kinross are stringy they want to pay just 2000 punds per agriculture project to 
us. Wanted to leave in 9 palos for whole community. Kinross helps other communities 
which don’t even exist with 50,000 pounds buying houses for them etc! 
 
Lorries have turned over and spilled acid – stops transhumance (showed me photos of 
spills). 
 
Ricardo: Kinross want us to stop existing! 
 
Ricardo: Mining companies are currently blackmailing and threatening Chilean 
government of pulling out investments if they don’t do things their way, for 
Environmental Certificate. 
 
Ricardo: We are suing the State with ILO169. 
 
Love of land and of family who live up at the top drives them. Identity 
Ricardo: We’re happy with 10 lucas (pounds) a day.  
Ricardo: We want to beat the mines and the State that’s what gives us most satisfaction 
and motivation 
Ricardo: They run over our animals all the injustices they do it gives us satisfaction to 
beat them. 
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I want to take some moneyof them so (Sacarle um chaucho de una minera and) that hurts 
them. It gives me great pleasure they fly over by plane and have to sit here in our HQ in 
this house…they classify us as Indios (derogatory term for Indigenous). 
 
Our love for our neighbours and community to help them rear their livestock. 
 
Ana: They see us as the poor and brute Indians (indios rotos) we hear it being said 
everywhere, but we don’t care, so all the better they come here to sit down with us 
here…here we treat everyone the same…we don’t care they call us with insulting 
nicknames 
Ana: “we don’t need to be professionals, our lives have taught us how to fight….they 
wonder how we know so many things but life is not for free” 
Ana: they affect us with water from the sources they use, we use water from the river 
Ana: “we’re not going to accept money of Casales mining project” We don’t trust 
companies at all in what they say, concerned about animals and future, they wouldn’t 
give us work, they always make false promises and never keep them. My daughter did 
the nursing course to work in Barrick finished it and they won’t give her a job because 
she is the daughter of a Colla!” 
 
They have never hired any of us in 12 years. It makes you so angry…they’re always 
causing harm to our animals, if our animals knew how to talk they would say so many 
things about the way the mining companies have treated them and covered them in dirt. 
 
We’ll never lose hope against the mining companies 
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Ana: (White woman who doesn’t look Colla) “I got accused of not being a real Colla but 
I’ve been living in the hills since 1960 where there were flowers it was beautiful to 
horseride there do you think its nice to go by horse nowadays?” 
 
The paths are full of mining traffic and vehicles…we have to take long routes to avoid 
the traffic…some people say we should get involved in eco-tourism but who’s going to 
want to go over there with the place all destroyed? 
 
Ricardo: Our identity is stronger the more we fight against the mining companies. now 
we oblige any new mining companies to come and speak to us when they try to enter our 
territory, they have to come over here. Here the one’s who is at fault is the State. The 
State is their godfather allows them to be there 
 
Ricardo: Relations are bad because they there’s no respect to us, there’s no respect and 
they don’t apply their CSR policies, they just want to take photos of us together 
 
Sometimes we sign a paper and they use it for something else they’re dishonest. 
Sometimes they take a photo of someone saying they’re from the Colla RJ community 
but we don’t even know that person! 
 
18 mining projects in their territory 
 
80% of the COllas live off their animals and not off mining – WE DON’T NEED 
MINING, we can exploit tourism which is friendly unlike mining. The mining companies 
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come and take our children they train them up and offer them 500 when they were 
earning 150 on the land so of course they go and leave our culture behind.  
 
There he’ll be exploited ordered about but here in the and no, he is his own boss and has 
freedom. We have true freedom, we answer to nobody. 
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Interviewee Code – C2 – Elena, local elected Politician, Paracatú. (21 minutes) 
 
Rajiv: Então Elena, pode me falar o que você acha sobre a mineradora Kinross aqui em 
Paracatu sobre as relações que ela mantém com a comunidade? 
 
Elena: Bom Rajiv Paracatú nos últimos anos deu um boom em desenvolvimento porque 
não é a questão só da mineradora a tecnologia na agricultura, no água pecuário, no agro 
negocio,  se desenvolveu muito. Se desenvolveu bastante nesses oito anos e o que não foi 
desenvolvido aqui foi a questão de industrias. Porque o que é o que nós precisamos 
ainda? E que a cidade tem que agregar valor ao que produz ao tomate, cebola, alho, arroz 
o que fora o soja principalmente e isso não conseguimos fazer ainda tem vários motivos o 
imposto que minas gerias tem, minas gerias tem um dos impostos maiores no Brasil........ 
(conversation with daughter about other topic) 
 
A mineradora...eu acredito se ela nunca tivesse vindo seria melhor para a gente 
viveríamos a nossa vida interior com a evolução no agropecuário acredita a mesma 
maneira  
 
Rajiv: Então hoje em dia Paracatu depende da mineração? 
 
Elena: Sim depende dela criou sim essa dependência nela que não era necessário. Mas 
como ela já veio ela tem seus não sei se você sabe seus bônus e seus ônus tem as coisas 
boas e as coisas ruins que não adiante a gente se enganar. A questão ambiental nunca 
mais será a mesma talvez daqui a uns quinhentos anos mil anos talvez né. Então o mal se 
já instalou. É uma mineradora de céu aberto todo o mundo sabe e tem conhecimento que 
é muito mais prejudicial no meio ambiente para a população 
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Rajiv: para a poeira.... 
 
Elena: É. Outra questão negativa é que ta dentro do município e dentro da cidade do 
perímetro urbano. Fica comendo a cidade.   
 
Mas a relação dela com a comunidade já esteve melhor. Hoje não é boa mais. 
 
Rajiv: Eu já ouvi falar que antes era melhor e a empresa estava mais próxima e hoje ficou 
mais distante. Isso tem a ver com que a Kinross entrou? 
 
Elena: Tem, tem a ver com a mudança dos proprietários e com a novas normas ne as 
novas leis dessa empresa, a política da empresa é diferente do que era da RPM. 
 
Rajiv: A RPM era empresa Brasileira? 
 
Elena: A RPM era Rio Paracatu com parceiros Brasileiros Eike Batatista era também 
proprietário. Parece que ele tinha mais ações. Era melhor com a comunidade, MUITO 
MELHOR. 
 
Rajiv: Não tão fria? 
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Elena: Não tão fria, não tão distante e não tão omissa. Omissa é que não enxerga ao 
frente os problemas e esconde. Não que eu pense que ela tem que dar dinheiro toda hora 
para a comunidade comprando opiniões favoráveis não...relação, enfrentar aos 
problemas. Tem as coisas boas que ela traz para a comunidade ne? Do geração do 
emprego e renda a participação em alguns, alguns projetos grandes, médios e pequenos 
mas eu acredito que ela tem que contribuir mais e ela tem que olhar melhor a 
comunidade. Ela não esta olhando no FUTURO dessa comunidade. 
 
Rajiv: Entendi. Antigamente ela sim olhava mais para a frente? Vc interatua hj com a 
empresa? 
 
Elena: Não. É meio distante. Procuro mas não precisar.  Não criar dependência ou 
vinculo pra não stressar receber e não não não sem criar dependência com ela. 
 
Rajiv: Como você acha que ela poderia melhorar relações com a comunidade, 
 
Elena: tendo uma pessoa que atende a comunidade DE FATO para dialogar. Não ficar só 
na mídia, radio, televisão e imprensa escrita não. Contato HUMANO. Relações 
HUMANAS. 
 
Rajiv: é isso que não está fazendo? 
 
Elena: Ela não existe. Ela é uma empresa. A gente sabe visa lucro. 
 
  530 
Rajiv: Mas ela tem um departamento de relações com a comunidade e responsabilidade 
social? 
 
Elena: a gente nao vê isso de FATO. E muitas situações. Entendeu? A gente não vê. Tem 
movimentos, você vai ver se vai encontrar com Max Mundin que é o Presidente do 
Central da Associação dos bairros. Nos temos vinte associações eu acho de bairros mais 
que isso eu acho. Agora ele é o presidente o central. Ele ta coordenando um movimento 
contra a Kinross. 
 
Rajiv: Posso falar com ele? Tem o contato dele? 
 
Elena: Tenho sim. Posso te ajudar. Então não é isso que eu penso. Paracatu tem que 
pensar na criação de recursos, a questão do Mao de obra, a empreendedorismo. 
 
Rajiv: A empresa faz isso? 
 
Elena: Olha tem a programa de “Parceiros” se vai deparar com ele aí. O semin rio de 
parceria. Eu acho muito pequeno. O valor. 
 
Rajiv: Eles cobram para isso? 
 
Elena: Você vai fazer projetos. Vc vai através da sua associação. Você manda projeto 
para isso. Eles tem lá........quinhentos mil reais que acho vai ser. Quinhentos mil reais. Ela 
recebe vinte projetos, vão ser aprovado dez, cinqüenta em cada um cabo e pronto.  
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Rajiv: A empresa acompanha o projeto ou...? 
 
Elena: Antigamente não acompanhava. Eu fui uma das pessoas que falei que deveria ter 
acompanhamento para não jogar o dinheiro fora.  Então hoje tem acompanhamento.  
 
Rajiv: Pois é, é para ter relações com a comunidade, para ter um laço com a comunidade. 
 
Elena: criar um laço e vinculo ne? Então de fato as pessoas da comunidade acham que ela 
age de maneira misteriosa de maneira não verdadeira. 
 
Rajiv: muito interessante. 
 
Elena: sabe que não tem certeza das coisas. 
 
Rajiv: Como identidade da empresa como você a descreveria?  
 
Elena: (respira profundo)...Identidade que ela criou? 
 
Rajív: é 
 
Elena: Sabe? Lucro e dinheiro. 
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Rajiv: Lucro e dinheiro. Ta  
 
Elena: não é que eles não fazem nada. Fazem sim. Por exemplo na área da saúde eu não 
sei se foi a construção da vem do dinheiro deles e da faculdade Atenas ai eu não sei mas 
sei que existe muito dinheiro deles. Mas acho que não é o suficiente o dinheiro não paga 
o mal........ grande que está fazendo na comunidade em relação ambiental. Então eu 
acredito que eles devem fazer MAIS na questão ambiental e na PREPARAÇAO dos 
jovens para ser empresários....efetivar não construir uma casa e falar aqui vai ser uma 
escola de aperfeiçoamento e não ser mantenedora diária dessa escola porque ela vai 
fechar em 2030 se não me engano. 
 
Rajiv: 2041 eu acho 
 
Elena: 2041 mas ela vai ir embora. Que certeza nos temos que ela vai ficar ali? Que 
certeza nos temos? Os donos do Kinross são vários acionistas. Vários ne? São cinqüenta 
acionistas. No mundo inteiro. Ela vai embora ela fecha. O Brasil e Paracatu vem ação 
contra quem? Contra as cinqüenta pessoas?    
 
Rajiv: É uma empresa aberta na bolsa de Toronto. 
 
Elena: É 
 
Rajiv: então é bem mais que cinqüenta acionistas. 
  533 
 
Elena: que vai acontecer em Paracatu? Que segurança Paracatu tem? 
 
Rajiv: Ai tem a ver a questão de agregar valor que você me contou antes. 
 
Elena: Isso agregar valor na soja. 
 
Rajiv: Mas já criou essa dependência ne? 
 
Elena: PLANEJAMENTO. 
 
Rajiv: planejamento. A empresa precisa pensar um pouco isso também. Suas opiniões. A 
empresa sabe de suas opiniões? Porque imagino que outros compartilham essa opinião 
que você tem. Que resposta ela tem? 
  
Elena:  Eu não sou a única pessoa que fez esse tipo de comentário e tem várias pessoas 
fazendo. 
 
Rajiv: Você não é a única pessoa que fez esse tipo de comentário? 
 
Elena: Eu acredito ........ qualquer que quiser passar um email para a RPM passa email 
falando o que quiser eu nunca passei. 
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Rajiv: a RPM tem algum canal de contato? 
 
Elena: Eles tem o email da pessoa da comunicação. Falar? Eu acho que não falei isso 
com ninguém mas essa opinião foi dada para outras pessoas lá dentro em seminários. 
Outra coisa....voce rajiv....poderia....dar um jeito. Vou ver meu tempo para te levar  a ver 
moradores na redondeza da expansão. (Draws a map) Aqui está RPM aqui estão 
pequenas propriedades existe um casal que o senhor tem mais de 80 anos e a senhora tem 
mais que 70. São doente os dois. Depois que fez a expansão eles não tem a água limpa 
mais no rio a água fica suja tem que levar água de caminhão para eles. 
 
Rajiv: eles tem alguma relação com a empresa? 
 
Elena:  a empresa fica ROLANDO e ROLANDO e nunca cumpre vai lá não cumpre não 
resolve é problema deles. Eles não podem plantar mais porque tem medo e pensam que 
em qualquer hora vão ter que sair. Eles não tem...antes o ônibus passava lá e voltava para 
trazer-los e cobrava passagem hoje não passa mais. Eles tem que pagar um carro para 
levar-los trazer para Paracatu e levar-los. Para você conversar com um deles para ver a 
situação que eles vivem lá. É uma situação muito humilhante e muito triste. Então se eles 
tem o dinheiro eles podem comprar isso lá não só deles mas de todo mundo nessa região 
me entendeu porque eles estão pedidos a tomar água potável. Quando eles vem para a 
cidade eles pagam um carro para trazer-los e  levar-los. 
 
Rajiv: Eles ainda não tem água potável? 
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Elena: Eles usavam do rio para lavar, banhar e beber. Hoje não pode mais a RPM manda 
levar. Fica assim “a nós estamos cumprimos com nosso PAPEL” não somos nada para 
eles. 
 
Rajiv: Mas não estão levando água para eles? 
 
Elena: Estão levando água mas água de caminhão PIPA. Quem garante da onde vem essa 
água? Pode ser água contaminada. 
 
Rajiv: É a água que vem na garrafa? 
 
Elena: Não é água que vem na caminhão. É um caminhão que tem um deposito. Então 
eles me procuraram. Eu procurei essa pessoa que tinha a relação com a comunidade o 
Pedro que foi embora agora.. 
 
Rajiv: é agora tem a Fadwa ne? 
 
Elena: chegou a Fadwa é.  
 
Rajiv: conhece a Fadwa? 
 
Elena: conheço a Fadwa.  
Rajiv: e como ela é? 
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Elena: é uma pessoa........ela vai falar para você o que a empresa manda ela falar. 
Entendeu? Então assim eu conheço a Fadwa, conheci o Pedro  que foi embora. 
 
Rajiv: e antes estava o Marcelo Coelho? 
 
Elena: Marcelo Coelho uma pessoa muita boa também. Muita boa. Então levei o Pedro 
até a casa desse casal de idosos fora da cidade e o Pedro assumiu o compromisso de 
cuidar deles, Pedro foi embora e não resolveu e os velhos estão lá. Agora tem a chuva. 
Um dia eles pagaram uma pessoa de carro da cidade quando eles iam era de noite o 
motorista tem a perna mecânica o carro parou num lugar cheio de água e o água veio 
vindo veio vindo e os dois velhos dentro do carro não dava conta porque tem a perna 
mecânica e não dava conta de andar direito. Até pareceu outro carro que os tirou de lá. 
Então olha a situação Rajiv.  
 
Rajiv: nossa.....e a Kinross sabia disso? 
 
Elena: SABE disso sabe porque eu tava presente quando o casal contou para o Pedro e 
não entendeu? E até hoje não tomaram uma decisão nenhuma. 
 
(Interuption – different work related conversation with daughter). 
 
Elena: então Rajiv essa é minha opinião. 
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Rajiv: muito obrigado é muito valido pois eu quero entender quais são as percepções de 
atores importantes sobre a mineradora e especialmente sobre as relações. Porque eu acho 
que não sempre as comunidades querem receber dinheiro, dinheiro, dinheiro eles também 
querem ter uma relação e aqui com o que você me falou esta parecendo que a empresa 
não tem uma boa relação. 
 
Elena: ela tem assim relação com a faculdade Atenas e com a prefeitura lá com 
presidente da câmara se precisar de alguma coisa ....com comunidade. 
 
Rajiv: mas o que que é comunidade para você? 
 
Elena: os moradores os vizinhos tem muitas reclamações dos vizinhos muitas mesmo. 
 
Rajiv: e ninguém reclamou para a prefeitura?  
 
Elena: GRITA mas não escuta ninguém escuta 
 
Rajiv: Não escuta 
 
Elena: Não escuta  
 
Rajiv: mas a prefeitura não escuta? 
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Elena: A prefeitura pode fazer muito POUCO a autorização nao vem do município e do 
governo federal e eles estão cumprindo todas as normas 
 
Rajiv: entendi. Agora eles tem um processo com os quilombolas ne? 
 
Elena: Tem mas não faz comunidade crescer comunidade desenvolver eles falam que faz 
você vai lá você vai ver os projetos são muito PEQUENOS tem que dar uma escola lá 
dentro da comunidade para conhecer a sua historia eu vou lá hoje para DOAR um 
acordeão porque eles não tem  
 
Rajiv: Nossa 
 
Elena: Aí o que eles falam assim que a comunidade não tem conhecimento do que precisa 
de fato mas um antropólogo sabe o que a comunidade precisa SABE. 
 
Rajiv: se entende e sabe disso conversando com a comunidade entendendo a cultura e 
historia dela e do que ela vai precisar 
 
Elena: Então se esta perdendo as tradições deles se esta perdendo TODO, as roupas 
típicas, a dança é um sacrifício eu vou lá as 6:30pm hoje as 18 horas pretendo sair daqui 
aí vou pegar o rapaz do projeto e volto lá é pertinho daqui eu tenho que voltar as 7:30 
porque tenho um compromisso não sei que hora e amanha saio a madrugada para Belo 
Horizonte. Então se quiser a gente vai juntos para a Quilombola. 
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Rajiv: Eu quero sim ir para lá. Que tem a ver com a empresa se eles estão perdendo a 
cultura deles? 
 
Elena: Tem a ver porque se a empresa fala que vai ajudar o que que é bairro? O que é 
mais importante para você? Não é sua historia? Suas raízes? E o que que fica da raiz? 
Não é a questão dos tradições? Então eles vão te mostrar o que eles fazem mas o 
resultado existe lá. Vamos dar para eles um acordeão um instrumento tradicional para 
eles porque eles não TEM as roupas deles são (não entendível) eles não tem um espaço 
para ELES mesmo assim instrutores, pesquisadores por conta deles não tem para tomar 
conta da historia deles e transformar-los em como que se fala...empreendedores dentro da 
associação...(answers the phone, attends to other issues at office, more phone calls and 
interview ends. Shortly after we go to the “Quilombo São Domingos”.   
 
Ana: A mineradora deixava crianças das escolas entrar e conhecer a as operações. Eles 
tentavam a todo custo mostrar para a gente que eles não agrediam. 
 
Rajiv: Porque eles faziam isso?  
 
Ana: Eu acho talvez para a gente ter uma boa visão e para não estar em contra da 
situação. 
 
Rajiv: Entendi 
 
Ana: Então eu acho que o governo deve de alguma certa forma ser beneficiado pelo 
Kinross. 
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Rajiv: Então porque você acha que agora a Kinross já não convida mais os crianças para 
ver as operações? 
 
Ana: eu acho porque não é interessante.....no inicio do Kinross eles tinham uma abertura  
maior com a população tinha algumas pessoas que lidavam com a população da cidade e 
dessa maneira acho que as pessoas se davam melhor agora eles se fecharam.  
 
Rajiv: Porque se fecharam você acha? 
 
Ana: Não sei talvez porque já não seja mais de interesse deles ter contato com a 
população ou porque já eles conseguiram o que queriam. 
 
Rajiv: Entendi. A gente sabe que eles tem a pareceria com a hospital e faz algumas outras 
atividades sociais. Em quanto a relação mais humanas parece que não ta? 
 
Ana: Eu não sei até que ponto esse parceria é só dar dinheiro, por exemplo eu te dou aqui 
100,000 reais e pronto acabou não vou manter porque é fácil construir hospital o difícil é 
manter no dia a dia ne. E também imagino o que são 100,000 reais pro que eles tiram 
daqui porque eles deparam...nao sei....nao estou julgando mas não sei como se eles 
deparam todo (diferente conversa com outras pessoas).....eu imagino que 100,000 reais 
para eles não devem ser nada. 
 
Rajiv: Que identidade você daria para a mineradora, como a descreveria? 
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Ana: se tivesse que descrever a identidade da Kinross.......seria como vampiro porque é 
muito fácil ludibriar e iludir  as pessoas de aahh da mesma forma de quando era criança e 
visitei e falaram “não a gente vai retirar o ouro mas a gente vai reflorestar replantar tudo”  
 
Rajiv: Você acreditava? 
 
Ana: Não não acreditava eles não deixava a gente visitar algumas partes não respondeu 
algumas perguntas. 
 
Rajiv: mas é interessante como você falou, algumas pessoas na cidade talvez muitas 
pessoas não concordariam com você talvez são mais pobres e eles não questionam. 
 
Ana: não tem acesso na informação    
 
Rajiv: não tem acesso por exemplo quando cheguei aqui na cidade fui almoçar num 
restaurante e a moça daí me perguntou sobre o que estava fazendo aqui e eu expliquei que 
era um pesquisador sobre a mineradora e ela respondeu que a mineradora dá muito 
emprego e que na casa dela tem duas pessoas trabalhando nela e tem medo de perder o 
emprego se algo acontece na mineradora. 
 
Ana: (chamada telefônica)....... mas as vezes também Rajiv as pessoas ficam sem opção 
por exemplo eles querem comprar uma parte de uma fazendo de alguém que é pobre mas 
tem aquela fazendo e tem ali sua identidade e a vida toda. 
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Rajiv: isso a identidade  
 
Ana: uma pessoa que não imagina nunca ver por exemplo 60,000 reais as vezes 60,000 
reais para essa pessoa é muita coisa. A terra dele vale trinta. A empresa oferece 60,000 
ele SAIM.  
 
Rajiv: o dinheiro que manda ne? Mas parece que os quilombas não são tão assim. 
 
Ana: Não porque dentro daí eles tem muitas pessoas que tem acesso ao informação. E 
eles lutam para manter aquilo. Eu não sei eu acho assim como dizer eles podem entrar 
com processo. Acho que vai levar uns 60 ou 70 anos até que eles não estão vivos mais...e 
talvez já a mineradora fez o que queria ne. (Pausa para conversar com colegas durante 
alguns minutos). 
 
Rajiv: mas eu não entendo porque a empresa era melhor antes e mais aberto. 
 
Ana: não que era melhor eles conseguiram talvez iludir..assim a população e hoje eles ne 
mais se falam  
 
Rajiv: entendi. Eles convidavam as pessoas para falar e eram mais participativos. 
 
Ana: Isso. Agora tanto que não tem engenheiros e nenhum engenheiro é daqui e aqui 
existem muitos engenheiros assim esses cargos mais altos....hoje é a Fadwa ne antes era a 
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Nadia Caldas uma jornalista formada numa universidade federal da Brasília muito bem 
conceituada e era daqui hoje em dia nem ela esta. Varias pessoas saíram gente que não é 
de Paracatu que veio trabalhar mas eles se demitiram porque não aceitavam mais a 
política de Kinross. 
 
Rajiv: a política de ter as portas abertas? 
 
Ana: antes era mais aberto, eu não se de alguma brigas internas....essas duas pessoas que 
tinham contato com a população não aceitavam mais a política deles e se demitiram gente 
que tinha dez anos trabalhando na empresa. 
 
Rajiv: Você conseguiu falar com a Nadia depois? 
 
Ana: Não mas ela é minha prima.  
 
Rajiv: essa é sua prima a Nadia? 
 
Ana: sim.  
 
Rajiv: ela te conversou sobre isso? 
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Ana: Não eu não perguntei. E isso foi recente. E ela vai casar com um dos chefes de lá. 
Mas ela brigou com lá e não aceitou.  Eu não sei qual foi a briga dela mas.....de duas 
outras pessoas que não aceitavam a política. Eles foram em contra e eles saíram. 
 
Rajiv: é uma pena que são mais próximas da cidade. 
 
Ana: Eu assim, eu imagino que eles poderiam ajudar eles tiram tanto que já destroem 
tanto fazem todas as coisas ruins que eles poderiam tentar a começar de outra forma que 
ajudasse com o desenvolvimento da cidade. 
 
Rajiv: isso 
 
Ana: porque eles patrocinam algumas festas essas coisas. Você vai conversar com 
alguém lá? 
 
Rajiv? Da empresa? 
 
Ana: é  
 
Rajiv: eu quero muito mas não sei se vou conseguir entrar mandei muitos emails mas não 
retornam liguei também desde são Paulo e nunca atendem. A Fadwa nunca responde os 
emails para mim. 
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Ana: eu já ouvi dizer que não é muito simpática 
 
Rajiv: Você tentou falar com eles? 
 
Ana: Quatro anos atrás. Você vai perceber quando falar com eles e como se tudo fosse 
um teatro é com roteiro decorado que eles vão falar que isso, isso, isso que vai trazer 
esses benefícios (cantando e rindo) meio propaganda sabe então não tem credibilidade  
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Interviewee Code C4 – David – Head of Afro-Brazilian culture NGO 
 
Rajiv: o que você acha sobre as relações da mineradora Kinross com a comunidade e os 
quilombos em particular? 
 
David: a relação a questão a questão em pauta é mineradora com os quilombos eu não sei 
você....já tem....conhecimento das formas do quilombo? 
 
Rajiv: não ontem eu visitei um.... 
 
David: São Domingos? 
 
Rajiv: sim São Domingos 
 
David: a principio quilombos brasileiros era onde os negros fugiam. Tinha alguns 
quilombos grandes no Brasil. E depois quando houve a libertação dos escravos que os 
senhores e os donos da fazenda foram obrigados a mandar eles ir embora. Ai eles 
procuraram um refugio um lugar que ninguém queria. Ai foi o que aconteceu em 
Paracatu. Esse pessoal procurou esse lugar que ninguém queria que hoje a Kinross quer 
muito. Fizeram essa pesquisa da Kinross. A Kinross tem 20 anos aqui mas com pesquisa 
e tudo que eu sou daqui dez anos antes de começar o manejo e trabalhar dez anos antes 
eles já tinham pesquisa.  Furavam o chão eles viam com homens em caminhão. 
 
Rajiv: isso sem consultar aos quilombos? 
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David: Não. Ele furava tudo na cidade. Toda cidade. Aí passou por aquele campo lá. Aí 
pegava o 2:10 de terra e levava para analisar. Aí depois disso constatou que o morro de 
ouro como chama lá que é o setor de três comunidades quilombolas (são domingos, 
amaros e machadinho) ai constatou aquilo. Mas ao principio era só morro que eles já 
desceram com isso já ta bem baixo... a terra o ouro aqui é céu aberto ne? Mas todos os 
dias eles soltam uma bomba. 
 
Rajiv: as quatro horas ne?        
 
David: as quatro horas. Quando vento ta para lá eles soltam aquela bomba e põem aquela 
que fica no aeroporto...se chama.....aqui se chama........ um “quadorzao” que d  a coisa do 
vento ai quando vira para lá eles soltam a bomba. 
 
A relação...era... no mínimo uma relação respeitosa era respeitosa era respeitar e tudo 
porque os quilombos foram reconhecidos pelo governo federal. Nos temos um instituto 
que fizemos de “Fala Negra” que faz parte desse processo todo. O que é quilombo, 
porque que é chamado de quilombo, porque que aí é quilombo. Ai nos trazemos 
pesquisadores para fazer o questionário para ver e depois nos fizemos... a “Fala Negra” 
fez o questionário e todo fizemos em 85 comunidades em Minas Gerais e cinco aqui em 
Paracatu. Ai foi lá buscou o que que bebe, que come que planta o que que canta aí 
levantou a identidade. Depois que levantou a identidade. 
 
Rajiv: foi há 5 anos atrás? 
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David: não, mais já estamos com 10 anos. Ai vieram os antropólogos de Brasília então 
sim esse questionário tiver preenchido corretamente é uma comunidade quilombola e 
dança, todas elas dançam, todas elas cantam................... 
 
Porque que essas três comunidades quilombolas ficaram ali? Porque ali tinha um córrego 
em São Domingos onde se lavava ouro é a sobrevivência deles.........aqui também na praia 
do córrego rico aqui também é um espécie de quilombo os donos os proprietários aqui em 
Santana são tudo negro no meu tempo de criança era tudo negro tudo negro tudo negro 
tudo negro quase tudo parente tudo negro negro (explica mais sobre a historia do 
bairro)......eles vediam o ouro do córrego. 
 
É dizer o patrão que dava comida e aqui meu pai ele fez um clube de negro, um clube de 
negro porque não podiam entrar na sociedade de maneira nenhuma aqui. 
 
Rajiv: depois da abolição de escravos? 
 
David: DEPOIS da ABOLIÇAO aqui é ainda hoje extremamente preconceituoso  
 
Rajiv: dá para notar estou aqui no Brasil há um ano e meio 
 
David: pois é aqui no Paracatu é um dos mais preconceituoso 
 
Rajiv: pensei que seria menos por causa dos quilombolos. 
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David: NAO. A afro descendência aqui tem 65% 
 
Rajiv: dá para ver. Então vocês são a maioria aqui. 
 
David: a grande MAIORIA se pode ver. Ainda tem um detalhe...Negro na prefeitura tem 
pouco....a câmara dos vereadores daqui (explica sobre o dia de emancipação) só teve dois 
vereadores aqui em Paracatu 
 
Rajiv: imagino que se um negro fosse candidato para ser vereador seria eleito como você 
ne? 
 
David: mas acontece o seguinte..que os negros, tem muito negro sentado aqui na praça 
um para falar aqui....ele não fala não não vai falar tem medo se você pega o microfone ai 
os brancos tudo fala mas os negros não falam. Isso cai acima da historia e da política 
então negro é criado pelos pais “não vai não você é preto! não vai não porque eles te vão 
chamar a atenção.” Minha mãe dizia assim “se vai num aniversario mas se te oferece 
alguma coisa se come......nao chega perto da mesa. Fica l  fora” você me esta 
entendendo? E A CRIAÇAO  
 
A escravidão do Brasil tem 123 anos só. A Inglaterra obrigou a princesa gritar e daí veio 
a historia de “só para inglês ver”. 
 
Rajiv: existe legislação no Brasil que protege muito as pessoas negras ne? 
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David: Mas como tudo aqui no Brasil tem lei mas não cumpre tem lei mas não cumpre. A 
lei federal do 1978 fala que tem direito a terra aquele quilombola. Mas acontece que aqui 
não funciona a terra é dos quilombolas a Kinross entrou ela foi notificada pela INCRA 
até hoje não acertou nada ai leva no embrulho é só para inglês ver ai quando tem um fica 
mandando sabendo da situação eles trocam ele manda ele embora ai chega outro eu não 
sei nada chega o maior inocente do mundo me explica isso? Quando eles acaba de 
explicar eles trocam tudo ai mais um ano torna trocar torna trocar então não existe 
conflito armado porque os negros são tímidos. 
 
Rajiv: lá nas quilombolas? 
 
David: Sim nas quilombolas.  
 
Rajiv: (Expliquei sobre minha visita de ontem na quilombola e como estão a favor de 
trabalhar com a empresa) 
 
David: mas sabe porque eles te falaram isso? Porque tem gente trabalhando na 
mineradora. O que estão fazendo? Estão eliminando estão acabando com o movimento 
quilombola. A gente vai fazer a festa aqui no dia 20  a zumbi da palmaires mais 
importante que o dia da libertação muito mais importante para nós............quando vc pede 
uma ajuda a Kinross não tem vontade nenhum para ajudar. Porque? Para fortalecer, o 
negro não quer fortalecer o negro. Ai o prefeito também leva dinheiro também se foi lá 
fazer um oficio inclusive trabalho na prefeitura trabalho no museu......o prefeito também 
mora dentro da terra dos quilombolas  
 
Rajiv: o prefeito da cidade Paracatu mora na terra dos quilombos? 
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David: sim o prefeito daqui. Tem uma fazendo lá ele não tem interesse nenhum em ajudar 
os quilombas............ Como se diz formiga em inglês? (compara “ant” com 
anta).................O prefeito não gostou que fizesse uma reunião no museu para resgatar a 
cultura quilombola. Meu pai ele tem uma bandeira, uma caixa e um acordeão isso é da 
raça do costume. Que acontece? Vai ser terminado. 
 
As pessoas estão sofrendo estão com dificuldades. Me manda um DVD se quilombos e 
explica sobre a historia deles de como alguém morreu. A Kinross o achou caído e tentou 
o ajudar mas morreu no hospital e cabo. A questão é isso não tem NINGUEM que engole 
Kinross não tem ninguém. 
 
Evani...a elegeram errada a Cristina é minha amiga sabe o que fala é consciente foi a 
primeira presidente que colocamos depois entrou a Evani............quem toca o processo do 
Kinross não é o quilombolo é o governo federal. 
 
Nos que começamos todo o processo levamos as pessoas para a Brasília, Recife, Maceió 
aprender sobre a cultura quilombola e conhecer outros.............nao se pode trabalhar 
pensando......que deu beneficio e não aderi. A kinross reuniu todo o mundo aqui em 
Paracatu, a empresa sabe que esta errada, mudou de idéia porque ia dar tumulto foi só a 
metade, a não foi muita gente então vai ser a metade da metade. Ultimamente eles estão 
reunindo com quatro ou cinco quilombola e o advogado eles nunca vão ganhar. Hoje 
mesmo a 1 hora da tarde tem uma reunião ai me chamaram para ir lá mas eu não vou não 
pertence ao grupo quilombola. 
 
Rajiv: seu papel é de fortalecer a cultura? 
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David: FORTALECER meu papel seria de colocar muita gente, comida típica para 
pessoal ver que o grupo esta forte mas ele a Kinross foi minando tirando pessoal hoje está 
conversando com cinco pessoas. Com duas pessoas de cada quilombola. 
Falei para eles que a empresa tem medo de nós juntos. De um a um eles pisa igual a uma 
formiga igual ao “ant” pisou igual “ant” cabo. Agora se vem subindo na roupa você tem 
que sair correndo. 
 
Rajiv: Percebi que estão dividindo a comunidade 
 
David: EXATAMENTE! E ali na Machadinho sabe o que fizeram? Tem lá uma terrinha 
pequeno 1 a 2 hectares que o dono pensava que era 10,000 reais eles mandava outra 
pessoa comprar por 30. Ele vende. A Kinross tira ouro toneladas de ouro. 
 
Rajiv: as relações entre a empresa e os quilombolas são boas? 
 
David: eu até disse que em nossa posição de necessitados devemos ter um cuidado maior. 
O subsolo é do governo federal quem da licença ambiental gera dinheiro para o governo 
nos temos que ir comendo junto no prato com eles tem uma lei que ampara. 
 
Rajiv: qual seria a solução ou situação ideal? 
 
David: o governo fazer a empresa cumprir e lei só isso o artigo 68 e todos. Primeiro era 
descobrir os quilombos. Segundo identificar os quilombos. Terceiro relacionou a todos os 
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quilombos e ter relação com todas as pessoas eu tenho ele mas não tenho. O antropólogo 
ficou um ano aqui ficou sabendo da onde eles vieram o que bebiam, o que comiam, que 
cantavam. Então eles o governo tem que bater o martelo porque estão na ultima instancia 
tem que bater o martelo ya tem que só bater o martelo bater o martelo quer dizer o 
INCRA desapropriar porque eles tem dinheiro para pagar. 
 
Os amaro alem de ser quilombola eles tem escritura. A terra é deles e o histórico. É tudo 
irregular e vai acabando com a gente. 
 
Rajiv: você prefere que os quilombas ficam ai ou vão para outro lugar? 
 
David: não podem porque tem as raízes ai os ancestrais enterrados ai. Nasceu lá a 
pessoal. A situação ideal..........é a empresa entrou e pagar eles por mês pagar eles por 
mês como royalty em quanto eles estiver lá e devolver para eles o resto o que foi 
demarcado. Os Amaro tem 966 hectares. Tem muitas fazendas. Isso aqui pertence aos 
quilombolas. (Ele entra em detalhes legais sobre o processo de venda de terreno e 
propriedade e como estão sendo prejudicados obrigados a vender para a empresa sendo 
desapropriados). 
 
Eles ficam empurrando com a barriga não resolve nada....para inglês ver também para 
inglês ver..........eu fiz uma estratégia lá mudei essa parte mandei ............sua historia é ai 
na índia a MINHA É AQUI. A gente levava muitos palestrantes, levava eles para o sul 
para Rio Grande do Sul para Rio de Janeiro ai encontrar com outros lá ver que estava 
acontecendo. 
 
Rajiv: a empresa não entende seu discurso? 
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David: NAO a empresa é CAPITALISTA e capitalista só quer capital  
 
Rajiv: não esta interessada na historia dos quilombolos? 
 
David: NAO não tem interesse nenhum no Maximo se tiver todo o mundo juntos mas 
começo a fracionar que só vai receber dois ou só uma 
 
Rajiv: porque essa empresa tem uma política forte de ser um bom vizinho 
 
David: (explica como a empresa cresceu). Você foi lá? 
 
Rajiv: não não fui ainda mas quero sim 
 
David: vai lá se vai ser a monstruosidade 
 
Rajiv: eu vi desde o ônibus e da faculdade Atenas o tamanho e é grande 
 
David: é muito grande. Se você foi perguntar a faculdade Atenas eles não interessem. Eu 
j  falei l  com eles para criar alguma coisa l  sobre a “anemia falciforme” 
 
Rajiv: anemia falciforme? O que é isso? 
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David: se não sabe? É a doença congênita do negro. Ela vem da áfrica só tem negro. Hoje 
o Brasil tem o teste pezinho quando o menino nasce a enfermeira vai l  e “puff” com a 
agulha tira sangue e pinga na lamina para ver se ele tem anemia falciforme. Se ele tiver 
ele vai ser uma criança que não vai direito. Se eu tiver eu sou uma pessoa indesejável na 
cidade (explica sobre os globos vermelhos e brancos e como é erídano). Essa criança 
morre com 3 anos. Mas tem tratamento. O governo sabe disso mas fala que é o negro que 
trouxe a doença da áfrica defendendo da malaria. (Explica sobre a doença na sangue). 
Quem tem sofre muito. Eu pedi a Atenas participar mas não deu resposta. 
 
Rajiv: como você vê o tema da identidade do quilombo e negro? Você acha que a 
empresa está ajudando ou prejudicando a essa identidade?     
 
David: está PREJUDICANDO PREJUDICANDO 
 
Rajiv: então daqui a 50 anos talvez a cultura e identidade dos quilombolos desaparece? 
 
David: eles estão fazendo tudo para isso. 
 
Rajiv: a empresa quer fazer isso? Fica na interesse dele? 
 
David: o que não está ajudando está atrapalhando. 
 
Rajiv: ajudando o que? 
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David: a cultura do negro pode ajudar a RPM? Não nada.  Então para eles se não esta 
ajudando está atrapalhando. 
 
Rajiv: mas ontem percebi com um grupo de quilombos que estavam a favor da empresa e 
a gente deu um acordeão  
 
David: deu acordeão? Eu di um acordeão para eles há pouco tempo. Lá é o grupo todos 
tem a casa rachado. Essa Evani é uma metida intelectual trata as pessoas muito mal eu 
deixei de ir lá eu gosto da dona Cristina as vezes vou nas festas. A Evani não consegue 
reunir uma só pessoa. Tem muito problema interno. Vão ter eleição agora e eu estou 
querendo que mude a diretoria. Para ser eleita ela mudou a estatuto inteira não pode fazer 
isso. 
 
Rajiv: Ela se preocupe pela cultura e identidade quilombola? 
 
David: não lá é outro grupo. A empresa cortou a água co cachoeira deles. Isso é bom 
parceiro? E também deu um “combi” velho. Eu consegui 20,000 reais para reformar essa 
casa lá na comunidade. 
 
Rajiv: então você acha que eles estão sendo comprados pela empresa? 
 
David: de certa fora sim. (chega um amigo de David na praça e conversa sobre a religião 
espiritualismo) 
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Rajiv: O que você acha sobre a mineradora  
 
Amigo de David: Causa muito impacto social, ambiental cultural.....        
 
David: (me convida para igreja espiritual dele e como preocupava sobre o meio ambiente 
e tem corrente indiano durante 5 minutos) 
 
Rajiv: mas.......em quanto ao impacto da mineradora você me estava contanto que é muito 
ne? 
 
Joao Batista: é muito GRANDE! O que começa errado termina errado mudar de lugar 
não tem como. 
 
David: aqui no bairro Santana tem muitas pessoas trabalhando na empresa. (me correge 
na pronunciação da palavra “Quilomba”)........o nome dele é bem difícil ....Rajiv 
 
Joao Batista: Raaajeeeviii? Você é que? 
 
Rajiv: estou fazendo meu doutorado sobre as percepções entre as relações da mineradoras 
e a comunidade. 
 
David: ela é boa porque não tem jeito de reação  
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Rajiv: não entendi isso de “reação”? 
 
David: que se a gente pudesse chegar lá e torcer a pescoço dela mas a gente não pode 
 
Rajiv: a então a empresa está dominando ne? 
 
David: sim DOMINA por isso que é boa 
 
Rajiv: então ela consegue fazer o que quiser? 
 
David: O QUE QUISER não só com os negros, não só com os quilombolas mas com a 
cidade inteira  
 
Joao Batista: é autoritária 
 
David: um comercio vende mais por causa da mineradora eles vende mais por causa da 
mineradora. Se tiver um filho e ele trabalha lá eu não preciso dar mais para ele. Então eu 
sou favor da mineradora. 
 
Rajiv: isso esta acontecendo ne? 
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David: isso esta acontecendo 
 
Rajiv: então estão dando a prioridade no dinheiro sobre a cultura ne? 
 
David: isso estão matando a cultura. Ai eu vou falar que a mineradora é ruim? Mesmo 
sendo um quilombola? 
 
Rajiv: isso aconteceu com o grupo de ontem eu acho. 
 
David: EXATAMENTE. Agora se não tivesse nada para eles. Então a mineradora faz 
exatamente essa jogada. Eu emprego seu filho, eu trato bem a seu filho. 
 
Rajiv: todos os quilombos tem filhos trabalhando na mineradora ou existem alguns que 
não tem? 
 
David: é RARO. 
 
Rajiv: porque queria falar com um grupo de quilombos que estão em contra da 
mineradora. 
 
David: é raro, é raro porque aquele que faz doce e salgado vende mais para pessoa que 
vem da mineradora. 
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Rajiv: você concordaria que o seguinte: as pessoas da Paracatu dão mais prioridade pelo 
lado econômico que pelo lado social, cultural e ambiental? 
 
David: com certeza com certeza porque se não tivessem ainda tem outra coisa as funções 
lá de alto nível não é de pessoal daqui. 
 
Rajiv: são todos de fora ne? 
 
David: sim todos de fora. O sub emprego é do povo de Paracatu.  
 
Rajiv: e eles aceitam? 
 
David: eles aceitam porque não tem outro. Mas em quanto isso estão fazendo uma casa 
fazendo não sei que ai vem a RPM ai dá brinquedos dá outra coisa e fica feliz. 
 
Joao Batista: Paracatu é uma colônia moderna. 
 
Rajiv: o que é uma colônia moderna? 
 
Joao Batista: é uma colônia da empresa. 
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David: tem outra coisa. Eu trouxe aqui uma jornalista da da da fora chama “Raymond 
Couts” ele é inglês porque a barragem..... a pessoal da cidade roubava sacos e terra e 
lavava no quintal e tirava bastante ouro e a Kinross andava matando uns deles. 
 
Rajiv: matando? 
 
David: MATANDO!  
 
Rajiv: quando foi isso? 
 
David: seis ou oito anos atrás. Ai eu trouxe essa agencia aqui e ele fez uma reportagem 
sobre uma mulher que mataram os dois filhos dela pegando o rejeito. 
 
Rajiv: e quem matou? 
 
David: a segurança da empresa 
 
Rajiv: ela tentou processar a empresa? 
 
David: o juiz e delegado recebem dinheiro. A empresa comprou uma fazenda para a 
mulher. Deu para ela tudo para calar boca ne? Para ela ficar calada. Então a Kinross é 
maior do que as pessoas pensam aqui em Paracatu. Maior que o governo.  
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Rajiv: ela que manda aqui. 
 
David: ela que manda. Então esse “combi” que leva os meninos para o colégio hoje é por 
causa dos pais trabalhando na empresa. A poluição do cianeto é enorme. A poluição aqui 
deve matar muita gente aqui. 
 
Rajiv: a empresa vai embora ne daqui a 30 anos? 
 
David: NAO VAI NAO. Porque tudo aqui tem outro. 
 
Rajiv: mas ela não pode entrar aqui no centro ne? 
 
David: QUE NAO PODE ENTRAR? PODE! Ela vem comprando comprando 
 
Rajiv: Vai comprar a cidade inteira? 
 
David:  VAI COMPRAR A CIDADE INTEIRA SE TIVER OURO. Ela vai sempre pagar 
mais para as casas e comprar. Eles tem dinheiro! 
 
Rajiv: mas a empresa tem política de ser responsável com os vizinhos isso esta no site de 
internet da empresa 
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David: AAAAA ISSO E BALELA 
 
Rajiv: O que é “balala”? 
 
David: só para inglês ver. Antes tinha só duas jornais na cidade e hoje tem doze. O 80% 
fala do Kinross. 
 
Rajiv: Você conhece o site no internet de “alertaparacatu” que fala em contra da empresa 
Kinross? E o Sergio Dani? 
 
David: Essa é uma outra historia. Eu não sou bobo eu já viajei para a Japão e outros 
países quando jogava futebol. O Sergio Dani ele é medico e fez umas reuniões ai na 
camara. Ai eu chamei ele para ajudar, ajuda com a doença porque até não tem 
atendimento em Paracatu com 65% descendente de Africano. Ai ele fez um movimento 
consegiu dinheiro, pegou o dinheiro e foi embora. Ele esta na Alemanha. Primeiro ele 
pegou 500,000, depois 1 milhão. 
 
Rajiv: e esse dinheiro veio da onde? 
 
David: daqui e da Kinross 
 
Amigo de David: a TODAPODEROSA   
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David: e para ele ficar calado mandou ele para ALEMANHA. Fez o mesmo com a 
senhora que perdeu os dois filhos para calar. Então o Sergio Dani para mim não vale ele 
não ajudou ele foi embora com dinheiro para Alemanha. Quando o dinheiro acaba ele 
vem de novo procurando dinheiro. (repete historia sobre doença anemia falciforme) nos 
fizemos l  na “fala negra” uma pesquisa tinha 40 pessoas com anemia falciforme dessas 
pessoas só tem 26 vivos o resto já morreu por falta de tratamento. 
 
Joao Batista: o manda é a maioria ne? Só que tem uma coisa se a maioria não esta certo 
não. Ele pode estar errado.  
 
Rajiv: Lógico. Pelo que estou ouvindo essa maioria estar sendo comprado? 
 
David: esta sendo COMPRADA, COMPRADA, COMPRADA 
 
Amigo de David: a empresa é tão grande que toda família tem uma pessoa trabalhando 
nela e a empresa manda a família CALAR 
 
David: melhorou a situação em casa, o cara tem credito 
 
Rajiv: o crescimento da cidade viu mais pessoas da fora chegando de mau de obra baixa? 
Isso teve algum impacto social na cidade? 
 
David: A droga ta terrível 
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Rajiv: isso se pode vincular com a empresa? 
 
David: PODE a circulação do dinheiro faz isso (explica sobre os impactos da droga na 
cidade). No ano passado morreram 60 moleques que vendiam drogas 60. (uma senhora na 
rua pergunta onde vive a senhora Cristina que faz bolos). 
 
Joao Batista: A RPM não estava preparada receber a Kinross EM TODA SENTIDO 
 
Rajiv: em quais sentidos por exemplo? 
 
Joao Batista: POLITICAMENTE, AMBIENTALMENTE se ela fosse preparada ela não 
fosse desse tipo.....................na folga os funcionários colocam uniforme para fazer 
compra. ESTAVAM DE FOLGA USAVAM UNIFORME 
 
Rajiv: porque? 
 
João Batista: e porque a companhia pedia para divulgar  
 
Rajiv: Nossa 
 
João Batista: eu te pergunto você tem um comércio se você vende para mim e sou da 
RPM sou garante de pagamento. A empresa tem convenio. Para quem você vai vender? 
Para Ele ou para mim que sou da empresa? 
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David: se você chega numa loja hoje e quer comprar te pedem fazer ficha e perguntam 
onde você trabalhar, se você fala na Kinross te fala “AA não precisa fazer ficha” 
 
Rajiv: Entendi. É um tipo de discriminação ne 
 
João Batista: mas para o vendedor é melhor e garante a comissão 
 
Rajiv: isso acontece por causa do dinheiro ne? 
 
João Batista: é o DINHEIRO 
 
David: você já sabe eu estou aqui e no museu e pode me procurar.   
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Interviewee Code – C6 – Claudia – Resident and Social Entrepreneur, Paracatu 
 
 
Rajiv: What do you think about the relationships that have the city / community with 
mining? 
 
Claudia: The relation of weak I think both sides, the side of the people is not 100% 
organized to fight for what she calls, then there is a certain unreadiness of the population 
in question to go in search of what is their desire and a also little knowledge of what is 
possible than is legal question of knowledge even know, is like the great philosophers tell 
us we must know the enemy to know with what weapons we fight them and this is rarely 
done when it is done and the few that do not end up bearing the pressure ends up being a 
fight in the popular saying cat fight. 
 
Rajiv: Who is the big dog the company? A poodle ... 
 
Claudia: almost exactly ... it's a kitten, and the company, then I do not see it the true and 
real effort to be against giving the game is that it will add value to the community then 
most of the company's stock is not if it did not have more all her actions to the 
community I've attended I've ever envisioned and that I had the opportunity to be close is 
very misleading, in 2009 here, I've been always very close and inserted within these very 
legal lawsuits. 
 
Rajiv: Are these legal lawsuits from the Quilombolas? 
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Claudia: With mining in the community. 
 
Rajiv. What the community or Quilombola Paracatu? 
 
Claudia: The Community of Paracatu, city, 
 
Rajiv: So, since 2009 
 
Claudia: I'm saying the word community in question I used this time towards the city 
Paracatu 
 
Rajiv: this is interesting, you worked with, followed and saw the company 
 
Claudia: yes we have made several proposals for change as coping with the community 
and you realize some things that have been altered, have been improved. 
 
Rajiv: Like what? 
 
Claudia: a large grain of sand in the middle of the beach, you know…..well then, the 
relationship between the town and Kinross is more or less at the level of government 
public policy some time ago, 
Rajiv: How's that? 
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Claudia: very misleading, 
 
Rajiv: deceitful, how do they deceive? 
 
Claudia: they pretend they do, what they do causes people to be in need of their help, 
instead of teaching people to fish they give them chewed fish. 
 
Rajiv: I understand, but this is exactly what the company says it will not do 
 
Claudia: Yes but it is just what they have done, because then you get to come in this 
context you will analyze the historical question, you have several points crucial to this, 
there is a culture of beneficialism 
 
Rajiv: yeah, in Brazil? 
 
Claudia: In Brazil, and much has been cut Paracatu also taught that if the beneficiary is to 
be the issue of adding value to human beings for it with their efforts to seek alternatives 
to build your own world to build their bridge itself 
 
Rajiv: training people 
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Claudia: yes to train them, to be inserted in the process of training a new instruction to be 
a new quest for a new opportunity, take people's heads so that I was born, grew well and I 
will die like this, and this mentality that we must change 
 
Claudia: The mining itself has already paracatuense own culture, because it was always 
thus has some philosophers who speak of the matter is, nobody is what he wanted to be 
like that because someone taught you or induced you to be what you are 
 
Rajiv: so its the environment as constructionists would say? 
 
Claudia: Do you seek be what will be taught, as much as you give away more of what 
they teach you what is the root and the environment that you live that makes you, you 
have much more than you lived through that than you own, 100% of what a human would 
be at most 10% owned by us 
 
Rajiv: is the philosophy of social constructionism? 
 
Claudia: it is exactly socialism, then so we have educational institutions, government, 
private companies, all of us in society have the responsibility of the environment that we 
live within this co-responsibility I do not see the mining effort to change that reality on 
the contrary, the more they stay that way for us I best repayment of what is my duty and 
do not need to heat the head with what it takes, 'cause our Brazilian law they are open and 
many double meaning and will give too much interests or according to what each play, 
this is the great truth, as our law is very open to what will happen, the company that 
actually has a responsibility towards the social and economic importance that it mainly 
engages in this issue companies that are involved with social and environmental issue, 
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she will play her socio-economic environment, l only to the extent the law "requires" pq 
our law and loose enforcement has little to our law, has a double understood, in fact it 
should be the watchdog somo in society and then, since our legal process and slow and 
full opening, and then who want to enjoy this advantage and the less people knew and 
understood the subject better for the entrepreneur because fewer headaches he has, will 
have less population pressure, the population will not know what to collect charges and 
will charge the wrong way, it does not oblige the authorities to do this pq charging the 
wrong way, there is all these factors, has a range of historical factors that this relationship 
is weak, morbid, failed, and I would say that it is untrue 
 
Rajiv: untrue? 
 
Claudia: False 
 
Rajiv: Because very interesting what you talk, you talk all that the company Kinross 
speaks of it in policies, they want to teach people to fish, they want to teach people to be 
sustainable. 
 
Claudia: Let me tell you one thing, as St. Francis of Assisi would say, between talking 
and doing is a great difference, one thing is I'm saying that I want to be just another thing 
I bear witness to life, I I do so be the first one who says it has to be the first to run, 'cause 
the ear closer to that of the speaker that this is defending whom? It is not who's ahead or 
beside him who is his own, who is the feet of A or B is defending himself then it is that 
they have to put the first instance and sent to us human beings in general and Brazil is not 
just a matter of our world culture is someone I talk to do is wake up and go, the more I 
put myself to do this year was here on an open assembly hall where the Kinross 
participated judge federal prosecutors and state was very bad. 
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Rajiv For what was the company's position? 
 
Claudia: the company, it omits a lot of things it invents a lot. 
 
Rajiv: What do you mean by omit? 
 
Claudia: Omit is when you do not speak neither yes nor no, if you omit, you out instead 
of you is lying on the fence, I do not suppose to tell you a lie I do not tell you the truth, 
wants to convince that the default is correct. So what has happened so questioned there, 
it's beautiful that you guys preach politics is very beautiful, just that this year many of our 
reality of what actually happens, the management policy for example, I commented to 
look there, and went and quoted including personal names were there, so and so are their 
employees, whenever we get something for him to solve the community he is willing to 
respond to people talk, more the result? I feel much more personal look at the company 
can only help you here so that way we will not be able to meet you 
 
Rajiv, and does not explain why? 
 
Claudia: No, it's because it's just business practice is a matter of the functional 
organization it does not work this is the great truth, if you bring her project up a mega 
project of $ 50,000.00 it will not pay you, will not invest in your project only because it's 
only $ 50,000.00 that the company invests, now let's combine what you make $ 
50,000.00 to restructure people, environment, culture, opening possibilities of creating 
opportunities for career growth prospects for people by humans. 
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Rajiv: you’d need about 10 of these projects, to actually make a difference 
 
Claudia: $ 50,000.00 from, you are knowledgeable, you are a scholar, can you? Is that 
enough? 
 
Rajiv: It would work on a micro scale 
 
Claudia: micro Very, very micro, you understand, then well, agent has already led several 
projects self-sustaining agent has the answer to is the same. 
 
Rajiv: over $ 50,000.00 that we do not work that way 
 
Claudia: If you want it that way but .... 
 
Claudia: Oh you have to get more partners, more waiting oh oh .... 
 
Rajiv: Why seek a partner? 
 
Claudia: I agree to seek partners because it is the duty, the wave of the moment today is a 
good wave and thank GOD, that fashion cool has to go right and have to take is the 
question of networking, you work in networks , you make the mass of brick and the brick 
I do so together we have built a wall. 
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Rajiv: yes 
 
Claudia: uniting So it's going, building, sewing it all, and their question is not only the 
question of seeking partnership, which I very people question is do you have the 
obligation to invest more in the city which they invest is very much to just “ SHUT 
MOUTHS” 
 
Rajiv: What is “shut mouths”? What is it enough for? 
 
Claudia: to shut up the people 
 
Rajiv: I understand, and it works right? 
 
Claudia: the worst is it works it works so well, that's where I'm telling you the issue of 
context is the failure of the company but also has the cultural failure of social 
organization, 
 
Rajiv: Civil society 
 
Claudia: This understood, Why civil society is not united, it is not and where I speak of 
not being prepared to be searching for these network alternatives, including a process that 
we are now riding for now we will push them in and we have already started now until 
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the end, even they began to change some of them positions they had before, more then 
ever to get answers and talk more we invest hey, this is more bullshit 
 
Rajiv: You are working with Sergio Dani? 
 
Claudia: No, no, more if needed we can 
 
Rajiv: I speak today in the morning with David, he has a similar vision 
 
Claudia: This is how the society looks like this, A, B and C, everyone looking the same 
result, the more each one fighting alone, today we are making this concept together, 
dreamed a dream is only an illusion dreamed a dream together is achievement, 
 
Rajiv: Over here in the city you here in town think their perception is the same as yours? 
 
Claudia: Yes it is 
 
Rajiv: Why people more humble and yesterday .... then this maroon community and I 
asked the same question to them 
 
Claudia: which one? Santo Domingo 
 
  576 
Rajiv: Yeah, Santo Domingo, 
 
Claudia: You've had a chance to go there? 
 
Rajiv: I went yesterday, and the first question I was expecting a response like yours, 
because they live very close and I asked how the relationships are what you think of the 
company? and relations are good and he is a very good partner agent wants to work with 
the company except that here the other maroon Evani not want to work, so we can not 
work the company is good is good-hearted 
 
Claudia: You interviewed who? 
 
Rajiv: A group of eight people, mainly women who spoke were 
 
Claudia: Do you remember someone's name? 
 
Rajiv: We gave an accordion 
 
Claudia: Oh ....... ok 
 
Claudia, the more there if you talk to others, also is a little afraid, we were organizing a 
walk to paralyze the company for at least two hours, more staff will do next year, but I 
can not tell you, 'cause laughter agent will do even what that within these conversations 
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that agent is doing, which is what we see more people join barrier against is any activity, 
it is rare in Paracatu a family that has someone who works directly or indirectly to 
company, so afraid of shredding, so it'll be the rare times you find someone who works 
there or a close relative and that will have even more courage you taping, mining is 
reputed to be suspicious and we're even, if you had recorder and gone without this you 
would have gone with Elena harvested true things, now recorder, you is not here and with 
an accent, they will think you will know what to do with the information that will lead to 
them and the problems for me there is this fear 
 
Rajiv: I noticed that they all have children working in the company, they want to work 
for the company, they do not want the children to be harmed. 
 
Claudia: In 2009 there was a possibility of the company get out there and what the 
company has, brainwashing agent plays up, is because if you leave so many thousand 
people will lose their jobs, sooner or later it will happen, not ore is eternal, ore has to end 
date 
 
Rajiv: 2041 
 
Claudia: whatever it is that is has a date prior to end, 'cause the company so much that it 
draws from the city in such a negative image it leaves us, so many negative 
consequences, because if we consider a general balance of costs and benefits, Paracatu 
gets the negative impacts of mining 
 
Rajiv: Oh, you think the overall balance is negative? Even considering the jobs they 
bring? 
  578 
 
Claudia: well, well, considering the whole, the positive and negative part, if we put in the 
balance we are well above the negative to positive, the best part about it is those who are 
not in, to get the tax federal and gold we have is a single Congressman representing 
ourselves, get out there 
 
Rajiv: But that will change, the city will receive 10% 
Claudia: When God has mercy on us, and put a different mentality in the minds of rulers 
and even more in the minds of those who vote, because if we have, everyone has a leader 
who deserves it is not, the sentence is true, Who are we vote then we deserve everything 
bad and good because we who put them, sometimes people are the most was not me who 
voted or put the guy there, what it was you did not vote for the other, We are all very 
apathetic, I know, I 
 
Rajiv: I've heard a lot about the Brazilian 
 
Claudia: no, we are, we are a people great, wonderful, full of wisdom has no place in the 
world, I say this without fear of contradiction, creative people, dedicated, hardworking, 
diligent and wise as we do because we know all the best thing that's very true, any thing 
else in the world that you people are rather most of them can do something better and not 
worse of all worse than it appears to us, for our society we can do better, then agent a 
concept of life that you can not know, change the situation before you, which you 
outsource then switch on the situation in which this front, so that's where you can have a 
good relationship I have a good relationship with mining. 
 
Rajiv: You have a good relationship? 
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Claudia: I have, it is necessary, we can not mix things up, is not 'cause she plays it I do 
not have to live well, 
 
Rajiv: understood 
 
Claudia: it is a necessary evil, suppose you is ill, a serious illness is something you can do 
but better than to live with it until a cure, you will live well 
 
Rajiv: So you do not have any other option? 
 
Claudia: no, it's the best option is to have another option, but it is the best option 
 
Rajiv: So what's the other option? 
 
Claudia: there you can have a bad relationship with the company, you have several 
options, choose the best more 
 
Rajiv: what we were talking about yesterday in the maroon 
 
Claudia: you can have a relationship neither here nor there, sitting on the fence, like if I 
come to me unless the beneficiary is not, and you can have a healthy relationship is that 
you know how to separate the wheat from the chaff, it is necessary, not to because they 
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are not 100% they should have done that I will not live as well give it destroys the left 
there's no way, so as you will struggle to improve, you have to know until you talk to, 
considering, you know how to deal have to know the situations that lead to the reality 
which we are placed and if I do not get along is complicated to do something about it, I 
have a good relationship with them, the agent works with a project with them, 
 
Rajiv: Oh, there's a project? 
 
Claudia: It has, more so, if you ask me what my satisfaction it is almost zero, despite my 
living 
 
Rajv: Why? 
 
Claudia: because I do not think even one-third of the second half of their duty 
 
Rajiv: I understand, and which is their obligation? 
 
Claudia: to society, for starters I think they have to reverse this situation has changed a 
lot since improved a lot, really 
 
Rajiv: Since when? 
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Claudia: seminar on the issue of their partnership, which is a form of investment projects 
in Paracatu, has changed a lot, this walking, is not what should be is not yet ideal, already 
walking over to it, congratulations here note 10. Let's look at everything in its place, the 
question of society as a whole is, there are some other things very important quality that 
could be done and more is set aside, or else do something here very badly done and puts 
everyone that she is doing and inhibits any other legal problem cool I think there are 
other ways to do it, do well and bring concrete results, please everybody 'cause she will 
not get neither Jesus did, more so , we will endeavor to do the best that's my thought is to 
make every one of them dialogue to become reality, 'cause all that talk is true 5% the rest 
put in the drawer and whip fire, you understand? 
 
Rajiv: I understand? 
 
Claudia: oh we did for the Quilombo community of St. Dominic and St. Antonio da 
Lagoa, there is a cool place for you to go, places the two projects with 300 thousand 
dollars 
 
Rajiv: With money from mining? 
 
Claudia: in close partnership with him for 100,000 For mining, I'm almost as disheveled 
calm nervous, I called the manager responsible partner has more ah? hey we made a 
presentation to them to explain the entire project with multiple people. (Interview stops as 
Max Mundin, President of Neighbour Association arrives for our interview). 
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nd
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Rajiv: the mine explain on their website all the different social activities in which they 
engage and participate in. Judging from the website they are doing a lot of things in the 
social sphere, and even claim to be responsible….. 
 
Claudia: But they don’t practice what they say! You don’t ask a child if he’s well 
behaved do you? You ask his parents!  
 
Rajiv: Oh so you’re saying Kinross just do Greenwashing? 
 
Claudia: Yes, that’s what they do with images of laughing children. They are a really 
cold company they never approach the community. They should engage with the local 
community. Nobody here will tell you that they are friendly. They just are about profits. 
My brother once went to work there and I told him it was a mistake, he shouldn’t and he 
never listened.. 
 
Rajiv: So what happened?  
 
Claudia: (laughing) he left after a few weeks he couldn’t take it anymore, they were 
exploiting him and he told me I was right. I felt to happy that he left. I often thank god 
that I don’t DEPEND on them and I can make a living from another industry by myself!  
 
Rajiv:  Estou fazendo o meu doutorado  na Inglaterra sobre as percepções, sobre as 
relações entre as empresas mineradoras e as comunidades aqui no Brasil, América latina, 
então  não estou procurando a verdade e sim as percepções sobre essa relação. 
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Interviewee Code – C7 – Max - Local Socialist community leader, Paracatu 
 
Max: A realidade do momento e da vida 
Raiv: a realidade de cada pessoa, cada pessoa tem uma verdade, mais eu queria entender 
bem o que vc 
Max:  nós  e o seguinte, primeiro antes de vocês gravar você tem saber o seguinte, o 
movimento nosso nós estamos no terceiro setor, tem o primeiro setor que é pouco, tem o 
segundo setor e nos estamos no terceiro setor que e eu represento as associações de 
bairros, central das associações, hoje nos somos 35 associações de bairros legalizados 
mais os povoados que tem São Domingos, Lagoa e Cunha e são Sebastião que são 4 
povoados que uma extensão de como se fosse um bairro mais são povoados mais 
próximos do meio rural, na verdade Paracatu é uma cidade que completo 213 anos, uma 
cidade histórica, se é histórica tem história e a história de  Paracatu e a história de 
Paracatu justamente  aqui nasceu por causa do Ouro. 
Rajiv: Ah, nasceu por causa do ouro, sempre teve ouro? 
Max: então e até hoje, por exemplo, na questão do minério, o ouro, então os primeiros 
habitantes aqui sabe que desde a época do início de Paracatu, hoje eu estou mais na  
história recente, no caso nosso, de população hoje não é diferente do mundo, estamos 
sofrendo os impactos ambientais, então os impactos ambientes hoje eles não refletem só 
nos grandes centros , ou nos países, então hoje nos estamos sofrendo a questão dos 
impactos ambientais e relativamente a questão da mineração e a história da mineração 
aqui ela por mais, hoje eu não sou contra a empresa, não trabalho  contra para fechar a 
empresa ela não é boa para a história de Paracatu, porque, o que fica o que gera e o que 
faz na parte ambiental,  social, cultural e da parte turística é quase nada pelo que 
representa da riqueza que esta saindo de um solo, de um município, maior que hoje o 
ouro é  a moeda mais valorizada no mundo, com tanto contraste que hoje a gente vive 
hoje me Paracatu de não ter uma compensação social pela empresa 
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Rajiv: Mais eles falam que tem o objetivo de ser responsável pela  comunidade e 
ambiente 
Max: Hoje nós estamos no pior momento em relação da comunidade com a empresa, já 
se passou 20 anos e vai vir mais 30 anos e estamos assim no macro porque já sabemos 
como eles atuam, já sabemos o que eles fazem  hoje nos estamos em plena discussão para 
saber o que vamos fazer daqui para frente, porque por exemplo, até hoje em relação a 
comunidade o que já tirou de ouro de Paracatu  pelo que eles estão fazendo, para mim 
como representante das associações é quase nada certo, quase nada 
Rajiv: Eles estão com hospital e fazendo investimentos, deram uma Kombi ? 
Max: Eles fazem alguns investimentos pontuais, mais ligados ao poder publico 
principalmente com a prefeitura, porque eles continuam com a prática de engessamento 
do poder publico, eu considero que isso é para não serem cobrados pelas grandes 
realizações que eles tem que fazer 
Rajiv: Eles fazem um pouquinho para não ser  ( ? ), mínimo 
Max: e sempre, e assim, sempre para, não assim com aquele espírito que não esta 
engessando, eles trabalham, esses canadenses eles trabalham com esse espírito sabe, são 
inteligentes,  eles pontuam aquilo que eles devem fazer e que principalmente representam 
a lei para eles não serem cobrados legalmente, e eles sempre tem o discurso nós estamos 
dentro da lei, vão lá prefeitura e falam que estão dentro da lei e os órgãos do governo nos 
estamos dentro da lei mais a lei que a gente vê mais que eles estão infringindo a questão 
ambiental e social eles 
Rajiv: Mais eles falam que faz muito, que vão além da lei 
Max: Eles fazem além da lei, mais pelo aqui que estamos cobrando hoje que é a retirado 
do solo o ouro, isso não  da nem 1% nem 0,5%, nos estamos em uma realidade, por 
exemplo só para você ter uma idéia já que você esta aqui fazendo um estudo, por 
exemplo , nós aqui somos uma cidade que parte turística fica capengando( ruim), a cidade 
que tem uma mineradora, a parte cultural vc não tem um grande espaço, vc não tem uma 
vila olímpica  para a juventude a criança para o adolescente, então isso eles agarram na 
  585 
reforma do hospital por mais de 20 anos que eles estão aqui, isso aqui não representa 
nada, até hoje nos estamos em discussão com essa mineração não só com essa mais com 
todas as grandes empresas que representam o capital, é só vou citar um exemplo para 
você existem 5 bairros que no ano de 2010 e 2011 a desvalorização imobiliária significa 
65%, se vc tem uma casa hoje nesses bairros que são vizinho da Kinross se vc tinha uma 
casas que ela valia 100 mil reais ela desvalorizou 65%  
Rajiv: Por causa da mineradora? 
Max: é hoje ela vale 35 mil, em exemplo pq,  o danos ninguém quer comprar, então o que 
que gera, desvalorização imobiliária, temos danos, poeira, ruídos,bombas detonação, 
Rajiv: e a empresa esta crescendo, expandindo 
Max: Nós estamos num momento de confronto, ao mesmo tempos que este bairros estão 
sendo desvalorizados aqueles mais distantes da mina estão super valorizados, pq,ao 
mesmo tempo que o pessoal esta correndo dali esta  migrando para lá. 
Rajiv: Nossa é impacto forte 
Max: impacto forte, então hoje nos esse ano foi o ano de  mobilização a central esteve 
próxima de paralisar a BR 040 em manifestação a Kinross em defesa do direito da 
população e até hoje nos estamos assim esperando uma resposta  pq, hoje nos já sabemos 
o que queremos, vejo que se a empresa não apresentar uma resposta  de indenização e 
solução para essa população eu acredito seriamente que vai ter uma revolução, igual esta 
acontecendo em outros países,  
Rajivaconteceu em outras mineradoras 
Max: se o povo sabe o que esta sendo atingido e se a empresa fala que não é ela que esta 
atingindo, não existe dialogo, pq, já se passou 20 anos e a empresa vai querer continuar 
tirando ouro e a população vai querer ter uma vida, vc esta entendendo? 
Rajiv: eu entendo 
Max: não esta querendo acabar com a empresa. 
  586 
Rajiv: Mais eu fico surpreendido pq a empresa, qdo eu leio o material dela de 
comunicação dela no site da empresa ou internet eles falam que fazem muitas coisas para 
a comunidade 
Max o que eles fazem muito bem é o marketing deles, o mkt deles é o seguinte, a 
imprensa de Paracatu hoje fala muito em da empresa , se vc for ver a grande mídia hoje 
ela tem acesso, tem tudo é uma empresa de mineração, então assim,  essa empresa ela 
conseguiu mudar o percurso de uma BR 040, se vc chegar La tem um trevo ali em cima 
pq eles conseguiram mudar aquilo, então é o poder ecônomico eles tenhem influência no 
congresso nacional em toda esfera do governo, agora referente a nós que nós somos uma 
entidade que não temos rabo preso e o negocio nosso é o povo, nos somos totalmente 
independente e nos estamos assim, com a empresa a relação esta no pior momento 
Rajiv: mais vcs tem que procurar a empresa ou a empresa vem para vc? Se quer dialogar 
a empresa esta chegando, ah Max agente que falar com vc ou é vc que tem que ? 
Max: não não,  hoje nos eles estão sinalizando alguma coisa só através de pressão, 
Rajiv: só através de pressão 
Max:a única coisa que eles ainda respeitam hoje é o seguinte por exemplo  é a pressão 
popular, eles ficam incomodados em ver a possibilidade de a população partir em marcha 
até a empresa 
Rajiv: pq fica mal na mídia neh 
Max: ai a grande impressa se ta entendendo 
Rajiv: não quer que o mundo veja isso 
Max e se vc me pergunta hoje eu não vejo outra possibilidade, vai acontecer, não 
aconteceu pq sinalizou ta assim mais 
Rajiv: Mais a população de Paracatu eu estou vendo que esta bem dividida, por exemplo,  
eu tenho a opinião de vc, da Claudia e do vereador que eu acho parecida bem criticas 
mais tem a opinião de outras pessoas que eu estou vendo que são mais humildes, estive 
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ontem com a Elena na comunidade  de quilombolas de São Domingos e tem essa 
quilombolas esta divida em dois e eu estava com um grupo de pessoas e eu fiz as mesmas 
perguntas, como estão as relações o que vc acha da mineradora,   e as relações são boas e 
agente acha que eles são muito bons parceiros e a gente quer muito trabalhar com eles e 
fazer projetos pq eles são bons, so que outro grupo que não quer colaborar  
Max: é os que se sentem atingidos, entendeu, essa divisão ela hoje ..... , se um a empresa 
ela tem hj mais ou menos uns 3000 empregos vc há de convir comigo que pela questão as 
famílias a partir do momento que tem uma pessoa lá ou as vezes tem um prestador de 
serviço ou um empresário que se relaciona comercial com a empresa kinross, eles 
defender pelo interesse financeiro por causa de que,  ah mais a empresa é um mau 
necessário,eles costumam falar que é um mau necessário,  hoje eu posso até falar que é 
um mau necessário seguinte virgula  pq a partir do momento que seja resolvido o 
problema da população atingida, oh eu vou ser a favor de fechar uma kinross, não, mais 
tbm não vou ser a favor dela estar danificando uma casa de um cidadão trabalhador, então 
é esse meio termo que nos temos que chegar, eu estou em defesa do cidadão 
Rajiv:  Como vc convence as pessoas que não querem nenhuma briga com a empresa e 
tem medo de, do sistema financeiro  de ter prejuízo o de perder emprego e possibilidade 
Max: hoje eu posso te falar que é o seguinte que a rejeição a empresa é muito maior, 
muito maior que a aceitação, então isso significa que a população hoje ela já convenceu 
que ela esta sendo muito mais atingida do que assistida, então por exemplo não é só quem 
é visinho da kinross se eu tenho uma casa cá do outro lado na época de poeira a dona de 
casa que esta trabalhando fora quando ela chega ta aquele poeira e uma porcentagem 
grande tem arcenico, cada tonelada que soltam no ar da questão parece que 1 % é com 
arcenico, e aqui a grande discussão que nos temos é o arcenico, então a partir do 
momento que ela joga a poeira para cima o arcenico vai para todo que é canto da cidade, 
lençol freático, nascente para tudo, entendeu, isso que hoje no momento que as 
autoridades ai vc fala que prefeitura mais é o seguinte as instituições no entanto estão 
engessados prefere fazer uma parceria  ali ,para construir uma obrazinha e não querem 
discutir o problema como um todo 
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Rajiv o principal 
Max. O principal por exemplo,  a saúde, pode ser a minha a sua ou de um cidadão, hoje o 
que nos estamos cobrando é o resultado do estudo epidemiológico,  
Rajiv: Sei que a faculdade esta fazendo um estudo 
Max : que ai sim, nos queremos saber qual é a real situação 
Rajiv: então pelo que eu entendo a empresa fala e tem um canal aberto de comunicação, 
tem pessoas como a Fadwa e tem outras pessoas que estão dispostas a falar com vcs  e se 
vc quiser falar tudo isso que falou para mim pode ir na empresa e conversar com eles 
Max: eles falam isso com vc o seguinte, tem,  mais assim deixa eu te falar como isso 
funciona, os diretores da Kinross funcionam nesse seguinte quesito que vc falou ai, tem 
uma turma que são gerentes para a operacionalizar a empresa para ela não parar e tira 
mais ouro e tem um equipe se fala que são as relações com a comunidade que são aqueles 
que são formados para posar de bons , vc quer conversar vamos conversar, mais assim 
eles nunca negam de conversar, mais fogem de reconhecer os danos que estão causando e 
eles fogem de apresentar uma solução para aquilo que a população esta reenvindigando 
então assim vc inicia o ano e termina o ano com aquele mesmo dialogo sem avançar em 
nada com a comunidade. 
Rajiv: E a empresa entende essa frustração porque não é só vc que me falou isso tudo 
mundo que eu falei fala o mesmo 
Max: Tem avançado  a partir do momento em que nossa entidade com  e outros parceiros, 
inclusive ONGs e faculdades tem posicionado e mobilizado a sociedade, certo, eu tenho 
que reconhecer para vc que tem avançado o seguinte, primeiro eles estão reconhecendo 
que não da mais para ficar só enganando, chegou num ponto que ou eles reconhecem o 
que tem que fazer e apresenta uma solução ou vai encarar o confronto  
Rajiv: tá 
Max, isso eles tem consciência, tem tido várias  mudanças nos quadros de pessoas  eles 
tem mudado internamente o jeito da empresa se relacionar, então por exemplo, de 
  589 
primeiro vc fazia aqui um negocio que tinha que ir para Belo Horizonte depois para o 
Canada certo aquele negócio, hoje eles vivem com essa maneira as pessoas vinham aqui 
colhiam a opinião publica e depois sumiam e a empresa ficava com o desgaste, então esse 
ano através de toda a mobilização que existe através do câmara dos vereadores, várias 
audiências, assembléia legislativa, o deputado da nossa cidade aqui que esta sempre 
levantando o debate sobre a mineração, eles tem mudado sabe 
Rajiv: é eu percebi o vereador 
Max:  eles tem mudado e eu inclusive, nos, a central das associações nos estamos no 
aguardo, nos apresentamos uma pauta vou pegar  no carro pra vc, uma pauta que nos 
apresentamos  na audiência pública que agente acha necessário para eles apresentarem a 
resposta para nos e a população são dez itens, e essa pauta nos estamos aguardando a 
resposta que eles passaram para instancia superior Canada 
Rajiv Já passaram para a empresa? 
Max: que eles passaram para instancia superior Canada ou Chile ou não sei aonde eles 
tem 
Rajiv: Chile ou Canada 
Max: Então assim, não sei se vc tem visitado o seguinte, o grande debate que vai vir 
agora nesse final de ano e no ano seguinte é a desvalorização imobiliária, pq ai esta 
mexendo no bolso do cidadão, por exemplo, vc  tem uma propriedade aqui, vizinho da 
Kinross, se não fosse a Kinross ela tava e com a Kinross ela foi para baixo  e ai? 
Rajiv e alguém tem que responder 
Max:  e isso não é eu é o caro que ta lá, que investiu sua casa ele quer uma resposta e 
quem tem que dar a resposta e a empresa e eu como representante da população na  
sociedade civil em to em cima, por exemplo ninguém me compra eu não tenho emprego 
na kinross, vc esta entendo não sou contra não é a nossa intenção de fechar a kinross mais 
é o seguinte a relação com a kinross desse ano para frente ela é de firmeza de embate e de 
cobrança nos temos um plano de desenvolvimento sustentável nos estamos pensando em 
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Paracatu 2030, aonde que passa justamente com a discussão com a Kinross a criação de 
um fundo, vc esta entendendo, um fundo para e ai depois eles vão embora e quem vai 
discutir esse fundo a população civil , e ai não é depois é agora, vc chegou em um 
momento que se vc voltar aqui o ano quem vc vai ver os resultados,  agora por exemplo 
se for acontecer essa marcha vc tem que estar para cobrir, que por exemplo essa marchar 
é uma Marcha que nos colocamos nome dela em defesa da vida, vc esta entendendo, isso 
é a ultima instancia,  se chegar a ponto dessa marcha é uma coisa que vc pode saber que a 
impressa internacional e nacional vai cobri pq já é o confronto da população com a 
empresa eu até quero acreditar que não vai chegar nesse ponto, mais nos já temos isso 
com uma decisão já soberana da população 
Rajiv: Então isso já esta acordado com seus bairros? 
Max: Tudo com Quilombola, pessoal de Sta Rita, meio rural , esse movimento aqui hoje 
não conta aqui mais fica em defesa dos direitos, ele é grande 
Rajiv: Mais como vcs chegaram a esse acordo, vc teve um voto? 
 Max:  Com assembléias nos bairros, com participação na câmera lotada 
Rajiv: Então a empresa já sabe? 
Max: Ela sabe e esta ciente, por exemplo,  eu sempre estou nas ruas cobrando os direitos 
dos cidadãos 
Rajiv: Vc esta vendo que as famílias que tem filhos ou pessoas trabalhando na empresa 
eles já estão chatos? chateados 
Max:  é esses bairros vizinhos que é , inclusive nos titulamos de abismo, inclusive se vc 
vier de avião vc vê um abismo, um abismo que é o seguinte daí as famílias estão morando 
ali próximas perto e cada vez eles vão aprofundar 
Rajiv: Vc vai lá nos próximos dias?  Vc me convida? 
Max: convido se vc quiser ir lá tirar foto de longe, para vc vêr o que que é a realidade 
Rajiv: estou precisando 
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Max: daí nos vamos subir lá na curva da morte,  para vc ver la de cima para vc ver o 
cenário e ai vc vai nos bairros e vc vê a realidade,vc vê casa com rachaduras, por causa 
das bombas das 4 horas, agora são 4 tem a bomba das 4 e se não teve vai ter e treme isso 
aqui tudo, todo dia um pouco antes ou um pouco depois, mais o bom de sentir como é 
que é o temor éla, se vc quiser que o horário para fazermos a visita é so ir lá, daí agente 
vai conversando mais, mais assim eu tenho uma consciência de que a empresa ela não vai 
embora ela vai querer deixar de tirar ouro, mais ela tem ciência que terá que abrir os 
cofres e não é para mim e sem para a cidade. 
Rajiv: Mais pq ela vai ter que fazer isso, pq se a lei não obriga 
Max: pq ela terá que fazer a compensação dos danos, e isso é nos a sociedade que tem 
que fazer a discussão com ela, ela tem que compensar os danos que ela esta causando a 
população e o que que é a compensação e chegar na questão do turismos ajudar a 
desenvolver turismo a cultura, o esporte e construir uma vila olímpica para a juventude e 
fazer um hospital do câncer, vc esta entendendo,  a empresa é que tem que resolver aonde 
tem mineração ela é que tem que compensar a cidade e não depois 
Rajiv: e vc acha que vai acontecer? 
Max: vai assim, com a cobrança da população pq com a cobrança com a parte dos 
políticos nos fazemos distinção, pq uma parte dos políticos eles tem um vinculo direto 
com a empresa, pq eles tem alguma benéfica,  eles tem caminhões prestando serviço lá, 
eles tem uma empresa  
Rajiv: Eu to vendo pq, que isso é uma barreira grande 
Max: uma barreira, um engessamento financeiro, isso vc sabe que no capitalismo eles 
atuam em cima disso, la Kinross se vc chegar lá eles sabem quem é as autoridades 
municipais eles pontuam ,  quem que eles tem que.....certo.... 
Rajiv: o seu nome esta ali tbm 
Max: eles tem eu ali como uma pessoa que não, uma pessoa que tem que apresentar , do 
jeito que eles querem se relacionar comigo tipo de me engessar com alguma benéfica eu 
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to do lado do povo, se eu entrar eles sabe que vou ser mais um , então isso ai não 
funciona, então eles tem a preocupação comigo de dar a resposta para aquilo que eu estou 
levando para voz d o povo 
Rajiv: e eles sempre dão a  resposta? 
Max: Sim, eu não sei se é bom para mim mais é o seguinte eles tem uma preocupação 
comigo assim mais emergente e para o Deputado Almir Para,  pq hoje as duas instituições 
que estão colocando a ........, então eles estão com essa preocupação acredito que eles vão 
ter avanço que eles vão indenizar parte daqueles pessoas atingidas que vc vai ter a 
oportunidade de ver e vai tbm dar uma resposta para a cidade como um todo com a 
questão do fundo, pq nos não podemos cobrar toda ora da empresa que precisa de um 
negocio ir La atrás de dinheiro, então o que significa o fundo,  vai ter um conselho do 
poder publico e da sociedade 
Por exemplo, nos vamos investir aqui no turismo,daí nos vamos lá e discuti não esta 
relacionado com a empresa, ah nos vamos fazer um investimento das áreas atingidas, 
então para isso que é a criação do fundo único, que ao invés de ficar a entidade 
mendigando aquele dinheirinho, aquele dinheiro para ficar engessado ,não é uma 
discussão maior,  inclusive hoje eu sou defensor dessa proposta por entender que ai vc 
tira o vinculo de pessoas para ficar lá, vc  vai vincular pessoas com a sociedade civil as 
entidades organizados e o poder publico, então ai é o ministério publico, para vc ver eles 
tem R$ 12 milhões no caixa por causa de um TAA que fez  com a empresa, é um milhão 
por ano, um TAA para projetos ambientais e é essa mesma coisa que queremos fazer com 
a empresa 
Rajiv: Mais o que o Ministério Publico vai fazer com esse dinheiro? 
 Max: diz que é para revitalização da bacia do Rio São Francisco, projetos ambientais, já 
é um avanço, tudo isso a partir do momento em que sociedade se mobiliza, não foi assim 
pq eles falaram ah vamos chamar o M P, vamos fazer isso  
Rajiv: Eles não saem com a boa vontade, olha povo a gente quer...... 
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Max: não sabe pq, eu não acredito uma vez que ali não tem aquele vinculo familiar 
 que tem os diretores da empresa que são todos de fora, eles não tem amizade por 
aqui a única a única é que eles tem aqui é relacionar e saber que a empresa esta tirando 
ouro, a direção da empresa  não tem esse vinculo igual família que vive o dia a dia. 
Rajiv:  Aonde eles moram os diretores? 
Max: Eles tem uma  ......  para vc ficar sabendo, que os gerentes deles não ficam muito 
tempo na cidade não, eles tem um rodízio, só esse ano já mudaram nessa relação de 
comunidade uns quatro, vc esta entendendo já é um coisa que eles não deixam as pessoas 
ficarem muito tempo não, relações com a comunidade, por exemplo vc que esta vindo 
agora se vc ficar muitos dias aqui vc vai acabar fazendo amizade com a  população, e eles 
não gostam que eles fazem isso não, pq eles sentem que a sociedade vai dominando o 
gestor deles, então eles fazem esse rodízio, o gerente deles aqui tem pouco tempo os que 
ficam mais tempo aqui são os de operação, pq ai não tem vinculo 
Rajiv:  a pessoa de responsabilidade social, por xemeplo a XXX ela não fica aqui 
sempre? 
Max: Essa dona não bateu muito comigo não, tipo o perfil dela é de direita e tipo aquele 
que defende mais a questão do capitalismo o interesse da empresa, certo, ela joga muito 
mal com a população 
Rajiv:  A população não gostou dela? 
Max: não, principalmente eu sou representante de todas as associações não há via com 
bons olhos, e falei para ela mesmo assim e com a imagem que ela tava chegando aqui de 
que eles estavam certos, tão tudo eu falei então vcs vão ficar com suas certezas e nos 
vamos ....,  
Rajiv: e o que ela respondeu? 
Max: não me respondeu ,  não gostou também do meio jeito tbm não, pq eu tava em 
defesa e teve esse choque, pq ela chegou usando desse poder que a empresa quer 
implantar, olha aqui a lei, e nos vamos fazer desse jeito certo, e ai já encontrou nos a 
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população com todos esses aspectos de mal relacionamento de entendimento com a 
empresa, se a empresa no caso deixar a relação da comunidade direto com ela não avança 
muito as negociações. 
Rajiv: Então não é só vc que achou isso dela, tem outras pessoas que acham que ela não é 
muito humana ? 
Max: tem nesse meio nosso tem vereadores, se ta entendendo tem outras pessoas 
Rajiv: Nesse cargo a qualidade da pessoa ter que mais é para relacionar, conversar ter 
mais empatia 
Max: Ela chegou muito confrontando as idéias se esta entendendo, 
Rajiv: ela esta aqui a pouco tempo.. 
Max: e eu mesmo assim  como presidente da central eu não vejo ela como a pessoa 
indicada para ficar no cargo de relação social, pq social é vc mexer com o social e de 
ouvir , de tudo, social ,ela esta mais para de pessoa de interesse empresarial,  
Rajiv:  Corporativo 
Max:  corporativo 
Rajiv: Ela mora aqui em Paracatu? 
Max: Não ela fica mais em Belo Horizonte,  
Rajiv: é mesmo, nossa 
Max: hoje por exemplo,  tinha o Marcelo Coelho é o que eu falei com vc quando eles 
perceberam que  ele estava muito bem com a comunidade e daí veio a desculpa que ele 
pediu para sair , daí tinha o Guilherme Fontes lá em BH  também pediu para sair não 
agüentou a pressão e agora já estou sabendo que o que ta ai tbm já esta com relação com 
a comunidade indo embora, não é o Pedro 
Rajiv: eles tem uma rotatividade com  muita fre quência 
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Max: Quando tem o caboclo vem com a família e chegou e pegou nos em plena 
mobilização, pq SP é SP, e o ano que vem é um ano eleitoral, eleições municipais o assim 
o que vai estar na pauta do discurso em defesa será a Kinross, ou vai ser pessoa 
defendendo ou pessoa .... svc esta entendendo, o debate, um dos principais debate vai ser 
o futuro da kinross 
Rajiv: e pelo que vc esta me contando o candidato terá que ter um olho mais critico 
Max: Uma independência, tem que ser aquela pessoa que não pode ser radical mais ele 
tem que apresentar para a população que estará  dialogando, sendo o elo em defesa tbm 
desses direitos 
Rajiv: é entendi, então  
Max: é assim, vou te falar uma coisa para vc é a população hoje , eu vejo que a relação 
ela vai ficar mais fervorosa não tem como hoje por exemplo, o cidadão esta com a família 
querendo criar os seus filhos em um meio ambiente limpo, ela não tem emprego na 
kinross ele trabalha fora muito até de bóia fria, aí o cara chega la de noite e vai para a sua 
casinha querendo descansar, aí chega a kinross extraindo ouro e fazendo aquele barulho e 
ele não consegue descansar, aí o cara não dorme e aí vc vai perguntar para um cara desse 
se ele vai defender a kinross! E ai quando nos vamos conversar com a kinross sobre isso 
e eles dizem que a kinross esta certa e que é o cara que não esta escutando bem, e não sou 
eu que estou falando e quando a população ela esta partindo para acabar com a paciência 
com a kinross e não é quem esta la trabalhando não ou quem tem algum beneficio é uma 
grande massa da população, vou te dar um exemplo a dona trabalha la o dia inteiro fora e 
a emprega dela saiu e deixo a casa limpinha e quando ela chega a noite ta la a casa cheia 
de pó, poeira da kinross daí a mulher já chega xingando, oh meu marido vamos vender 
essa casa daqui e vamos mudar, então isso nos estamos totalmente... nos temos isso.... vc 
esta entendendo?  a  empresa tem que reconhecer isso 
Rajiv:  No seu caso pessoalmente, vc presidente da organização bairro e com esse grande 
argumento que fez sobre a desvalorização o que motivou vc pessoalmente a com essa luta 
e por que vc mora também? 
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Max: Não, eu tenho parentes atingidos certo, mas como representante do povo uma vez 
que chegou para mim das associações essas demandas eu adotei, chegou para mim eu 
como presidente a central é a mãe das associações eu não tinha outra bandeira se não 
assumir a defesa do cidadão com isso não é vc pegar um arma, é vc estudar certo, tem 
que conhecer, passar a saber que a empresa nas leis omissas do pais  que se  passou para 
ela esta cumprindo as licenças e tudo, mais assim,  é passar a mobilizar a comunidade pq 
eles estão transcendendo as leis, lá quando eles vão pedir as licenças não consta nada  
disso que a bomba vai estragar a casa do cidadão, que a poeira...vc esta entendendo hj o 
que nos estamos cobrando é que eles estão fazendo os danos a mais e não estão 
reconhecendo...então 
Rajiv:  E qual é o fim da sua organização, objetivo, missão, qual o nome oficial? 
Max: Hoje é o seguinte o nosso objetivo principal e par amenizar esses danos , sabendo 
que a empresa vai continuar é que ela reconheça os danos e indenize 
Rajiv: Então o objetivo é Kinross vcs seu trabalho é em função da mineradora? 
Max: Vc fala entidade? Nos trabalhamos em várias frentes 
Rajiv: Qual seria a missão da identidade? 
Max: A central ela é uma entidade tipo guarda chuva, as associações tem os seus 
estatutos e representam os seus morados e defender os seus interesses na cultura, no 
esporte nos desenvolvimento a central é justamente defender os interessas das ONGs e 
das associações nesse .....das empresas e do poder público. 
Rajiv: Sua preocupação é sobre a cidadania? 
Max: É nos estamos mais na parte de critica, de cobrança e de desenvolvimento 
Rajiv: Da cidade, dos moradores 
Max: Hoje por exemplo, tudo que vc for pensar hoje tem que ser pensado para o 
desenvolvimento humano e sustentável, vc esta entendendo, se não for o que nos estamos 
fazendo aqui nessa terra, assim como as igrejas tem as suas limitações neh ...a central das 
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associações hj ela é uma entidade importantíssima ela politicamente é muito respeitada 
pela força que tem, por exemplo se sai o nome da entendida hoje mobilizando a 
sociedade não é nome o vereador tal ou deputado, é a própria população ali representada, 
inclusive hoje a única preocupação deles e isso, que nos conseguimos , se vc falar hoje 
vamos fazer uma assembléia hj com a população para  discutir a questão da  Kinross, eu 
pego o meu carro de som e vou para as rua 
Rajiv: Ah, vc tem um carro e som 
Max: Direto eu pego e vou para os bairros para levantar esses temas com a população e 
chego lá, para lá e falo olha gente vamos debater  
Rajiv: Vc tem pensado em fazer algo assim nos próximos dias? 
Max: Tenho, eu tenho pq agora nos vamos fazer as assembléias nos bairros para discutir 
essa questão da desvalorização imobiliária certo, provavelmente a partir da semana que 
vem eu devo fazer uma no Bairro Bela Vista 
 
Max: a empresa esta fazendo um estudo sócio econômica, tudo isso é fruto do que da 
mobilização, a empresa esta fazendo esse estudo para saber a real situação do cidadão, do 
imóvel dele,  o que que tem, quantos metros quadrados, eles estão fazendo isso para 
gastar dinheiro a toa, não , estão fazendo isso para o plano de desapropriação para eles 
agirem. 
Rajiv: Se vc tivesse que descrever a identidade da empresa? 
1:09 
Max: Ela hoje é uma empresa que representa o capitalismo e que no momento esta 
causando grandes impactos e danos a comunidade, os impactos são maiores que os 
beneficios 
Rajiv : Entendi 
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Max: O Custo beneficio , só para vc ver esta tirando ouro,e no futuro vai ficar para nós ali 
um abismo e com aquilo tudo de produto o que que vai ficar ali de futuro para as 
próximas gerações, ali vai virar uma Serra Pelada, o povo vai atacar ali atrás cavar atrás 
de ouro, então o futuro não é bom pq eles estão tirando o ouro e ainda vão deixar para nos 
os danos 
Rajiv : E depois que eles não querer saber nada de Paracatu 
Max: Novas gerações , poder publico 
Rajiv: è bom que seus netos lembre de vcs pelo menos fez algo........... 
Max:  eu quero ficar na história como alguém que ficou em defesa do cidadão 
Rajiv: isso é interessante 
Max: Naõ pq eu me vendi, inclusive é o que a maioria aqui faz 
Rajiv: Pq se vendem para a empresa? 
Max: é se vendem  em troca de benefícios 
Rajiv: é isso é interessante para mim saber o pq vc não se vendeu, tem os seus valores 
próprios 
Max: ....... eles usam desse artifício, de compra liderança 
Rajiv: é isso aconteceu com Sergio Dani 
Max: Isso pra mim, eu tenho esse carinho e qdo eles vêem esse carinho lá para cima já 
sabem que eu estou protestando ou eu to...e o povo no centro da cidade sabe que qdo eu 
estou aqui nessa avenida, o povo...o bom era vc pegar, hj é o seguinte a rejeição que a 
empresa tem é bem maior que a aceitação, a aceitação só é de quem é beneficiado 
Rajiv:  Eu gostaria de entender bem é..... vc acha que aqui no povo aqui moram 90 mil 
pessoas a aprovação da mineradora enquanto a sua responsabilidade social seria aprovada 
ou reprovada? 
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Max:  Vc fala a população?  Reprovada, pq hoje esta uma grande discussão, pq grande 
porcentagem da  população esta com câncer,  
Rajiv: Eles tem câncer 
Max: e hoje , a população esta com uma epidemia então já se tem uma  suspeita muito 
grande através de estudos que  
Rajiv: é verdade que aqui epidemia de cancer ? 
Max, é hoje o que mais tem em Paracatu é câncer, cancer do colo do útero, de mama de 
próstata de tudo entendeu 
Rajiv: mais pq no seu caso vc  age , essa luta pessoal, vem da sua  de como vc foi criado 
por seus pais, ou vc não quer se vender para a empresa 
Max: hoje eu sou socialista e tudo que nos estamos discutindo hoje no mundo é isso, vc 
esta entendendo 
Rajiv: vc é do partido PT? 
Max: Na verdade eu não sou partidário sou socialista 
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Interviewee Code C12 with Trade Union President of Kinross Paracatu workers – 
Paracatu –  
 
Rajiv: What are your views on the relations with the workers at the mine? 
 
Osvaldo: it has diverse cycles, some very hard ones. The mine has had different owners. 
When it was Rio Tinto we had a very friendly relationship. Towards the end of their time 
the relationship got better. When Kinross entered they brought new people. The 
relationship is more conflictive. The company has been very unethical in our opinion. In 
our assemblies they pressure our workers on how they should vote.  
 
Rajiv: is that legal? 
 
Osvaldo: no not at all it goes against the ILO and national legislation. The put 
psychological pressure on their workers, threaten them they’ll be fired if they don’t vote a 
certain way. We’ve reported these practices to the ministry of public. 
 
We had a better relationship with the previous counterpart at the company but he was 
fired. 
 
Rajiv: why do you think? 
 
Osvaldo: the company doesn’t like that sort of person who is friendly with the workers, 
recognizes their work. Unions need to be independent. 
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Rajiv: how many workers do you cover? 
 
Osvaldo: we can’t by law cover outsourced workers. We have a very high number of 
members, on average in Brazil only 25% of workers belong to unions we have 75% of 
the workers with us. 
 
Rajiv: so you have a lot of power? 
 
Osvaldo: Yes we do. But workers don’t fight much they expect us to do all their fighting 
for them. They don’t participate enough. We’ve never striked before. We did manage to 
stop the Kinross buses for 15 minutes on the main highway to demand higher wages.  
 
Rajiv: what are the main complaints from your members? 
 
Osvaldo: two things. Their salaries are very low. Paracatu historically has people from 
agriculture. Agriculure pays very low so the mine is good in comparison. Most skilled 
workers leave the company for other mines. 
 
The company has managed to get workers to work 25% extra for no extra salary by 
getting more shifts. They pay an extra 8% only.  
 
The company has a very strong image but that image doesn’t consolidate. I’m going to a 
meeting today to represent a worker who was fired for whistleblowing to an international 
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organization for bad practices. He complained about verbal and physical abuse to 
SA8000. The company fired him before SA8000 even came here. 
 
The company says they do things but they don’t in reality. We have other companies here 
who have a much better conduct with participation. Where you have have breakfast and 
question the general manager. 
 
Rajiv: how’s the organizational climate there? 
 
Osvaldo: it’s not good. If you could do research there you’d see it would be well 
classified for a good place to work. 
 
Rajiv: do you represent other companies? 
 
Osvaldo: yes, and relations with workers there are better. For government actors the 
company is great as they have an interesting policy. However, in the local communities 
the relationship is bad.  
 
The company just leaves crumbs in the community, they paint a church they put their 
name here and there. But they’re taking our wealth. The best jobs are not for people from 
here they come from outside. There’s no strong investment in the city. The Mayor is 
scared of offending the company.  
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The company can talk a lot about what they want to do but there’s no action. there’s no 
company commitment to anything they just send and employee to participate in 
community meetings, that employee will leave in the future, so there’s no commitment. 
 
Rajiv: how’s your counterpart now? 
 
Osvaldo: he doesn’t accept responsibility. I don’t like to criticise people. He never says 
no and says he’ll do it later, later, later and it never happens he just “enrola” he enrola 
enrola enrola he never says no. it’s one of the worst things that can happen. You think 
something will happen and it doesn’t.  
The community criticise the company a lot but workers won’t in public as they’re scared 
of losing their job. The mine is inside the city so it they cause a lot of inconvenience to 
the community. The company doesn’t seemed worried. They could work on these things 
but they don’t want to spend a bit of money to alleviate these problems. 
 
We’ve only had one case of Silicosis where lungs are affected and we couldn’t prove it. 
We have a common case of back and neck pain. The main concern in health is with 
arsenic from the dust. One worker had 6 times the national limit of arsenic in his blood. 
After 8 months away from arsenic he still has high limits. 
 
Rajiv: what would you say their identity is? 
 
Osvaldo: they run over anyone in front of them. They look for their objectives like a 
machine that runs over anyone who interferes in their path.  
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A job at the mine for someone from agriculture is like a dream job. However someone 
with more preparation isn’t the same. We’re not at a critical stage for a strike. 
 
If relations continue as they are for 1 -2 more years we will have a strike. The workers 
want the company to stay but a better treatment. The community sometimes just wants 
the mine to leave. 
 
I always speak about history at debates and meetings like in Holland. I always say we 
produce gold since 300 years the slave would come put it on a donkey send to Rio de 
Janeiro and then to Portugal, today the slaves take the gold, put it on a helicopter and 
send to Canada. Paracatu continues poor, the city has never benefited from this gold 
extraction.  
 
There are several cities around without mining but have better development rates than 
Paracatu. The mine hasn’t contributed significantly to the city. Comparing what they take 
from here and what they leave is very unequal  
 
More than 80% of workers have a loan from the company which shows how low the 
salaries are as they can’t make ends meet on the salary. It’s rare that they don’t have it. 
They pay interest on this. It’s complicated. 
 
Rajiv: is it possible to see workers or managers walking around the streets of Paracatu? 
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Osvaldo: before much more when it was Rio Tinto. They would go to parties and 
meetings for city events. Kinross is much more reserved. They have another policy. The 
General Manager doesn’t ever meet us, the previous one did sometimes.  
 
Rajiv: on the website they show Paracatu in a different way with more CSR 
 
We have a phrase here called it’s just for English to see (laughs). What exists here is a 
company that generates jobs, pays taxes, complies with law….and works hard to create a 
good image. The reality isn’t that, the workers are penalized, when they make them work 
25% more they don’t even pay for that! 
 
I think if you told people tomorrow Kinross will close and leave and your life will stay 
the same 95% of people here would like that. Their worry including mine is that we lose 
our jobs. The permanence of the company is important. If the company was further away 
8-10km away conflict would be less. The company’s moving closer to us. They got their 
license to expand and finish with an urbanized neighbourhood that had water and 
infrastructure.  
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Interview with Elano G – Well known Journalist in Paracatu at his house. 22nd 
November, 2011 – 1 hour 20 minutes C15 
 
Rajiv: So what are your views on the mine and it’s relationship with the town? Its’ 
identity too as a mine? 
 
Elano: Well mining forms part of Paracatu’s identity. It was born into mining. My view 
today is different from four years ago I think it was very different under the English than 
under the Canadians? 
 
Rajiv: Why is that? 
 
Elano: The philosophy of those Canadians is more distant much COLDER they don’t 
take into account our wishes in the community. I don’t disagree with mine exploration we 
depend on it. (points to radio, camera, tv) All of this depends on mining. It needs to be 
done in a balanced way with the environment and social issues. 
 
Rajiv: The company actually talks a lot about its CSR if you look on its’ website you’ll 
see they talk about doing a lot for the community. 
 
Elano: I think when the company was English owned it was much closer to the people. 
So much so that throughout the years they managed to get close to the community. The 
previous managers of the company would go to cafes to have a coffee and bread with us. 
The Brazilian people like that, they’re a warm people they like to be treated well and like 
to treat others well. 
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Rajiv: it’s not just a business commercial relationship. 
 
Elano: exactly, the Japanese is like that too. He’s very distant and serious, however, when 
he does a first business with you he wants to see your face. After that he’ll always do 
business with you. Brazilians have that too they always want personal contact. So, what 
the company’s proposing in terms of community relations it’s going downhill. There’s no 
more dialogue, conversation, information exchanging. 
 
Rajiv: that’s interesting because on their website they say they do that. 
 
 Elano: they’ve done a few social things like funded the local hospital. But the worst 
thing is that they’re closed for information.  They say they’re open but they’re 
increasingly more distant  
 
Rajiv: I spoke with the company about this and they said this is what they actually want, 
to be more distanced from the community. They told me that community perceptions are 
not what they’d hope for them to be. 
 
Elano: The company is in a privileged situation. Just before the Canadians took charge of 
the company they were going through a period of huge conflict with the community when 
it was RPM and not Kinross. There was lots of divergence after announcing expansion 
plans due to environmental impacts. They managed to deal with that so well, the 
managers they managed to pacify the community they faced a stone in the shoe. A person 
you must have heard of already called Sergio Dani. 
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Rajiv: Yes I have, he wasn’t very polite with me by email. 
 
Elano: He was an obstacle for them. Today he’s distant, so his influence is weakened.  
 
Rajiv: I spoke to Max Mundin who said he might want to create a protest here. 
 
Elano: Sergio Dani caused a lot of strife for the company. The company managed to 
overcome Sergio Dani and the community back then as they were very skilled and had a 
different philosophy back then so the Canadians have been really fortunate as Sergio 
Dani had left here when they arrived. If Sergio was still here they’d be finished by now 
and with their “low profile” policy (laughs). 
 
Rajiv: is the management from Paracatu? 
 
Elano: If you look at the senior level management none of them are from Paracatu. Back 
then before you had people from here in Paracatu, they lived here from before at least 15 
years before and the new people who have arrived here now have come with the 
philosophy of the Canadians, a philosophy of keeping distance. Hardly anyone here 
knows the managers. They know how to be nice. When you’re with them they incredibly 
nice but their policy is completely wrong. 
 
Rajiv: One of their main principles is to be a good neighbour that should mean open 
dialogue. 
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Elano: When they first arrived here, and gave their first public introductions and meeting 
I noticed they would be different immediately because in their communications materials 
they’d left RPM completely out and all of Paracatu identifies them as RPM. 
 
Rajiv: Yes that’s something I’ve noticed too. I spoke with high school kids the other day 
and they only referred to it as RPM. The image of the mine isn’t positive overall. 
 
Elano: At 4pm they explode bombs for exploration. The other day I was close there and 
heard the sirens and my car started to shake a lot as they denotated their explosives. But 
it’s alright as they’re within the law. 
 
Rajiv: but the definition of CSR is going beyond legal compliance I’ve read…I walked 
around with the counciller on Saturday to speak to the neighbours of the mine. 
 
Elano: Sometimes I publically defended the company for free when it was RPM and 
Sergio Dani was attacking the company. I didn’t agree with that it was terrorism. I 
protested in the streets. Today it would be difficult for me to do that again with these 
relations they have. Because I believed in those people in management back when it was 
RPM they seemed more committed, been here for a long time, their kids were born here. 
Today I can’t defend them as I don’t believe in them. I have reservations about their 
external policy. 
 
Rajiv: It’s just strange they’re like this as they communicate on their website about all the 
social initiatives they have. 
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Elano: In relation to what they take and extract, what they give back is really very little 
there should be a higher return. If we demanded more from them……I mean look at 
youtube and type Kinross you’ll see their CEO and Directors living in luxurious 
mansions in Canada that’s their wealth. They need to do more because in 20-30 years 
they’ll be gone. 
 
Rajiv: If you had to describe Paracatu’s identity how would you express it? 
 
Elano:  what we see is exploration. It’s just a desire for making profit, that’s most 
important. Like most companies, they’re after profit. But it should come via development 
to the community. They make a lot of money.  
 
Rajiv: I spoke to the Ministry of Public who told me they have an agreement with the 
company who will give 1 million reais per year to the community in invement. 
 
Elano: but that’s nothing! The Ministry of Public can over go as far as the law permits 
them to.  
 
Rajiv: the company told me they held a public assembly where they were highly 
criticized. 
 
Elano: No I couldn’t but I heard…I don’t see that was positive, they have an audience 
just to show they comply with certain demands, and later propose nothing. 
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Rajiv: I keep hearing the company always likes to “enrolar” be nice and polite and 
always tell people they’ll get back to them but never do or never give them a concrete 
answer.  
 
Elano: Yes that happens a lot these days. I see today they’re wrong, their policy is wrong. 
I even told them, I told Fadwa to her face their policy is wrong. 
 
Rajiv: What did they say? 
 
Elano: They said yes they’re trying to get closer to the community but I don’t see any 
proof. Fadwa is really nice and well intentioned. It’s the company policy that’s wrong.  
 
Rajiv: I’ve heard that managers who get too close to the community are told to leave the 
company… such as Marcelo 
 
Elano: Marcelo was the last remaining one of the nice managers. He had a Paracatu 
identity, he was one of the last Mohicans (laughs). Also Nadja, they defended the 
company and community. The company lost these key people who acted as links between 
the community and company. When the previous managers sold the company Luis 
Alberto and Victor Hugo gave an interview, and I asked them “what’s going to change 
with the sale”? and they said “nothing will change, we guarantee nothing’s going 
change”. The first change was that they were moved out! They said nothing would 
change and they were sacked…not a good sign. Since then, things just get worse. 
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Rajiv: Fadwa told me she thought the company was too active in the local press with 
adverts and she wanted to revert that as her first action. 
 
Elano: but they went too far with that. The press and media are the connection between 
company and community we want to shed light over that…..the company has another big 
issue to deal with and that’s the fact it’s within the urban perimeter. For example 
Votorantin they contribute with social investment here even though there’s no demand on 
them as they’re 40km from here, but Kinross they’re here on our doorstep…the dust gets 
everywhere, all the neighbouring residents used to call us informing us how the dust 
would constantly cover their houses and furniture after cleaning. 
 
Rajiv: I’m seeing most people I’ve spoken to have the same opinion as you. 
 
Elano: if you’d come here four years earlier you’d have heard different opinions so it’s 
not just due to the people you’ve selected to talk to it’s the company that have created 
these opinions. If you stop somebody randomly in the streets here and ask them you’ll see 
they have the same opinion as me unless they are a company employee they have no 
choice but to defend the company. 
 
Rajiv: that’s another question I’d like to ask you about, the perception of the workers on 
the company. 
 
Elano: I spoke to a friend who works there in a middle level such as supervisor and he 
said he was the only one still left there from the previous team from RPM and he’s only 
staying as he’s close to retirement. He said ‘I’m just taking it on the chin for now, since 
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the new group took over they don’t give us a moment’s rest and anything and everything 
that can prevent profit maximization is being sidelined”. 
 
In terms of their social work they’re doing to the absolute minimum necessary to “shut 
mouths up” and comply. Here in Paracatu the press is very ethical. 
 
Rajiv: Really? Kinross told me they were giving workshops on ethics in journalism as 
they thought it necessary.  
 
Elano: If we weren’t ethical we would have turned the community against the company, 
it’s like a timebomb. Nobody in the press is doing that. We have here in the city great 
sources of sponsors so the mining company makes no difference. The press here have 
been very ethical. We even give the company coverage for free at times. I heard a really 
awful comment from an employee of the mine recently who said it’s better for us to do 
these social events and get free press coverage than paying the press money directly for 
advertisement. I defend all my colleagues on that. They’re all ethnical here. 
 
Rajiv: I heard about these ethical workshops on journalism… 
 
Elano: they told you about that? (laughter). I don’t agree much with it. They’re 
underestimating us a lot. I already worked in the Globo Network and other national 
networks. I came to live here in Paracatu by choice I wanted a quieter life in the interior 
so when they say things like that its offensive to us. 
 
Rajiv: maybe that happens due to a lack of dialogue 
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Elano: if they really understood the importance between press and company for society 
they would have a different approach and policy………. 
 
Rajiv: I spoke to Max Mundin who said he’s not far off from having a revolution here…. 
 
Elano: he’s come to us a few times to speak on our show but due to my own ethics I don’t 
let him speak live on air as he is very revolutionary and wants to use us as a platform and 
could cause serious conflict with the company so we record him and make the 
appropriate edits. I’m not defending the company (speaks to daughter about postgraduate 
course)…….I’d tell anyone the same things I’m telling you right now even from the 
company. 
 
These days information is really well accessible and even humble and modest people are 
not easily persuaded like before everyone has internet, radio, tv, it’s easy today to form 
your own opinion. 
 
Rajiv: what changes have you seen over the years in the city? 
 
Elano: violence has increased a lot!  
 
Rajiv: I heard about a shooting from the girlfriend of the victim 
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Elano: it’s probably related to crack, it’s a terrible problem here there’s a war between 
druglords. 90% of cases of violence are related to crack, and it’s a problem on a national 
scale. The main factor for growth I see today is that the city’s becoming a centre for 
universities, a lot of new universities opening up here. That’s bringing a lot people here 
and its positive. It shows that we have good alternatives apart from mining so we’re not 
so dependent. We have lots of agriculture and milk production. Paracatu 2030 
Sustainable development plan is really interesting.  
 
With the 1 million reais per year the company will pay won’t be enough to mitigate the 
environmental impacts of the company especially that huge crater they’ve got in the land. 
 
Rajiv: What do you think about CSR? 
 
Elano: It’s all important, NGO’s contribute here with great work. It’s important to help 
them for companies.  
 
If the company doesn’t change its position and policy they’re going to continue getting 
being attacked by the community. 
 
Rajiv: I know of a specialist who says sometimes communities just want close relations 
with companies and are not obsessed with getting money from them  
 
Elano: When the mining company started here it was lead by Eike Batista’s MMX group. 
Their policy was closed like the current one. They say the English people are very closed, 
cold and methodological but they’ve combined an interesting mix between the Brazilian 
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“hip shaking” style with the freedom the English gave and they were great times. A lot 
fewer people back then had a negative perception of the firm. 
 
Ana: people loved Vitor Hugo the ex CEO and Luis Alberto and all of a sudden they 
were fired. 
 
Rajiv: the company told me the community liked them because they were paternalistic 
and gave away presents and gifts all the time. 
 
Ana: No it wasn’t like that. The company used to take part in most events in the city as 
they were an important actor, not always financially but they were present. Today you no 
longer see that. Before Fadwa you had easy access to talk to the company. Now to talk to 
Fadwa it’s almost impossible to speak to her. 
 
Elano: It’s very hard to create trust from nothing. So you need to take time and let people 
get to know you and it takes times. However the company has managed to kill off all the 
ties the community had with them before.  It’s not a comfortable situation for the 
company. But they can solve it. But firstly they need to change their policy.  
 
Ana: their contract is federal and not municipal. 
 
Elano: I imagine the Canadians are doing the minimal not to let the community invade 
them, the bare minimum. The moment the community agree they feel exploited they will 
invade the company and stop it operating like back in the times of the “Confidence do 
Minero”. Back then in the 19th century Portugal charged 20% of all wealth found here it 
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caused conflict and a revolution. The Portuguese crown cut up the main protester and 
spread his body parts across the main Royal Highway so nobody else would try, however 
it caused a revolution instead. Today they’re taking Everything, if they left just 20% it 
would be great! (Laughter). You’ll see in youtube the Kinross management playing golf 
and their large mansions having banquets…..the percentage of tax that comes to the 
municipality from the gold royalties is very little. 
 
Back in the times of the small scale mining there was much more money distributed in 
the city. I’m against this type of mining it’s bad for the environment and other things but 
the city had a better vibe all the small scale miners had money in their pockets. It was a 
bad thing for health and environment without doubt.  
 
There’s no more distribution of income anymore like before. Though we don’t have 
favela slums like in Sao Paulo, none of that misery here. But still there is a terrible 
difference between rich and poor.  
 
When you come back count on me. We can have a radio show and call in. I’d very much 
access to your research results in the end. 
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Interviewee Code C37 – Jaime – Icaritas NGO – Paracatu – 21st November, 2011 – 1 
hour 26 minutes 
 
My thoughts: Was very suspicious at first about me and who I was. I explained 
everything and then showed him my profile on Cranfield website which put him at ease 
 
Jaime: we are an international network organization, linked to the catholic church but 
work with everyone they don’t have to be catholic. We’re all over Brazil.  
 
(Spent 10 minutes talking about historical context of land property problems in Brazil 
how few people have too much land and this causes social and environmental impacts. 
His organization are campaigning for a maximum size of land of 35 hectares per person. 
This would only impact 50 families in Brazil!! We would have millions of hectares for 
agrarian reform. The Governer of Mato Grosso do Sul has 1 million hectares of land. 
Brazilians need to understand it’s not just about laws but that we need to change people.) 
 
Rajiv: what do you think about Kinross and it’s relations with the community? 
 
Jaime: they came here imposing a lot of things on us in the 1980s. progress and 
development now depends on them they called us a small backwards town. The mine’s 
vision here is all about profit maximization, just making profits. Now it’s even stronger 
with Kinross. They’re relationship with the community is about dominance. They leave 
very little behind. More moderate people here don’t want the mine to leave. They should 
have more democratic relations here. They’re not investing enough here.  
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Rajiv: I hear the company will invest 1 million reais here 
 
Jaime: if you count the 30 years they mine here and consider 1 million reais it’s very 
little. The agriculture here uses a lot poison but that’s no excuse for the mine to poison 
here. One mistake doesn’t justify another. The health of Paracatus population has 
worsened. We need doctors still here, the hospital doesn’t have enough, it’s just full of 
student doctors. 
 
Kinross distributes crumbs to social projects. Each project gets around 10, 15, 20, 30 
thousand reais per project it’s very little for the amount of profits it takes from here in 
Paracatu. The Mayor has no power to get the company to pay more.  
 
The company don’t listen to the population on issues of pollution. A university found 
proof of it in the air but the company say it’s an isolated incident. The company don’t 
give us answers. The water here in polluted, the company then shows their research to 
show it’s not polluted. 
 
Rajiv: it’s like a fight of research 
 
Jaime: we need some neutral research. The local community need to know the truth about 
pollution. The other thing you must have perceived already is about compensation to 
those resettled. 
 
 The mine is not responsible for her acts or damages, cracks in houses, dust and the 
detonations. The mine doesn’t relate well with the community. people with money can 
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get compensation but poor people can’t. they don’t negotiate with the community they 
negotiate with people as individuals. They divide the community. 
 
Once I complained about the mine on a Saturday and a manager overheard me in Sao 
Domingos Quilimbo talking and on Monday company representatives came over here to 
explain their policy to us. She never explained it was due to my criticism.  
 
Sao Domingos is divided because of problems with water and pollution. The company 
want to invest there to win the community over so they can continue destroying their land 
near to the Quilombo. The company have their discourse that doesn’t convince they say 
they are environmentally friendly and have good relations with the community, value 
people but it’s not convincing. They don’t give responses to the population. 
 
Rajiv: what did you think of the people from the mine? 
 
Jaime: everything comes from the top – down at the mine. They mine, destroy and profit. 
We saw the relationship and there is no friendly relationship with the, but from behind 
they defend a capitalist model of profit. They impose their ideas with force.  
 
Rajiv: but the company says otherwise that they are responsible with the community. 
 
Jaime: when they say they’re helping the community? It’s Crumbs! We shouldn’t even 
call that help, it’s our right. 15,20,30 thousand reais for projects is nothing. They need to 
take a certain percentage out of their profits and invest it into the community. That needs 
to be discussed with the population. 
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The company have a project of revitalizing the stream with a park and trees safety 
barriers here it’s very nice but at the same time Foundation Joao Pinheiro…the 
geographer said they should have made this linear park along the whole extension of the 
stream. The company don’t say anything to the locals about what they’ll do with the 
mouth of the stream. 
 
With reference to relations with employees. Those who work at the mine their lives 
transform into the mine they don’t live much with us, the company have their own club. 
The miners practically live in the mine, we call that brainwashing. They defend the mine. 
If they heard me criticizing the mine they might even hit me. 
 
You see that sign about how many days they’ve had no accidents. That’s a lie. The 
managers are trained about silencing anyone who got injured there, they drive them home 
and stop them from saying anything. I’ve heard from reliable sources this is true. 
 
The mine always wins international awards. Someone who was working there told me an 
international organization came here even the bosses start to clean up and those who are 
considered as the lowest skilled workers are put in a truck and taken to the forest and left 
there for the day so that the foreign visitors can assess the mine for the award. Once the 
foreigners leave the truck goes back for the low skilled workers. I was told this by 
someone who was taken to the forest.  
 
The Paracatu population is not organized for confronting the mine or debating. This is a 
problem of Paracatu. The company got their environmental license recently for the 
tailings dam against the wishes of the Ministry of Public. 
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Doctor Onesio a prosecutor said the company should not have got the license due to their 
weak community relations. The ministry of public know that giving a license to the mine 
would put our city at risk. 
 
The day before yesterday on the local tv station gave a report on the whole license issue.  
 
One of the mine’s biggest arguments is that they purchase internally and so develop and 
enrich the city. Due to them the city has grown a lot.  
 
Our city has exploded, it exploded completely. Our population in the periphery is very 
poor. We have other problems with the city such as housing, transport, education and 
employment. The traffic here in hell!  
 
Most of the intellectual workers are from outside and not the city. The workers from here 
do the basic simple manual work.  
 
Rajiv: but the company told me they have a manager who’s from the city and started as a 
manual miner and is now manager of strategy and he gives talks at the university. 
 
Jaime: yes, that’s what we refer to as brain washing, it s company strategy. There’s no 
point in building a great hospital with equipment and doctors. The public transport is 
expensive and their owners get rich from this they charge a lot. The environment here, 
we’re always fighting for a cleaner environment.  
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Rajiv: what would you say is the identity of Kinross? 
 
Jaime: foreigner that’s here to make profit and destroy the population. There’s nothing 
more than that. They’re controlled by shareholders around the world waiting for results 
and they have no idea of what’s happening here. In the future we could have a destroyed 
city, without work, hunger and a sick population. We relate their identity to the tailings 
dam, they maintain it for now but what about when they leave? Who can guarantee they 
will look after it after 2044? 
 
They have guaranteed anything to us about the mine closure. They haven’t convinced the 
population at all. 
 
Rajiv: what’s the perception of the local community here on the mine? 
 
Jaime: I think the city is divided. I’d say 40% defend the mine and 60% are against it. I’m 
part of the 60% in the 40% you’ll find employees, their families and businesses. 
 
I saw in the public assemblies this division. Those who didn’t benefit from the mine 
throw stone at it and those who benefit defend it. Whoever makes a profit from the mine 
defends it. There’s an issue of consciousness and morality too. Everyone has an opinion 
of the mine. 
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The company fires people for any small thing. I know someone was fired after working 
there for twenty years his boss told him he was unmotivated. Most people leave there 
with an illness due to chemical products. 
 
When you see the communication from the mine it makes you cry it’s so beautiful what 
they’re doing. A friend of mine worked there for 10 years with headaches and they were 
cured once he left. A relative of mine went to work there and told me everything hurts 
once you work there. Lot of previous workers of the mine have an opinion against the 
mine, once they leave they then speak. 
 
 If you go to the Santa Rita community they’ll reject you and suspect you’re a spy or 
company consultant. They will mistrust to the maximise of any researcher.  
 
These days people participate less they all just care about their own lives. People with 
money close themselves off to the world if they have a bed, house and car they don’t care 
about other people’s problems. People are becoming increasingly individualistic here in 
Paracatu  
 
We have a problem with drugs here it’s very big. At neighbourhood associations very 
few people will go to discuss problems. Councillors have told us they’ll be receiving 200 
million reais this years from tax revenue but yet we still have poor social assistence. The 
city is growing but not developing. It’s exploding 
Back in the 1980’s the population survived without the mine. The people here had their 
own life before. We need more participation. The mine keeps imposing and not dialoge 
or listen. 
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They’re sponsoring everything here in the town, football matches. They’ve managed to 
dominate the press. Elano Guiramaes always speaks well of the mine and he’s even paid 
by them. Speak to him and you’ll see how much he defends the mine you’ll have a 
different conversation to this with him. He’s very strategic. 
 
A few years ago there were protests here about the mine and the company decided to 
make their own protest using uniforms and badges, trucks down the road and Elano was 
at the front shouting “enough of people protesting against progress and the mine!” It was 
quite a scary sight.  
 
I have a master’s thesis on the Santa Rita community. I’ll send it to you by email.  That 
community is divided between those who benefited from the mine and thoe that didn’t. 
the rich farmers got good compensation. The small scale farmers got very little and 
moved to the city which changed their lives. 
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Interviewee Code C39 – Emails from former Kinross Paracatu Manager revealing 
confidential information (….  Confidential material deleted to protect informants’ 
identity) 
 
 12th March, 2014 
Prezado Rajiv, bom dia! 
Fui …..Chefe de……. da Kinross e conheço ainda muitos problemas relativos à 
mineradora, suas praticas e métodos de trabalho ( junto e contra a comunidade) onde 
tenho vários  documentos a respeito.  
Tenho documentos sobre vários assuntos, desde situações de meio ambiente e 
preocupações da mineradora com a comunidade, até as praticas de perseguições  à 
empregados, ex empregados, sindicatos, movimentos sociais, acompanhamento da vida e 
ações de  políticos e lideres comunitários, sindicatos , etc.  
Se quiser conversar por skipe, o meu é……, me chama que te adiciono. 
Me indique por favor o melhor horário para falarmos em virtude do fuso. 
Um abraço 
 
1
st
 April, 2014 
 
Vc conhece a historia dos grandes imperadores romanos: Pão e Circo. 
  
A kinross  distribui migalhas para um povo carente, que sedentamente as recebe recebe e 
ainda vai sendo enganado pela  imprensa local - comprada(paga-se por espaços nos 
jornais e nas midias). Aliado  a isso, temos a falta de transparencia da mineradora, que 
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mente, omite, manipula, disfarça e consegue vender a imagem de impoluta. Temos 
também um serviço de informações que denigre, intimida e achaca as pessoas contrarias à 
mineradora, que são acompanhadas diuturnamente e a qualquer deslize pessoal, 
sentimental, financeiro, moral,etc é coagido por essa força que aniquila qualquer 
iniciativa e acaba sendo desmoralizado na sociedade.  
 O número de empregados diretos nao passa de 1300 ( APROXIMADAMENTE)  e o de 
indiretos fica na na faixa dos 1000 acredito eu, a esta altura sem projeto de expansão. 
A empresa se antecipa a qualquer ação e Abafa qualquer tentativa trazendo especialistas 
manipuladores , que se vendem por dinheiro,  e em audiencias publicas poucos vão ou 
tem conhecimento dos assuntos tratados de interesse da população, desta forma ela 
mata  qualquer tentativa de insurgencia. 
  
A empresa "negocia', influencia de todas as formas em todos aspectos da sociedade e 
pessoas de boa fé, são "enganadas ou de tão necessitadas das migalhas, se curvam a este 
poderio. 
Há pessoas má intencionadas que se vendem e ajudar a vender outras e há 
as  maquiavélicas e especializadas em contra informações que trabalham para a empresa 
onde temos temos pontos interessantes que com seu conhecimento , com do Marcio 
(professor e geólogo) podemos em alguns casos pelo menos em colocar em duvida a 
transparência tão propalada e divulgada na mídia. 
Temos casos de assedio sexual, com demissões, sem demissões ...muita vergonha 
acontece na empresa. 
Abraço  
 
 
  628 
Interviewee Code D1 – Carlos and Jorge – Brothers and Local residents and activist 
resisting tailings dam from mining company in Los Caimanes, Chile 
Carlos: The community has no relations with the Pelambres mine, everything we do with 
them is via the legal courts.  
 
Me: how was life like before the dam was built? 
Carlos: before the mine located the gigantic tailings dam the community was very much 
one and unified…very close knit and collective. Since the dam was installed the mine has 
divided the community between those who accept social benefits from it and payment 
from the mine for their water rights with those who did not. 
 
Me: What did the you who didn’t receive this payment do.  
 
Carlos: Many things, taken legal, action, road blockades, street protests, made videos, 
travelled to France to make our story known and even had a hunger strike! 
We used a lawyer to block that payment from the mine to 100 of our own neighbours. 
But at the same time many of the group who wanted payment for their water rights are 
also against the mine.  
 
Me: Do you think the majority are against the mining company? 
Carlos: yes definitely the vast majority around 90% of the community’s 1700 inhabitants 
are against the mine and its dam. 
Our defence committee has taken direct action many times such as creating road blocks 
with burning tyres, painting the whole village with graffiti messages against Pelambres 
mine and the hunger strike.  
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Me: What are your main grievances about this dam? 
 
Carlos: Well, firstly fear of the dam breaking and wiping out the whole community as 
happened in El Melón a nearby town in the 1980s especially since we are located in a 
seismic zone. 
The dam has severely cut off the village’s water supply and also contaminated it 
according to the Head of Chilean Physicians tests on the water but according to the 
government tests the water is clean!! How can they argue with the head of Chilean 
Physicians? 
……The fact  is that the Mine has divided what was once a very strong and united 
community. 
 
Me: How has it divided you like this? So what exactly are you fighting for? 
 
Carlos: The main reason is for my elderly parents I worry for them. I also need to fight 
for “what is right”. 
I also desire for a large financial payment from the mine as compensation for 
EVERYONE in the community whether they are with or against them in order for people 
to leave and set up new lives in safer environments.  
 
We know we are powerless to stop the tailings dam from operating and shut it down. 
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That mining tailings dam is polluting the valley and many of us grow crops, avocados, 
courgettes, watermelons…so that dirty and polluted water from the dam will contaminate 
our crops and then who is going to buy them when they hear they come from Caimanes? 
Pelambres are offering lots of money to the municipality for us to have better public 
services if we accept then we become dependent on them! Then Pelambres will be able to 
do as they please with us and we will be dependent on them without our crops and 
livestock 
 
They even manipulate information and systems to prove they are responsible. They 
(Pelambres) are tipped off when an environmental inspector is coming to assess the water 
in their dam to ensure it is not coming from our community’s water table. They tamper 
with mechanical things there and manage to show that they are not using our 
water…they’re very clever we know as we have insider information from the mine 
people there working who feel for us what we are going through inform us. 
 
Interview with Carlos and elder brother Jorge 
Jorge: we decided to take extreme measures with the hunger strike in the hope of getting 
media attention and therefore the Mine to stop the tailing dam operations or for the Mine 
to make a generous financial offer to all residents in terms of compensation so that they 
can leave and start new lives if they wish. 
Me: how was the experience? 
 
Jorge: It was a great feeling to receive the medals for our bravery and get the recognition. 
We have been fighting now for 12 years most of the local community are tired and fed up 
with this conflict and prefer to stay out of it.  
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Me: How did you get this activist element to your personalities? 
 
Jorge: Our parents had been very active and vocal at first in the fight against Pelambres 
mine’s dam but now as they are elderly and in their 70’s have stepped down from such 
activities but they have been a huge influence in our lives. 
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Interviewee Code E1, Barbara, Local Indigenous Leader 
 
Barbara: Inaugurated Barrick before ILO 169 knowing it would come.  
Being a Campillay means a lot of history, oral tradition cosmovision. 
We were here first now the government want the change the rules of the game, wanting 
to change ILO169 
Barrick and the mines cannot be compatible with our identity as they are polluting the 
rivers. 
Ignorant people are in favour of Barrick. They don’t understand. They’re naïve believing 
all the promises of work. Few people in favour. 
Barrick just leave crumbs here. 
“we are on a war path” but Barrick just divide us and put against one other like with 
OLCA. 
Campusanos have a private for profit company with their Agricultural Cooperative. 
The government in early 20
th
 Century required ceding land to to the Huascoaltinos as a 
community not to a single person or whoever comes along after. 
As we know the mine won’t ever leave they need to pay us compensation and comply 
with the RCA. 
Doing this to defend their valley. Need water to survive. 
 
Marlene – we don`t need the mines, we`re independent 
The State is to blame for why we have no communications here, internet, poor radio, 
terrible health service 
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We feel shame receiving hand outs from the mine. We’re independent. 
 
Barbara Campillay President of Diaguita Community– Video Interview 
Campillay means soul of a red heart of a Guanaco. Community leader of Diaguitas. 
Majority of the 30-40 communities are against mining. All her generations are from her. 
Beautiful valley. 
We are farmers. This valley is not and never has been a mining one, of course there used 
to be artesenal mining without the chemicals that large scale uses. The glaciers are 
destroyed, there is no regulation. 
We have water rights and the water has diminished, as you can see, the valley is 
becoming dry. There are people who get just 4 minutes of water use per week for their 
crops and I get 30 minutes. 
We have older relatives who have never left this valley before so it’s very important for 
them they have water like before. 
They are trying to make a tunnel and breaking rocks up there in the glacier. 
They say they’re helping Diaguita culture, of course they take some Diaguita lady give 
her a bit of money, they buy her some clay however, for us in our culture the most 
important thing is Water, if you’t have water, people used to plant their own vegetables in 
orchards before now we have to import. People use to exchange produce but we can’t do 
that anymore due to the water. 
Secondary aspects only what Barrick promotes for Diaguitas. 
 
Lots of trees dying. Barrick send planes above to stop raining and kill the glaciers, the 
locals hear the planes. Once it rained lots in the nearby areas but hardly anything here, 
isn’t that strange? 
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The water and land is most important. 
 
The authorities have always tried to divide us, but we have stayed strong together. We are 
taking an approach similar to Nelson Mandela on a much smaller scale. We are rescuing 
our culture ourselves not from external intervention. We celebrate many different 
indigenous festivals. 
 
Barrick do everything regarding our culture and identity for their own benefit image and 
take pics of it all. 
 
I teach the more humble uneducated people in the community how to do accounts etc and 
about never signing anything and how our politicians are always trying to con us. Its easy 
to con the locals as all they care about is watching tv they are simple and uneducated. 
Many of them don’t know how to read or write. 
 
My cousin was robbed at the elections for being mayor. People here vote for benefits 
(just as in Brazil). Barrick paid for singers to come here. They once brought an erotic 
dancer here – Tati Merino. 
 
Solution to our problems is that all the miners leave! Unfortunately the politicans in 
Santiago will not let this happen, this is El Dorado, for centuries they’ve looked for El 
Dorado and here it is! We want to defend the spirits of our ancestors and in our pottery 
you’ll see the rivers and mountains so the mountains are sacred for us. Water, water, 
water. 
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Our lawyers defended the Mapuche sisters and nobody was willing to help us, we were 
asked to ask the mining companies for lawyers, we had no choice. We are defending our 
culture. This valley will turn into a mining one and our culture will die. We want the 
mining companies to leave save their identity, culture and water which is life. Barrack lie, 
they are only responsible for all our problems. 
 
Campillays we always fought the Spanish and now the miners. 
 
Sandra Candidate for Mayor – ecosystem is too fragile, divide the community, strengthen 
the community only in their terms via their CSR. They don’t help the Culture, us 
Diaguitas don’t need the mines to develop ourselves 
 
 
Email correspondence with Indigenous Leader Barbara – E1 
 
29
th
 May, 2013 
 
Taphua Coñi Rajiv ( Hola hermano Rajiv ). Te aclaro algo un poquito. 
 Tú me debes decir Taphua Nai Barbara ( Hola hermana Barbara ) Coñi : 
 masculino Nai : Femenino. ya? 
 01. SI es efectivo Solange y Yo, como muchos Diaguitas conocemos el 
 tema minero, sabemos la estrategia del Buen Vecino,( de hecho 
  636 
 Codelco-Chile, imprimió un libro que yo no lo he podido conseguir ) 
 que se titula " Como engañar a la Comunidad "). Pero también hay 
 Diaguitas que nunca han visto una mina, ni conocen como es una planta 
 minera, pero el hecho de que ellos vengan a invadir tu territorio y 
 por la intuición como Indígena, el amor a la Pachamamma, saben que les 
 están mintiendo. En una charla, reunión, los Diaguitas te pueden decir 
 si está bien, y te pueden dejar convencido de que entendieron todo lo 
 que tú les dijiste o expusiste, y te dejaron convencido que van a 
 aceptar los que tú les propusiste, , pero ellos saben ( me refieron 
 específicamente a los que son mas calladitos, que no tienen estudios, 
 que son más humildes y más temerosos ) que los están engañando, que 
 les están mintiendo. Tú sabes que Barrick en los primeros estudios que 
 presentó al Estado OCULTO LA EXISTENCIA DE GLACIARES, y eso jamás los 
 hemos perdonado los Diaguitas.LO más sagrado para los Diaguitas son 
 las Montañas, ( Kakanchic : Montaña Buena, dnde se encuentran los 
 espíritus de nuestros Tatai ( Abuelos ), ya que de Ahí baja la Vida, 
 o sea La Co, Ko ( Agua ) ( en la Ceramina Diaguita puedes ver que lo 
 que más se plasma en ellas, son las Montañas, La Amaru ( Deidad que 
 representa El Río ), y también el Valle, La escalera Blanca que va al 
 cielo, etc ). El AGUA es la subsistencia de nuestra Cultura. Ya no 
 creemos en Ellos, porque si ocultaron lo más preciado para cualquier 
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 ser humano es fàcil para ellos ocultar otras cosas de menos rango. 
 Respecto a la influencia,: La iGlesia igual a tenido influencia en 
 esto, Los Párrocos que llegan a estos lugares son humildes también, no 
 son del Opus Dei..- La Cacica Solange, Paula, Orlando, y Varios 
 Caciques más. incluida Yo hemos tenido influen-cias. porque NO Tenemos 
 Temor, ya que siempre hubo Temor. PERO EN GENERAL LAS QUE LA LLEVAMOS 
 Y HEMOS SIDO MAS DECIDIDAS HEMOS SIDO LAS MUJERES DIAGUITAS, Y 
HEMOS 
 ORGANIZADO A NUESTRO PUEBLO. Tampoco hay que ser mal agradecido, OLca 
 también hay ayudado. Luis Faura, sólo es UN OPORTUNISTA, SOLO ve el 
 bien propio y no el comunitario. 
 02. Nuestros Abogados, en 07 meses consiguieron lo que nadie en Chile 
 hizo porque ELLOS SON EXCELENTES, SON SON VENDIDOS, TIENEN UN 
BUEN 
 PRESTIGIO, .NO SON CORRUPTOS. ( En Chile hay mucha corrupción,)y Las 
 Autoridades firman Tratados Inernacionales, pero los Standares en 
 Chile no son respetados, y Menos respetan a los Indigenas.En la TV. 
 muestran una realidad que NO es lo que vive el común de los habitantes 
 de este País. La fuerza que nos dá la Pachamamma, La Kakanchic, La KO, 
 El Wiracocha, seguramente fué para que todo fuera el 2013. porque era 
 YA EL MOMENTO, Y NO SE PODÍA ESPERAR MAS. 
 03. Con el dolor de mi Cai ( Corazón ) hay hermanos que les han hecho 
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 talleres, en diferentes desciplinas, han trabajado allá, pero con 
 salarios bajos a 4000 y 5000 msnm, otros han recibido dádivas, les 
 dan dinero para cerámica, para instalar un kiosko bazar, muchas veces 
 estos Diaguitas ( por ignorancia ) dicen que buena la minera que me 
 dió esto, y les dan como mil veces las gracias, En mi caso yo no le 
 doy las gracias a ellos, como les voy a dar las gracias, si están 
 contaminando mi valle, el Agua, tengo 02 hrs de Agua al mes. suendo 
 que hace 02 años yo rregamna mis arboles a la Hora que Hasta hace poco de mas de 02 
años, yo regaba a la hora que yo quería 
mis árboles, en cambio ahora todo el Valle, está con Turno, porque hay 
poca AGUA. 
Precisamente yo, tengo 02 horas de AGUA AL MES; HAY OTROS HERMANOS, 
QUE TIENEN 30, 40 50 mINUTOS AL MES. Nos tienen que repartir el EL 
aGUA para que nos alcance para todos. 
Rajiv, CREO QUE REPRESENTO EL PENSAMIENTO DE LA MAYORIA DEL 
PUEBLO 
DIAGUITA,YA QUE NO SE SI TE CONTE QUE SALI ELEGIDA "CACICA 
PRESIDENTA 
PROVINCIAL DIAGUITA " Esto es de toda la Provincia del Huasco que va 
de Cordillera a Mar, EN el febrero de 2013, POR 02 AÑOS.. 
y Solange el Domingo 26, recién pasado,fue Reelegida Cacica 
Presidenta Regional ( Región de Atacama ) y tu sabes que tenemos la 
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misms COSMOVISION DIAGUITA. . 
Entonces tenemos el apoyo del 90%. y la Cacica Paula Alcayaga, es PDta 
Comunal ( Alto del Carmen ),   
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23 May 2013  
rajivmaher@hotmail.co.uk 
 
 
TAPHUA RAJIV. HOLA COÑI ( HERMANO ), TAPHUA AMIGO. ES LO KE YO TE 
 DIGO, QUE MIENTRAS HAYA CONFLICTO ELLOS RECIBEN DINEROS DEL 
 EXTRANJERO. NO LE TRABAJAN UN DIA A NADIE SE LA LLEVAN EN PURAS 
 MARCHAS, VIAJAN AL EXTRANJERO, TIENEN VEHICULOS. ELLOS SIEMPRE 
HAN 
 DICHO QUE NO QUIEREN DINERO, QUE SOLO LES INTERESA QUE LA 
MINERA SE 
 VAYA, PERO JAMAS SE PREOCUPARON QUE EL VALLE SE UNIERA, ELLOS 
HAN 
 HECHO SUS MARCHAS TODOS LOS AÑOS, IGUAL SE LO AGRADECEMOS, 
PORQUE 
 DEFIENDEN EL AGUA LA TIERRA, PERO SON UN GRUPO CERRADO, SON 
ELLOS 
 NOMAS.- A ELLOS LES INTERESABA MUCHO QUE SIGUIERAMOS 
DESUNIDOS. EN 
 CAMBIO NOSOTROS HICIMOS LO QUE HIZO EL Ex.Pdte.de SudAfrica, NELSON 
 MANDELA. El Unió a SU PUEBLO CON EL DEPORTE Y NOSOTROS, lo hacemos 
 CON nuestra CULTURA, RESCATANDO Y CELEBRANDO: El Inti Raymi (Año 
Nuevo 
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 Indigena, ke se celebran entre el 21 y 24 de junio).La Mujer Indígena 
 que se celebra el 05 de Septiembre. La Challa ( lluvia fina ) que la 
 celebramos en Febrero de c/año, que es una fiesta de Culto al Agua y 
 de agradecimiento. además de una fiesta de Enamoramiento. Hacemos 
 Mateadas, Churrascas. etc. etc. 
 LOS DIAGUITAS NOS EMBESTIMOS, CON NUESTROS PONCHOS, CON LAS 
WILCHAS ( 
 Cintillo que se pone en la cabeza ), hacemos Veladas, hacemos 
 homenajes a los Taitas ( Papás ) a las Mammas ( mamás ) a los 
 Ancianos, a los Shamanes o Shamanas, o Meicos o Curanderos.,a Los 
 Chinos que le bailan a la Virgen. Hacemos Nuestros Sahumerios. Hacemos 
 Agradecimientos siempre y Rogativas a la Pachamama. Bendecimos la 
 Kakanchic ( Montaña Buena ). Homenajeamos a nuestras Cacicas y 
 Caciques y a nuestras Matriarcas. 
 Para rescatar nuestra Lengua," el Kakán " hacemos juegos de Palabras 
 con los Niños y Niñas. EN CAMBIO A ELLOS LES DA VERGUENZA PONERSE UN 
 PONCHO, UNA WILCHA, Y CELEBRAR LAS FIESTAS ANCESTRALES O 
RESCATAR TU 
 CULTURA. . 
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rajivmaher@hotmail.co.uk 16
th
 May, 2013 
Taphua Rajiv, Hola. 
01. Sabes que en general cronologicamente los acontecimientos tú los 
describes bien. 
02. El Gobierno el 2006, le otorgó el 2do RCA a Barrick, ya que antes 
le habia otorgado la 1era  RCA ( me parece fue el 2001 ) 
03. Cualquier Autoridad del gobierno que iba al Valle se le daba a 
saber la problemática con la MInera, pero todos se hacían los sordos y 
mudos y ciegos.. 
04. SE le entregó una carta personalmente al Presidente de Republica 
el Marzo 2011. Lo Hizo Solange Bordones. Cacica'Presidenta 
Regional.Diaguita. Sólo Contesto por medio de Sernageomin que ya se 
había hecho la Consulta Ciudadana. 
05. Por medio de un concejal de la Comuna de Alto del Carmen. El nos 
consiguió un cupo en el Congreso ( Senadores y Diputados ) en 
VALPARAISO. , En Novbre o Dic 2011 ( el mes exacto no recuerdo en este 
momento ),para la Comision de Recursos Naturales  SOLO NOS DIO 05 
MINUTOS PARA EXPONER NUESTRO CASO.Por lo cual redactamos una carta muy 
extensa, pero que se pudo leer el 05 minutos, de nuestra problematica 
con la Minera y tampoco no queremos ninguna minera más.. Y fue leía 
por SOLANGE EN ESA OCASIÓN. 
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06.LA COMISION QUEDÓ DE SESIONAR EN NUESTRA COMUNA DE ALTO 
DEL CARMEN 
EN marzo 2012, despues en abril del 2012, y asi paso todo el año 2012, 
y NUNCA LLEGARON.A SESIONAR.LA PRESIDENTA DE ESA COMISION  ES 
LA SRA 
ANDREA MOLINA Y NOS ENVIO A DECIR POR MEDIO DEL CONCEJAL, QUE 
NO TENIA 
MAYORES ANTECEDENTES AL RESPECTO. 
07. COMO NUNCA LLEGARON Y SE PASABA EL TIEMPO, EL RIO SE ESTABA 
SECANDO, EL TRANQUE SE ESTABA SECANDO, Y TODA LA AGRICULTURA 
HA TENiDO 
NEFASTAS CONCECUENCIAS.( POR LA DESTRUCCION DE LOS GLACIARES ) 
NOS 
DECIDIMOS CONTRATAR A LOS ABOGADOS . NOS PUSIMOS DE ACUERDO 
LAS 
COMUNIDADES PREVIO A HABERLAS VISITADO POR TODO EL VALLE ( tu 
fuiste 
me parece a 1 o 2 reuniones ), YA QUE LA AUTODETERMNACION ERA DE CADA 
UNO DE NOSOTROS Y DE CADA COMUNIDAD Y ERA NUESTRO DERECHO A 
DEFENDER 
LA VIDA Y EL AGUA.. 
Y ASI FUERON DECIDIENDOSE Y SE SUMARON AL " RECURSO DE 
PROTECCION 
VARIAS COMUNIDADESMAS. Somos 10 organizaciones. 
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08.CUANDO CONOCIO SOLANGE AL ABOGADO SR. LORENZO SOTO, SOLO 
FUE UNA 
CASUALIDAD, YA QUE NADIE SABIA QUE IBA UN DIAGUITA AL 
CONGRESO.EL 
CONCEJAL NOS AVISO COMO A LAS 15,00 HRS DE QUE TENIAMOS UN CUPO. 
Y NOS 
EMPEZAMOS A MOVER. Y SOLANGE VIAJO ESA MISMA NOCHE DEL MISMO 
DIA. A 
VALPARAISO. Y EL PAPA LA ESPERO EN STGO PARA LLEVARLA HABIA EL 
PUERTO. 
09. RODRIGO VILLABLANCA EN ESTO MIENTE, MIENTE , YA QUE SOLANGE 
SE 
ENCONTRO CON UN DOCTOR QUE ES DIPUTADO DE NUESTRA ZONA. 
ELLOS ESTABAN 
CONVERSANDO, Y DE CASUALIDAD, PASO ALGUIEN Y SE DEVOLVIO A 
SALUDAR AL 
DOCTOR. Y AHI SE LO PRESENTARON A SOLANGE.  SOLANGE NO SABIA 
QUE ERA 
ABOGADO Y LORENZO SOTO TAMPOCO SABIA QUE SOLANGE ERA 
DIAGUITA. 
10. COMO VERAS EL DESTINO SE ENCARGA DE ESTAS COSAS 
INEXPLICABLES, YA 
QUE EN PRINCIPIO NADIE PODIA IR A ESA REUNION, PORQUE HABIA QUE 
TOMAR 
  645 
LA DECISION INMEDIATAMENTE. YO NO PODIA, PAULA TAMPOCO. Y 
PENSAMOS QUE 
ALGUIEN DEBIA HACER  OTRO SACRIFICIO POR LA PACHAMAMA, YA QUE 
ES LA 
ULTIMA OPORTUNIDAD.  Y SOLANGE PUDO IR POR FIN A VALPARAISO. 
POR OTRA PARTE NOSOTROS DESCONOCIAMOS QUE RODRIGO 
VILLABLANCA IBA A 
ESA REUNION, 
11.A LAS COMUNIDADES DIAGUITAS   O L C A  NUNCA   NOS APOYO JAMAS. 
MENOS EL LUIS FAURAS.  ELLOS LUCRAN CON LA DESGRACIA AJENA. 
MIENTRAS 
HAYA CONFLICTO A ELLOS LES LLEGA DINERO DE LA ONG. DEL 
EXTRANJERO Y NO 
SE DE DONDE MAS, YA QUE NO LE TRABAJAN UN DIA A NADIE Y ANDAN 
EN PURAS 
MARCHAS, RECORREN CHILE COMPLETO, VAN A EXTRANJERO Y ESTO ES 
MUY CARO. 
. Y NOSOTROS ESCASITAMENTE TENEMOS DINERO PARA HACER 
NUESTRAS 
REUNIONES. Ellos. LLEVAN MAS DE 10 AÑOS HACIENDO MARCHAS Y QUE 
CONSIGUIERON?? QUE EL RIO SE SECARA QUE LA BARRICK SE INSTALARA. 
OLCA, 
FAURA Y R.VILLABLANCA. SON APASIGUADORES DE MASAS. Muchas veces 
nos 
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estabamos organizando y Faura nos hechaba todo para atras y volviamos 
a retroceder  Varias veces nos hicieron esto. Y UN DIA NOS DIMOS 
CUENTA DE ESTO. y empezamos a organizarnos y nos decidimos a contratar 
los abogados. NOSOTROS NOS DEMORAMoS MUCHO, PORQUE NO TENEMOS 
DINERO. 
SOMOS GENTE HUMILDE TU Conociste el valle.y a pesar de todo todavía es 
hermoso. Los 02 ABOGADOS QUE TENEMOS SON LOS UNICOS EN CHILE QUE 
NOS 
OFRECIERON SUS ASESORIAS. 
12. LUIS FAURAS NOS OFRECIO UN EXCELENTE ABOGADO MAPUCHE PARA 
QUE NOS 
DEFENDIERA, PERO HASTA EL DIA DE HOY AUN NO LLEGA CON EL 
ABOGADO. 
13. Nos desprestigian que le dimos PODER A LOS ABOGADOS.  En Chile 
como te va representar un Abogado si no le das un Poder?? Así ES la 
Ley. TODO ABOGADO NECESITA DE UN PODER PARA REPRESENTARTE 
ANTE LAS 
FISCALIAS, LA CORTE DE APELACIONES, ANTE LA CORTE SUPREMA.. Son 
BIEN 
ignorantes parece, 
14.R. Villablanca, Faura y OLCA critican a nuestroS abogados y a 
nosotros. ELLOS No son  DIaGUITAS. Y  Nos Faltan el respeto. ya que 
los Derechos son Nuestros y No de Ellos. Y no tienen porque oponerse a 
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nuestra Autodeterminación. 
15. FINALMENTE NUNCA HA HABIDO UN QUIEBRE CON FAURA Y OLCA: 
Jamas 
hemos trabajado con Ellos.Ellos hacen reuniones secretas, es un grupo 
cerrado. que sólo participan algunos , o sEA los de Olca,  Faura 
pertenece a una comunidad Diaguita y asistía a nuestras reuniones sólo 
para disolver todo lo nuestro.. El no es Diaguita se autoreconoció 
porque su ex' esposa es Diaguita. Llleva como 15 años separado de 
ella.y sólo la busco para que le diera la firma y autoreconocerse, ( 
esto ya pasó a pelambre, pero es la verdad ) 
Chauuu.   Kakanchic,  Kakanchic,  ( Dios de la Montaña ) 
Jallalla,  Jallala,    : Voz de Triufo. 
Barbara 
Cacica y Pdta Diaguita Provincial 
 
29
th
 April, 2013 
Taphua Hermano ( Coñi ) Rajiv. ¿ Como estás?. espero estés bien junto 
  a tus seres queridos. A tu consulta respondo: 
  01. La paralización del monstruo, por supuesto QUE SE DEBIO A NUESTRA 
  FUERZA Y A DIGNIDAD DE NUESTRO PUEBLO, ( nunca les recibimos limosnas, 
  ni migajas, porque NUESTRO VALLE, NUESTRA PACHAMAMA es valiosísimA, es 
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  incalculable su valor histórico, material, y espiritual ). Y ESTE 
  FUERZA VIENE DEL CORAZON DE CADA HERMANO, DE LAS 
COMUNIDADES Y 
  ORGANIZACIONES QUE PUSIMOS EL RECURSO. 
  NO TUVIMOS MIEDO, ( Ellos son tan poderosos, pero no nos dió miedo ). 
  TU ME VISTE HACIENDO REUNIONES PARA TENER EL APOYO DE LOS 
HERMANOS. Y 
  QUE LA GENTE TOMARA VALOR.- TOTAL NOSOTROS LOS DIRIGENTES 
ESTABAMOS 
  PONIENDO PRACTICAMENTE NUESTRA CABEZA EN LA GUILLOTINA. 
  02. Olca NUNCA Nos ayudó, todo lo contrario en la misma Página de la 
  Olca hubieron declaraciones que: Solange, Paula, Orlando y YO, 
  practicamente estábamos vendiendo el VALLE, y que los Abogados 
  nuestros eran unos chantas. 
  03. LAS UNICAS PERSONAS EN CHILE, QUE NOS OFRECIERON APOYO 
FUERON 
  NUESTROS DOS ABOGADOS. POR QUIEN REZO TODOS LOS DIAS, Y LE PIDO 
AL 
  W IRACOCHA ( Dios ), LA PACHAMAMA, ( Madretierra ) AL INTI, ( Sol ) 
  A LA KO, ( Agua ) Y AL LUI ( Viento )que los protejA 
  04.La Empresa JAMÁS SE RELACIONÓ CON LAS COMUNIDADES DIAGUITAS, 
sólo 
  lo hacía con las Autoridades, Empresarios, y algunos hermanos 
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  diaguitas, en forma individual, que de Indígena no tienen nada, ya que 
  recibían limosnas, a cambio del AGUA. 
  05.Los Diaguitas, la mayoría somos, Micro Agricultores, también pesó 
  esto. Estamos defendiendo nuestras plantaciones, nuestros arboles, que 
  se nos están secando. 
  06. EN CUANTO A LOS GOBIERNOS Y SUS AUTORIDADES NADIE NO HA 
APOYADO. 
  SE HAN HECHO, LOS CIEGOS, SORDOS Y MUDOS. 
  El siniestro Peter Munk, en un documental que lo entrevistaron opinó 
  lo sgte : " La Comida tiene su precio " o sea quizo decir " Estos 
  muertos de hambre tienen que aguantarse, ya que yo les daré trabajo, 
  para que coman. ". Nosotros JAMÁS HEMOS SIDO MUERTOS DE HAMBRE, la 
  pachamama nos ha dado y nos seguirá dando para salir adelante. Cuantas 
  familias por generaciones y generaciones, sacaron a sus hijos adelante 
  de todo los que la Tierra, les dió y seguira dando. Y JAMAS 
  NECESITAMOS MINERAS.. 
  Un abrazo y cuídate, Bendiciones,. Añupi 
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23
rd
 April, 2013    
Taphua ( hola ),Rajiv, como te habrás enterado, Pascua sigue 
   paralizada, ellos presentaron otro recurso, pero la Corte nuevamente 
   se los rechazó, ya que NO ADJUNTARON NINGUN ANTECEDENTE NUEVO.- 
Algo 
   inédito en Chile, que el Pueblo Diaguita, tenga detenido al monstruo. 
   Fuímos el primer pueblo conquistado por los españoles., éstos entraron 
   a estos territorios por Copayapu ( Copiapó ) desde el territorio que 
   hoy se llama Argentina, y nos mataron a nuestros 30 Caciques 
   Diaguitas. Hoy en el siglo 20y 21, nuevamente llegó el invasor ( 
   Barrick-Peter Munk), como no nos pueden matar como ocurrió, en 
   aquellos tiempos de la conquista española, nos quieren eliminar 
   sustentablemente como ellos llaman ( ¿ Qué es desarrollo sustentable 
   ?, nosotros no lo entendemos ). Quieren eliminar y que se termine 
   nuestra Cultura Milenaria, dejándonos sin agua, además han contaminado 
   nuestra tierra y AGUA. ( SIN AGUA y SIN TIERRA NO HAY CULTURA ) Ellos 
   han destruido GLACIARES ( ellos dicen glaciaretes ),Bocedales; 
   Llaretas,etc, Pero no han destruído nuestra Fortaleza, Nuestras 
   Convicciones, No NOS PUDIERON DESUNIR ).VIVA LA PACHAMAMA , VIVA 
LA 
   KO. Añupi 
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Interviewee code E2 – Orlando – local politician and Community leader – 25 
minutes 
 
Orlando: Only speak to me as I’m not from Barrick. Born as raised there as Diaguita. 
Proud to be Campillay. Worked in many mines. Electrician. Came back because loves his 
Valley. Built his house and land from scratch with own hands. Doesn’t need help from 
mines or government “when one wants to grow and to well in life one doesn’t need to 
accept help from mines or governments” –  
 
Pollution will be and is high, water was red in jan/feb due to mine testing. 
The Mayor came from the Mine and therefore helps them with permits etc. 
He is candidate for Councillor wants to defend being Diaguita and the Valley. 
Diaguita = doesn’t sell out or let anybody walk over him! Nobody can impose their ideas 
in them. Not scared of anyone. Will fight for his kids, grandkids who face mine.  
Huascoaltinos receive service road from Mine and fighting company. 
Orlando wants compensation for damages already made by Barrick 
That’s why they’re group is fighting for the compensation. 
Mine has disrespected sacred grave. 
“Barrick is responsible for all the damages” – playing with slogan 
We are strengthening and suing them. 
Recognized as Diaguitas in 2006. Barrack had already taken over and bought the 
previous Mayor. 
The Valley is very dispersed villages are remote unlike a city so its hard to bring 
together. 
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“we are becoming more united and closer”. 
Its all lies about many jobs as I know having worked in mining many years need ISOs, 
exams etc. they wouldn’t let a farm worker go up there. 
“I don’t sell my conscience, I would never work for Barrick” I would never sell myself as 
I’m Diaguita. Our identity is too strong. Do you think after all the hard work and sacrifice 
my wife and I have made on our house we would leave it all for the mine?  
“Barrick go wherever they can get their teeth into” so they use people 
“Once a girl from el Morro came here offering us social projects and economic help but I 
refused as I’ve always worked hard for things in my life, I don’t need this help that’s why 
I would sell myself” 
“thanks to the lord my hands are good and my brain is in working order so why do I need 
that mine? I can sell a CD of my music and live off that so I’m not going to sell myself 
for something that would be bread for today and hunger for tomorrow” 
“I don’t need handouts from Barrick or from the government I brought up my kids by my 
own hard work. That’s what being a Diaguita is about it is about hard work and not 
accepting handouts from others. We are independent people and proud we don’t need 
mining companies and the government!” 
“ we are 100% clear that they the mine have to compensate us for the damages already 
caused!!!” x3 
“we have our right to demand compensation and we’re not negotiating”  
“we are fighting for everyone in the community” 
“for being Diaguita I will want to stay here and not sell up and leave with compensation” 
“the people in the countryside have been bribed, sold their goats for a truck to Barrick” 
“us Diaguitas are united but unfortunately we those people who are Diaguitas but say 
they are and are not together with us such as Lucho Fauro who is married to a Diaguita 
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but doesn’t have Diaguita blood. Can he have the same feeling as me?” “No of course not 
he’s not from here” there are 10 other egs like him who shout about Barrick then get a 
coin and shut up. 
Barrick use people and kids pay them to say good things about them.  
I know the mines from personal experience in many different ones, they can’t lie to me 
about what they’re doing I know about mining. I was Union Leader and never sold out.  
Barrick have people in the local government to change rural zones into urban ones, so 
they can build and construct  here. If we become Urban according to the government we 
won’t be able to continue with many of our customs such as cooking with wood, having 
chickens, rabbits.  
The mine and government never the tell the whole story about urbanizing the community 
always leave out the negative aspects. 
I’m going to communicate everything to the community so that they’re informed because 
people here are not informed. I like to speak with base and foundation, just like a house 
needs solid foundation. 
I never go to events here because they are financed by Barrick so if I go they would take 
photos of me at folklore concerts and I’d be in the paper as a supporter of Barrick. It’s the 
same as the Roman times they have a community party and everyone is happy. Its really 
sad in the 21
st
 Century and our people are still used.  
It’s a atropello and injustice that’s happening here. 
We don’t need to protest in the street anymore what we’re doing is fairest, we have to go 
via legal channels because the mine is in partnership with the government, they will 
always support the mine. Do you think the guy sat with a tie in Santiago will care what 
happens here? They don’t even know what its like here they never even come here. 
For me all the mines should leave, we were brought up without mines and I brought my 
kids up without mines here, we care about the water, trees and land. 
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Interiewee Code E3 Dona Cristina – grape farmer, Huasco Valley – 15 minutes 
Cristina: There is Not enough water for irrigation. The mines only help the rich and not 
the poor. I defend the poor humble people, its sad to see the valley dying. I’m sad 
because my grandkids will not get to see this valley. 
Me: What is the mining company doing wrong? 
Cristina: They don’t practice what they preach. Their waste will contaminate the water 
supplies and end all of us here. 
 
We need to get compensation from them if they dry our water supplies. We are divided, 
those with most power and wealth in the community are together with the mines. The 
valley will die. We have to fight for compensation from the mining companies. How else 
can we survive without water? Here we have peace and tranquility but Barrick will force 
us out of here when they finish our water supplies. We won’t be able to stay here in our 
valley then, how can we? We don’t want to leave this for a city and all the stress that 
comes with that life..NO of course not!” 
Me: What can you do about this situation? 
Cristina: We’ve marched, been on tv the mines don’t take notice of us. The ones in 
favour of the mines are those who don’ t want to work, lazy ones who live off hand outs 
and accept lies but those of us who work like us are against 
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Interviewee Code E4 – Church Priest - Valle del Huasco – Interview Transcripts 
Church priest – worst thing that can happen to valley, its like a cancer getting worse and 
worse. It will destroy the valley.  
Certain chapels are in favour of church.  
3 big invasions. 
1. Incas – changed language 
2. Spanish - changed language – lost their Identity 
3. Miners –  
 
The Incas taught locals about ceramics and agriculture, the Spanish left horses, sheep, 
seeds, so the mines should leave something. 
 
Barrick lie, buy people.  
Agrees that people withy values, ethics, history and strong identity etc are against mine. 
Materialistic people with weak identities are in favour. Materialistic people = young, age-
important. Older people = against.  
 
El Morro offered him the pick-up. 
Barrick buys silence and people. 
 
Always been poor church, never needed rich people so why need the rich now? This 
place is now a symbol as a place that does not accept money from mines. 
We are a symbol for Rome and rest of Church. 
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Give work to few people, the river and water give more employment. How do we eat 
lettuce etc without the word? TRADTIONS AND IDENTITY ARG 
 
Priest – part II 
 
They were named as Diaguitos by government and seen as beneficiaries and not for their 
Identity, which social benefits they can receive housing social. 
 
BUT NOT FOR THEIR IDENTITY!! THAT MEANS TERRITORY AND WATER 
Barrick in their Diaguita publications speak about ceramic and knitting. Manipulating 
their Identity for their own good. Barrick does it to desviar the attention the secondary 
elements of the Identity and not to teach the parts of territory and water and language. 
Barrick finance the Indigenous New Year of the sun 
 
They’ve created 22 communities here form three to get more internal conflict going on. 
DIVIDED THE THREE DIAGUITAS INTO 22, DIVIDING PEOPLE.  
 
BARRICK ARE LIARS THEY WORK LYING ALL THE TIME ALWAYS 
SUPPORTED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. They’re not transparent. Utiliza las 
personas y los abandona, personas vulnerables utiliza y chao. 
Barrick with Muni changed community from self-sufficient to dependent. 
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Identity was very collective and Diaguitas before went to hills hunted Guanaco and 
shared out in quarters. Started sheep farming then moved down to farm crops then they 
started salary jobs and then the mines came in and gave salaries. This became the 
Diaguita Urbano. 
They don’t have their own historical vision of them.     
 
Diaguitas were no warriors but agriculture, they were dominated by Incas and Spanish 
and negotiated with them. Incas taught them ceramic, terraces.  
 
As long as they stay divided they won’t find their Identity. Their Identity is in their 
Collectiveness. You can’t be Diaguita in an urban area. 
Donde dice Mall vemos Mall donde tienen tan mal. 
La Solange ha preguntado a los arboles, el rio si es justo? Los ancestros habrían 
preguntado si eso es justo? 
Estamos perdiendo toda la identidad por quedarnos todos iguales. 
Huascalotinos defenden el Lugar no se pierde eso el lugar la Identidad de las. 
Padres salio de dar clases en la U cuando vio que sus alumnos que firmaron que la 
contaminación del rio era de algas 
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Car ride and Community Meeting 
 
Not scarred of Barrick. Nearly killed Orlando by throwing nails on road. 
The countryside wasn’t dangerous before the mine arrived. 
Created division in community since arrived.  
The Huascoaltinos get paid by Barrick and we don’t so we want compensation. 
Fighting for grandkids future. Learned that from ancestors and need to pay respect to 
them. 
Barrick always do favours hoping for something in return they don’t do anything for free 
Biggest impact will be amount of cyanide. We have eg of Agrosuper nearby. 
 
Ivan – Long Hair - We know they send 150 social and psychology workers to study us, 
what we’re like, our quality of life to understand us and then use it to control us. A lot 
poverty, due to that some buy into the mine when it offers schools, hospitals etc.  
Hopes the mines can create tourism project like Tasco and take advantage of all the gold 
by working as jeweller. 
 
The government are trying to get indigenous to change ILO169 law to a Decree. Fought 
another Diaguita not to change ILO169 who wanted to change. Orlando = soy 
revolucionario. 
Paula = wanted to give my dad and neighbours money so that they’d leave their land but 
they didn’t accept they’d rather die happy there than leave their land and horses.  
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Peter Monk – “if you want to eat you need money and therefore need us” x4. 
We have a paradise, clean water and glaciers – Orlando. 
 
Meeting all about getting compensation for everyone = pure Framing. 
Criticizing OLCA and Luis Faura for criticizing them, and trying to convince and frame 
their arguments and get this community on side before they side with OLCA and Luis 
Faura. 
 
Using Diaguita Identity as argument, pachamama, explaining what it means. 
Discussions criticising Huascoaltinos. Always speaking of $60m they got from Barrick. 
 
Speaking about water scarcity in the world and how valuable a resource it is.  
Refer repeatedly to Indigenous and ILO169 laws even citing them. 
 
Solange Speaking about the credentials of the lawyer Lorenzo Soto how he has defended 
the Mapuche Sisters x7, framing it to get their support.  
Argue that suing Barrick is the only choice they have. 
Blaming OLCA for stirring up community. 
Government and OLCA have never helped us with lawyers we have been accused of 
being sell outs but we’re not we are the only hardworking ones here we have a right to 
this protection and compensation. 
Not OLCA or the Campusanos have a right to tell us what to do. 
We are fighting amongst ourselves over water and that’s Barrick’s fault. 
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Questioning OLCAs credentials that they live off Conflict with Barrick therefore if the 
conflict is over and the mine leaves or they get their compensation OLCA will be out of 
work. 
 
Gave letter to government mining ministry wrote back arguing that the community 
participation for consultation already happened therefore they can’t do much about that. 
Wanted Nancy Yanez as lawyer but shes with the Huascoaltinos. 
OLCA should fight against barrack and not against them. 
 
A lot about “Vendidos” 
Telling them repeatedly never to sign anything from anyone as Barrick and others have 
often taken advantage of them.  
Explaining to them about the importance and power they have today due to ILO169. 
 
One member of audience wants to fight the mines to get of rid of them as they never do 
as they promise anywhere in the world. But says it will impossible to get rid of them. 
Mentions water scarcity around world again. 
Speaking a lot about lawyers and their speciality in indigenous and environmental law. 
 
OLCA and environmentalists are trying to sue this group 
 
Barbara: OLCA lives of conflicts they need conflict to exist and get funding but now we 
as indigenous people are exercising our right to defend ourselves, the damage done by 
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Barrick needs to paid and paid expensive. OLCA annoyed because they are negotiating. 
“los huevones vienen de Santiago, valeska recorre todo el mundo a méxico” Campusano 
recebe de la minera y nosotros nada! 
They’re angry that we are suing. Campusano with OLCA is suing us now. 
Han basurado nuestro abogado y nosotros. 
169 is essential here but the Constitution Chilena says we have a right to live in a clean 
place without pollution. The mapuche sisters didn’t have ILO169 for Ralco and won. 
 
Government asked to change to 124 from 169, Orlando got angry and shouted against 
this and left at the meeting in Arica. Was called a Roto for not listening to 124 but he 
defended himself. 
International pressure forced Chile to ratify 169 but right wing demanded the decreto 124 
on top of ILO169. 124 doesn’t demand consult. 
The government offered good hotel, food but with other intentions. 
 
We just want the mine to leave but 10 years protesting and marching for what> OLCA 
are not even from here. Vallenar 60,000 = 3 candidatos. Alto del Carmen 4,000=6 
candidatos Alcalde. 
El dano alguien lo tiene que pagar.  JUST AFTER FINANCIAL COMPENSATION. 
We fight neighbours for w ter use, land prices are going down and this is Barrick’s fault. 
“we are the majority in our group” 
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Interviewee Code F1 – Local community resident campaigning against the opening 
of new mine 
 
A young engineering professor who runs a blog against mining near the town, he is too 
afraid to reveal his name or any contact details on his blog because he would surely lose 
his job if he went public, as ALL his students work at the mining companies! People are 
fearful to speak badly about mining companies here as almost everyone works at one! He 
participated in direct action last year by holding an anti mining banner on a church at the 
city's anniversary party, however said everyone in the town is very passive, apathetic and 
fearful. Nobody is willing to put their neck on the line for this cause. In a town of 55000 
there are only 6 or 7 activists against the mining proposal. He also took me to the 
mountain just 2.5 miles from the beautiful colonial historic centre where some mining has 
begun. 
 
9
th
 May, 2013 
me : Oi Luís Claudio tudo bem? Como vai a luta contra a Mina del Rey? Aínda pretendem 
a construir-a? 
3:52 PM  
 Claudio : Bom dia Rajiv. Tudo bem? Estamos lutando contra... mas parece que ir  ser 
reativa ano que vem... 
3:54 PM  
 me : que ruim isso! Queria-lhe pelo menos contar sobre a resistencia de uma outra 
comunidade em Minas contra a mineradora daí em Conceiçao de Mato Dentro eles tem o 
projeto de mineraçao maior do mundo e com a ajuda do Ministerio Publico estao criando-
se muita uniao e força do Povo e gostaria que lá em Mariana pudessem fazer algo 
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parecido olha aqui de uns dias atrás 
http://www.almg.gov.br/acompanhe/noticias/arquivos/2013/05/06_direitos_humanos_con
ceicao_do_mato_dentro.html 
  
 Claudio : ótimo... muito obrigado... olha como vão as coisas: 
http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/search?updated-max=2013-01-11T08:47:00-
02:00&max-results=5 
3:57 PM  
 me : nossa é bem triste mas a resistencia do povo aumentou? ou é a mesma coisa de cada 
um só pensando em possivels ganhos económicos de emprego e aluguel? 
3:58 PM  
tem tantas pessoas inteligentes e capaces ali em Mariana como vcs e os académicos que 
realmente dá para criar um movimento contra a reativaçao. Tem ajuda de um vereador 
pelo menos né? 
4:00 PM  
 Claudio : Não temos apoio... a população é favor.... não se manifestam contra... Poucos se 
manifestam contra, desses poucos, menos ainda fazem algo concreto.... aqui em Mariana, 
o povo está muito individualista (cada um só pensa em si, e em seu benefício próprio a 
curto prazo.) Est  muito triste. 
4:01 PM  
As assinaturas sobem devagar: 
http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de
_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb 
4:04 PM  
 me : é eu acabei de ver as assinaturas acho que j  assinei mas vou tentar fazer de novo 
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é só ir até Congonhas para os Marianeses ver o que será o futuro com a reativaçao da 
Mina 
  
 Claudio : Pois é... 
   
Em julho vamos espalhar panfletos por toda a cidade. 
4:05 PM  
Vamos tentar aumentar as assinaturas. 
  
 me : quem pode querer isso mesmo para eles? Congonhas foi u desastre 
4:06 PM  
ótimo mas preciso-lhe avisar de uma coisa olha só aqui a Vale trabalha com Espioes em 
ONGs ou grupos que estao em contra deles 
http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar-on-line/economia/ex-gerente-acusa-vale-de-
espionagem/ 
4:08 PM  
 Claudio : Nossa... temos que ter cuidado para trabalhar com isso... 
4:09 PM  
 me : pois é mas vc já teve sucesso antes com as pamfletas entao acredito que consegue ter 
de novo mas seria melhor desconfiar de pessoas novas que  querem ajudar  
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 Claudio : ótimo.... muito obrigado... 
4:10 PM  
 me : se vc consegue criar um grupo de pessoas em contra seria ótimo conseguir uma 
audiencia p blica e levar todos para l  
4:11 PM  
para falar abertamente sobre os impatos que vai gerar a Mina da populaçao 
  
 Claudio : Como podemos conseguir uma audiência p blica? 
4:12 PM  
 me : eu nao sei exatamente mas vale a pena ir a falar com algum Promotor de Justicia l  
em mariana melhor com aquele que est  em contra da mina também 
  
 Claudio : ótimo.... 
4:13 PM  
 me : vou te passar os emails de dois Promotores de Justicia em BH que estao ajudando 
muito a comunidade de Conceiçao de Mato Dentro sao de fortalecer os Movimentos 
Sociais na comunidade para resistir a mina 
   
acho que vcs estao precisando do mesmo 
  
 Claudio :  timo.... 
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 me : sabe eu vou mandar o email com copia a vc para os promotores 
  
 Claudio : Muito obrigado. 
4:14 PM  
 me : com Link a suas p ginas para eles ver 
  
 Claudio : Muito obrigado mesmo... 
http://cuidardemariana.blogspot.com.br/2012/10/inicio-da-mineracao-da-mina-del-
rey.html 
4:15 PM  
 me : legal mais tarde hj eu mando 
   
um abraço e a gente se fala 
  
 Claudio : Muito obrigado. Um abraço... 
 
8
th
 May, 2013 
 
Boa noite Rajiv. 
 
Aqui está tudo bem. Quando irá voltar? 
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Não temos apoio... a população é favor.... não se manifestam contra... Poucos se 
manifestam contra, desses poucos, menos ainda fazem algo concreto.... aqui em Mariana, 
o povo está muito individualista (cada um só pensa em si, e em seu benefício próprio a 
curto prazo.) Est  muito triste…….Muitos moradores da cidade trabalham nessa 
empresa, isso gera uma certa dependência. 
 
Meu ponto de vista é: a cidade pode sobreviver sem destruir suas nascentes e seu entorno 
montanhoso. Para isso teria que se investir em turismo histórico e ecológico. Existe uma 
Universidade Federal na Cidade. Poderiam vir outras indústrias para as cidades 
(indústrias de transformação e tecnologia). 
 
A principal estratégia adotada pela prefeitura da cidade é a geração de emprego. Esse é o 
ponto principal. 
 
A empresa está distribuindo vários informativos (jornais) nas casas dos moradores sobre 
as "boas ações" que vem realizando. Mas na verdade percebo que é a obrigação social, 
pois é isenta de vários impostos. 
A empresa não coloca o assunto da reativação da Mina Del Rey. A empresa não fala nada 
sobre a Mina Del Rey. A empresa fica somente fazendo propaganda de "coisas boas", 
geração de emprego, áreas preservadas, desenvolvimento... 
 
Por favor, nos ajude. 
 
http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de
_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb 
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http://www.avaaz.org/po/petition/Contra_a_reativacao_da_Mina_Del_Rey_na_cidade_de
_Mariana_Minas_Gerais_Brasil/?eJtYbbb 
 
Fique à vontade para perguntar sobre. 
 
Muito obrigado. 
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Interviewee Code F2 - University Professor in Social Sciences, Mariana  
 
On Saturday morning I met a Uni professor who is very anti mining and has her own 
social movement in the town aimed at improving the quality of life through sustainability. 
She was very cross when I said Brazilians seem passive and submissive compared to 
others in terms of mining. She then gave me many examples of local social movements 
against mining, which are formed of highly educated and ecological minded people. 
Certainly not of normal, average Brazilians. She also conceded that here in Mariana the 
people would never protest as they're not critical enough, they are docile and simpletons. 
She also explained the historical importance of mining here, afterall the State is called 
General Mines and people from here are known as Mineiros which means Miners in 
English, and the Portuguese arrived here only to exploit the place for gold, next came the 
Brits and so forth always for minerals. She pointed to a location in the north of Brazil 
which has Chilean style social movements with direct action by the communities against 
the very same mining company here (Vale).  
 
She believes its because there in the north they have no employment from Vale as its the 
world's longest train that creates the problems for the communities whereas here they can 
work in the mines. So employment and economic opportunities are key in terms of 
generating positive perceptions and relations and vice versa. People are more willing to 
accept the negative impacts it seems when they have financial stability from the mine.  
 
From: Amanda [xxx@gmail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 3:34 AM 
To: Maher, Rajiv 
Subject: Re: Estrategias da Vale para sua aceitaçao da mina del rey 
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 Olá Rajiv, tudo bem? 
 
Sua colocação está correta. Sim, a cidade é dependente da mineradora (seja Vale, seja 
Samarco ou outras...), mas é uma dependência histórica, como havíamos conversado por 
aqui: trocou-se a mineração do ouro pela de minério de ferro...e as relações de exploração 
são as mesmas. 
 
Quanto ao seu questionamento a respeito das estratégias, a Vale começou a esboçar uma 
aproximação com a comunidade, através de encontros com lideranças (é o nome que eles 
deram). Fui a dois deles e achei uma palhaçada. Mas tem pessoas daqui que "gostam", se 
sentem importantes sendo chamadas para esses encontros, regados a salgadinhos, 
refrigerantes e brindes...Nós do movimento ambientalista, assim como os sindicalistas, 
quando vamos sempre questionamos sobre as ações impactantes, sobre a mina del rey, 
mas desde o ultimo, há um ano mais ou menos, nunca mais ouvi falar nesses encontros. 
Foi nesse ultimo que nós filmamos as falas deles e eles (a Vale) não gostaram. 
 
  
 
Bom, acho que o trabalho que estou enviando em anexo pode te ajudar mais. Trata-se 
daquele trabalho de conclusão de curso de minha aluna de que te havia falado. Ela fez um 
livro reportagem sobre a questão da mina del rey. Atualiza todas as questoes que você 
pergunta.  
 
  672 
E aqui também tem links para matérias que fizemos no jornal laboratório do curso de 
Jornalismo, o Lampião, onde sou professora de reportagem. Tem algumas matérias sobre 
a questão. 
 
http://issuu.com/jornallampiao/docs/ed4 
"Mineradora promove encontro entre empresa e sociedade civil"  
 
 
E materia na página 8 dessa edição http://issuu.com/jornallampiao/docs/lampiao9 
"Mina Del Rey: a concretização de um destino a olhos nus" 
 
 
Espero ter ajudado. Bom trabalho e nos mantenha informados quando tiver terminado 
para divulgarmos por aqui também. 
 
Abraços, 
 
Amanda 
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Interviewee code F3 – Director of social and cultural NGO, Mariana and Paracatu 
 
Met at the Community Samba party the councillor introduced me to a guy called Tomas 
and he works with local communities of mines at Paracatu with Kinross (500km away 
from here) and also another mine in the amazon which has several Maroon communities 
and he lives here.  
 
He explained that the Maroons in Paracatu being so close to the city and being dependent 
on mining historically make their identity weaker and mean they have naturally less 
opposition to Kinross. He explained how the Maroon community up north is much less 
accepting of the large mine there because they ahve lived alone in the jungle for many 
many years isolated from society and developed their own identity and culture they even 
sound more African when they speak! This group is also much better organized with 
leadership compared to in Paracatu and therefore they get much more out of the mining 
company (backs up other data I have too). The Maroons up north (like in my Chile cases) 
don't work at the mine so therefore don't have this dependence on it either.  
 
Tomas also explained that Maroons with a strong identity i.e. not the Paracatu ones have 
a stronger and prouder identity than normal afro-brazilians who make up the vast 
majority of the local population here in this town. That is because the Maroons are proud 
of their history of escaping slavery and setting up new settlements 
and communities whereas the other majority of afro-brazilians had to wait until 1888 to 
be freed from slavery. 
 
Also, Mariana which is a historical city recognized by the government for its patrimony 
has more related government institutions here to help protect it from such aggressive 
mining as in Paracatu. Paracatu is more isolated in that sense. Therefore by having more 
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public institutions with teeth Mariana is safer and therefore the local population can be at 
ease whereas in Paracatu they are more on their own. The fact that Mariana has Federal 
Universities and just 10 miles from here has even more considered among the best in the 
country with students from all over also means there is naturally more questioning of any 
urban mine projects. In Paracatu the universities are more like technical colleges and 
therefore have less critical capacity.  
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Interviewee code F4 – Email exchange with research questions to a Mining company 
Trade Union Leader – Mariana. 
 
14
th
 December, 2012 
 
RESPOSTAS AO RAJIV 
Na verdade existe uma grande distância entre a realidade vivida pelos Marianenses nas 
últimas três décadas  ( da mina mais próxima estar a 30 km )  e agora, há que se 
apresenta, com a possibilidade de passar à conviver com uma Mina há 1,5Km do centro 
da cidade. 
Mesmo tendo experiências muito próximas, como as comunidades das cidades de 
Congonhas e Itabira, que convivem com esta precária situação nos últimos 60 anos e 
principalmente com a expansão da produção nos últimos 10 anos (2002/2011), sintoma 
da histórica alta de preços do minério de Ferro no mundo.  
Mesmo assim são realidades muito distantes da maioria da população de Mariana,não 
pela distância, mas sim pelo baixo acesso a informação que a imprensa produz sobre 
estes problemas ou por parte dos governos e empresas que sempre preferem divulgar 
sobre o sucesso do negócio e nunca dos problemas gerados pela atividade. No Brasil o 
que vale é a urgência do negócio e seus resultados financeiros, atividades desta 
magnitude sempre estiveram acima das necessidades dos trabalhadores ou da população 
atingida pela mineração, meio ambiente modificado para servir ao negócio, ocupação de 
grandes áreas com incentivo fiscal e até mudanças de comunidades inteiras para servir a 
mineração são comuns. 
 Para se ter uma idéia a Vale em 2011 obteve 40 bilhões de reais de lucro líquido, 20% 
deste lucro foi arrancado daqui da região do chamado complexo mineral de Mariana. 
Por tudo isso, acho que o poder econômico do setor da mineração exerce uma influencia 
muito forte na comunidade, principalmente no que tange o controle econômico e político 
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da cidade. Ao ser uma atividade com um peso industrial muito forte no estado, no país e 
principalmente nos municípios mineradores, cria-se uma dependência quase de 
sobrevivência da economia local por falta de políticas de governo há longo prazo. As 
mineradoras mandam nas cidades. 
Questões básicas como saúde, educação, saneamento básico, poderiam estar resolvidos se 
um pouquinho deste enorme lucro ficasse para a cidade e para os marianenses, mas 
vivemos sob á ótica de uma política covarde e submissa, líderes, políticos, comunitários, 
sindicais, movimentos, são cooptados ou mesmo comprados. 
A propaganda da empresa é muito forte, além de jornais escritos na comunidade e em 
todo país que não são poucos, têm ainda há mídia televisiva e de rádio. Mas não é só isso, 
dados do IBGE constam que mais da metade da população de Mariana vive com menos 
de um salário mínimo, temos 17 mil desempregados, sendo que entre estes 10 mil são 
mulheres, ou seja ambiente propício para que toda e qualquer oportunidade vire questão 
fundamental na vida das pessoas. Sem falar sobre uma forte cultura de exploração 
extrativista e não de desenvolvimento social, que vem desde a colonização, ou seja, mais 
de três séculos de servidão. 
Dados algumas explicações é necessário também quebrar alguns mitos, a Vale fala que a 
Mina em questão vai ser pequena, no entanto vai produzir inicialmente mais de 1 milhão 
de toneladas/ano. Mesmo que produzisse menos teria os mesmos efeitos, gerando poeira, 
consumindo muita água, aumentando o trânsito dentro da cidade.  
A vale alega que vai gerar empregos, também concordo que vai gerar empregos, só que; 
na obra vai gerar milhares de empregos precários de baixa remuneração e ocasionando 
mais um aumento da população local, temporariamente sem logística e infra-estrutura 
para isso. Depois vai ser 200 empregos fixos, só que a empresa mesmo confirma que este 
empreendimento vai ser terceirizado, mantendo baixos salários e falta de condições de 
trabalho, como já é hoje em todos os empreendimentos da empresa deste tipo. 
Por isso acredito que vai ser um empreendimento muito ruim para a comunidade, pois as 
contradições continuam, não é possível concordar com este tipo de investimento onde só 
uns poucos saem beneficiados pela exploração de nossas riquezas naturais. Temos de 
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discutir que este tipo de exploração muito próximas as cidades não são necessários e só 
se explicam pela ganância dos verdadeiros donos da Vale, bancos internacionais e de 
executivos que nunca pisaram em locais próximos a estas minas.  
Para mineração, é necessário ter um projeto que inclua a população e trabalhadores como 
o centro das preocupações de empreendimentos como este e não ao contrário como hoje. 
Para isso temos um caminho longo, em primeiro lugar temos uma disputa em andamento 
que é a consciência da maioria. Em segundo é manter os que já têm essa consciência 
formada, organizados e mobilizados, pois na conjuntura atual tudo pode acontecer. 
Quando falo da conjuntura política e econômica, digo da crise internacional, que começa 
a abalar a economia brasileira e em particular a mineração. 
Há três anos atrás, ninguém imaginava o que vem acontecendo na Europa e o que vem 
acontecendo nos países Árabes. Por isso pergunto, alguém pode prever que no Brasil ou 
em Mariana vai continuar tudo como antes? Acho que não e acho que a consciência muda 
muito adivindas das dificuldades e necessidades da maioria. Por enquanto a empresa têm 
uma certa zona de conforto e mesmo assim enfrenta uma resistência por parte de seus 
trabalhadores que conhecem os seus métodos e parte da população mais consciente, 
Vamos continuar trabalhando para desmascarar este tipo de projeto que não serve a 
maioria. 
Espero que tenha ajudado e só peço que quando completar seus estudos envie uma cópia 
para o Sindicato Metabase dos Inconfidentes, no qual sou diretor. Se precisar de mais 
alguma coisa continue fazendo contato. 
Abraços  
 
 
18
th
 December, 2012 
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Concordo sim, com o seu paragrafo abaixo, não se esquecendo do numero enorme de 
lideranças cooptadas ou conrrompidas ligadas a comunidade ou ao próprio movimento 
sindical da mineração. 
Mas em breve poderemos ter mudanças reais, nesta conjuntura atual. As férias estão 
ótimas, obrigado. Tendo novidades manterei contato. 
Um abraço.   
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Interviewee Code F5 – Local Woman Councillor, Mariana 
Met a city councillor (the only female and Afro-Brazilian one in a town which has a vast 
majority of Afro-Brazilians). She is the only political figure against mining for all the 
negative impacts it causes and the exploitation of workers she argues. In fact she believes 
that reason nobody protests is because they work in mining and secondly due to cultural 
and educational reasons. People have very poor quality education, they don't question 
anything. She also invited me to a samba party the next night to meet more locals. 
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Interviewee code – G1 Interview with Miguel, Manager at Anglo American, Barro 
Alto. 
 
After a year the construction phase of the mine started in 2007 this meant an influx of 
several thousand male manual workers from all over Brazil. The workers were housed 
several kilometres from Barro Alto. This according to Miguel was an intelligent decision 
looking back in hindsight as it mitigated conflicts and tensions. Unfortunately on 
weekends some construction workers would go to Barro Alto and get intoxicated at the 
bars and there were several violent clashes involving knives and at least one fatal 
stabbing of a construction worker by a local resident. This construction stage was the 
most delicate and with most potential to harm company - community relations according 
to Miguel. However, interestingly local community interviewees did not make any 
reference to the days of construction and conflict with the workers, instead they chose to 
focus on the CSR and economic footprint of Anglo American in Barro Alto. 
 
Agreed that their jobs would be much easier in terms of community relations if they 
could engage in old fashioned philanthropy and hand outs, however, the values of the 
company are that of capacity building and teaching communities to become self-
sufficient and independent and this takes time and patience to also convince communities 
it is the best option for them. 
 
The English and South Africans (sad version of the English) are too rigid and unflexible. 
They say they understand the importance of understanding the the peculiarities of each 
local context yet when it comes to asking for the SEAT and Anglo Social Way reports 
they choose not to understand and ask for them. The people in HQ are very obsessed with 
compliance. 
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The locals were all obsessed about the mine since the late 1960s and it all finally 
happened in 2007 40 years later. They created crazy expectations lead by the previous 
Canadian mine. When Anglo finally started with the large construction site they made 
sure the workers stayed over the other side of the mountain to keep any local community 
conflict low. Moreover, Leonardo, and others did a lot of community relations by living 
there for a year before operations getting to understand how the locals are.  
 
Nevertheless, as the locals saw they were not getting a rain of money as hoped they got 
very aggressive and verbal at the Forums and even physical at times. The municipal 
government and Mayor also made life very difficult for them protesting at times outside 
their main office. However, the most important factor was being ALWAYS 
TRANSPARENT no matter what. That way Anglo was able to get across their Ethical 
principles of working to the community and also their philosophy of sustainable 
development and capacity building. Of course (as argued by Liomar) life for them would 
be much easier if they could engage in philanthropy than sustainability as per AA. 
 
Politics in BA is extremely important as with any small town in Brazil. People’s 
livelihoods depend on it. Either they work in a farm or they work for the municipal 
government. If you support the winning candidate you have a chance of getting a job. If a 
Mayor or candidate criticizes Anglo then they get lots of support. Its very important to 
know how to negotiate and communicate with this group of people that way you can turn 
a potential conflict into a benefit for the relationship as happened with the Mayor and 
municipality. 
 
With time AA were able to transmit their philosophy of working in partnerships with 
local associations and cooperatives only. The people who criticise AA still have self 
interests and are not trustworthy, they are not willing to work collectively and with AA. 
Locals are very simple they don’t even have access to newspapers nobody even reads. 
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Only way of communicating is via car loudspeaker. People here are not willing to take 
courses and learn they are stubborn even on training courses such as the milk production 
one they refuse to be instructed on how to deal with their cows. 
 
SEAT is a tool and just that. London tries to make out it is the holy book which will save 
the nation but it is not. By doing a rigorous SEAT you won’t create good relations, as you 
need to have the extensive ground work from before. You need to get locals to partner 
with everything in terms of social investment. You need to learn about the local context 
as it is very special and locals need to identify with you. In BA Leroy and Miguel have 
been in the region for many years. You can’t have people from other places from 
different cultures as they won’t be accepted by locals with such low education and 
cultural levels. Civil society is very weak here. The reason why people act the way they 
do is because of the local context and the level of mining company’s community relations 
and investment – transparency is important! 
 
Minas – Rio is having lots of problems due to the fact that they didn’t do the heavy 
baseline relationship building and MMX were very irresponsible. Furthermore, the area is 
close to Cerro de Cipó and the highest waterfall in MG it’s the pride and joy of Mineiros 
and environmentalists they will not give up without a fight. It needed much more 
studying before going ahead, perhaps should not even have gone ahead. It is partly to 
blame for Cynthia’s resignation. They are investing socially like crazy but don’t have 
detailed plans of how the projects should be run in the future with community 
participation. (REPROLATINA – its all about the culture and education of the locals 
there they are different, much better prepared and therefore resisting the project more.) 
M-R has an Aussie or South African leading the social investment work there, she 
doesn’t understand the context. Lots of the workers are from Vale, an arrogant company. 
Workers are near the communities and behave irresponsibly unlike at BA where they 
were kept far away. In short, they haven’t done their background and prior due diligence 
research regarding the community properly.  
  683 
  
  684 
Interviewee code G2 – Head of and Officer of NGO partner of Anglo American, 
Barro Alto 
 
With the local government supplying most jobs the community is very passionate about 
politics, as supporting and helping certain candidates gain power during elections means 
a good chance of gaining a job this is known as “clientelismo” or simply clientelism in 
English. The term refers to an exchange of goods or services for political support. 
 
Local businesses are very bitter that Anglo not doing enough for infrastructure in the 
community or buying enough from their shops. They want much more from the mine. 
 
Interviewee code G3 – Local Supermarket owner, Barro Alto 
Anglo American are not ethical in their treatment of the community. They only hire 
people recommended by workers and friends there, there is nepotism. The company 
should do much more for the town to develop it so it can grow. The managers don’t live 
here otherwise they would spend more money and help the economy. Why do they live in 
Goianianese? 
 
They never reply to my complaints to their grievance hotline. 
 
Their manager XXXXX is corrupt and you can quote me on that. He was here buying up 
houses cheaply using public funds. I mobilized the local community back in 2008 with 
banners to go and protest at their annual forum so they don’t like me. 
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Interviewee code G4 – Local community Woman resident and leader with husband 
and daughter 
 
Anglo American are not ethical in their treatment of the community. They only hire 
people recommended by workers and friends there, there is nepotism. The company 
should do much more for the town to develop it so it can grow. The managers don’t live 
here otherwise they would spend more money and help the economy. Why do they live in 
Goianianese? 
 
Daughter has been applying for jobs for many years she is qualified and never gets an 
interview. They never reply to my complaints to their grievance hotline about this 
situation. 
Annoyed Anglo just bring in workers from outside of the local community instead of 
training locals to do the well paid jobs. 
 
Gave up protesting against the mine but believes it should do much more. 
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Interviewee Code G5 – Leroy – Community relations officer, Anglo American, 
Barro Alto 
When Anglo American finally arrived to the town in 2006 having decided they would be 
able to use their expertise to mine the nickel they spent a year building community 
relations before constructing their mining operations. Building these relations involved 
Leroy the current day community relations officer who is from the nearby city of 
Nickelandia, where Anglo American have another Nickel mine in operation, becoming 
acquainted and integrating with the local community. another one of Leroy’s objectives 
was to align community expectations with Anglo American’s philosophy and strategy 
regarding community investment. Leroy explained that during the years pursuing 
previous? to Anglo American’s arrival that the local community had created huge and 
unrealistic expectations about how they would all become rich once the mine would be 
open, and further the community understood and still view the minerals as “theirs” 
despite legally all sub-soil minerals belonging to the Brazilian State. 
 
Agreed that their jobs would be much easier in terms of community relations if they 
could engage in old fashioned philanthropy and hand outs, however, the values of the 
company are that of capacity building and teaching communities to become self-
sufficient and independent and this takes time and patience to also convince communities 
it is the best option for them. 
 
Interviewee code G6 - Ju – taxi driver for Anglo American, Barro Alto 
It’s all about corruption. All politicians and public sector workers are corrupt including 
the police. The only reason people complain against AA is because they want money 
from them – and lots.  Everyone wants money including he who doesn’t want more taxis 
there. 
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Interviewee Code H1 – Interview transcripts Conceiçao de Mato Dentro  
 - Skype conversations with Community Leader Fernanda 
 
[3/5/13 6:05:30 PM] Fernanda: olá Rajiv. Nenhuma melhora, ao contrário, na última 
reunião (todos os meses temos reuniões dos atingidos com a empresa e ministério 
público) a empresa faltou tanto com respeito que no meio da reunião , todos se 
levantataram e sairam. Literalmente bateram em retirada. O promotor ficou boquiaberto. 
Outra coisa, a comunidade da água quente, está literalmente sem água e a qualidade das 
águas dos cursos d'água está cada vez pior. A situação está complicada e tensa. Na 
próxima segunda, dia 11 de março, temos a próxima reunião. 
 [3/5/13 6:13:45 PM] Fernanda: Pelo que sei da história do Peru, a coisa por lá é mais 
grave, pois os atingidos enfrentam até ameaça de morte e conseguem barrar 
empreendimentos. 
[3/5/13 6:14:55 PM] Fernanda: Em CMD a coisa está muito complicada. Tenho medo da 
comunidade se revoltar verdadeiramente e recorrer a vias mais violentes, com o que não 
concordo, mas o abuso é grande demais 
 [3/26/13 1:05:49 PM] Fernanda: Rajiv, estou a 4 km da entrada da empresa. A distância 
da entrada até as estruturas exatamente eu não sei, pois não entrei lá. Se precisar posso 
perguntar. 
 
[3/26/13 1:31:13 PM] Fernanda: com as reuniões da reasa a comunidade está mais unida, 
mais junta, mais ciente dos seus direitos e o que é mais importante, mais disposta a 
reinvindicá-los. 
 
 [3/26/13 1:34:08 PM] Fernanda: Mas falta um pouco para a classificaçao muito unidos. 
A distância física e a própria desagragação das relações e o distanciamento físico e social 
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imposto pela empresa quando dos reassentamentos, fez estas dificuldades se agravarem. 
As comunidades de Munbuca e Ferrugem, por exemplo, não existem mais. Existem 
famílias dessas duas comunidades aqui e ali, espalhadas 
[3/26/13 1:34:59 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi, muito obrigado Fernanda 
[3/26/13 1:36:52 PM] Fernanda: ok 
 [3/26/13 1:52:51 PM] Fernanda: vou te dar um exemplo, na minha comunidade, a 
empresa depois de meses de problemas com instalação das fossas, a empresa se reuniu 
com a comunidade e pediu uma chance. A comunidade deu e tem mais de 01 ano que não 
consegue resolver a questão da instalação das fossas sépticas. Nada que fazem 
funcionam. Estão desacreditados e desmoralizados perante a comunidade 
 [3/26/13 2:09:04 PM] Fernanda: se ele não sabe, tem inúmeros atingidos que amam o 
lugar e querem continuar lá, mas precisam da garantia mínima para continuar, conforme 
previsto inclusive em condicionante. Garantias das águas é das primeiras coisas. AQlém 
das garantias da fertilidade do solo, pois temos uma preocupação com o rebaixamento do 
lençol freático (que vai ocorrer com o aprofundamento da cava da mina). 
 
[3/26/13 2:11:02 PM] Fernanda: agora as pessoas estão aparecendo doentes com 
verminoses. Como estamos recebendo relatos de que caminhões de empresas 
tercerizadas, que recolhem os dejetos das fossas dos acampamentos, estão despejando as 
fezes nos cursos d'água, a contaminação é certa 
  
5/7/13 4:06:40 PM] Fernanda: isso mesmo. O povo de Conceição vai se empodeirando, 
tendo noção do poder que tem e os políticos de providências que precisam tomar 
[ 
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5/7/13 4:31:02 PM] Fernanda: O eixo estrutural do desenvolvimento de Conceição do 
Mato Dentro sempre foi o turismo baseado na riqueza natural da regiaõ - cachoeiras, 
montanhas, além das tradições - festas, queijo, farinha, biscoito. 
[5/7/13 4:31:32 PM] Rajiv Maher: entao a mineraçao NAO é compativel com isso 
[5/7/13 4:31:33 PM] Fernanda: A mineração feriu o "coração" do povo 
 [5/7/13 4:32:03 PM] Fernanda: A cidade que sempre foi capital do ecoturismo, está 
vendo sua maior riqueza - o ecoturismo -seriamente ameaçado 
 [5/7/13 4:48:34 PM] Fernanda: ontem ouvimos na depoimentos de pessoas que disseram 
que não precisam e nunca precisaram dos empregos que a Anglo tem a oferecer, que a 
tranquilidade não tem preço 
 [5/9/13 3:08:19 PM] Fernanda: quantos aos marcos, pensando hoje, entendo que a 
criação da reasa e sua caminhada até hoje foi um marco e um grande avanço 
 [5/9/13 3:11:32 PM] Fernanda: temos um grupo de poucas pessoas que vem lutando e 
fazendo a resistência 
[5/9/13 3:11:50 PM] Fernanda: desde 2006/2007 
[5/9/13 3:12:49 PM] Fernanda: teve um período de grande união, chegamos a fazer uma 
comissão de atingidos que a anglo com estratégias conseguiu desasrticular - isso foi em 
2010 
[5/9/13 3:13:21 PM] Fernanda: a criação da reasa preencheu esse anseio de união que 
estava vazio 
[5/9/13 3:13:40 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi....e isso está no seu arquivo? Acho que seria 
muito importante publicar algo sobre dessa estrategia de desarticular vcs 
[5/9/13 3:13:54 PM] Fernanda: você tinha que ver a união dos atingidos e a participação 
nesta audiência pública, foi emocionante 
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[5/9/13 3:15:08 PM] Fernanda: estou localizando e vou ver... sabe é que tenho milhares 
(milhares mesmo) de arquivos, emails, documentos, que me perco 
 [5/10/13 4:12:36 PM] Rajiv Maher: quantas pessoas lideram na Reasa? 
 
[5/10/13 4:13:18 PM] Rajiv Maher: porque tira muito tempo e energia 
[5/10/13 4:14:02 PM] Fernanda: a Reasa não tem líderes 
[5/10/13 4:15:33 PM] Fernanda: Toda a comunidade participa. Nós formamos um 
pequeno grupo que seríamos como os representantes....Ninguém ganha nada, só gasta. 
Agora para essa audiência pública, gastamos com aluguel do ônibus, alimentação de 50 
pessoas, faixas, cartazes e banners, etc.... 
[5/10/13 4:15:52 PM] Rajiv Maher: bastante dinheiro 
[5/10/13 4:16:21 PM] Fernanda: além de eu, por exemplo, só agora estar conseguindo 
colocar meu trabalho em dia, pois passei dias divulgando, fazendo camisetas, etc., tudo o 
que foi preciso 
[5/10/13 4:17:05 PM] Rajiv Maher: isso imaginei...é muito sacrificio mas sinceiramente 
acho que se vc nao tivesse feito o sacrificio nao teriam causado tanto impacto 
 [5/10/13 4:20:16 PM] Fernanda: faço por amor a minha terra, por amor a água, por amor 
a causa, somente por isso.... 
 [5/10/13 4:22:13 PM] Fernanda: pode parecer piegas, mas é isso 
 
[5/10/13 4:28:37 PM] Fernanda: A Professora Denise, esteve na FRança visitando as 
comunidade dos atingidos pela mineração que encerraram as atividades fazem décadas.... 
[5/10/13 4:29:09 PM] Fernanda: Deixam os buracos, a sujeira, a poluição, todos os 
problemas e se vão.... 
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 [6/12/13 2:57:24 PM] Fernanda: ao ler a matéria do Wall Street Journal, a sensação que 
me deu é que temos imprensa chapa branca tanto no Brasil quanto nos USA. 
 
Os repórteres passam a impressão de que a Anglo fez mais do que precisava fazer, e 
fizeram caricatura quer com as ações do MP quanto com as declarações do Sandro. 
 
Espremendo, veja o que fica dos depoimentos do Sandro e do Dr Marcelo: 
 
Sandro: "The project is the result of much bigger, global forces. There came a point 
where we realized we weren't going to stop a global force, so we decided to try to impose 
as many conditions as possible so we could get what we could."  
[ "decidimos tentar impor o maior número de condicionantes possível, de modo que 
pudéssemos ganhar o que fosse possível"] 
Their list of complaints, drawn from residents in monthly town-hall meetings, included 
the allegation that Anglo American had not carried out a sufficient cataloging of 
prehistorical drawings, spear tips and other archeological artifacts. They also demanded 
that a construction-free zone around a cave containing blind albino spiders be expanded 
to 820 feet from 328 feet.  
[As comunidades [...] também reivindicaram que uma zona (raio) de proteção em torno 
de uma caverna com aranhas albinas e cegas fosse ampliada de 100 para 250 metros"].  
Obs: Engraçado é que ocorreu exatamente o contrário. A Anglo é que sapateou durante 
quase um ano em cima da norma (de 250 metros mínimos de raio de proteção), até 
conseguir o 'de acordo' absurdo do órgão teleguiado pelo governo estadual. 
Mr. Machado, a 39-year-old lawyer from Belo Horizonte, the state capital city of two 
million, supports the company's right to mine "as long as it's done right." He describes his 
lawsuit as "a precautionary measure, we decided that work on the project couldn't go 
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forward until the archeological studies were actually finished." He shows off an 
archeological report as thick as a phone book, the fruit of Anglo American's, and his, 
work.  
["O Sr. Machado descreve sua ação como uma 'medida preventiva, que, decidimos, deve 
impedir que o projeto avance enquanto os estudos arqueológicos não estiverem 
concluídos'. Ele se gaba de um relatório arqueológico tão grosso quanto um catálogo 
telefônico, fruto do trabalho dele e da Anglo American".] 
Veja ainda que o verbo "pressuposição" é empregado uma vez, reportando-se à versão 
das comunidades que se reunem na Reasa. A visão dos dirigentes da Anglo, não são 
pressuposições, ao que parece!??????!!!  E, curiosamente, as reivindicações dos 
moradores locais são ao que parece estritamente de ordem biológica e arqueológica, 
quando, muito bem sabemos, o foco maior destas reuniões tem sido outro e, ao que 
parece, à pauta das comunidades não comparecem nenhum dano social, nenhum 
impedimento ao direito de ir e vir, nenhum abuso ao direito de propriedade, nenhuma 
implosão de cachoeira e nenhuma degradação crônica dos recursos hídricos locais. Daqui 
a pouco vão falar que os atingidos pelo projeto Minas-Rio, formam um complô 
comunista, financiado por Cuba e orientada por mensagens psicografadas do 
"Comandante" Chaves. 
E tudo isso, apesar do projeto ter sido "concebido por alguns dos maiores geólogos e 
engenheiros do mundo" ("the project, conceived by some of the best geologists and 
engeneers in the world")! Grandes bostas! 
O John Miller e o Paul Kiernan precisam levar mais a sério essa situação e conhecer o 
que não conhecem, antes de chegar e fazerem-se porta-vozes das conclusões dirigidas 
pela empresa - que desde sempre fez vistas grossas às situações que denunciamos, como 
se seu acordo com os governantes - ao que parece, da república de bananas do Brasil - 
fosse suficiente para descartar a democracia e os direitos da sociedade de defender-se e 
assegurar um mínimo de justiça. 
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Além das informações requentadas e algumas sobre o contexto internacional, a única 
declaração mais razoável que constou da notícia é a do representante do MME, que 
lembrou que a MMX fez pouco caso dos procedimentos de licenciamento no Brasil.  
Agora pergunto - será que as entrevistas dadas pelo Marcco e o Sandro Lage resumiram-
se às passagens pinçadas e coloridas pelos amigos do WSJ?? 
Se quiser, pode transmitir estas impressões para eles. Acho que deveríamos juntar outros 
comentários, traduzir para o inglês e tb enviar para o conselho editorial do jornal, nos 
Estados Unidos. 
Sugiro ainda ajuntar aos comentários, a nota de esclarecimento dos atingidos. 
Abraço, 
Gilberto 
 [6/12/13 3:11:26 PM] Fernanda: Os absurdos são tantos que às vezes penso que aí na 
Inglaterra não sabem bem o que ocorre aqui em Conceição do Mato Dentro 
 
 [6/12/13 3:26:21 PM] Fernanda: Os impactos continuam exatamente os mesmos e cada 
vez ficando mais graves 
[6/12/13 3:27:27 PM] Rajiv Maher: e adianta ligar no "fala conosco" da Anglo? Ou será 
que estou sendo muito ingenuo? 
[6/12/13 3:29:59 PM] Fernanda: Não adianta, já ligamos inúmeras vezes 
 
 
 [7/16/13 4:25:20 PM] Fernanda: A poucos dias atrás, tivemos um protestos violento de 
funcionários de empresa terceirizada. Pela primeira vez a população urbana ficou frente a 
frente com a insegurança, em virtude de mais de 300 funcionários ficarem andando pela 
avenida principal, sem nada, sem roupa para vestir, sem documentos e lugar para ficar. O 
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efetivo policial de Conceição não passa de 01 dúzia de policiais para conter300 
funcionários. O comércio fechou as portas. As pessoas da cidade estão chamando para 
paralisar a empresa. 
 [7/16/13 4:28:49 PM] Fernanda: veja aí 
 
http://g1.globo.com/videos/minas-gerais/mgtv-1edicao/t/edicoes/v/protesto-com-cerca-
de-800-pessoas-termina-com-alojamento-incendiado-em-mg/2672327/ 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRdxEkUc9MQ&feature=share 
 
 [7/16/13 4:30:59 PM] Fernanda: aceitação???? é de rir, na minha comunidade, que é da 
água quente, a empresa deve contar com 10% de aceitação, ou até menos..... Está sendo 
feito esta semana, um trabalho pela universidade federal lá na minha comunidade. Vai 
ficar fácil de responder com dados mais precisos daqui a poucos dias. Estão toda a 
semana lá na comunidade fazendo pesquisas 
 [7/16/13 4:39:05 PM] Fernanda: o descontentamento quase unâmime é, principalmente, 
pelas atitudes da anglo que denunciamos e que estão se concretizando a cada dia de 
forma mais grave 
 
 [7/16/13 4:40:45 PM] Fernanda: eles estão "cavando um buraco", mas vão acabar caindo 
lá dentro... 
 
 [7/16/13 4:44:17 PM] Fernanda: como a situação das empresas mineradoras não anda 
muito boa, a china não está comprando tanto, ó eike batista está despencando, a anglo já 
gastou demais, estou assistindo onde essa história vai parar.... 
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 [7/30/13 10:38:17 PM] Fernanda: Sim, já tentou "influenciar" na minha comunidade 
oferecendo benefícios, em outras comunidades também e se vallendo desses benefícios 
concedidos para poucos, para implantar a discórdia entre vizinhos e até mesmo parentes. 
[7/30/13 10:39:05 PM] Fernanda: Ameaças também já ocorreram 
[7/30/13 10:50:26 PM] Rajiv Maher: é isso imaginava pois é a mesma historia que vejo 
em muitas comunidades 
[7/30/13 10:50:58 PM] Rajiv Maher: vc lembra que tipo de beneficios que eram? projetos 
sociais? capacitaçao de curso? emprego na empresa? ou outros? 
[7/30/13 10:53:05 PM] Fernanda: emprego 
[7/30/13 10:53:11 PM] Fernanda: renda em dinheiro 
[7/30/13 10:53:15 PM] Fernanda: cesta básica 
[7/30/13 10:53:31 PM] Fernanda: promessas de aquisição de terra de forma mais rápida 
[7/30/13 10:53:49 PM] Rajiv Maher: deve ser dificil para alguns rejeitar e resistir e nao 
cair na tentaçao 
[7/30/13 10:54:04 PM] Fernanda: alguns resistiram 
[7/30/13 10:54:10 PM] Fernanda: alguns aceitaram 
[7/30/13 10:54:21 PM] Fernanda: mas a maioria se arrependeu 
 [7/30/13 10:54:38 PM] Fernanda: ou até mesmo se conformou com o destino 
[7/30/13 10:55:10 PM] Rajiv Maher: mas vc acha que alguns que aceitaram foram com 
voces para o Ministerio Publico em Maio a reclamar contra a empresa? 
[7/30/13 10:55:56 PM] Rajiv Maher: é dizer que arrependeram dps de aceitar as 
"migalias" da Anglo e até protestar contra ela 
  696 
[7/30/13 11:02:39 PM] Fernanda: sim, alguns já fizeram isso 
 [8/1/13 4:29:31 PM] Fernanda: Na grande maioria das vezes, os valores e demais 
benefícios não form observados 
 [8/12/13 8:59:07 PM] Fernanda: O córrego passa sete (corta a comunidade da água 
quente e jassém), ficou impróprio para o consumo e hoje corre em vazão mínima 
[8/12/13 8:59:41 PM] Rajiv Maher: as pessoas bebiam do córrego passa sete? 
[8/12/13 9:00:00 PM] Fernanda: O córrego pereira (córrego vargem grande) corta a 
minha propriedade e outras) tem suas águas impróprias para o consumo e utilização 
[8/12/13 9:00:16 PM] Rajiv Maher: entendi 
[8/12/13 9:00:43 PM] Fernanda: bebiam, tomavam bano, lavavam roupa, utilizavam para 
fazer comida, lavar louça e vasilhas, para tudo mesmo.... 
[8/12/13 9:01:08 PM] Rajiv Maher: entao é o sustenta a vida daí 
[8/12/13 9:01:59 PM] Fernanda: sim, por isso a anglo foi obrigada e colocar água para a 
comunidade da água quente por determinação da supram 
[8/12/13 9:02:20 PM] Rajiv Maher: nao sabia entao foi culpada 
[8/12/13 9:02:43 PM] Fernanda: sim 
[8/12/13 9:03:06 PM] Fernanda: nós da água quente somos consideradas atingidos 
emergenciais em caráter da água 
 [8/12/13 9:12:55 PM] Fernanda: a anglo, para atender a determinação fez um sistema 
muito pouco eficiente de distribuição de água. Fez um poço artesiano e colocou uma 
mangueira com torneira na porta de cada casa que permitiu. Muitas vezes, por falta de luz 
ou porque a bomba de água estraga, todos ficam sem água. Já ocorreu da comunidade 
ficar sem água por até 10 dias e a anglo levando garrafas de água mineral. Como 
sobreviver (tomar banho, banho crianças, comida, lavar vasilhas e roupas) com água em 
garrafas????? A anglo não tem classificação. 
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 [8/12/13 9:15:34 PM] Fernanda: é muito difícil e desumano 
 
[9/6/13 7:06:39 PM] Fernanda: A Anglo vai nas reuniões da reasa e ouve todas as 
queixas dos atingidos, que vão desde porteiras quebradas, mataburros que cairam e outras 
pequenas questões até problemas enormes e não conseguem dar saída, nem solução para 
absolutamente nada. 
 [9/6/13 7:10:25 PM] Fernanda: não se dão ao trabalho nem de prometer em alguns casos 
[9/6/13 7:10:39 PM] Fernanda: outros prometem e nunca cumprem 
[9/6/13 7:13:42 PM] Fernanda: tem um caso hilário: na água quente, prometerem plantar 
citronela nas casas e passados 12 meses, sem ter mais o que falar, pediram um "voto de 
confiança" que eles iriam importar mudas de citronela. Eu não aguentei e perguntei se 
queriam mudas eudaria a eles de graça, pois tenho essa planta em casa 
 
 [9/19/13 2:19:07 PM] Fernanda: A comunidade indicou 03 empresas de notório saber e a 
anglo escolheu a Diversus 
[9/19/13 2:23:05 PM] Fernanda: As duas comunidades são Mumbuca e Ferrugem 
 
 
[10/14/13 9:15:37 PM] Fernanda: A comunidade demandou o trabalho e a Supram assim 
determinou, que a comunidade indicasse 03 empresas de notório saber que a anglo iria 
escolher 01 delas e pagar pelo trabalho 
 [10/14/13 9:16:47 PM] Fernanda: Essa empresa é de um exfuncionário da Anglo 
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 [11/11/13 6:31:47 PM] Fernanda: As novidades é que estão fazendo uma fiscalização 
das condições de trabalho nos alojamento da anglo 
 [11/11/13 6:33:35 PM] Fernanda: sim pelo ministério do trabalho. Em Conceição do 
Mato Dentro estão os fiscais do ministério do trabalho e a polícia federal 
[11/11/13 6:33:51 PM] Fernanda: Parece que as condições de trabalho são bem graves 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEorAlteUWA&feature=youtu.be 
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Interviewee Code H2 – Mr. Da Silva, Elderly Maroon Resident in village near 
Conceiçao de Mato Dentro affected by the mineduct – 35 minutes 
 
Rajiv: I wanted to hear your thoughts about the mineduct project. 
Mr Da Silva: this mine has massacred us completely massacred us! The Brazilian 
authorities are massacrating us via this company. 
Me: What is your biggest complaint about the mining project? 
Mr Da Silva: We are Maroon people and we’re being ejected from our own land! 
Me: how can that be if you’re protected by law? 
Mr Da Silva: but we haven’t been recognized by the State as official Maroons. We 
believe we have all the application process done we’ve submitted all our papers to be 
recognized as Maroons, but of course they are not responding because they don’t want us 
to be officially certified as Maroons for this mining project! 
 
Me: So how is it you were ejected from your land? 
 
Mr Da Silva: some of our relatives sold their land but I and others didn’t and now we are 
being accused of being illegal settlers on our own land!! We don’t get help from any 
lawyers as they all want us to sell our land. Nobody is helping us! We’re being 
massacred! The mining company invaded our land together with the Brazilian authorities 
and police. It’s a Massacre that’s taking place here we are being massacred.   
 
I’m not complaining about the company, I’m sure that company Anglo American from 
there in England doesn’t want to hurt anyone. It’s the Brazilian authorities who are 
behind this. 
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There was a negotiation deal about taking Maroon families out of their land to a new land 
bought by Anglo American. They are just like slaves again. They left threatened by 
security forces with guns. I’m speaking about Brazilian justice it doesn’t exist! 
 
Most people are not brave enough to say anything publically about this. They are scared 
about the consequences from the authorities and on their loved ones. 
 
Me: what would be the ideal solution for you? 
 
Mr Da Silva: that we get our dignity back. I’m outraged by how they are treating nature, 
the environment and our people! It’s a huge massacre! We don’t ever get answers to any 
of our questions! Its pure terrorism that they are doing. 
 
Me: How are you in terms of collectiveness in resisting this destruction and problems? 
How united are you as a community? 
 
Mr Da Silva: There is no union! Everyone is scared and uninformed! They don’t want to 
say a word! They will only get me out of here via  a tractor or by killing me. I’m not 
scared! 
 
I work together with my brother trying to educate and create awareness amongt our 
communities. but most others are still not brave enough to do this. We believe in god that 
things will come through. He will ensure we are victorious! 
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Me: How did you become so strong willed and such a strong defender of your 
community? 
 
Mr Da Silva: I learned via observing nature and living with it.  The main concern is with 
water today in the world! Water is life! 
 
Me: How has it been working with others from outside such as NGOs and other 
authorities who have gone to help you in your struggle? 
 
Everyone including NGOs, lawyers etc who have come to help have left because they’ve 
been silenced in my view! Seems like they are scared about telling the truth, of losing 
their jobs etc. 
 
Me: It seems the mining company has a lot of power is this true? 
 
Mr Da Silva: the government and justice is stepping all over us! This is a national 
heritage site with our caves, waterfalls, mata atlantic forests. I believe when the English 
find out whats going on they will try to help and tell the government to stop. 
 
We also proved that Miguel Mata, representing Anglo American is a liar! He lied in front 
of a public audience with the State prosector about not taking armed guards to evict me 
and my family off our land! He’s a liar and deceitful! 
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Me: do you feel very much alone in your resistence against the mine? 
 
Mr Da Silva: yes very lonely. Nobody helps nobody does anything until now! We’ve 
been asking about the water problem for over a year now and without a response and it 
just gets worse. We’re abandoned and neglected here. 
 
Me: do you sometimes think about leaving and just giving up? 
 
Mr Da Silva: I will only leave here if the justice department evict me. Otherwise they will 
have to evict me out by pieces. 
 
Me: Do you know of this certain NGO? Are they helping? 
 
Mr Da Silva: yes of course they come over and give us presentaitons and tell us about our 
rights but it makes no difference as we’re always getting run over by the authorities!  
 
I bet English authorities would never permit a Brazilian company to do the same in the 
UK! 
 
Everyone is silenced. Nobody says a word! 
 
Me: What do you think about all the social responsibility and community relations work 
the mine does? 
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Mr Da Silva: I brought up my kids perfectly well without the help of Anglo (American) 
so why would I need them to help raise my grandchildren? We don’t need them here for 
their help. We are well and better off without them here causing great impact to our 
lives.”Company doesn’t have any respect for the human rights of those impacted.  
 
The company is always saying how responsible and respectful it is but in practice its not. 
They are always polite when they deal with you. 
We just want the company to respect the agreements we have had so far. 
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Interviewee code – H3 – Pamela – Local community activist opposing mineduct 
Its all about politics, we don’t have any political clout. Lawyers refuse to represent us 
when they discover we are fighting the Federal government, the State and a huge 
multinational mining company over issues such as land and planning.  
 
Most lawyers would not risk their careers in being associated with such a litigation so 
therefore we are left with some civil society actors to help us. 
 
Anglo doesn’t really engage with us they have come to a few meetings to participate but 
never give us any concrete answers. The “bolsas” (social benefits) they give to a few in 
our communities only ends up dividing us as those who receive benefits refuse to speak 
out against the mine. Some have family members with jobs linked to the mine so they 
stay quiet. Relations are non-existent with the Anglo from our side. They don’t 
acknowledge us and only look to other communities who are easy to co-opt. 
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Interviewee Code – H4 – Coordinator State Public Prosecution department 
 
Mbilizaçao correu apartir Audiencia publico do MP mas existia o reclamo antes. Muitas 
reunioes cm varias comunidades. MP Marcelo Mata machado. 
Mina tá numa serra com varias comunidades ali. Uma vez por vez realizam reuniao na 
comunidade. Essas antes da mineraçao tradicional foram pego de surpresa. Perdeu a 
Confianza na Empresa. Hoeuve muitos enganos no começo, compras de terra, terra no 
bolo terra que a familia que deixa dividida a familia fizeram familias brigar entre eles. 
Grandes conflitos familiares. Primeiras 4 reunieos nao permitu empresa falar com MP. 
Pelas mentiras e enganos nao cumpriam. A Percepçao dos Urbanos e muito diferente dos 
Rurais em CMD, movimento comercio, trabalho etc, alguns criticos. No rural é outra. A 
Mina é muito longe da cidade. Acontecem na ambiente. Relaçao foi boa no começo 
houeve marketing. Nao tem educaçao ne estudos, alguns se tem.  Nao sao organizados, 
sao varias lideranças. Tem varias posiçoes ali nada consolidado. Alguns querem que AA 
despoluem rios como antes que fosse mais transparente e cumprir a lei. Quilombolas 
querem que fosse embora. Existem pessoas locais que tem acesso a advogados.  
 
Sem MP seria mais dificil para comunidades para rurais pq nao tem educaçao. AA adota 
estrategia para debilitar e imagen. Comunidades foram para MP varias vezes. Eles vao 
até organos governo, busam redes de apoio. 
 
Estudo grande de uma consultoria que fez estudo na comunidade por pressao da 
comunidade. MMX tem muita culpa do começou. 
Tem um rio Perreira e Corrego Passa Sete totalmente contaminado ali por só AA nao a 
MMX. MP paralizou. Pessoa de Comunicaçao da empresa é puro Marketing. Fizeram 40 
reclamaçoes. Outro projeto de mineraçao Manabi Holdings – Japanse com MMX.     
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Interviewee code H5 – Head of local State Prosecution department - Michael  
There is very little trust from the rural communities towards Anglo American. The 
mining company and the State are together as partners. Anglo has invested a lot in the 
urban centre but that’s not where the impacts of their mineduct will be, they will be 
mainly in the rural areas to their water.  
 
There will also be and are now social and economic impacts. We have had an influx of 
thousands of low educated low skilled men move to this regional eco-tourism capital. 
Now the rents are very high, all prices of goods and services have hyper inflated and 
there are more social related crimes. 
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Interviewee Code – H6 – Jim – Corporate Head of Social Performance, Anglo American   
Relations between community and ourselves seemed very good when I walked around 
there with community relations team. 
We have invested millions in the urban centre for training locals to work at the mine 
works. 
Those who complain are only doing so for financial related reasons they want to sell their 
land and property to us for multiple times their market value – nothing else. 
(referring to photos I show him of impacts to water sources) none of that is related to our 
mining project its construction work by the State building new roads so we are not to 
blame. 
Our project was only halted due to an internal source who leaked some dubious 
documents to the State prosector. The State prosectutor has his own political interests and 
ambitions hence he is campaigning against us. 
 
